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My thesis intends to show how a detailed study of the issue of sexual equality 
in the correspondence between Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill can shed light 
(1) on the general epistemological, methodological, political, social, and moral 
disagreements existing between Comte and Mill, and (2) on the evolution of Mill’s 
arguments for the emancipation of women.
I start with a summary of the circumstances which led Comte and Mill to 
address the topic of sexual equality and I introduce their respective views on the 
subject prior to the start of the correspondence in the early 1840s. I then review the 
various biological arguments adduced by Comte in support of his belief in the natural 
intellectual inferiority of women and single out his commitment to phrenology as a 
crucial element for his case for women’s subjection. I present Mill’s rejoinder to 
Comte’s phrenological case and explain how it relates to Mill’s defense of 
associationist psychology and the conception of the “logic of the moral sciences” 
developed in his System of Logic. I then turn to Comte’s sociological arguments for the 
subjection of women. I show how they in fact rely on a biologically inspired 
conception of human “development”, and present the interpretation of the historical 
record Mill opposes to Comte. The subsequent chapter introduces Mill’s pet project 
of Ethology, which he thought would provide proper knowledge of human nature 
capable of adjudicating the sexual equality debate. Furthermore it analyses the 
methodological obstacles which prevented Mill from developing this new ‘science of 
the formation of human character’. I conclude by showing how his failed attempt at 
founding Ethology forced Mill to find (most notably in his Subjection of Women) 
alternative arguments for the emancipation o f women and investigate how they tally 
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Abbreviations :
All references to the Comte-Mill correspondence are made to the following edition:
O. A. Haac (ed.), The Correspondence of John Stuart. M ill and Auguste Comte. Translated 
and edited by O.A. Haac, with an introduction by A. Kremer-Marietti. New 
Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers, 1995. The form of referencing is as 
follows: Comte to Mill, October 5, 1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 188. It indicates the author 
and the addressee of the letter, its date, and the page in Haac’s edition of the 
correspondence.
All references to Comte’s Cours de philosophie positive (1830-1842) are made, for 
Lessons 1 to 45, to A. Comte, Philosophie premiere. Cours de philosophie positive, lecons 1 a 
45. Edited, with introductions, by M. Serres, F. Dagognet & A. Sinaceur. Paris: 
Hermann, 1975 (abbreviated PP); and, for Lessons 46 to 60, to A. Comte, Phjsique 
sociale. Cours de philosophie positive, lecons 46 a 60. Edited, with an introduction, by J.-P. 
Enthoven. Paris: Hermann, 1975 (abbreviated PS).
All references to Mill’s System of Logic (1843) are made to the edition of the book in 
the Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (J. M. Robson [ed.]): J. S. Mill, A  System of Logic, 
Putiorinative and Inductive, Being a Connected XAeiv of the Principles of Linden ce and the Methods 
of Scientific investigation. Edited, with a textual introduction, by J. M. Robson and with 
an introduction by R. F. McRae. Toronto & London: University of Toronto Press 
and Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973 (abbreviated SL). The form of referencing is as 
follows: J. S. Mill, SL, VI, IX, 1, p. 897; it indicates the book, chapter, section and 
page of the extract quoted. Since I primarily refer to the 1843 edition of the System, 
quotes taken from later editions are indicated.
Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from the French are mine.
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Introduction :
During the last ten years, a considerable amount of work has been devoted to 
the different aspects o f Auguste Comte’s life, his thought, and the theoretical, 
ideological, cultural, and practical influence of his positivism. This attempt to revive 
the interest in Comte’s philosophy after decades of indifference or contempt has 
resulted in a flow of contributions, within which no recess of the Comtean corpus 
seems to have escaped the zeal of commentators. However, there is a topic that has 
received hardly any attention, that of Comte’s views on women1.
O f course, the reader conversant with Comte’s writings will not fail to remark 
that if there is one question on which Comte is irremediably outdated, it is indeed on 
the sexual equality issue: neither his uncompromising plea for women’s subjection, 
nor his obstinate opposition to divorce, nor his alleged demonstration of women’s 
intellectual inferiority would convince anybody that it is still worth reading Comte’s 
ponderous volumes. It should not therefore come as a surprise that those who are 
eager to defend the actuality or relevance of Comte’s philosophy might prefer to 
avoid addressing his views on women for fear of compromising his intellectual 
rehabilitation.
However, I argue that, despite its unattractiveness, Comte’s treatment of the 
issue of sexual equality offers an interesting vantage point from which to assess the 
consistency of his ideas. For it is a distinctive feature of Comte’s “positive 
philosophy” that it is structured as a system in which “politics” depends on 
“philosophy”: practical measures must derive from a theoretically-based insight and 
piecemeal interventions must be replaced by a comprehensive planning of social 
phenomena. The architecture of Comte’s works itself — centered around the two 
‘massifs’ of the Cours de philosophie positive and the Sjsteme de politique positive (the Cours 
being itself renamed by Comte Sjsteme de philosophie positive after the publishing of the 
Politique positive) — illustrates his cravings for a systematic philosophy conceived, as he 
maintains in the foreword to the Cours, in an Aristotelian manner: “the general 
system of human conceptions”2. In short, one may say that Comte intends to ground 
the social, political, cultural, and religious organization of modern societies on an 
encyclopaedia informed by the discoveries of the positive sciences and the 
sociological laws of the development of mankind. Accordingly, and given Comte’s 
insistence on the systematic nature of his thought, one might expect a survey of his
9
views on sexual equality to shed some light on the way he articulated his 
“philosophy” and his “politics”, knowledge and action.
The benefit of approaching Comte’s philosophy via its treatment of sexual 
equality is that Comte had addressed the problem in a correspondence with another 
luminary of the nineteenth century, namely John Smart Mill. Contrary to Comte’s, 
Mill’s political writings have never ceased to attract readers, most notably because of 
his powerful case for individual freedom and liberal principles. In particular, his 
outspoken plea for women’s emancipation gained him the title of one of the early 
figures of modern feminism. However, when Millian scholars study Mill’s views on 
sexual equality, they generally tend to emphasize the political aspect of the question 
but gloss over the epistemological and methodological dimensions of the problem. 
Yet Mill, just as Comte, defended the idea that sound policies should be premised on 
a reliable knowledge of human and social phenomena. In the case of Mill’s thought 
too, “philosophy” and “politics” should not be divorced if one wants to gain an 
adequate picture of Mill’s ideas. A close reading of his correspondence with Comte 
enables one to grasp the connections between these different features of Mill’s 
works.
The ambition of my thesis is to show that an analysis of the Comte-Mill 
correspondence on sexual equality can contribute to a better understanding of both 
thinkers, not only with regard to the political component of their philosophy, but 
also with regard to their methodology for the human sciences and how the former 
relates to the latter. More precisely, it brings out the crucial role played by biology in 
Comte’s social thought and investigates to what extent this distinctive feature, which 
has generally been overlooked, can be reconciled with Comte’s plea for an 
autonomous sociology. Furthermore, it explains the evolution of Mill’s argument for 
the emancipation of women from the System of Logic (1843) to the Subjection of Women 
(1869). In the course of doing so, it provides an original explanation of the failure of 
Mill’s pet project of an Ethology and defends Mill’s mature feminist views in the 
Subjection of Women against various charges of inconsistency.
My work primarily intends to be a philosophical analysis of the conceptual ins 
and outs of the discussion Comte and Mill had on sexual equality. But I am also 
convinced that a proper grasp of this debate cannot be obtained without setting it in 
its historical context. Hence the appeal, throughout my thesis, to various political, 
social, cultural and scientific elements so as to shed light on the intellectual
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background of the Comte-Mill correspondence. Although the label is not 
fashionable today, I believe this methodological approach qualifies my work as a 
contribution to the field of the history of ideas.
I will start by demonstrating that the issue of sexual equality was a primary 
concern of both thinkers and that they both considered a scientifically based 
approach to the problem as a necessary ingredient of its resolution. It will be also 
shown that they radically differed about the nature of this scientifically based 
approach and its practical outcomes, but that their respective accounts were not free 
from shortcomings (Chapter I: Comte and Mill on Sexual Equality. Context and 
Problem.). I then turn to Comte’s exposition of his various biological arguments for 
the subjection of women and single out the one based on phrenology as the main 
biological support of his case for women’s subjection (Chapter II: The Female Brain 
and the Subjection of Women. Biology, Phrenology and Sexual Equality). In the subsequent 
chapter, I will review Comte’s appeal to phrenology to substantiate his case for 
women’s and will show that his reliance on phrenology in the case of sexual equality 
was just a particular instance of a more general endorsement of the new “physiology 
of the brain” as a legitimate approach to the study of mental phenomena. I will also 
introduce the exact content of the various criticisms levelled at phrenology by Mill 
and will show to what extent they were compatible with his methodology (Chapter 
III: The Phrenological Controversy). Chapter IV (The F.xplanation of Moral Phenomena. 
Comte and M ill on the Architectonics of the Moral Sciences) will present the theoretical 
framework in which Mill thought the sexual equality issue could be adjudicated and 
will contrast it with Comte’s: whereas Comte gave precedence to biology, Mill 
preferred to emphasize the role of the environmental factors which he thought were 
responsible for women’s subjection. Comte’s non-biological arguments for women’s 
subjection will be reviewed in Chapter V (as well as Mill’s objections), where it will 
be shown that Comte’s sociological arguments were in fact suffused with biological 
assumptions (Chapter V: A  Never Finding Subjection? Comte, Mill, and the Sociological 
Argument against Sexual Equality). The next chapter will scrutinize the key theoretical 
element in Mill’s case for women’s emancipation, namely his “Ethology” or “science 
of the formation of character” and will analyse various explanations as to why it 
never developed into a proper research programme, as Mill expected (Chapter VI: 
The Ethological Fiasco. The Methodological Shortcomings of the Millian Science of the Formation 
of Character). Eventually, I will show how Mill overcame the ethological failure in his
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Subjection of Women and came up with new and convincing arguments to support his 
feminist plea (Chapter VII: Row To Discover One’s Nature. M ill’s Argument for 
Emancipation in the Subjection of Women).
1 See Appendix I for a bibliography o f  Comtean studies since 1993. As for sexual equality, the scarce 
secondary literature mostly focuses on the sources o f Comte’s views on women and how they relate to 
the broader intellectual, social and political context within which they had been developed (see M. 
Pickering, “Angels and Dem ons in the Moral Vision o f Auguste Comte”, journal of Women’s History 
1996, 8, pp. 10-40; A. Le Bras-Chopard, “L’ideal feminin d’Auguste Comte. Convergences et 
dissonances avec ses contemporains socialistes”, in M. Bourdeau, J.-F. Braunstein & A. Petit (eds.), 
Auguste Comte Aujourd’hui. Paris: Kime, 2003, pp. 170-183). A. Petit and B. Bensaude-Vincent explore 
the views o f  Comte in the Sjsteme de politique positive but do not consider the Cours de philosophie positive, 
thereby eschewing the consideration o f the methodological aspect o f the question o f sexual equality 
(A. Petit & B. Bensaude-Vincent, “Le feminisme militant d’un auguste phallocrate (Auguste Comte, 
‘Systeme de politique positive’)”, Revue philosophique 1976, 3, pp. 293-311). S. Kofman’s Aberrations. Le 
devenirfemme d ’Auguste Comte (Paris: Aubier-Flammarion, 1978) addresses some o f  the problems I am 
interested in but does so from a psychoanalytic perspective that I do not endorse.
2 A. Comte, Philosophie des sciences. Edited with an introduction and notes byj. Grange. Paris: Gallimard, 
1996, p. 45.
12
I -  Comte and Mill on Sexual Equality : 
Context and Problems.
Although the topic of sexual equality quickly became a crucial element of 
the discussion between Comte and Mill, many other questions were addressed in 
their letters, and it is likely that their willingness to correspond with one another 
was motivated by other reasons than the expected benefit of a discussion on 
women’s condition. Accordingly, it will be useful to provide an account of the 
beginnings of the correspondence (IA) and of the circumstances that led them to 
address the issue of sexual equality (IB), as well as a historical and doctrinal 
presentation of their views on the subject prior to the correspondence (IC). The 
aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that the issue of sexual equality was a primary 
concern of both thinkers and that they both considered a scientific approach to the 
problem as a necessary ingredient of its resolution. It is also shown that they 
radically differed about the nature of this scientific approach and its practical 
consequences. In the course of this discussion, the various problems associated 
with Comte’s (IIC1) and Mill’s (IIC2) respective ways of solving the issue of sexual 
equality are introduced.
A -  The Beginnings of the Comte-Mill Correspondence.
What were Mill’s intentions when he took the initiative of sending his 
first letter to Comte on November 8, 1841? For want of textual evidence, one may 
conjecture that Mill, who was revising the draft of what would eventually appear in 
1843 as the System of Logic, was eager to benefit from the comments and expertise 
of the author of the Cours de philosophie positive , one of the few recent books - along 
with Herschel’s Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy (1830) and 
Whewell’s History of the Inductive Sciences (1837) and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences 
(1840) — that studied the logic and reasoning at work in the natural sciences. 
However, Mill was certainly attracted to Comte because of something that was 
present in both Herschel’s and Whewell’s writings but remained undeveloped. For, 
like Herschel and Whewell, Mill thought that the methods exemplified by the 
different sciences could be applied to the study of social phenomena. As R. Yeo 
has shown, the ‘public discourse’ of science in the 1830s underlined the
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accessibility, singularity, and transferability of scientific method “beyond the study 
of nature to the study of society ” (R. Yeo, “Scientific Method and the Rhetoric of 
Science in Britain, 1830 — 1917”, p. 263)2. Yet, Herschel’s pronouncements in the 
Discourse remained programmatic: it was hoped that the success of the methods of 
the natural sciences would help transform legislation and politics into 
“experimental sciences” (J. Herschel, A  Preliminary Discourse, p. 73)3, but no clue 
was given as how to bring about such a change. As for Whewell, although he 
insisted on the desirability of turning these subjects into scientific inquiries, he was 
also wary of not pushing the analogies between the physical and the moral sciences 
too far; in particular, he remained suspicious of the importation of the concepts 
and methods of the former into the latter4. By contrast, Comte was a consistent 
advocate of what I shall call “the scientificisation of politics”: he not only preached 
the extension of a scientific approach to social phenomena; he also attempted to 
establish the laws of these phenomena and to infer from them appropriate policies. 
It is likely that such a plan appealed to Mill, since it constituted a way to fulfil his 
hope of contributing to the happiness of mankind5.
As for Comte, it is also difficult to state the reasons that prompted him to 
enter into an exchange with an unknown English correspondent. However, Mill’s 
deferential and somewhat submissive tone in his first letters may have convinced 
Comte that he was dealing with a foreign disciple6. After all, Mill praised Comte’s 
distinction between the temporal and spiritual powers, shared his belief in the 
necessity of the true social science he was trying to establish while they 
corresponded (Comte was about to finish the sixth volume of the Cours, which 
contained the final part of his sociology), agreed globally with his appraisal of the 
intellectual and moral advancement on the Continent and in England, and also felt 
the need for a moral regeneration.
On a more personal note, Comte also appreciated Mill’s friendly concern 
for his troubled marital relation with his wife Caroline Massin, which his 
correspondent expressed as early as July 1842:
‘Y ou  doubtless know me well enough by now to believe I am sincere when I 
tell you how sad I felt upon learning how the inveterate distaste you feel in a 
position, so little suited to your taste, has now been compounded by moral 
pain. I do not yet dare to ask, here, for more detail than you convey o f  your 
own accord. Later perhaps I shall have secured the right to share in your 
suffering. As far as relieving it when it is real, it is ordinarily fatuous to think 
oneself capable o f that” (Mill to Comte, July 11,1842, in Haac [ed.], p. 83).
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As for what regards Comte’s “position”, Mill was referring to the 
difficulties encountered by the former student of the Ecole polytechnique to secure a 
full-time professorship in his home institution7. But what about the “moral pain” 
mentioned by Mill? At first, Comte was quite reluctant to write about it, but he 
appreciated Mill’s tact (Comte to Mill, July 22, 1842, in Haac [ed.], p. 88). However, 
he eventually gave way to his correspondent’s well-intentioned curiosity about the 
cause of his “moral suffering” (Id.). In his next letter, Comte exposed extensively 
the details of his intimate life:
“Our personal friendship (...) causes me not to wait any longer to give you an 
important piece o f  personal news. A fundamental change, more favorable 
than unfavorable, has occurred in my household since my last letter. Madame 
Comte has left me voluntarily and probably irrevocably. For seventeen years I 
have been married, as a result o f  an unfortunate love to a woman o f rare 
moral and intellectual qualities, but brought up under blameworthy principles 
and with a false notion o f the essential function that her sex must play in the 
human economy. Her total lack o f affection for me has never made it 
possible for me to overlook either her resistance to my authorin’ or her 
despotic character. There have been none o f the compensations o f  a loving 
disposition, the only special quality in which women are irreplaceable, and the 
power o f which modem anarchy prevents them from appreciating as they 
should.
Thus, my philosophical endeavors have been carried on and completed 
not only in the face o f  material difficulties, as you know, but also in the midst 
o f more painful and absorbing disturbances, the result o f  an almost constant 
civil war o f the most intimate kind, the confrontation in the home. The event 
which has just taken place makes me hope that from now on, even if I lack 
the happiness at home for which I was made but which I had to give up a 
long time ago, I shall at least have the sad peace o f  my loneliness that now 
completely envelops me” (Comte to Mill, August 24, 1842, in Haac [ed.], p.
98).
As it now clearly appears, Comte’s difficult personal situation (both with 
regard to the means for securing his livelihood and to his marriage with Caroline 
Massin), the need for solace it induced in him, and his longing for intellectual
recognition, certainly contributed to his decision to go on with the
correspondence. However, what is of interest to us here is not so much the 
accuracy of Comte’s account of his estrangement from his wife8, but rather the 
discussion it initiated between the two thinkers, since Comte’s effusions about his 
personal difficulties led them to address the issue of divorce and, by extension, that 
of the condition of women.
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B -  From Divorce to Human Nature.
Besides its importance for the understanding of the relationship between 
Comte and Mill, the exposition of his “personal secret” (Comte to Mill, August 24, 
1842, in Haac [ed.], p. 99) by Comte provides us with a convenient starting point 
for our investigation. For the long passage quoted above was not only intended as 
a pro domo pleading but also as a reasoned and impartial appraisal of the causes 
which prompted Caroline’s departure. There always could be, Comte maintained, 
an intellectual and practical benefit to an analysis of the intimate details of one’s 
existence if it was done philosophically. That was exacdy what he intended to do in 
his letters to Mill and it was even to become one of the mottos of the Religion of 
Humanity, namely “Live Openly” °.
In such a perspective, Comte’s narrative of his domestic situation must be 
taken as a genuine piece of objective analysis. According to Comte, Caroline was 
endowed with “rare moral and intellectual qualities” [Ibid., p. 98)1". But he also held 
that her incapacity to fit her role as a woman within the domestic sphere caused 
the failure of their marriage. It was Caroline’s insubordination, her “despotic 
character” (Id.), her “total lack of affection” (Id.), which constituted as many 
obstacles to the fulfillment of her duties as a wife. In brief, Caroline’s assertiveness 
was a symptom of her ‘manhood’. She was abnormal, Comte argued, to the extent 
that she failed to comply with the norms proper to her social role, namely as a 
source of affective support within the household, “the only special quality in which 
women are irreplaceable” (Id.) as Comte put it. And, as he suggested, since his wife 
had been “brought up under blameworthy principles and with a false notion of the 
essential function that her sex must play in the human economy” (Id.), it was to be 
feared that her misconduct was not purely idiosyncratic but resulted from an 
erroneous appraisal, characteristic of the “modem anarchy” (Id.), of women’s social 
role and status11.
O f course, all this may sound like the grandiloquent pronouncement, made 
under the cloak of an alleged objective perspective, of a deserted man turned bitter, 
but one has to keep in mind that it had been Comte’s constant preoccupation to 
present the events of his entire life in the light of his own philosophy. Such an 
explanation certainly had a ‘therapeutic’ value for its author, by exempting him 
from considering his possible responsibility, but it was much more than that, for 
Comte really thought that one ought to live by one’s principles: his system was
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intended to provide one with both an interpretative framework to apply and a set 
of moral injunctions to practise. In that sense, the previous biographical account 
paved the way for a genuine sociological analysis.
That Mill understood Comte’s confession in this way — as a private matter 
that must be dealt with as objectively and rationally as possible - was attested by his 
reply to his French pen-mate regarding the practical outcome of the situation. 
Given the absence of children, Mill thought that separation was the best solution 
available. However, he immediately qualified his view with respect to Comte’s own 
principles:
“Such incompatibility, which often exists without either one side or the other 
being truly and seriously at fault, has so far led me to believe that the question 
o f  divorce is moot, just like a number o f other issues o f  private morality, on 
which you have pronounced judgment and decided a long time ago. I am far 
from harboring opinions contrary to yours. I have, truthfully, no fixed 
opinion here and tend to believe ... [words missing in the manuscript] for, to 
arrive at a definitive judgment, one needs a more profound knowledge o f  
human nature12, both in its general and in its particular applications.
My conversion in this matter is perhaps reserved for your Political Treatise 
[i.e. Comte’s Sjsteme de politique positive, eventually published between 1851 and 
1854, after the end o f  the correspondence]” (Mill to Comte, September 10,
1842, in Haac [ed.], p. 101-2).
At this point, one may say that the truly philosophical part of the 
discussion concerning sexual equality, and the cognate questions of the destination 
of marriage and possibility of divorce, has been engaged, and that Mill’s statement 
set up the terms in which it was to be broached. First of all, Mill was aware that the 
issue of divorce, in the present state of affairs existing in the most advanced 
European countries, was par excellence a vexed one for it touched upon the religious 
nature of the marital bond and the patriarchal organization of the relations 
between the sexes. Accordingly, prudence should prevail regarding these matters. 
Secondly, he also knew that Comte considered his views on that issue to be the 
only “scientific” alternative to traditional justifications for the indissolubility of 
marriage. Thirdly, Mill’s alleged agnostic stance rested on the firm belief that any 
claim for or against should rest on a proper and comprehensive “knowledge of 
human nature, both in its general and in its particular applications”. Finally, Mill 
did not regard Comte’s published writings on the subject to have settled the 
question definitively; hence his appeal to Comte’s future Sjsteme de politique positive 
for better arguments. Accordingly, the correspondence was to serve for both as a 
test for their respective methodologies for the human sciences, their conceptions
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of women’s nature and social position, and the accounts they offered for their 
relations.
In other words, the consideration of what could have seemed a mere 
personal or legal matter sparked a debate on the foundations and methods of the 
science of human nature. In this lay the appeal of “the scientificisation of politics”: 
it promised that the “art” of politics would eventually find its basis in science.
C — The “Scientificisation of Politics” : Prospects and Problems.
Mill’s willingness to engage with Comte in this discussion about divorce, 
and the latter’s eagerness to take it up, did not only reflect the personal nature of 
their correspondence but also their shared belief that the post-revolutionary era 
called for a moral regeneration. For both, the French Revolution of 1789 was a 
necessary historical step to the extent that it enabled Western European societies 
to get rid of an outdated social and political system. It furthered the development 
of science, industry, and trade, by challenging the traditional order of human 
relations upheld by the domineering classes of the ancien regime, particularly the 
landed nobility and the Church. However, this progressive influence of the 
revolutionary ideals was merely transitional, for it was first and foremost negative 
or critical: it had destroyed the ancien regime but failed to provide the guidelines for a 
renovated social organization. Such an incapacity was blatant, as the repetitive 
failure of the succeeding forms of political institutions in France or the limited 
modifications of the electoral franchise brought about by the 1832 Reform Bill in 
England illustrated. A new set of moral and social ideas was needed, and both 
Comte and Mill thought they could take part in its elaboration.
1 -  Comte against Divorce: The Defence of the Family as the Basic 
Social Unit.
For Comte, the debate about divorce was one symptom of the “modem 
anarchy” characterizing the transitional nature of the post-revolutionary era. The 
inability of theology or metaphysics to defend the principle of the indissolubility of 
marriage offered an opportunity to demonstrate that positive philosophy could 
provide human institutions with a rationale that would make then immune to all 
sorts of attacks. Even more so if one followed Comte in maintaining that the
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family was the primary element of social life. Hence the urgency of setting it on a 
secure theoretical footing.
This concern surfaced in the Fiftieth lesson of the Cours de Philosophie 
Positive entided “Preliminary Considerations on social statics, or general theory of 
the spontaneous order of human societies” , which is a key element of the 
“dogmatic part of social philosophy” (as opposed to the “historical part” 
introduced in the fifth and the sixth volume), and which was published towards the 
end of 1839 in the fourth volume of the Cours. It was certainly from that lesson 
that Mill drew the impression that divorce was an issue on which Comte had 
“pronounced judgment and decided a long time ago” (Mill to Comte, September 
10, 1842, in Haac [ed.], p. 101). Family was indeed central to Comte’s social statics.
To put it briefly, social statics is the synchronic study of all the elements 
out of which societies are made, whereas social dynamics study the evolution of 
these societies. Accordingly, one of the goals of social statics is to identify the 
elements constitutive of social phenomena, that is individuals, families, and 
societies themselves. Individuals are described as endowed with a natural instinct 
for sociability, characterized by the preeminence of affective faculties over 
intellectual ones, and led in their actions by the consideration of their well-being. 
As for the family, it constitutes the first form of society, for only such an 
association enables the social dispositions inherent in individuals to thrive. They 
develop by way of the rudimentary division of labour existing between husband 
and wife, which foretells the hierarchical cooperative system to be found in 
societies proper. As Comte put it, “the family spontaneously presents us with the 
genuine necessary germ of the diverse essential dispositions characterizing the 
social organism” (A. Comte, Physique So dale, p. 183)13, “domestic life [being] the 
constant basis of social life” {Ibid., p. 184). Accordingly, since the family, as 
conceived by Comte, is a strictly patriarchal association (in which the husband — or 
the father - provides for the needs of his dependants and supervises all activities, 
while the wife takes care of the household), and given that society is just a 
development of the organizational features of the domestic realm, subordination — 
of wife to husband, of children to parents — is to be mirrored at the level of society 
itself:
“Whatever empty notions are to be formed today about social equality, any 
society, even the most limited, necessarily and obviously presupposes not 
only diversities but also some inequalities: for there could not exist a genuine
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society without a permanent cooperation to a general operation, carried on by 
way o f  distinct and suitably subordinated means. Now, the most complete 
realization possible o f  such elementary conditions inevitably belongs to the 
family only, in which nature has borne all the essential costs o f the 
institution” {Ibid., p. 249).
So, far from being a side issue raised for the sake of comprehensiveness, 
the vindication of the patriarchal model of the family is central to Comte’s project 
of social regeneration: if society is to be organized authoritatively according to a 
subordination principle, and if the family is indispensable both as a source and as a 
model for the application of this principle to society at large, any attack on the 
basic structure of the family has to be opposed. Comte certainly regarded the 
evolution of French legal arrangements concerning divorce that was brought about 
by the Revolution as a symptom of such a disruptive trend. And even though 
divorce had been abrogated by the time Comte was writing, its possible 
rehabilitation remained in his eyes a threat to customary mores14.
Comte’s fear of a rehabilitation of divorce was certainly aroused by the
intense militant activity of these “bold sophists”, as he called them, “who have
direcdv attempted to axe metaphysically down to the elementary roots of social 
order by rehearsing with an undeniable timeliness ancient aberrations” (Ibid., p. 
185)15. There was indeed, in the first third of the nineteenth century in France, a 
vast movement — both political and philosophical — which vigorously denounced 
the social evils created by the prohibition of divorce and the received conception 
of marital relations. However, Comte overstated his case when he claimed that 
those who advocated the rehabilitation of divorce were by the same token 
intending to destroy the family. To the contrary, the “divorciaires”, as Francis 
Ronsin recalls16, repeatedly voiced their attachment to the traditional monogamist 
family, which only the Saint Simonians17 and the Fourierists18 (at least the few who 
endorsed the whole doctrines of Enfantin and Fourier without reservations) 
questioned.
The goal of this movement was to regenerate the familial institution, 
especially through a reform of the legal dispositions concerning marriage. 
However, their attempt differed radically from that of Comte, for they refused the 
latter’s principle of subordination and placed their hope in a more balanced 
relation between husband and wife, which would be characterized by a respect for 
the individual’s rights to begin and end the relation at his or her own will (if there 
were children, provisions being made for their education and with their interests in
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view) and a share in the decisions concerning the household. But this conception 
of marriage assumed that women had the same rights as men to choose the life 
they wanted to live, and that along with their male counterparts they partook in the 
intellectual and moral capacities enabling them to do so. By contrast, because he 
held women to be deprived of the very capacities that would allow them to be 
treated on a par with men, Comte categorically refused this conception of 
marriage.
Once set in context, the issue of divorce appears as only one element of a 
much broader social question: with the French Revolution and the spreading of its 
principles all over Europe, the issue of sexual equality had the occasion to surface 
on the forefront of the political debate. If the fall of the ancien regime meant that the 
only ground for distinguishing between individuals was merit, and that any 
distinction based on birth, wealth, or religion was illegitimate, should not the 
principle of equality be applied to relations between the sexes? If the characteristic 
of modern societies was to replace the “law of the strongest” by the “rule of law”, 
why would the domestic sphere be exempted from such a movement of 
emancipation? If the lower male elements of society had been emancipated, why 
would the same process not occur for women?
How was Comte to counter such claims? Simply by turning the 
subordination of one sex to the other into a “universal natural disposition” (Ibid., 
p. 184). The demonstration of such a proposition was the burden of the Fiftieth 
lesson of the Cours de Philosophie Positive, whose argument can be summarized as 
follows. Mankind is a sociable species that demands to be organized in a hierarchic 
manner (the subordination principle) so as to satisfy the needs of its members. 
This hierarchic structure rests in its turn on the respective capacities of the 
different individuals (their “nature”), which define their social role and status. 
There exists a sex-based distinction according to which males are endowed with 
character traits appropriate for intellectual and supervisory tasks proper to the 
public sphere whereas women’s distinctive traits fit them for the role of men’s 
affective auxiliaries in the private sphere. For clarity’s sake, one could venture the 
following formalization of Comte’s argument:
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1. In order to satisfy the needs o f  theirs members, 
societies have to be organized hierarchically in all their aspects (public and private)
2. There exist natural differences that make males fit for supervision 
and women for obedience.
3. Societies should be organized according to the patriarchal model.
What would it take for Comte’s argument to be sound? At first sight, once 
the premises are granted, the conclusion seems to follow. But what about the 
premises? As to the first, one may be surprised that the subordination principle, 
which has proved an efficient tool — through division of labour and the hierarchic 
structure of cooperative endeavours - for the maximization of the material well­
being at the level of the community, is extended to the private sphere. Should not 
individuals be left free to decide to whom they want to be associated with and on 
which terms (equalitarian or not)?
However, if we stick to Comte’s ideas, we ought to refuse such restriction 
of the scope of application of the subordination principle, for he argued that all 
social interactions must be conducive to an increase in well-being for society at 
large: the positivist motto “Vivre pour autrur (“Live for Others”) exacts from 
individuals that their altruism extends outside the circle of their relatives.
So, let us assume for the sake of argument that the first premise is true: one 
may thus maintain that the subordination principle still applies to all social 
interactions. Obviously, the practicability o f Comte’s organisational proposal 
depends on the availability of knowledge of human capacities and abilities that 
would enable him to cash out empirically his factual premise (“males are fit for 
supervision and women for obedience”). Accordingly, if one wants to refute his 
argument, perhaps it would be worth leaving aside the first premise (which is not 
entirely counter-intuitive and benefits from some empirical support) and taking the 
second as the primary target.
What Comte needs in order for his argument to be sound is a premise 
establishing that men are endowed with specific character traits enabling them to 
carry out supervision duties in ways unavailable to women. The hierarchical 
organization should be based on natural differences in capacities, if such
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differences exist. These features, Comte finds in the biological make-up of 
individuals.
“The sound biological philosophy, especially with regard to the important 
theory o f  Gall, begins to be able to treat as it scientifically deserves these 
chimerical revolutionary pronouncements concerning the alleged equality7 o f  
the two sexes, by demonstrating directly, either by way o f  anatomical 
examination, or by way o f physiological observation, the radical differences, 
both physical and moral, which, in all animal species, and particularly within 
the human race, separate one from the other, notwithstanding the common 
preponderance o f the specific type” {Ibid., p. 254).
Now, what is puzzling in Comte’s argument is not so much its explicit 
endorsement of Gall’s pseudo science of phrenology or the social and political 
views it is intended to support, but rather its reliance on biology. And this is 
puzzling because it sits ill with the “encyclopaedic scale of the sciences” that 
structures the Cours de philosophie positive.
As is well-known, Comte endorsed a non-reductionist view of science, 
according to which each science depends on another for its methods and doctrines 
but is nonetheless irreducible to it because its object displays new features 
requiring a specific approach and giving rise to new laws19. The conclusion of the 
Couri First Lesson nailed down Comte’s conviction unambiguously: the very 
project of a single unified and all-encompassing science he regarded as illusory. 
Comte held such an ideal to be out of reach:
“I am utterly convinced that these attempts to explain all phenomena by way 
o f  a single law are highly chimerical, even when conceived by the most 
competent minds. Our intellectual resources are too narrow, and the universe 
is too complex, to leave us hope that such a scientific perfection is within our 
reach” (Auguste Comte, Philosophie premiere, p. 40)
To illustrate Comte’s non-reductionist views, let us take the example of 
biology. It depends on physics and chemistry because physical and chemical laws 
apply to living bodies, but they also exhibit specific phenomena (which are relative 
to their “organization”, like reproduction or pathologies) which have laws of their 
own and require an original method to be studied (Comte singles out comparison 
as the distinctive method of biology). As he puts it, organic phenomena
“are indeed obviously more complicated and more specific than the others 
[inorganic phenomena]; they depend on the latter, whereas the latter do not at 
all depend on them” {Ibid. , p. 55).
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Similarly, if one considers the study of man, a distinction must be drawn 
between the features of the individual in itself and the features of the individual qua 
belonging to a sociable species. To biology (“organic physics”, as Comte puts it) 
belong considerations of the first kind, whereas “social physics” (what he would 
later call “sociolog)7”) take charge of the second kind of phenomena. But the same 
kind of dependence that exists between physics and chemistry on the one hand 
and biology on the other hand also obtains between “organic physics” and “social 
physics”:
“The second order o f  phenomena is obviously more complicated and more 
specific than the first; it depends on the latter without influencing it. (.. .) In 
all social phenomena, one first observes the influence o f physiological laws 
on the individual, and then the influence o f something specific which 
modifies their effects, and which is related to the action o f the individuals on 
one another; in the human species, that action is radically complicated by the 
action o f  each generation on the one following it” (Ibid., p. 57).
Accordingly, though he stresses the importance of biology for sociology, 
Comte nonetheless advocates the irreducibility of the latter to the former and 
argues that what make social phenomena specific are their collective (the 
interaction of individuals gives birth to a sui generis kind of features) and historical 
dimension.
“the necessary subordination between these two studies does not, as a few 
eminent physiologists had been led to believe, constrain one to view social 
physics as a mere appendix o f  physiology. Even though the phenomena are 
certainly homogeneous, they are not identical, and the separation o f  the two 
sciences is truly fundamental. For it would be impossible to treat the 
collective study o f  the species as a pure deduction from the study o f  the 
individual, since the social conditions, which modify the action o f  
physiological laws, must be considered first. Consequendy, one must found 
social physics on a body o f  direct and specific observations, without 
neglecting, as required, the intimate and necessary relation it entertains with 
physiology as such” (Id.)
These developments of the Cours, which theorized both the status of the 
science of social phenomena as a specific discipline and the relative independence 
of the different sciences in the encyclopaedic scale, have led to consider Comte as 
one of sociology’s forefathers20 and as an early advocate of the “disunity of 
science” thesis21. However, Comte’s treatment of the sexual equality issue seems to 
challenge both descriptions.
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As I will argue throughout my thesis, it was indeed the case that Comte 
gave precedence to biology over sociology in the setdement of the sexual equality 
debate. As the formalized version of Comte’s argument indicated, the onus of his 
demonstration lay with the biological premise. What he chose to argue from to 
adjudicate the issue of women’s role in society was not an account of the nature 
and history of inter-individual interactions (as would be required of sociology by 
Comte’s own admission) but a biological account of character traits. And even in 
what Comte took to be his properly sociological argument for subjection, his ideas 
were suffused with biological assumptions.
If this is the correct interpretation to give of his argument for women’s 
subjection, Comte’s conception of an autonomous sociology, understood as “the 
collective study of the [human] species” in which “the social conditions (...) must 
be considered first”, is seriously endangered since we have an instance of a 
sociological problem in which sociology adds nothing to biology, except a few 
lights on the way social conditions have troubled the natural manifestation of 
people’s capacities. But surely, this does not fit Comte’s ambitious expectations for 
sociology.
This discrepancy between Comte’s methodological principles (his 
endorsement of the “disunity of science” thesis and his promotion of sociolog}7 as 
a specific discipline) and his actual manner of solving the issue of sexual equality 
(the bypassing of sociology in favour of biology) was not without compromising 
the “scientificisation of politics”. For the appeal of this project lay in the deduction 
of the practical measures of the “arts of politics” from a political science sui generis. 
Comte’s standing as a positive philosopher also depended on his ability to claim 
for himself the discovery and establishment of sociology as an independent 
science, but his treatment of the sexual equality issue belied his aspiration to 
originality. On the other hand, Comte did not take women’s subordination to be 
an adventitious element of his social theory that could be disposed of without 
harmful practical consequences.
Accordingly, Comte’s predicament was the following: either he stuck to his 
methodological principles but gave up his belief in women’s subordination; or he 
retained his biological demonstration for the latter but failed to live up to the 
standards of his own methodology. Yet, a third way was also conceivable, in which 
Comte would have it both wavs: by finding independent and genuine sociological
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support for his belief in the necessary subordination of women. This last possibility 
would have attracted him incomparably more than either of the branches of the 
previous alternative, for it would have singled him out as a true positive social 
philosopher. The interest of the correspondence with Mill lies in its ability to
provide some hints as to why Comte failed to escape this predicament.
2 — Mill’s Feminism: Is Mill’s Liberal N aturalism  Consistent?
Mill shared with Comte the prospect of a “scientificisation of politics”. His 
ambition was to take part in such a movement by extending the methods of the 
natural sciences to the objects of the moral sciences: Mill regarded the first five 
Books of his System oj ljogic as so many necessary steps towards Book VI, which 
contained his reflections “On the Logic of the Moral Sciences”:
“Here, therefore, if  anywhere, the principles laid down in the preceding 
Books [of the Logic] may be expected to be useful” (}. S. Mill, SL, VI, I, 1).
Mill undoubtedly agreed with Comte that the issue of divorce, and by
extension that of sexual equality7, would benefit from the “scientificisation of
politics”, for he argued that “to arrive at a definitive judgment [regarding this 
matter], one needs a more profound knowledge of human nature, both in its 
general and in its particular applications” (Mill to Comte, September 10, 1842, in 
Haac [ed.], p. 102). Notwithstanding this methodological agreement, Mill did not 
think that a scientific appraisal of the question of sexual equality would lead to the 
practical conclusions upheld by Comte. To be sure, Mill adopted an agnostic stance 
at the opening of the debate: “I am far from harboring opinions contrary to yours. 
I have, truthfully, no fixed opinion here” (Ibid., p. 101-2). But such an attitude may 
be ascribed to Mill’s desire not to compromise an exchange which he regarded as 
potentially beneficial for his own intellectual development. For, by the time he 
started corresponding with Comte, Mill was already a convinced — if not yet 
outspoken -  supporter of women’s emancipation.
A study of Mill’s early public and private writings indicates that by 1841 
Mill had made up his mind regarding the sexual equality debate. O f course, his 
position did not have the logical and rhetorical consistency it finally gained with
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The Subjection of Women (1869). But many arguments and numerous factual examples 
he resorted to in this book seem to have originated years before its publication, 
mostly in the 1830s as textual evidence indicates. Accordingly, he was well 
equipped to engage with Comte.
Without entering into the historical details of the genesis of Mill’s early 
feminism, one may single out three main components of his views on sexual 
equality: the conviction that women were exposed to unjust discrimination22; the 
analysis of the sources of their subjection, especially in marriage23; and the search 
for possible ways of improving their plight24. These three elements can be found in 
one single piece by Mill entided “On Marriage”, written in 1832-183325, and which 
has the advantage of presenting us with an ardculated version of Mill’s views on 
sexual equality. However, since the logical structure of this essay is not obvious at 
first sight, I will reformulate Mill’s argument independendy of its actual exposidon.
According to Mill, rather than tackling the issue of the nature of social 
arrangements (and especially marriage) headfirst, one should rather turn to the 
social agents on which they depend in order to define what suits their nature best:
“The question is not what marriage ought to be, but a far wider question, 
what woman ought to be. Settle that first, and the other will settle itself.
Determine whether marriage is to be a relation between two equal beings, or 
between a superior and an inferior, between a protector and a dependent; and 
all other doubts will be easily resolved” (J. S. Mill, “On Marriage”, p. 42).
One should not be misled by Mill’s somewhat confusing terminology. For 
he starts with what apparendy resembles a normadve question (“what woman 
ought to be”), and then goes on showing that there “is no natural inequality 
between the sexes”(J<^ .), that is by stating a matter of fact. The ambiguity can be 
dispelled if one clearly identifies Mill’s goal in that instance and rephrases his 
argument. One may surmise from the previous quotation that Mill wants to define 
the appropriate nature of marriage and considers the following alternative: either 
marriage is an equalitarian relation or it is not. If it is not, a cause must be found to 
this inequality.
Here, the pattern of reasoning is the one typically used by Radicals: 
individuals should be treated equally unless good cause can be shown to do 
otherwise. Now, the decisive step is taken when Mill argues that there is no natural 
inequality between the sexes. In fact, Mill does not say that the natural fact of 
equality is the source of positive normative considerations on women (what a
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woman “ought to be” in the sense of, say, what are the values she must conform 
to), but rather that the natural fact of equality disqualifies a certain number of 
actions or institutions because they are detrimental to the happiness of women. 
For instance, if marriage is considered a relation between a superior and an 
inferior, there must be evidence of either the superiority of one partner or the 
inferiority of the other. Since there is no such evidence, one ought not view 
marriage as a relation of dependence. Hence Mill’s conclusion:
“a woman ought not to be dependent on a man, more than a man on a 
woman, except so far as their affections make them so, by a voluntary 
surrender, renewed and renewing at each instant by free and spontaneous 
choice” (Id.)
We encounter here the first tenet of Mill’s feminism, i.e. his conviction that 
social arrangements founded on a principle of sexual subordination are 
discriminatory.
Consider now the factual premise on which Mill’s argument for equality 
rests. In this regard, Mill is extremely confident: “But in this question there is 
surely no difficulty” (Id). However, since the inference developed by Mill is not 
that straightforward, let us repeat the structure of his argument: either marriage is 
an equalitarian relation or it is not. If it is not, a cause must be found for this 
inequality. What about physical (what Mill calls “natural”[Id]) inequality? After all, 
if we are talking about a dependence relation, it would be sensible to conjecture 
that the dependence might be relative to a superiority based on physical strength. 
Here, Mill’s reply is twofold. Firstly, he claims that physical strength cannot be 
counted as a legitimate measure of superiority. Secondly, he maintains that, even if 
it were the case, it is not sure that men would be entitled to govern women.
The second assertion is undoubtedly the weaker26, and that is certainly why 
he chooses to argue for the first. Consequently, he challenges the very fact that 
superiority could be based on physical strength. His transition is rather astute, for 
he knows who he has to convince, i.e. English Victorian males who think that their 
superiority is not that of the body but that of the soul. And “if bodily strength is to 
be the measure of superiority, mankind are no better than savages” (Id.). Equate 
“mankind” with England, and the argument based on the conflation of superiority 
and physical strength is defused. Hence the following historical claim:
“Every step in the progress o f  civilization has tended to diminish the 
deference paid to bodily strength, until when now that quality confers
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scarcely any advantages except its natural ones: the strong man has little or no 
power to employ his strength as a means o f acquiring any other advantage 
over the weaker in body” (Id.)
Without question, Mill’s claim draws on a point which is at the heart of 
the philosophy of history and political philosophy of the Enlightenment: namely, 
that the advent of modernity is coeval with the demise of the “law o f the 
strongest” and the rise of the “rule of law”. Authority is now entrusted to those 
who are entitled to it by their personal merit. But the change is also certainly even 
more visible if one considers industry, in which the use of machinery has radically 
modified the importance of manual and physical labour in production. In short, 
Mill wants us to understand that superiority based on strength is something of the 
past. And gone with it is the idea that marriage is a relation “between a superior 
and an inferior, between a protector and a dependent” (Jd)21\
“in the progress o f  civilization, the time has come when women may aspire to 
something more than merely to find a protector. The condition o f a single 
woman has ceased to be dangerous and precarious: the law, and general 
opinion, suffice without any more special guardianship, to shield her in 
ordinary circumstances from insult or injury: woman in short is no longer a 
mere property, but a person, who is counted not solely on her husband’s o f  
father’s account but on her own. She is now ripe for equality” (Ibid., p. 49).
However, from the fact women’s subordination cannot be grounded on 
mere physical inferiority, it does not follow, as Mill seems to have it, that 
subordination should be discarded altogether. For, even if their physical inferiority 
is disregarded as a relevant factor, it may well be the case that there exists another 
reason that would legitimate women’s subjection to men. The obvious candidate is 
intellectual or moral inferiority: if women lack certain capacities or character traits 
usually associated with the exercise of autonomy, then they should be subjected to 
those who are endowed with them, i.e. males. Accordingly, if Mill wants his 
argument to be valid, he needs to add a premise to the effect that women are not 
intellectually or morally inferior to men. Then the inference would hold.
Unfortunately, no such premise is to be found in Mill’s essay. One may 
thus surmise that the correspondence with Comte would enable him to elaborate 
this premise and that it would rest, in the last resort, on this “more profound 
knowledge of human nature” (Mill to Comte, September 10, 1842, in Haac [ed.], p. 
102). What would it look like? Given Mill’s empiricist and associationist leanings, 
one can conjecture that the best candidate would consist in an environmentalist 
theory of human capacities, stating that under normal conditions (for instance, the
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absence of any inborn physical deficiency affecting one’s intellectual faculties), men 
and women subjected to a similar range of psychological stimulations (affective, 
moral, rational) display on average the same capacities and that any difference 
observed in their achievements is due to unrecorded environmental stimulations. 
As the reader familiar with the System of Logie knows, such a theory falls within the 
realm of Mill’s pet project of an Ethology, the science of the formation of 
characters.
What is of interest to us here is that, even if Mill fails, in the piece “On 
Marriage” to establish the intellectual equality of men and women, he nonetheless 
provides his readers with an ethological rationale as to why women are still 
subjected to men in a time when they are more or less freed from physical 
constraint. This means that, although one still lacks the experimental setting 
appropriate to the demonstration of the natural equality of men and women, one 
can still rely on an ethological analysis to assess the sources of women’s subjection,
i.e. the second tenet of Mill’s feminism.
Mill regards women’s education as one of the main causes of their 
subjection, which usually takes the form of them being confined to the household 
and its domestic chores, with no hope for an independent existence. He details this 
reproductive mechanism when he comes to inquire into the “means by which the 
condition of a married woman is rendered artificially desirable” (Id.). After having 
set aside unlikely explanations (it cannot be because of an improvement of 
women’s legal or civil condition subsequent to marriage, for there is none), he 
points out what he thinks is the main cause of the enduring attraction of marriage:
“It is not law, but education and custom which make the difference. Women 
are so brought up, as not to be able to subsist in the mere physical sense, 
without a man to keep them” (Id.)
Since girls are brought up in the idea that they are destined to be men’s 
dependents in all decisive regards (security, subsistence, affection), they do not feel 
- and they are prevented by their parents and acquaintances from realizing it -  the 
urge to develop character traits such as self-reliance, fortitude, or initiative. To the 
contrary they are prompted to cultivate alleged feminine character traits such as 
patience, temperance, or benevolence for relatives, which suit their social position. 
Therefore they end up being convinced that they do not partake of these qualities 
so highly praised in men, and imagine that their mere existence is impossible
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without them. Such is the trick of men-governed societies: to convince women that 
they are not fit for autonomy because of their intellectual capacities and that they 
benefit from the system of dependence to which they are subjected (Id., p. 41-2).
Given Mill’s endorsement of women’s cause, the previous ethological 
analysis leads us naturally to the third tenet of his feminism, the search for possible 
ways of improving their plight. If women are to further their social position, Mill 
maintains, they must be educated so as to be able to earn by themselves their 
livelihood, that is by getting trained in a certain profession. By the same token, they 
might be able to develop the character traits associated with such a training 
(perseverance, ingenuity, etc.), which are certainly elements partly constitutive of 
autonomy and independence28, and might be able to express, on a par with men, 
the full range of their intellectual capacities.
Now, in a society where marriage has become a matter of choice and not 
of necessity, what about divorce29? Mill lists three main arguments in favor of 
indissolubility. First, he acknowledges the fact that repeated failures in finding the 
light match may contribute to the moral debasement and disillusionment of those 
who fail to encounter the appropriate partner. Secondly, in case the couple has 
children, he invokes the necessity of guaranteeing for them a familial environment 
in which they will thrive. Thirdly, he underlines the fact that if one is not bound 
and can substitute one partner for another, that could tend to prevent one’s moral 
improvement, for one could always put the blame on the other. Now, Mill 
maintains one should not fear that people will part with each other on the burst 
instance of disagreement. For, in a “tolerably moral state of society” {Ibid., p. 48), 
promiscuity will still be an object of moral reprobation. As for children, Mill 
ventures that the new modalities of marriage (in which the partners are free to 
enter or not into the relation), by elevating the morality of individuals, will lead 
couples to have children if and only if they are sure that their affection for each 
other is true and durable. And if they decide to divorce, he hopes that they will 
eschew total separation for the children’s good. But Mill sees no serious reasons 
for refusing the possibility of divorce. Hence his conclusion:
“The arguments, therefore, in favour o f the indissolubility o f marriage, are as 
nothing in comparison with the far more potent arguments for leaving this 
like the other relations voluntarily contracted by human beings, to depend for 
its continuance upon the wishes o f the contracting parties” {Ibid., p. 49).
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As I hope my reconstruction of the essay “On Marriage” illustrates, Mill 
viewed the issue of women’s emancipation as a central social question deserving a 
full-length analysis. Just as Comte, Mill thought that the practical issue of divorce, 
and by extension that of the appropriate structure of family, could only be settled 
by an inquiry into the nature of women’s intellectual capacities, which would rely 
primarily on an ethological basis. Once this knowledge would be made available to 
the public, it would bring drastic reforms with regard to women’s social position. 
As far as Mill was concerned, he surely hoped the “scientificisation of politics” 
would lead to such an outcome.
Finally, one cannot ignore that Mill also had reasons, besides his political 
and scientific concerns for social issues, to address the question of divorce: he was 
himself taken in a platonic love-affair with Harriet Taylor, the attractive and 
intellectually stimulating wife of a well-to-do wholesale druggist he had met in the 
early 1830s and who remained married to her husband till his death in 1849). Her 
relation with Mill was attracting its fair share of gossip from their friends and 
intimates, to such an extent that Mill, partly because of the tittle-tattle, 
progressively withdrew from society to some kind of seclusion during the 1840s 
(he broke up with a large number of his old acquaintances and resigned from the 
editorship of the l^ ondon and Westminster Review in 1840). John Taylor, who 
respected Mill’s eminence as a thinker, was quite ready to accommodate the wishes 
of his wife, as long as the bounds of morality and decency were observed. But 
divorce was out of question for both, John Taylor being quite wary of his public 
reputation and Harriet being tied by a strong affection to her children. An 
agreement was finally reached: Mill could visit Harriet when her husband was not 
in, and join her discreetly when she was outside of London for short vacations and 
travels abroad, but she would continue to live with Taylor. Yet, it is likely that 
Harriet and John Stuart’s passionate love could hardly content itself with such a 
makeshift compromise. However, they were so eager not give a handle to calumny 
or controversy that they respected scrupulously the terms of the agreement with 
John Taylor to the very day of the latter’s burial. For all that, they did not find the 
situation less absurd or revolting, but they managed to transform their feelings of 
anger and injustice into the positive resolution of furthering the emancipation of 
women and the improvement of society30. Mill’s reflections on sexual equality were 
his theoretical contributions to the cause.
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However, whilst Comte’s answer to the problem of sexual equality 
threatens the consistency of his system, Mill’s case in “On Marriage” fails to 
provide a sound argument for women’s emancipation: the ethological premise 
establishing the intellectual equality of men and women is lacking. Accordingly, 
one of the goals of this thesis will be to trace the origin, development, and fate of 
this “Ethology” in Mill’s writings, most notably the correspondence with Comte 
and the System of Logic. But, besides this historical and conceptual inquiry, I will also 
attempt to uncover the tensions that may exist between Mill’s views on sexual 
equality and the general orientation of his philosophy.
As John Skorupski argues ’1, Mill’s philosophy is best described as a “liberal 
naturalism”, that is as a philosophy which views human beings as natural entities 
living in a natural world and asserts that an autonomous exercise of one’s natural 
capacities is conducive to one’s happiness. In this last respect, liberalism insists on 
the moral importance not only of letting the individual develop her capacities but 
also of letting her choose which capacitie(s) she wants to develop, as the case of 
women’s emancipation illustrates. Now, a certain interpretation of naturalism 
seems to belie Mill’s ethological project.
As an epistemological thesis, naturalism maintains that the whole behavior 
(individual and social) of human beings is amenable to the same kind of knowledge 
as the natural world. Accordingly, the knowledge of human beings is to be 
modeled on the natural sciences (such as physics, chemistry, and biology) and is to 
take the same form (reliance on empirical testing, nomological nature of its general 
statements, predictive dimension). As the following quote from the first chapter of 
Book VI of the System of Logzc illustrates, Mill is entirely supportive of that 
epistemic facet of naturalism:
“if what has been pronounced “the proper study o f  mankind” is not destined 
to remain the only subject which Philosophy can not succeed in rescuing 
from empiricism; the same process through which the lawTs o f  many simpler 
phenomena [material] have by general acknowledgment been placed beyond 
dispute, must be consciously and deliberately applied to those more difficult 
inquiries [about human beings] (...); it is by generalizing the methods 
successfully followed in the former inquiries, and adapting them to the latter, 
that we may hope to remove this blot on the face o f  science” (J. S. Mill, J j L ,
Book VI, Chap. I, Sect. 1, p. 834).
But naturalism can also be taken as an ontological thesis, which in its extreme 
reductionist form considers the behavior of human beings as the direct or
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unmediated effect of the operation of laws and mechanisms proper to the natural 
sciences, and in the last resort physics. Now, it is very7 likely that a biological 
approach to the problem of sexual equality — which was Comte’s - will be favored 
by the naturalist, who maintains as a matter of principle that human capacities are 
dependent on the biological make-up of their bearers for their existence and on 
their environment for their expression. As I will try to show in my thesis, if Mill 
refuses the reduction of biology to sociology, which was characteristic of Comte’s 
treatment of the sexual equality issue, it is not because he contradicted his self­
professed naturalism but because his conception o f human nature and scientific 
explanation could not be accommodated within the limits of the biology- of his 
time.
The last point of historical and philosophical interest I will review in my 
thesis is that of the evolution of Mill’s feminism. At the time of the System and the 
correspondence with Comte, Mill took to be the key to help resolve the difficult 
question of sexual equlaity, namely his pet project of ethology, never got off the 
ground in the following y*ears. Given the centrality of ethology in Mill’s case for 
women’s emancipation and the role he ascribed to it in his architectonic of the 
“moral sciences”, it will prove interesting to inquire into the reasons of such a 
damaging intellectual failure. But another problem resulted from the failure: was 
Mill left with no argument to support his feminism? I will argue that Mill was able 
to overcome this predicament and came up with convincing arguments that took 
stock (and put to good use) the ethological failure. In particular, I will show that 
the Subjection of Women, which presented Mill’s mature feminist views, developed a 
new way of addressing the problem, which supposed that the liberal component of 
Mill’s philosophy, and especially its emphasis on the necessity of letting individuals 
engage in “experiments in living”, constituted the proper experimental setting in 
which to adjudicate the sexual equality issue. In that instance, it was for Mill’s 
political philosophy to be productive of a certain knowledge of human nature.
1 Mill first started reading Comte in 1828-9 after his French friend Gustave d’Eichthal 
communicated him the Syst'eme de politique positive (a short tract published by Comte in 1822 as the 
Plan des travaux necessairespour la reorganisation de la societe while he was still associated with St Simon 
and his school). As he told Comte in his first letter (Mill to Comte, November 8, 1841, in O. A. 
Haac [ed.], The Correspondence of John Stuart Mill and Auguste Comte. Translated from the French and 
edited by O.A. Haac, with an introduction by A. Kremer-Marietti, N ew  Brunswick & London: 
Transaction Publishers, 1995, p. 35), Mill came across die first two volumes o f the Cours de 
philosophie positive, on the philosophy o f  mathematics and the philosophy o f  astronomy and physics 
(respectively published in 1830 and 1835), in 1837; by late 1838, he got hold o f the third volume on 
the philosophy o f chemistry' and biology' published in 1838, as a letter to Molesworth indicates
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as much struck with it as with the others & and have learnt as much from it, though there are more 
questionable things in the former two, but even on these he has shaken me”, Mill to Sir William 
Molesworth, October 19, 1838; in J. S. Mill, The Later Letters of John Stuart Mill. 1849-1873. Edited by 
F. E. Mineka and D. N . Lindley, London & Toronto: University o f Toronto Press -  Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1972, p. 1988; see Mill to John Robertson, October 10, 1838; in J. S. Mill, The Earlier 
Letters of John Stuart Mill. 1812-1848. Edited by F. E. Mineka, with an introduction by F.A. Hayek, 
London & Toronto: University o f Toronto Press -  Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963, pp. 388-9). 
Eventually, the third letter o f Mill to Comte suggests that, by the end o f 1841, he had read the 
volumes published in 1839 and 1841, for he expressed to the latter that he had been “impatiently 
awaiting the publication o f the volume [the sixth, published in July 1842] which will complete your 
great work, and then o f  the special treatise on politics which is to follow and where I expect to find 
insights on many questions raised in your fourth and fifth volumes; so far they have only roused my 
intellectual interests without satisfying them fully” (Mill to Comte, December 18, 1841, in Haac 
[ed.], p. 43-4). As J. M. Robson recalls, “Mill (...) was immensely impressed by the sixth [volume o f  
the Cours], which led him, in January, 1843, into a “remaniement complet” o f  the concluding 
chapters o f Book VP’ (J. S. Mill, M System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of 
the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation. Edited, with a textual introduction, by J. 
M. Robson and with an introduction by R. F. McRae. Toronto & London: University o f  Toronto 
Press -  Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973, pp. lxviii-lxix; for the detail o f  Mill’s revisions o f Book VI, 
see p. lxxv-lxxvi), that is the chapters dealing with the methods o f the moral sciences.
2 R. Yeo, “Scientific Method and the Rhetoric o f Science in Britain, 1830-1917”, in J. A. Schuster & 
R. Yeo, The Politics and Rhetoric of Scientific Method: Historical Studies. Dordrecht & Lancaster: Reidel, 
1986, pp. 259-97.
3 J. Herschel, M Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy. Foreword by A. Fine. Chicago 
& London: The University o f Chicago Press, 1987.
4 On Whewell’s ambivalence, see R. Yeo, Defining Science. William Whewell, Natural Knowledge, and 
Public Debate in Early Victorian Britain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 193-201 
and 231-41.
5 See J. S. Mill, A.utobiography and Literary Essays. Edited, with an introduction, by J. M. Robson and J. 
Stillinger. Toronto & London: University o f Toronto Press and Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981, 
Chap. III. On Mill’s early conceptions o f the logic o f the moral sciences, O. A. Kubitz, Development 
ofJohn Stuart M ill’s System of Logic. Urbana: The University Press o f Illinois, 1932, chap. I and chap. V 
(pp. 203-5).
6 At the beginning o f  the correspondence Comte sent his wife a letter, dated March 3, 1842, in 
which he talked o f  the “voluntary subordination Mill overtly profess[ed]” to him (A. Comte, 
Correspondancegenerale et confessions. Tome II, avril 1841- mars 1845. Edited, with an introduction, by 
P. E. de Berredo Carneiro and P. Arnaud. Paris -  La Haye: Mouton, 1975, p. 114).
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Comte failed twice to be elected — first as the successor of Navier in 1836, and then as the 
successor o f Poisson in 1840 — to a chair in Mathematics. Consequently, he was forced to take a 
third job as substitute professor in a preparatory school for the Ecole polytechnique.
8 Considering the austerity and rigidity usually associated with Comte’s name, the story o f  his 
marriage with Caroline Massin sheds a refreshing light on the life o f  the founder o f positivism: he 
met her in 1821 while visiting the Gaieties de Bois o f  the Palais Royal in Paris, where she was -  
Comte suggested — prostituting herself; they saw each other quite regularly during six months, at 
least when Comte could afford it, but she put an end to the “affair” when she deserted him for 
Antoine Cerclet — a liberal political activist who would eventually become secretary o f the Presidence 
of the Chambre des Deputes and maitre des requites at the Conseil d ’Etat under the July Monarchy -, who 
bought for her a reading room {cabinet de lecture). That was where Comte met her again at the end of 
1822. By the fall o f  1823, they made up with each other, and got civilly married on February 19, 
1825. Despite genuine affection on both sides, die subsequent years saw their relations deteriorating 
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where she definitively left, with no hope o f return as she has been warned by her husband, in 
August 1842. On this episode o f  Comte’s life, see M. Pickering, A.uguste Comte, A.n Intellectual 
Biography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 315-26.
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mottos printed on the front page o f the Systeme de Politique Positive (see A. Comte, Sysfeme de politique 
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1,1 In a later letter, Comte would recall that she “really possesse[d] more intellectual strength, more 
depth, and, at the same time, more good judgment than most so justly praised members o f  her sex” 
(Comte to Mill, 5 Oct., 1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 190).
11 Comte issued a similar analysis less than a decade later, when his former disciple Littre tried to 
mitigate his hostility' towards his wife: Comte reminded him that it was “the very exceptional nature 
of this [ i.e. Caroline] anti-feminine type” (Comte to Littre, 6 Cesar, 63; in Testament d Auguste Comte, 
avec les pieces qui s j  rapportent. Publie par ses executeurs testamentaires conformement a ses dernieres volontes. 
Paris : 1884, p. 48) that compromised their marriage.
12 In his edition, Haac adds between brackets the relative clause “than I have” to indicate that Mill 
was merely pointing out his own incapacity’ to judge this question for want o f  a proper knowledge 
o f human nature. However, nothing in the French original suggests that Mill intended to restrict 
such an incapacity7 to his own case: the sentence “pour en decider irrevocablement, il faudrait 
attendre une connaissance plus profonde de la nature humaine” (as it is given in A. Comte, 
Correspondance generate et confessions. Tome II. Avril 1841- mars 1842, p. 367) means that nobody is 
presently in command o f such a knowledge o f human nature.
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Paris : Aubier, 1992.
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o f the Cours, entitled “Exposition o f  the plan o f this course or general considerations on the 
fundamental hierarchy o f the positive sciences”; in A. Comte, Philosophie premiere. Cours de philosophie 
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without taking refuge in any o f the established sciences. He developed a theory o f  science in which 
the idea o f  relative autonomy played a central role. This attributed to social science a territory o f its 
own and gave it the task o f developing its own proper theories and methods” (pp. 7-8).
21 Most notably I. Hacking in “The Disunities o f  the Sciences”, in P. Galison & D. J. Stump, The 
Disunity of Science. Boundaries, Contexts, and Power. Stanford: Stanford University7 Press, 1996, pp. 37- 
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unity7, namely derivation o f  all laws from one fundamental law o f nature”(p. 38). Similarly7, J.-F. 
Braunstein remarks that “Comte’s scientific philosophy is a ‘philosophy o f  the sciences’ and not a 
philosophy o f science” (J.-F. Braunstein, “La philosophie des sciences d’Auguste Comte”, in P. 
Wagner [ed.], Lesphilosophes et la science. Paris: Gallimard, 2002, p. 792).
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included in the first issue o f  the Westminster Preview (1824), in J. S. Mill, Autobiography, pp. 291-325; 
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French Historians. Edited, with a textual introduction, by J. M. Robson. Introduction by J. C. Cairns. 
Toronto & London: University7 o f Toronto Press and Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985, pp. 15-52.
24 In the so-called ‘Wale fragment”, which is an early version o f the Autobiography, Mill argued that 
he had held his convictions about sexual equality7 “from early boyhood” (J. S. Mill, Autobiography, p. 
252). The following episode supports his account and illustrates the practical aspect o f  Mill’s 
commitment. On a day o f 1823, on his way to work at India House, the seventeen years old Mill 
came across the body o f a strangled newborn child in St. James’ Park. For Mill, such an horror was 
certainly the sinister proof o f the soundness o f Malthus’ views, which he discovered while studying 
economics with his father and discussing with several o f James Mill’s intellectual companions 
(Bentham, Ricardo, etc.): since families o f workers tend to increase the number o f their members in 
order to maximize their income by putting their children to work, and thereby lower the wages by 
way of the introduction on the market o f cheap unqualified labour, the growth o f  food supply 
would not be able keep up with the unchecked growth o f population; hence the terrible conditions 
of existence o f the labouring classes and the temptation to resort to infanticide so as to alleviate 
one’s plight. But the young Mill was also convinced that knowledge (of contraception) and foresight 
could prevent such atrocities and defuse Malthusian pessimistic predictions. He and a friend 
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To put tilings shortly, Mill contends that “for a long time the indissolubility o f  marriage acted 
powerfully to elevate the social position o f women” {Ibid., p. 40). For, prior to the institution o f  
marriage as an indissoluble tie, the law o f the strongest applied to marital matters, enabling men to 
take whatever woman they could, but also to repudiate her as soon as she did not fulfil their
expectations. Because it was based on pure physical strength, the relation was by essence
asymmetric. With the institution o f  an irrevocable vow, women could at least, and despite the fact 
that they were still chosen by men, secure a minimum o f permanency for their situation and 
subsistence: they could not be repudiated by a pure act o f  whim.
28 However, Mill also qualifies the extent to which women will be entitled to compete with men in 
worldly matters:
“It does not follow that a woman should actually support herself because she 
should be capable o f  doing so: in the natural course o f  events she will not. It is 
not desirable to burthen the labour market with a double number o f  
competitors. In a healthy state o f things, the husband would be able by his
single exertions to earn all that is necessary for both; and there would be no
need that the wife should take part in the mere providing o f what is required 
to support life” {Ibid., p. 43).
This restriction is surprising: would not it be strange to train women and not let them enter the 
job market? Surely, professional training is in itself a good school for the will and the 
understanding, the necessary ingredients o f autonomy. However, it would also be sensible to 
venture that these faculties are better exercised in real-life situations than in classrooms. If 
independence is what is really aimed at, why not giving it a fair tty? Mill justified his reluctance by 
arguing that, from a purely economic point o f view, a flood o f freshly trained women pouring on 
the market would be the cause o f a lowering o f wages. In any case, it has to be noted that Mill’s 
own words indicates that there is no necessary link between the fact o f  being a woman and that o f  
being excluded from effectually practicing a certain profession: Mill says that it “does not follow 
that a woman should actually support herself because she should be capable o f doing so: in the 
natural course o f  events she will not' {Id.). Bur Mill never maintained that a woman ought not support 
herself even if she is capable o f doing so. Maybe he would prefer that she abstains from it, but he 
never regarded this exemption as mandatory: “The great occupation o f  woman should be to beautify 
life (...). If in addition to this activity o f  her nature demands more energetic and definite 
employment, there is never any lack o f it in the world” {Ibid., p. 44). One can certainly question 
Mill’s claim that it is in the nature o f woman to “beautify” life (after all, why cannot men do it?), but 
his argument in no way legitimates the exclusion o f women from professional practice.
29 Even if  divorce had been authorized in England since the seventeenth century, it could only be 
pronounced on grounds o f  adultery and after so complex and so expensive a procedure (which only 
Parliamentary dispositions could achieve) that it had been very exceptionally appealed to (only 110 
divorces had been pronounced between 1800 and 1850). Accordingly, M il was primarily advocating 
a simplification o f  the procedure itself.
30 See F.A. Hayek, John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor. Their Correspondence and Subsequent Marriage. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951; N. Capaldi, John Stuart Mill, Chap. 4; and J.E. Jacobs, The 
Voice of Harriet Taylor Mill. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002.
31 J. Skorupski, John Stuart Mill. London: Routledge, 1989, Chap. 1, and “Introduction: The Fortunes 
o f Liberal Naturalism”, in J. Skorupski (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to John Stuart Mill. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 1-34.
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II - The Female Brain and the Subjection of Women: 
Biology, Phrenology and Sexual Equality.
As argued in the previous chapter, the challenges posed to “positive 
philosophy” and “liberal naturalism” by the sexual equality issue originate in the 
respective ways Comte and Mill provide for the articulation of the biological and 
sociological levels of analysis. To put it briefly, my claim is that Comte failed to live 
up to the methodological standard he set for sociology when he maintained that 
biology could settle the question of sexual equality, whereas Mill, despite his self­
professed naturalism, refused to consider as sound arguments based on biology.
In what follows, I attempt a systematic reconstruction of the Comte-Mill 
correspondence that adduces textual and argumentative evidence in support of 
these claims. This chapter starts with an account of how the issue of sexual equality 
was first introduced by Mill in the correspondence (HA), and how Comte 
responded by emphasizing the importance of biology for the appropriate handling 
of the discussion (IIB) I then turn to Comte’s actual exposition of his various 
biological arguments for the subjection of women (IIC), and eventually single out 
the one based on phrenology as the main biological support of Comte’s case for 
women’s subjection (HD).
A -  Setting the Grounds of the Debate.
Mill’s attempt to introduce the issue of sexual equality in the 
correspondence was a cautious one, for it was only touched upon at the beginning 
of the summer of 1843, almost one year and a half after his exchange with Comte 
had begun. Despite some disagreements1, the general impression one gets from the 
letters up to this date is that of a general convergence of opinions on most matters, 
speculative and practical. However, one also discerns in Mill a growing desire for 
intellectual recognition. The letter of August 12, 1842, was a watershed, for it 
renounced the somewhat submissive tone Mill had adopted thus far. Mill wanted 
to be treated as a fellow thinker and not as a pupil. Time was ripe, he thought, for 
a genuine discussion:
“It has (...) always been my desire to engage in a true, frank and rather 
systematic comparison o f our ideas, be they philosophic or sociological” (Mill 
to Comte, 12 August, 1842; in Haac [ed.], pp. 91-2)
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Mill acknowledged that the imminent publication of the sixth volume of 
the Cours completed Comte’s first philosophical grand oeuvre, and thus testified to 
the systematic dimension of his reflections. But he also regarded his work as a 
systematic endeavour, which would soon materialize for the public in the System of 
Logic, the originality of which he was eager to defend. Accordingly, Mill suggested 
that Comte acquaint himself with Mill’s writings (which demanded an infringement 
of the latter’s “cerebral hygiene” that prevented him from reading anything else 
than poetry and a few scientific reports), so that they could direct their discussion 
“from the start towards points of real and basic difference” (Ibid., p. 92), whose 
very existence Mill claimed he could not yet determine. But that he was searching 
for them, the following pronouncement undoubtedly demonstrated:
“I know that I have come ever closer to your ideas as I have come to know 
them better, but you realize as a geometer that a constant decrease is not 
always a decrease without limit” (Id.).
As we also knowT, Mill used Comte’s confession as a pretext for raising the 
issue of divorce, and ventured that perhaps it would have been worth 
reconsidering the whole problem of the relations between the sexes anew2. Deeply 
moved by Mill’s concern, Comte replied that he was sure that his correspondent 
would eventually surrender to the views he first presented in the Cours:
“As for our lack o f  agreement in the matter o f  divorce, I am convinced that, 
in spite o f my personal case, which fortunately is exceptional though not as 
rare as it ought to be today, it will not take me long to persuade you to adopt 
my view, for it is o f  great import to society that marriage be indissoluble. This 
is the ultimate and indispensable attribute o f monogamy as an institution, an 
essential condition o f the definitive [human] economy” (Comte to Mill, 30 
September, 1842; Ibid., p. 105).
Comte concluded that, if they had the chance to discuss this issue face to 
face, he had no doubt he would convert Mill to his opinion on “this important 
point of social organization ... without waiting for the Treatise on Political Polity3 
where ... this essential point will be appropriately clarified” (Id.). The follow-up to 
this opening came one year later in June of 1843, when Mill first voiced his 
objections.
Taking advantage of Comte’s positive reception of his System of Logic4, Mill 
thanked “the most competent judge, indeed the only one so far competent on any 
question of systematic methodology” for the “high praise” (Mill to Comte, 15
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June, 1843; Ibid., p. 164) he kindly gave to his book, and insisted on the 
spontaneous convergence that characterized their respective views:
“Such harmony would in itself almost constitute sufficient proof o f  the truth 
and even o f  the timeliness o f  the new philosophy, leading others to judge that 
it is o f the kind to create true convictions in anyone possessing the necessary 
positive background and native intelligence” {Ibid., p. 165).
But it was the very way Mill specified the extent of their agreement which 
gave the correspondence a new turn:
“Henceforth, reassured as to questions o f  methodology -  where I fear no 
further differences o f opinion o f  any importance, be it on the general theory 
o f positivism, or on its particular application to the social sciences — all I need 
still hope for is an equally perfect agreement with respect to social doctrine”
{Id.)
Consequendy, whilst acknowledging the extent of his agreement with Comte on 
methodological matters, Mill also specified the nature of what he considered to be 
possible sources of disagreement, even if he took the trouble of venturing that, 
perhaps, his lack of conviction regarding issues Comte held to be already setded 
was due to an insufficient intellectual development. Yet, he nevertheless chose to 
state them explicidy:
“As to the doctrines o f static sociolog}', which you did not invent but took 
over from old social theories, though you gave them support with your 
customary energy and philosophical conviction, there remain some areas o f  
real disagreement between us. ... While I fullv recognize, for instance, the 
social necessity for the basic institutions o f  property and marriage3, and while 
I accept no utopia concerning either one, I am still inclined to believe that 
these two institutions may be destined to undergo more serious modifications 
than you seem to think , even though I feel quite unable to foresee what these 
will be” {Id.).
He finally alluded to what they already touched upon in the 
correspondence and even “confessed” one of his theoretical “sins”:
“the question o f  divorce is for me undecided, in spite o f  the powerful 
arguments in your fourth volume, and I am subject to an even more 
fundamental heresy, since I do not, in principle, acknowledge the necessary 
subservience o f one sex to the other” {Id.).
Mill concluded on these “questions of major importance”, without giving 
more details. One may nonetheless infer from these last two quotations a plausible 
interpretation as to the terms in which he intended to address the issue of sexual 
equality.
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From the previous statements, one may conceive at least two ways of 
tackling the problem. The first approach relies on the social and political outlook 
John Stuart Mill inherited from Bentham and his father James Mill. In a Utilitarian 
perspective (that of “social necessity”), the value of legal and political arrangements 
(such as marriage or divorce) is assessed with respect to their contribution towards 
the “greatest happiness of the greatest number”, to use the Benthamite motto. If 
the institutions surveyed prove more detrimental than beneficial to the welfare of 
the community and its members, then such a diagnostic would prompt their 
reformation or abandonment: as Mill put it, the outcome of such an evaluation 
process may result in “serious modifications” (Id).
Now, the drawback of the Utilitarian approach is that it may be reconciled 
with the paternalistic argument for women’s subjection. For the latter claim rested 
on the premise that women, because they lacked the intellectual resources to do so, 
were unable to promote their own interests and, accordingly, what was best for 
them wras to be decided by men. So, it was not that women’s interests were not 
considered, but just that women were not to do the considering. The search for the 
“greatest happiness of the greatest number” took into account their well-being, but 
sacrificed their autonomy, that is a key element of Mill’s moral and political 
conceptions.
Such a shortcoming explains why Mill made the Utilitarian perspective 
depend on a more fundamental approach to the problem, that of the study of 
human nature, and, particularly of the nature of women, as his “confession” to 
Comte testified: “I am subject to an even more fundamental heresy, since I do not, 
in principle, acknowledge the necessary subsentience of one sex to the other” (Id). 
If it was “more fundamental”, it was because Mill’s belief in the natural equality of 
the sexes required his rejection of any legal, political, or social arrangements based 
on the alleged inferiority of women. As he already told Comte with regard to the 
issue of divorce, what was needed was “a more profound knowledge of human 
nature” (Mill to Comte, September 10, 1842; Ibid, p. 102). But what would be the 
nature of this “knowledge of human nature”, Mill did not say.
Comte showed no sign of concern with Mill’s alleged “heretical” views: 
their complete agreement on method and social dynamics encouraged him to think 
that Mill would soon break with his opinions and convert to his views. In his reply 
to Mill’s letter of June 29, 1843, he attempted, in his unrivalled patronizing manner,
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to explain to his correspondent that he was just going through a normal transition 
in his intellectual development:
“I have myself once passed through a rather analogous mental situation, 
although perhaps my studies in biolog}’ moved me faster away from it. To my 
eyes, this is an inevitable phase in the present-day development o f  
emancipated minds, a stage o f thought which momentarily concedes essential 
ideas to negative philosophy, notions the theory o f  which has unfortunately 
remained so far under the dangerous hegemony o f  theological conceptions, 
but which basically contain no major fault besides this disastrous association”
{Ibid., p. 171).
Buried in this statement is the first indication in the correspondence of the 
biological dimension of the sexual equality issue. Comte’s emphasis on the role that 
his “studies of biology” played in his own intellectual development was meant to 
imply that he considered the appropriate theoretical elaboration of social 
phenomena, including those concerning the social condition of women, to be 
dependent, in a way to be specified, on biology. The “knowledge of human nature” 
Mill was calling for, Comte held it to be primarily biological. So perceptive a reader 
as Mill could not have missed such a crucial feature of Comte’s developments in 
the Fiftieth Lesson of the Cours de philosophie positive. If Mill was to refute the claim 
about female inferiority, Comte’s biological premise had to be challenged. The 
ensuing correspondence proved that it was indeed one of the primary targets of 
Mill’s objections.
B -  The Theoretical Relevance of Biology: Philosophical Issues.
The choice to focus primarily on the biological aspect of the debate was 
thus first dictated by Comte’s own line of argument in the Cours. But it is also very 
likely that Mill’s eagerness to defuse Comte’s case for women’s subjection drew 
him to question the relevance of biological data with regard to the sexual equality 
issue.
Echoing Comte’s pronouncement in the Cours with regard to the ability of 
“the sound biological philosophy” (A. Comte, PS, p. 186) to demonstrate the 
natural inferiority of women, Mill concurred with his French addressee that in 
principle biology certainly had a bearing on the problem. Yet he did not regard it as 
presently capable of solving it conclusively:
“Should we not come to agree on the matters in question, our dissent would 
almost prove that the principles o f biology on which their resolution
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ultimately depends are not as yet sufficiently developed” (Mill to Comte, 13 
July, 1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 173).
Therefore, Mill agreed with Comte that the resolution of the sociological issue of 
sexual equality “ultimately depend[ed]” on biology; yet, as things stood, biology 
was not able, in his eyes, to provide acceptable evidence for or against the 
hypothesis of natural equality0.
On the other hand, Comte tirelessly voiced throughout the correspondence 
his belief in the capacity of biological data to settle the question definitively, as the 
three following quotations illustrate:
“As imperfect as biolog)' may still be in every respect, it seems to me that it 
can already firmly establish the hierarchy o f  sexes” (Comte to Mill, 16 July,
1843; Ibid., p. 179).
“the subjection o f women (...) is directly based on a natural inferiority which 
nothing can undo and which is even more pronounced among humans than 
among the other higher animals” (Comte to Mill, 6 October, 1843; Ibid., p.
191).
“the preliminary insights which we have derived from biology alone and 
which take on greater importance, especially for the problem at hand [that o f  
sexual equality], are already far more advanced than you seem to admit, in 
spite o f  the rather unsatisfactory state o f our biological studies” (Comte to 
Mill, 14 November, 1843; Ibid., p. 207).
In short, quid juris, Comte and Mill acknowledge the importance of biology 
for the sexual equality debate; quid facti, Comte failed to convince Mill that 
biological data had settled the case.
As to the disagreement about the conclusive nature of biological evidence, 
Mill attributed it to the backward state of biology itself: the recendy coined term of 
“biology”, expressed the belief entertained by physicians and physiologists alike 
that the phenomena characteristic of living beings were specific and could not be 
studied only with the practical and theoretical resources of the inorganic sciences. 
However, the unity denoted by the word was merely ideal, since biology still 
referred to an incredibly diverse batch of inquiries (systematics, natural history, 
botany, anatomy, physiology, etc.), which was certainly not in the 1840s on a par 
with physics in terms of theoretical cohesiveness. What was more, as Mill told 
Comte in a previous letter, the medical dominion over biological studies hampered 
their development:
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“As for biolog)-, it remains here, even more than in your country, in that 
provisional state described so well by you, and even by Bacon — a state in 
which science is not as yet separate from the corresponding art [of medicine].
Except for descriptive natural history, which has made great strides here in 
the last twelve or fifteen years, the study o f biolog)' is scarcely pursued except 
by physicians and surgeons who, if  they are competent, are soon absorbed by 
the strain o f  their profession, which is especially hard in our country” (Mill to 
Comte, 28 Jan., 1843; Ibid., p. 129).
Comte treated quite off-handedly Mill’s remark on the immaturity of biology and 
ascribed the reluctance to consider biological data as acceptable evidence to his 
addressee’s scientific and philosophical education:
“It seems to me ... based on the fact that you do perhaps not take the whole 
body o f  biological studies, including those carried on today, into as complete 
and intimate considerations as that o f inorganic notions -  the various 
categories o f which have been familiar to you for a long time, as your treatise 
so clearly indicates” {Id.)
This easy agreement reached on the theoretical relevance of biology must 
not obscure the fact that such a stance was fraught with problems both for 
Comte’s “positive philosophy” and Mill’s “liberal naturalism”. On the one hand, 
Comte’s primary' reliance on biology' to adjudicate the sexual equality debate 
clashed with his own prescriptions as to the alleged autonomy of sociology, for he 
repeatedly presented biological data as sufficient evidence for the subjection of 
women: the extracts of correspondence quoted above merely echoed the Fiftieth 
Lesson of the Cours in which Comte maintained that sociology would 
“supplement” {completer in French) the “essential scientific assessment” (A. Comte, 
PS, p. 186) provided by biology' in the case at hand. But then, what about the 
alleged autonomy of sociology? Could Comte justify such a serious infringement of 
the principles of his “positive philosophy”? Turning to Mill, one might wonder 
how his claim that the sociological issue of sexual equality' “ultimately dependfed]” 
(Mill to Comte, 13 July; 1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 173) on biology tallies with his pet- 
project of ethology', i.e. an independent science of the formation of character. How 
would the latter coexist with the “sufficiendy developed” {id.) biology Mill himself 
considered capable of deciding the sexual equality issue?7
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C — The Varieties of Biological Arguments for the Subjection of
Women.
Any philosophical correspondence, because it includes many elements 
foreign to purely speculative matters and sometimes lacks a unitary design, 
demands a certain amount of interpretation and gap filling. For his part, Comte 
candidly acknowledged that his letters were no exception to this rule:
“they were not preceded by any special preparation. I wrote them without 
first making a draft (...)  and in the simple inspiration o f  the moment” (Comte 
to Mill, December 23,1843; Ibid., p. 215).
However, given the highly systematic cast of Comte’s mind, one may reasonably 
hope that a sustained line of reasoning could be unearthed from his letters. And it 
is indeed the case that, with respect to the biological arguments for the subjection 
of women, a somewhat systematic reconstruction of his position can be obtained 
through the analysis of passages taken from three of his letters to Mill (July 16, 
1843; October 5, 1843; and November 14, 1843). For the sake of clarity, I quote 
these extracts (three of which have the advantage of stating explicitly the source of 
his arguments) below and prefix to them a passage of the Cours, in order to show 
that Comte’s position did not vary between the publication of the latter and the 
start of the correspondence with Mill:
“The sound biological philosophy, especially with regard to the important 
theory o f Gall, begins to be able to treat as it scientifically deserves these 
chimerical revolutionary pronouncements concerning the alleged equality of 
the two sexes, by demonstrating directly, either by way o f anatomical 
examination, or by way o f physiological observation, the radical differences, 
both physical and moral, which, in all animal species, and particularly within 
the human race, separate one from the other, notwithstanding the common 
preponderance o f  the specific type. Comparing, as far as possible, the analysis 
o f  the sexes with that o f the ages, positive biolog)' eventually tends to 
represent the feminine sex, primarily in our species, as necessarily living, 
comparatively with the other sex, in a sort o f state o f  continuing childhood, 
which removes it further, in all the more important respects, from the ideal 
type o f  the race” (A. Comte, PS, p. 186).
“As imperfect as biolog)' may still be in every respect, it seems to me that it 
can already firmly establish the hierarchy o f sexes, proving both anatomically 
and physiologically that for almost the entire animal chain, and especially in 
our species, the female sex constitutes a sort o f state o f radical childhood, 
which makes it essentially inferior to the corresponding organic type” (Comte 
to Mill, 16 July, 1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 179-80).
“Even if the analysis o f  anatomy had not as yet sufficiently clarified the 
explicit demonstration that our species is organically superior to the rest o f
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the animal kingdom (something which in fact has become demonstrable quite 
recently), the study o f  physiology would leave no doubt here, if only because 
man has progressively obtained the ascendancy [over all other species].
Things stand about the same way in the matter o f the sexes, though to a 
much lesser extent” (Comte to Mill, October 5, 1843; Ibid., p. 191).
“ ...on e can consider that this doctrine [the physiology o f the brain o f  Gall 
and Spurzheim] has already sufficiently established the basic principle o f the 
hierarchy in the family [the subordination o f one sex to the other], at least as 
far as biology can do” (Comte to Mill, November 14,1843; Ibid., p. 208)
“Even before biological theory was suitably developed by Yicq d’Azyr and 
Bichat, and above all independently from the physiology o f  the brain, we 
already find a respectable work (...) which had already tried to base this 
principle [the subordination o f one sex to the other] simply on the dominant 
idea o f the physical functions [proper to man and woman]:It is the short 
treatise by a physician from Montpellier, Roussel, entitled Syst'eme physique et 
morale de la femme, published in 1775” (Id.).
“Comparative Biology seems moreover to me to leave little doubt concerning 
this matter. If one follows the lessons o f Monsieur de Blainville, for example, 
even though he proposes no express thesis o f  any kind here, it is impossible 
not to see emerge, from the whole o f zoological studies, the general law o f  
the superiority o f the masculine sex in all the upper ranges o f the hierarchy o f  
living beings. One would have to descend among the invertebrates to find — 
and even there very rarelv -  any notable exceptions to this great organic 
principle, which, besides, shows that the difference between the sexes 
increases with the degrees o f complexity o f the organism” (Id.).
At first glance, this harvest of quotations might seem difficult to order into 
an intelligible set of well-articulated arguments. Comte indeed appealed to different 
disciplines (anatomy, physiology, comparative anatomy, physiology of the brain), 
invoked various methods (comparison of different kinds; inter-sexual, inter-age, 
and inter-specific), and referred to now outdated sources (Gall, Spurzheim, 
Roussel, de Blainville). Furthermore, he took for granted that his addressee would 
have no problem locating evidence for such intriguing a claim as that which 
maintained that the female sex was characterized by “a sort of state of continuing 
childhood” (Comte to Mill, 16 July, 1843; Ibid., p. 180) in the biological literature, 
thereby assuming a familiarity foreign to the modern reader.
To make sense of these data, one must provide a comprehensive 
interpretative framework within which the variety of biological arguments in 
support of the subjection of women is laid out, related to its putative primary 
sources when possible, and eventually assessed in view of Comte’s thesis of the 
inferiority of women. In this last regard, it is useful to restate what Comte needed 
to establish for his argument to be successful: what was to be proved was that 
women were deprived of, or significantly less endowed with, the specific character 
traits which enabled men to fulfil their social role. Among the various character
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traits associated with male dominance, those depending on intellectual capacities 
(the various powers of abstraction, inference, comparison, foresight) and 
determinations of the will (perseverance, attention, authority) were those which 
anti-equalitarians of Comte’s brand were most eager to see ascribed to a greater 
extent to men. Moreover, in order to render women’s subjection perennial, it had 
to be proven that the character traits in question could not be acquired or 
significantly developed through exercise by women. Hence, their grounding in the 
immutable biological “organisation” of women. Innate inferiority with regard to 
intellect and willpower: such was the claim on which Comte’s argument for the 
subjection of women was premised.
Once the content of the premise required by Comte’s argument has been 
ascertained, the definition of the interpretative framework within which it could be 
established follows “naturally”, so to speak: since inferiority denotes the property 
of an object o f being in a lower position or state in degree, rank, quality, amount, 
etc, comparatively to some other object, and with reference to one feature 
common to them both, the appropriate manner of assessing this relational 
property is by way of comparison. Accordingly, what Comte intended to do was to 
compare the character traits respectively typical of men and women and ascribe the 
observed differences to the differences existing between the male and female 
biological make-up. And for Comte indeed, comparison was the method of biology 
par excellence'.
“it is only in the study (...) o f  living bodies that the comparative art properly
speaking can reach its full and characteristically philosophic development” (A.
Comte, PP, p. 699).
But if comparison was used to settle the issue of sexual equality, by the same token 
it meant that the latter problem was primarily a biological one.
Out of the five modes of biological comparison8 introduced by Comte, 
only three were referred to in the different quotations dealing with the issue of 
sexual equality: “comparison between the sexes” (second mode); “comparison 
between the diverse phases of development” (third mode), and “comparison 
between all the organisms forming the biological hierarchy” (fifth mode; Ibid., p. 
702). Moreover, Comte argued that the greater the scope of a classification, the 
better for its scientific value: hence, the results obtained through the fifth mode
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were deemed superior to those obtained through the third, those of the third to 
those of the second9.
With this knowledge of the methods resorted to by Comte, we can now 
turn to the different biological arguments he invoked in support of the subjection 
of women. The following chart offers a synoptic reconstruction of Comte’s claims 
as they appeared in the Cours and in the correspondence with Mill:
Intra-Specific Comparison 




(5,h Mode of Comparison: 
Between all living beings)
(2,ui Mode o f Comparison: 
Between the Sexes)
Anatomy Physiology Developm ental
Studies
3nl Mode of 
Comparison: between 
the various phases o f 
development
Anatomy Physiology
CPP CPP (Gall) CPP CPP CPP
July 16,1843 July 16,1843 July 16, 1843







Nov. 14, 1843 
(De Blainville)
Nov. 14 ,1 8 4 3  
(Dc Blainville)
[Virey] [Cabanis] [Roussel,Cabanis, 
Virey]
The first row distinguishes the two main comparative modes through 
which Comte hoped to end the debate: the intra-specific comparison of men and 
women would prove the inferiority o f the latter, whilst the inter-specific 
comparison would confirm the previous conclusion by making it a particular 
case o f a broader one, namely that female inferiority is a natural law applying to 
the whole world of sexually-differentiated living beings (hence the necessity o f 
limiting the fifth mode of comparison to dimorphic species).
The second row details the different disciplines within which the 
comparison is undertaken: whereas anatomy focuses on the structural differences 
between the two sexes, physiology pays attention to the particular functions they
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respectively exhibit. As to the comparison between the diverse phases of 
development, it distinguishes the sexes with respect to the way they develop 
through time.
The next four rows list the presence or absence of the different lines of 
reasoning in Comte’s writings (CPP stand for Cours de philosophic positive; the letters 
are referred to by date), and mention within brackets the explicit references made 
to the works of life scientists. The last row provides possible sources or 
illustrations for Comte’s claims.
Since the debate in the correspondence focused on the support phrenology 
allegedly gave to the subjection of women, my analysis will be primarily concerned 
with this aspect of the discussion. However, Appendix III lists the other biological 
arguments Comte invoked to support his claims and explains why Mill did not feel 
compelled to challenge them.
D — Female Phrenology.
As suggested above, Comte found in phrenology support for his claim that 
there exist natural and irreducible differences in intellectual and volitional powers 
between the sexes legitimating the paternalistic organization of society. But what 
was phrenology?
To put things shortly, it may be defined as a naturalistic attempt to account 
for the nature, variety, and development of human mental powers. A set of five 
main tenets summarises the gist of this approach: (1) penchants, moral qualities 
and intellectual faculties are inborn, both in man and animals (Innateness); (2) the 
brain is the organ of all penchants, qualities, and faculties (Localization); (3) each 
penchant, quality, or faculty is localized in a specific part - its so-called specific 
“organ” - of the brain (Modularity); (4) the development of a penchant, quality, or 
faculty is proportional to the volume of the organ in which it is localized 
(Proportionality); (5) since the shape of the skull reveals that of the brain, it is 
possible to assess the relative development of each penchant, quality, or faculty just 
by observing the conformation of the head (Cranioscopy).
Notwithstanding the disrepute into which it fell in later days, this theory, 
originated at the close of the eighteenth century by the Viennese physician F. J. 
Gall (1758-1828) with the active collaboration of his disciple J. G. Spurzheim
50
(1776-1832), continued to evoke passionate interest and bitter controversies 
throughout Europe (especially in German-speaking states, France, and England) 
and the United States until 1850. It then progressively faded away from the public 
and scientific scene so as to become almost complete extinct by the start of the 
twentieth century10. The reasons why Gall’s theory appealed to many were diverse, 
but can be summarized under three main heads: metaphysical, methodological, and 
social.
Metaphysically speaking, the most ardent materialistic supporters of 
phrenology took its emphasis on the material dependence of mind on brain to be 
the final blow to the old-aged conception of the soul as immaterial, 
notwithstanding Gall’s cautious qualifications as to the agnostic stance of 
phrenology in matters ontological: his claiming that “the brain was the organ of the 
mind” was his manner of accommodating the concerns of those who doubted the 
religious orthodoxy of the new science. For, if the mind was nothing over and 
above the brain, it would perish with it, which clashed with the spiritualist dogma 
of the immortality of the soul; furthermore, if the mind was equated with the brain, 
psychological phenomena would be governed by laws as deterministic as the ones 
that applied to material phenomena, thereby rendering otiose the idea of free will.
As far as methodology was concerned, phrenologists claimed that the 
theoretical tenets developed by Gall and Spurzheim gave birth to a properly 
scientific study of the mind. By assuming — through the Innateness Thesis - a 
functional continuity between animals and humans with regard to mental 
phenomena (the latter merely developing what was already present, albeit less 
markedly, in the former, even if some intellectual faculties seemed to appear only 
in man), phrenology fitted well the highly naturalistic bent typical of early 
nineteenth-century biology, especially in France and England where the 
comparative method was heralded as the key to a better understanding of organic 
phenomena. Gall’s masterstroke was to include mental phenomena in the latter’s 
realm, via his Localization Thesis (2). Moreover, by emphasizing the power of the 
instinctual and affective drives in man, he broke with an overly intellectualistic 
depiction of mankind.
However, the Localization Thesis merely amounted to the formal 
assumption of the dependence of mental phenomena on brain phenomena. Gall’s 
theory became genuinely informative only because it included the Modularity
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Thesis (3), according to which the brain was composed of several organs that were 
the substratum of the different mental dispositions. Only when a detailed account 
of the number, relations, and localizations in the brain of these dispositions was 
given, could phrenological conjectures be considered scientifically progressive. To 
be sure, many objected to Gall, even among his most faithful supporters, that his 
phrenological charts were proved wrong or inaccurate. But they were proved 
wrong because they were falsifiable. They were false but nevertheless scientific 
hypotheses, if by “scientific” one understood “amenable to empirical testing”.
The Proportionality Thesis (4) also contributed to substantiate the 
phrenologists’ claim that their approach was thoroughly empirical, since it enabled 
them both to resort, at least in theory, to comparative observations in order to 
assess the differential development of one’s mental capacities and to account for 
the variety of individual characters. However, they usually did not consider their 
acknowledgment of the fact of inter-individual differences as a threat to their 
project of a genuine science of man, for it was fortunately the case that the 
differential development of each mental capacity was lawlike. Phrenologists thus 
found a balance between generality (the lawlikeness of mental development) and 
specificity (the ability to identify the idiosyncratic character of a given subject).
Unfortunately, the material evidence on which phrenology intended to base 
its conclusions proved elusive, for, as Gall himself sadly recognized, it was almost 
impossible to observe the brains of individuals in vivo or just after their death 
because of religious and moral prejudices. Moreover, in the latter case, the likely 
alterations of the cortex provoked by the fatal disease or accompanying the death 
process itself (about which little was known) were ..also regarded as serious 
observational predicaments. Hence the appeal to cranioscopy (5), that is the 
semeiological practice of inferring from the flat and salient parts of the cranium 
the relative development of the corresponding parts of the cerebrum. Based on a 
quite popular embryological thesis according to which the bones of the dome of 
the cranium bore the imprint of the underlying cerebral cortex, Gall’s cranioscopic 
thesis had the further advantage of considerably extending the stock of subjects 
available for study, for even the dead -  or rather their skull - could contribute to 
the enterprise.
Finally, it was the prospect of the possible applications of this new science 
of human capabilities to the art of government that drew to it a considerable
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number of politicians, enlightened civil servants, and social reformers. For it 
rendered possible scientific reorganization of society by ascribing to individuals 
specific roles that would take advantage of their talents whilst mitigating the 
negative effects of their flaws. Teachers and physicians would thus assess the 
abilities and disabilities of their pupils or patients and counsel them on the proper 
career or way of life. Entrepreneurs would select knowingly their employees and 
place them at their appropriate place in the production process so as to maximize 
outputs. Statesmen would grant political rights and electoral franchise only to those 
who could exercise them fully and responsibly, and put in charge of matters of 
public concern individuals capable of dealing with these tasks. Thanks to 
phrenology, judges would be able to distinguish between the criminal penchant of 
the hardened convict and the momentary lapse of the occasional offender and to 
proportionate rationally the respective sentences of both in accordance with their 
dangerousness for society. The inventor}7 of the possible social applications of 
phrenology was almost endless and testified to its potential usefulness.
To be sure, phrenology could serve a wide variety of political interests. In 
Restoration France, it became the flag of those who wanted to get rid of the last 
vestiges of Mncien Regime social hierarchy, some Republicans included. In England 
at the time of the first Reform Bill, as R. Cooter has argued in his Cultural Meaning 
of Popular Science, it was used as a tool to legitimate the existing social order and to 
pacify the relations between the working, middle, and ruling classes.
However, what was common to these different discourses was the idea that 
phrenology, understood as the naturalistic science of human capacities, could 
provide a scientific tool for an organization (or reorganization) of modem societies 
based on the adequate knowledge of what was held to be the proximate cause of 
actions in human individuals, namely mental dispositions. But, contrary to the 
Enlightenment belief of an indefinite intellectual and moral progress of mankind, 
phrenologists, even when they granted the possibility of shaping one’s personality, 
severely limited the scope of educational endeavours. The most one could attempt 
was to develop one’s inborn capacities, for there was no hope of transforming 
oneself radically: one’s affective, moral and intellectual lot was fixed between 
certain limits by one’s cerebral constitution11.
As for women’s lot, there is evidence that a wide consensus reigned among 
the phrenological community12. Focusing on the French branch of the movement
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before 1848, M. Staum underlines that the little written about the capabilities of 
women was in line with the gender stereotyping prevalent in medicine and 
biology13: “their affectionate and maternal feminine nature marked them for 
domestic tasks. Even if women complemented men, they would not benefit from 
educational opportunity, occupational advancement, or full citizenship” (M. Staum, 
labeling People, p. 81). The same pronouncements seem to have been willingly 
echoed by most phrenological quarters in Europe during the first half of the 
nineteenth-century, even the more so because they had already appeared in the 
writings of phrenology’s founder Gall and of its most active propagator 
Spurzheim.
What is striking about Gall’s and Spurzheim’s comments on the topic of 
women’s capabilities is that it was never treated as a subject worthy of inquiry or 
about which any serious doubt could be raised. Such was the force of the 
traditional conception of feminine roles and of the alleged naturality of the mental 
dispositions on which they depended, that the psychological differences observed 
between the sexes served as proofs for some of the theoretical tenets of 
phrenology. For instance, when, in the second volume of the A.natomie etpbysiologie 
du systeme nerveux en general et du cerveau en particulier (1812)14, Gall and Spurzheim 
attempted to adduce evidence for the Localization thesis (according to which “the 
brain is the sole organ of all intellectual faculties and all moral qualities”), the 
“ninth p roo f’ ascribed the differences between the respective faculties and 
qualities characteristic of men and women to differences of brain conformation in 
the two sexes:
“Why is it generally the case that woman possesses certain qualities and 
certain faculties at a more eminent degree than man, whereas man prevails 
over woman with respect to other qualities and faculties? (...)  So as to be able 
to answer those questions and others o f the same kind, one must know the 
differences characteristic o f  the structure o f  the brain. ( ...)  But the very 
possibility7 o f  answering these questions still presupposes that it is in the brain 
that one must search for the cause o f all moral qualities and all intellectual 
faculties” (F. J. Gall & J. G. Spurzheim, Anatomie et physio logie, II, p. 260)15.
Similarly, one of the proofs of the Modularity Thesis postulated the 
existence of a plurality of cerebral organs to explain sexually specific mental traits:
“Each time the two sexes o f  the same species display marked differences o f  
penchants or faculties, the shape o f their encephalon differs as markedly. The 
brain o f  woman is usually less developed in its antero-superior parts; hence 
the narrower and lower forehead o f women compared to that o f men” (Ibid.,
II, p. 382-3)16.
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According to the Proportionality Thesis and given the actual localisation of 
the different organs, these “physical differences” in brain conformation were said 
to provide a rationale for the differences in penchants, qualities, and faculties 
characteristic of each sex. As Gall stated in a later treatise:
“These differences explain perfectly the superiority o f intellectual faculties in 
man, and the greater energy o f  the love for children in women, etc.” (F. J.
Gall, Recherches sur lesfofictions du cerveau, I, p. 204).
More precisely, the lesser development of the frontal region of their brain, 
Gall argued in the fourth volume of his Anatomie etphysiologie (1819), accounted for 
their difficulties at grasping genuine causal relations and at forming inductive 
generalizations, the distinctive features of what was revealingly dubbed “the 
philosophical head”(F. J. Gall, Anatomie et physiologie, IV, p. 175). This 
underdevelopment resulted in women’s susceptibility to false judgments, credulity, 
prejudices and superstition:
“if  such weaknesses are more often the prerogative o f the sex, o f women in 
other respects well-educated and good-spirited, it is because the antero- 
superior parts are ordinarily subject to a considerably lesser development in 
women than in men; and, consequently, they hardly suspect that there cannot 
be an effect or an event without a cause.
In proportion as the cerebral parts located near the antero-superior region 
o f the forehead are more developed, the characteristic faculties o f  the human 
mind appear more markedly. Man raises himself higher and higher, not only 
above the beast, but also the crowd of his fellow-men” {Ibid., IV, p. 177)17.
Gall certainly thought that the last qualification applied also to men in 
general when compared to women.
Even if it was not fully faithful to his former master’s teaching, J. G. 
Spurzheim provided the English-speaking public with a summary of the somewhat 
tedious and unarticulated argument Gall had proposed, in which the links between 
the development of cerebral organs and the resulting development of mental 
dispositions were made clear:
“in general the female head is smaller than that o f the male; it is often 
somewhat longer from the forehead to the occiput, but it is commonly 
narrower laterally. The basilar region o f the female head is also smaller, the 
occipital more elongated, and the frontal developed in a minor degree, the 
organs o f  the perceptive faculties being commonly larger than those o f  the 
reflective powers” (J. G. Spurzheim, Phrenology in connexion with. .., p. 40-1)18.
To balance this somewhat negative account of women’s intellectual 
capacities19, Gall and Spurzheim both emphasized the greater development of
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affective and altruistic dispositions in women. Whereas men were generally led by 
their “instinct of propagation” because of a larger cerebellum2", Gall argued that 
the greater development of the superior part of the occipital region in women 
explained their love of children21. Drawing on the traditional medical and 
physiological lore that insisted on the reproductive and caring functions, Gall piled 
up the various instances of what he assumed to be inborn traits of women: little 
girls’ interest for dolls; the greater attachment of females to their offspring in 
animal species; the happiness of the mother when she realises she is pregnant, etc. 
He then concluded that
“The entire physical constitution o f  woman as well as her intellectual and 
moral character convince us that she is destined, more than man, to take care 
of children” (Gall, Anatomie et physiologie, III, p. 146)22.
Spurzheim merely echoed Gall when, after having drawn the attention of 
his readers to women’s more developed organs of “phUoprogenitiveness”, 
“attachment”, and “benevolence”, he finally asserted that
“It is quite evident that nature has destined the two sexes to particular and 
dissimilar situations, and that she has endowed the various dispositions o f  
each with different degrees o f  activity” (J. G. Spurzheim, Phrenolog)' in 
Connexion with. .., p. 43).
Consequently, in his writings about education, Spurzheim took advantage 
of the allegedly scientific approach of phrenology “to examine what natural claims 
[women] have to equality”. For “education”, he argued, “ought to be regulated 
according to the determination of the latter point” (J. G. Spurzheim, A  View of the 
FJementaiy Principles of Education, p. 272)23. Even if he acknowledged a few cases of 
spirited women, Spurzheim stuck to his opinion that “the two sexes, in the actual 
state of things are naturally different in their dispositions” (Jbid., p. 276). To be 
sure, the difference was a matter of intensity, not of nature, for men and women 
“possess essentially the same powers of mind, the whole difference consists in the 
degrees in which they have them” (Id.). For instance, it was the case for rational 
abilities:
“The intellectual faculties (...), like the feelings, are essentially the same in 
both sexes, are widely different in power in the two, and men undoubtedly 
enjoy the superiority” {Ibid., p. 285).
Spurzheim then went on to list the different traits that rendered women unfit for 
intellectual accomplishments: inability to focus on a definite subject, exclusive
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attention to the present, poor resistance to sustained work, failure to grasp causal 
relations, etc. All this would explain that
“In arts and sciences females rarely show themselves masters, they most 
commonly remain apprentices” (Id).
Accordingly, for Spurzheim, when one took pain to compare “the 
understanding of the two sexes”, one came to grasp why “one half of the human 
species has excluded the other half from all participation in government” (Ibid., p. 
284). Everything considered, the exclusion was legitimate because it was founded 
on the natural inequality of the sexes.
O f course, Spurzheim was aware that some, following the lead of Mary 
Wollstonecraft24, had ascribed this absence of intellectual achievements by women 
to a deficient education, and claimed that what many held to be a natural inequality 
was just the consequence of contingent social arrangements in which the female 
sex was not given a fair chance. However, Spurzheim did not find the objection 
decisive, since he held that when women engaged deliberately in pursuits requiring 
a certain amount of intellectual skills, and received the proper education in that last 
regard, they still could not rival men, as he thought the case of the fine arts 
testified. “Why then, may we ask”, Spurzheim boasted, “do their compositions so 
rarely equal those of men?” (Ibid., p. 286). The answer was straightforward: because 
no amount of training would ever instil into them what they were lacking. 
Spurzheim’s own gentlemanly conservative pronouncement followed:
“I cannot perceive any arrangement o f nature that can lead me to expect, that 
women will cease to be considered as subordinate to men. Let them 
endeavour, if they please, to acquire the same degree o f  talent, but till they 
have acquired it, let them cherish order, and exercise the virtues o f  their 
actual condition in society, rather than attempt to rise into a sphere for which 
they are not at present fitted” (Ibid., p. 288).
In the mind of Spurzheim, it was certain that such a change would never occur: 
women would remain mothers, wives, and daughters, and never would they 
become the equals, at least intellectually, of their fathers, husbands or sons. Such 
was the fate their brain dictated. By the same token, phrenology could be held to 
help to decide some of the questions raised by the debate over sexual equality: 
firstly, it maintained that mental dispositions were inborn, fixed at the outset, the 
scope of their developmental potential being determined within certain limits.
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Secondly, no amount of education could transform or modify radically the set of 
dispositions constitutive of one’s individual character.
One of the many corollaries of these propositions was that gender-related 
traits were innate and immutable. And since men, according to phrenological 
analysis, were endowed with specific character traits enabling them to achieve 
supervision in ways unavailable to women, the subjection of the latter followed 
naturally. In that respect, phrenology could support the plea for civil, political, and 
social inequality between the sexes by showing that it had a natural origin and 
justified grounds. Hence, Comte’s enthusiastic acceptance of the new “physiology 
of the brain”, which provided support for his non-egalitarian theses, and Mill’s 
pointed criticisms should come as no surprise. Let us now turn to the details of our 
two authors’ respective treatments of phrenology and its relevance for the sexual 
equality issue.
1 One -  concerning phrenology - would prove particularly important with regard to the later 
discussion on sexual equality: see infra IID & III.
2 See IB.
3 Comte referred to his Systeme de politique positive in four volumes, eventually published between 
1851 and 1854.
4 Comte singled out as objects o f praise Mill’s treatment o f induction, its presentation o f  the 
methods o f experimental inquiry, his emphasis on the deductive method, and his account o f  
sociology in the sixth book o f the System. Regarding the possible disagreements Mill evoked in his 
previous letters, Comte said he found none except that dealing with the “so-called calculation o f  
probability'” which he regarded as “a radical aberration o f the spirit o f mathematics” (Comte to 
Mill, 16 May, 1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 155).
5 The very fact that Mill associated property and marriage as two objects for possible reforms is 
quite telling: one may indeed venture that these two institutions constituted the heart o f nineteenth- 
century European (bourgeois, one could add) societies. Moreover, and that was one point developed 
at length by Mill, usual prejudices tended to regard wives as their husband’s chattel, and family as 
their property'. So, one could be prompted to think that changes in either o f  these institutions 
would bring a change in the other.
6 Quite paradoxically, Mill also maintained a few lines below that biolog)’ could back his advocacy 
for sexual equality: “Meanwhile, what I would have to say in support o f my principal heresy would 
be entirely drawn from principles o f  biology, which doubtless are very imperfect. [This] not only 
because I lack sufficient knowledge o f biology, but perhaps also due to today’s insufficiency o f  
biological theory itself as it applies to sociological speculation” (Mill to Comte, 13 July, 1843; in 
Haac [ed.], p. 174). In fact, one may surmise that Mill meant that the hypothesis o f  women’s natural 
inferiority had against it negative evidence (it had been refuted), without assuming that he could 
harvest in favour o f  the hypothesis o f natural equality positive evidence. In short, he could prove 
Comte wrong but not himself right.
7 Appendix I provides a historical account o f  the likely sources o f  Comte’s and Mill’s biological 
knowledge and intends to shed new light on the vexed question o f  Comte’s influence on Mill by 
showing how the latter drew on the former for his logical and methodological appraisal o f the life 
sciences.
8 The remaining ones were the first (“comparison between the diverse parts o f a given organism”; 




10 The history o f phrenology is now well-charted territory. For a brief and up-to-date account o f  
Gall’s life and works, see J. Van Wyhe, “The Authority' o f  Human Nature: the Schadellehre o f  Franz 
Joseph Gall”, British Journal of the History of Science, 2002, 35, pp. 17-42, which aptly complements the 
philosophically and methodologically oriented approach o f  G. Lanteri-Laura, Histoire de la phrenologie. 
E  'homme et son cerveau selon F. J. Gall. Second edition. Paris: PUF, 1993 (esp. Chap. II). On 
phrenology in France, see M. Renneville, He langage des cranes. Une histoire de la phrenologie. Paris: 
Institut d’edition Sanofi-Synrhelabo, 2000; for England, see R. Cooter, The Cultural Meaning of 
Popular Science. Phrenology and the Organisation of Consent in Nineteenth-Century Britain. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University' Press, 1984, and J. Van Wyhe, Phrenology and the Origins of Victorian Naturalism. 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004; for the United States, see J.D. Davies, Phrenology and Fad Science: a 19"'- 
Century American Crusade. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University' Press, 1955.
11 This progressive shift from a belief in equality' to an emphasis on innate differences is described 
in F. E. Manuel, “From Equality' to Orgamcism”, Journal of the History of Ideas, 1956,17:1, pp. 54-69.
12 The early phrenological treatments (that is pre-1850) o f  sexual differences have not received 
much attention from historians: two exceptions are C. Russett, Sexual Science. The Victorian 
Construction of Womanhood. Cambridge: Cambridge University' Press, 1989, pp. 19-22; and M. S. 
Staum, Labeling People. French Scholars on Society, Race, and Empire, 1815-1848. Montreal & Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University7 Press, 2003, pp. 64-5.
13 See Appendix II.
14 F. J. Gall & J. G. Spurzheim, Anatomie et physiologie du systeme nerveux en general et du cerveau en 
particulier, avec des observations sur la possibility de reconnattre plusieurs dispositions intellectuelles et morales de 
I’homme et des animaux par la configuration de leurs tetes. 4 volumes. Paris: F. Schoell, 1810 and 1812, for 
volumes I and II; Librairie grecque-latine-allemande, 1818, for volume III; N. Maze, 1819, for 
volume IV. The collaboration between the two men ceased after the second volume. References to 
that book and Gall’s Recherches sur lesfonctions du cerveau (see n. 15 infra) are made to volume, and page 
numbers.
15 The same point is maintained in F. J. Gall’s later Recherches sur les fionctions du cerveau et sur celles de 
chacune de ses parties. Six volumes. Paris: Bechet, 1822 (for vol. I); Boucher, 1822 (for vol. II) and 
1823 (for vol. Ill, IV, & V7); Bailliere: 1825 (for vol. VI): see for instance II, p. 160. See also J. G. 
Spurzheim, Observations sur la phrenologie, ou connaissance de I’homme moral et intellectuel fondee sur les fonctions 
du systeme nerveux. Paris: Treuttel & Wiirtz, 1818, p. 27: “Certain faculties are more active in men, 
others in women. It is usually claimed that man thinks and woman feels. Malebranche derived this 
difference between the two sexes from the different degree o f density7 o f their cerebral fibres. But it 
is easy to prove that, in general, the shape and development o f men’s and women’s brains vary, and 
that women have a narrower and longer head (from the forehead to the occipital bump), whereas 
men have it shorter but larger on both sides”. The same contention was repeated in his Essai 
philosophise sur la nature morale et intellectuelle de I’homme. Paris: Treuttel & Wiirtz, 1820, p. 79: “nature 
has made a distinction between the two sexes: it has given some more active faculties to women, 
and some other more energetic to men; the latter would never feel exactly like women, and the 
former would never think like men, because nature has not intended it”.
u  The description is more precise in the Recherches sur les fonctions du cerveau-. “The parts o f  the brain 
located in the antero-superior part o f the forehead are smaller in most women; hence their generally 
smaller and shorter foreheads. On the contrary7, they have the parts located near the upper part o f  
the occipital bone greatly more developed. Their cerebellum is generally smaller than that o f men” 
(F. J. Gall, Recherches sur les fonctions du cerveau, I, pp. 204-5).
17 Once again, Gall repeated this claim in his Recherches, but there he underlined that women’s lesser 
intellectual capacities was a fact primarily relative to their brain conformation and not to be ascribed 
to a larger physiological specificity' or their education: “Compare the cerebral organization o f the 
most distinguished men with regard to superior intellectual faculties with that o f almost all women, 
and you will become certain that their inferiority' in that respect is neither due to the education they 
receive nor to certain inconveniences proper to them, but is uniquely dependent on the lesser 
development o f  the cerebral parts located in the antero-superior o f  the forehead” (Ibid., V, p. 225).
18 J. G. Spurzheim, Phrenology in Connexion with the Study of Physiognomy. Boston: Marsh, Capen, & 
Ly'on, 1833.
V) In his Observations sur la folie ou Sur les derangements des fonctions morales et intellectuelles de I’homme (Paris: 
Treuttel & Wiirtz, 1818, pp. 189-91), Spurzheim also added that women were more prone to 
madness.
20 See F. J. Gall, Recherches sur les fonctions du cerveau, III, pp. 245-415. On the phrenological treatment 
o f  the instinct o f propagation, see E. Clarke & L.S. Jacyna, Nineteenth-Century Origins of Neuroscientific 
Concepts. Berkeley: University7 o f California Press, 1987, pp. 286-91; M. Shortland, “Courting the
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Cerebellum: Early Organological and Phrenological Views o f  Sexuality”, British Journal of the History 
of Science, 1987, 20, pp. 173-99.
21 See F. J. Gall, Recherches sur les fonctions du cerveau, III, pp. 415-72.
22 The same development and the same conclusion were repeated in F. J. Gall, Recherches sur les 
fonctions du cerveau, V, pp. 415-73.
23 J. G. Spurzheim, A. View of the Elementary Principles of Education, Founded on the Study of the Nature of 
Man. Edinburgh: A. Constable & Co, 1821.
24 Spurzheim’s acquaintance with Wollstonecraft’s writings seems to have been quite superficial, if  
not merely second-hand, for he misspelled her name twice in the space o f  two pages {Ibid., p. 275- 
6).
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I ll — The Phrenological Controversy.
Something momentous happened with phrenology regarding the “nature” 
of women during the course of the nineteenth century: whereas generations of 
physicians used to maintain that ‘Tota mu Her in utero\ the new ‘cerebral physiology’ 
of Gall and his associates claimed that ‘Tota mulier in cerebrd. This shift did not 
escape Comte’s notice, as his insistence on the key-role of phrenology in the 
setdement o f the sexual equality issue illustrated. As he put it in the Cours with 
regard to women’s subjection:
“I have purposely set aside the vulgar consideration o f  the mere material 
differences on which this fundamental subordination has been irrationally 
grounded [i.e. anatomical differences merely concerning the body]; for it has 
to be essentially connected, as previous indications have shown, with the 
nobler properties o f  our cerebral nature” (A. Comte, PS, p. 187).
Accordingly, this chapter intends to present the manner in which Comte 
appealed to phrenology to substantiate his case for women’s subjection (IIIA). I 
then show that Comte’s reliance on phrenology in the case of sexual equality was a 
particular instance of a more general endorsement of the new “physiology of the 
brain” as a legitimate approach to the study of mental phenomena (IIIB). Thirdly, 
I discuss the exact content of the various criticisms levelled at phrenology by Mill 
and show how they were compatible with his naturalism.(IIIC).
Now, a reader conversant with the Comte-Mill correspondence may object 
that my reconstruction of the discussion deliberately ignores the fact that the topic 
of phrenology was addressed before, and independendy of, the debate on sexual 
equality. To this objection, I reply with the following interpretative hypothesis.
If the discussion on the scientific status of phrenology cropped up in the 
correspondence, it was because Mill was aware of the crucial role it played in 
Comte’s case for women’s subjection. Accordingly Mill intended to defuse Comte’s 
sexist argument by demonstrating that phrenology, the allegedly scientific basis on 
which it was grounded and to which it conferred some sort of naturalistic prestige, 
did not deliver what Comte needed. Furthermore, what Mill aimed at was not 
merely to show that the actual results borrowed from phrenology were either false 
or unwarranted and hence unreliable as evidence for the settlement of the sexual 
equality issue, or that they did not lead to the sexist conclusions reached by Comte 
(as I show in this chapter), but also that biology could never be the appropriate
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basis on which to draw sociological inferences (as I show in the following chapter). 
Consequendy, even if the purely methodological nature of the discussion in the 
correspondence cannot be denied, one has to acknowledge that what sparked the 
debate was Mill’s political and moral concern for the likely practical consequences 
of Comte’s endorsement of phrenology.
A — Comte and the Phrenological Support for Women’s Subjection.
Comte never failed to emphasize the importance of the phrenological 
argument in his case for sexual inequality. As already noted, the Cours de philosophic 
positive singled out “the important theory of Gall” as the branch of the “sound 
biological philosophy” most capable of refuting the “chimerical revolutionary 
pronouncements concerning the alleged equality of the two sexes” (A. Comte, PS, 
p. 186). The correspondence with Mill revealed no change in perspective:
“one can consider that this doctrine [Gall’s] has already sufficiently 
established the basic principle o f  the hierarchy in the family, at least as far as 
biolog)- alone can do” (Comte to Mill, November 14, 1843; in Haac [ed.], p.
208). ’
However, the correspondence improved over the Cours in at least one respect: it 
provided more precise references to the phrenological literature dealing with the 
sexual equality issue. Accordingly, Comte refereed Mill to some of J. G. 
Spurzheim’s books, namely
“his Observations sur la Phrenologie1, the Essaiphilosopbique sur les facultes morales et 
intellectuelle/, his book on education3, and (...)  his work on madness4” (Id.).
In the preceding paragraph, Comte also mentioned F.J Gall’s Anatomie et physiologie 
du systeme nerveux en general et du cerveau enparticulie?, and he evoked, without quoting 
its title, the Recherches sur les fonctions du cerveau et sur cedes de chacune de sesparties6.
As seen in the previous chapter, these works provided purported evidence 
for the claim that women were intellectually and morally inferior. Yet, as Comte 
acknowledged, they never addressed the issue of sexual equality7 for its own sake: 
“The subordination of one sex to the other”, he regretted, “is not directly 
examined in these books” (Id.). But he certainly thought this shortcoming could be 
remedied if one took the pain to draw from the scientific appraisal of women’s 
capacities the appropriate social and political consequences.
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Comte’s insistence on underlining the importance of phrenology was not 
merely an attempt on his part to support by whatever means available his sexist 
claims. Comte genuinely regarded the new “phrenological physiology” as a 
progressive attempt to establish on secure grounds a scientific knowledge of man. 
As the question of sexual equality illustrated, it could also crucially contribute to a 
rational handling of pressing political problems such as the determination of 
individuals’ social roles, the legitimisation of existing hierarchies, or the definition 
of the aim and structure of the educational system. For instance, just as it was said 
to settle negatively the case for women’s equality, phrenology could also be 
“operationalized”, to use Jan Goldstein’s phrase, for the adjudication of the claims 
of other unruly groups, such as the working class7. In this regard, the importance 
of phrenology as a tool of social ordering should not be overlooked, for its analysis 
of human capacities could be applied to the organization of society at large.
In his correspondence with Mill, Comte hinted at that social dimension of 
phrenology. In a letter dated March 4, 1842, Comte claimed that phrenology was 
the appropriate ground of what he called “a truly rational theory of human 
nature”(in Haac [ed.], p. 58), that is the basis on which to establish sociolog}7, 
which was the science with which he had what he had most concerned himself. 
What was the nature of the relations between them? As seen previously, Comte 
held mankind to be a sociable species that demanded to be organized in a 
hierarchic manner so as to satisfy the needs of its members. This hierarchic 
structure rested in its turn on the respective capacities of the different individuals 
(their “nature”), which defined their social role and status. What phrenology told 
us, Comte maintained, was that there existed several independent cerebral organs 
on which these capacities depended, and that “there [was] even a first general 
division of the brain into three areas which correspond [ed] to three types of 
manifestations” (Id.), namely that of the animal, the moral, and the intellectual 
faculties. When read in the light of the social theorization of the Cours, there is no 
doubt that these three cerebral areas could correspond to Comte’s schematization 
of the three kinds of faculties, namely the intellectual, affective, and active or 
practical faculties. Since Comte thought that each of these three kinds o f faculties 
were designed so as to satisfy specific needs (need for knowledge, need for 
affection, need for subsistence), the consequence on the sociological level was 
straightforward: everybody would be assigned, conformably with their particular
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biological make-up, a specific role in society. Those in which the intellectual 
faculties dominate would become “savantf\ those whose active qualities were most 
developed would join the group of practical individuals (as proletarians or 
entrepreneurs), and those with highly developed affective qualities would form the 
third group. From what we have learnt from the previous chapter, we know who 
would be the members of the latter group: women, of course, whereas men will be 
distributed into the two remaining groups.
At this point, one may object that I am actually over-interpreting Comte 
and that, in this letter, he never presented as such the relations between biology 
and sociolog)7. To be sure, the link was not made explicitly, but it was nonetheless 
implied by Comte’s final words:
“As far as I am concerned, it [cerebral physiology] has certainly been o f great 
use and you must have discovered in my fourth and fifth volumes what 
extensive use I was able to make o f it, while avoiding misplaced or premature 
conclusions” (Ibid., p. 59)
Since we know that Comte, in the fourth and the fifth volumes of the 
Cours, had theorized the social role of women in the light of their alleged “nature”, 
and given that this letter stated out in full on the basis of which kind of knowledge 
such a theorization had been made, one may reasonably assume that Comte 
regarded his treatment of sexual equality as an instance of the application of 
phrenology to the organization of society.
Now, when all these elements are considered together, it would be very 
unlikely that such a perceptive reader as Mill had missed the political and moral 
consequences of Comte’s endorsement of phrenology. This may explain why the 
latter subject cropped up as a matter worth debating even before Comte and Mill 
broached the issue of sexual equality, and why Mill felt the need to engage the 
discussion.
B — Comte’s Methodological Appraisal of Phrenology.
Comte presented his “General Considerations on the Positive Study of 
Intellectual and Moral, or Cerebral, Functions”, that his views on phrenology, in 
the Forty-Fifth Lesson of the Cours de philosophic positive 8. The very fact that he
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dedicated an entire Lesson to the subject testifies to its importance in Comte’s 
system.
The advent of phrenology, claimed Comte, was momentous because it 
marked the final phase of an epoch-making process in the history of science: the 
extension of the positive method, characterized by its focus on phenomena and its 
search for laws, to the workings of the human mind. According to Comte, “Gall’s 
immortal works” (A. Comte, PP, p. 872) could be considered the legitimate 
continuation of the Cartesian enterprise. Just as Descartes’ mechanistic explanation 
of physical and biological phenomena superseded the metaphysical approach of 
the Scholastics, phrenology had introduced positivity in the study of mental 
phenomena. In fact, Comte suggested,
“the primitive distribution o f  the intellectual system into the positive and the 
metaphysical method, as Descartes instituted it ( ...)  is, without a doubt, an 
indispensable concession this great renovator could not (...)  refrain from 
making to the general spirit o f  his century and to the irresistible influence of 
his own education” (Ibid., p. 852).
The great divide, instituted in the Meditations, between res cogitans and res extensa, 
mind and matter, was illusory: the former had to be investigated like the latter, 
according to the same methods. Just as one could study the digestive function by 
dissecting the different organs and analysing the tissues performing it, one could 
attempt to determine the organic conditions of mental events in the same spirit, 
and this formed an essential part of anatomy and physiology.
The main agent of this “fortunate philosophical revolution”, Comte went 
on, was the “illustrious Gall”, whose works constituted the basis of a “new system 
of studies of intellectual and moral man” (Ibid., p. 846-9). However, Comte was 
also wary of emphasizing that, even if phrenological investigations represented the 
“unquestionable beginnings of posivity” in the science of man, phrenology itself 
was not “a mature science, but a science still entirely in the making, except for its 
philosophical principles which had been properly established by Gall” (Ibid., p. 
851). Accordingly, a good part of the Forty-Fifth Lesson was devoted to the 
clarification of the methodological principles governing the new “phrenological 
physiology” (Id.), the critical appraisal of some of its shortcomings, and the 
introduction of a few improvements designed to remedy those.
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His definition of the “positive theory of affective and intellectual 
functions” left no mystery as to Comte’s endorsement of Gall’s localisationist 
thesis, for he considered it as
“the study, at one and the same time experimental and rational, o f the various 
phenomena o f internal sensibility peculiar to the cerebral ganglions which are 
deprived o f  immediate external apparatus” {Ibid., p. 849).
Anatomically speaking, all mental phenomena were primarily dependent on the 
brain for their production. And even if P.-J. G. Cabanis had popularised the idea 
that the brain produced thought just like the liver secreted bile, only Gall could 
claim to have conceived the relations between mind and brain in their full extent 
since he was the first to demonstrate that both the intellectual and the affective 
functions were ascribable to the latter.
As for the physiological aspect of Gall’s theory, Comte held that the two 
“philosophical principles” (Ibid., p. 863) on which it was based and which were 
intended to provide a rationale for the origin and functioning of the various mental 
faculties, namely the Innateness thesis and the Modularity Thesis, were “beyond 
questioning” {Id.). Comte in fact thought that cases of strong characters and 
specific talents were evidence for the former principle, whereas mental disorders, 
which often affected one disposition but left the others intact, proved the latter. 
He also held that the comparative observation of man and animals supported both 
theses, since education could certainly not explain animal behaviours, whose 
diversity could be accounted for by known differences in their cerebral 
constitution. He added that Gall’s theory was only “the scientific formulation of 
the general results of universal experience with respect to the true intellectual and 
moral constitution of man in all times and in all places” (Ibid,’, p. 864), a 
convergence he regarded as the “essential symptom of the truth” {Id.) of 
phrenology, since the “competence” of common sense was “indisputable regarding 
phenomena whose very nature subjects them to its continuous and careful 
scrutiny” (Id.). As seen previously, it was indeed the fact that phrenology 
corroborated the “vulgar’s view” of women as creatures endowed with more 
energetic affective faculties but less active intellectual dispositions.
These three theses set the very aim of phrenological investigations:
“The proper and elementary object o f  phrenological physiology consists in 
(...)  determining, as accurately as possible, the cerebral organ specific to each 
disposition, affective or intellectual, expressed markedly and clearly
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acknowledged as being at the same time simple and new; or, conversely, what 
is more difficult, in determining which part o f the encephalic mass displaying 
the true anatomical conditions o f  a distinct organ governs a given function”
{Ibid., p. 865)9.
Comte acknowledged that the homogeneous constitution of cerebral ganglions and 
the absence of sharp observable distinctions in the cerebrum were serious 
obstacles to the second mode of inquiry — from organ to function. Moreover, he 
asserted that in man the affective and intellectual functions tended to occupy “less 
and less extended portions of the encephalic mass” (Ibid., p. 866) compared with 
animals, which would render their identification difficult. But he suggested that 
pathological anatomy (whose ‘natural experiments’ identified precisely the cerebral 
localizations on which depended mental disorders, that is the pathological 
functioning of a specific disposition) and comparative anatomy (which would 
correlate the development of brain organs with that of cerebral functions in the 
animal scale) would help solve this predicament. Moreover, Comte held that the 
mode of inquiry which proceeded from function to organ would compensate for 
the scarce anatomical data: the physiological approach, relying on the systematic 
observation of overt behaviours, would enable one to draw a list of the elementary 
faculties from which tentative localizations could be ventured.
Now, Comte was not blind to the fact that Gall actually operated according 
to that second mode for his own brain charts and that his attempts at localizing 
functions had been heavily criticized by anatomists who claimed that ablations or 
clinical evidence did not corroborate Gall’s hypotheses and therefore rejected his 
physiological approach. Comte acknowledged that these objections were “difficult 
to dismiss” and agreed that the set of actual localizations proposed by Gall was 
“notoriously incorrect in many essential respects” (Ibid., p. 871). However, and 
despite its factual inaccuracy, Comte claimed that Gall’s attempt at localizing “was 
not only legitimate, but also an unquestionable instance of the general right of 
naturalists to frame hypotheses” (Id.).
Drawing on the theory of physical hypotheses exposed in the Twenty- 
Eighth Lesson of the Cours, Comte claimed that Gall’s erroneous localizations 
nonetheless satisfied the epistemological standard characteristic of genuine 
scientific conjectures. According to that theory, only propositions “susceptible, by 
their own nature, of a more or less remote but clearly inevitable positive 
verification and whose degree of precision would be in exact harmony with the one
67
characteristic of the corresponding phenomena” (Ibid., p.457) were legitimate. In 
this regard, it was indeed the case that Gall’s localizations assigned, at least in 
theory, precise and definite portions of the brain to the various intellectual and 
affective functions, which assignations it was the office of the anatomists to test by 
way of observations and experiments (when possible) or by resorting to clinical 
evidence or observations drawn from comparative anatomy. Just as the positive 
theory of disease emerged with Bichat’s pathological anatomy (which correlated 
the different kinds of diseases with the various human tissues) and Broussais’ 
theory of irritation (which related diseases to excessive irritation of certain organs), 
the same could be expected for the study of intellectual and affective functions. To 
be sure, Gall’s phrenological charts were proved wrong, but that was because they 
were falsifiable. Moreover, and in line with the anti-inductivist stance he took with 
regard to theory-formation, Comte held that a false hypothesis was better than no 
hypothesis at all, since it launched the search for a better one. Hence, Comte 
concluded, Gall’s attempts at localizing were legitimate.
The fruitfulness of such attempts, Comte argued, was already illustrated by 
the fact that some of Gall’s localizations had been corroborated by anatomical 
investigation, which was evidence that all “actual organs of the various cerebral 
faculties, even if they are not yet identified, are likely to be so in the future” (Ibid., 
p. 872): the case in point was that of the love of offspring or
“philoprogenitiveness”, which was located in the posterior lobes of the brain, and 
that of the instinct of propagation or “amativeness”, in the cerebellum10.
Moreover, and although he refused to pronounce on the exact number and 
locations of fundamental functions, Comte nonetheless enthusiastically endorsed 
the “general doctrine” (Ibid., p. 866) of Gall, that is his distinction between 
intellectual and affective functions, the former being located in the posterior and 
middle parts of the brain whereas the latter occupied its anterior part, which only 
represented between a quarter and a sixth of the total mass of the encephalon. This 
discrepancy in volume, Comte claimed, established the prominence of affective 
functions over intellectual ones, for it materialized the principle that intelligence 
was only a means to fulfil certain ends fixed beforehand.
The value of Gall and Spurzheim’s theory became even more obvious with 
the acknowledgement of the relevance of the distinction they operated within the 
two kinds of faculties11. On the one hand, they distinguished affective dispositions
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into penchants (located in the posterior part of the brain) and sentiments or 
affections (located in the middle part of the brain). Penchants, Comte explained, 
referred to the most fundamental needs of the individual and his family with regard 
to self-conservation, such as reproduction, education of the offspring, feeding, 
shelter, etc., whereas sentiments related to social feelings (love of approbation, 
benevolence, etc.). On the other hand, they identified, within intellectual faculties, 
reflective or “combinational” (I b i d p. 867) faculties (located in the antero-superior 
part of the frontal region) and perceptual ones (occupying the rest of the frontal 
region). These classificatory refinements, argued Comte, confirmed and explained
“the unquestionable distinction, which had been vaguely established in all 
times by the good sense o f  the vulgar, between what is called the heart, the 
character, and the mind, a distinction that scientific theories will from now on 
represent with accuracy by referring to the groups o f  faculties which 
correspond respectively to the posterior, middle, and anterior parts o f the 
cerebral system” (Ibid., p. 867).
However, Comte also pointed out some shortcomings of phrenology, 
which he thought were evidence of the fact that
“intellectual and moral physiology' is conceived and cultivated today in too 
irrational and too narrow a manner, whose influence, as long as it survives, 
will necessarily be an insurmountable obstacle to any genuine progress o f  a 
doctrine which has not really achieved any significant step since its 
foundation” (Ibid., p. 881).
The most evident sign of this backwardness was the “outrageous 
multiplication of the fundamental faculties” (Ibid., p. 875), which increased from 
twenty-nine in Gall to thirty-five in Spurzheim. For instance, Comte recalled, an 
“alleged fundamental mathematical aptitude”(Id.) had been introduced to account 
for the ability of certain individuals to excel in this field. But, on that account, why 
not postulate a chemical or an anatomical aptitude?
“Unless a sensible philosophy calls to a halt such a habit, every7 phrenologist 
will soon create a faculty7 and an organ if the case seems appropriate” (Ibid., p.
874).
This first shortcoming, Comte argued, was the consequence of the 
phrenologists’ neglect of the “association, either synergic or sympathetic, of the 
diverse phrenological functions” (Ibid., p. 879), that is the taking into account of 
the diverse interactions of the various faculties which gave rise to actual mental 
acts. In most thought processes, he suggested, different abilities were involved, 
even if the result seemed unique. Comte maintained that
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“In the absence o f such a fundamental consideration, the number o f  
penchants, sentiments, or aptitudes, would almost seem likely to be increased 
indefinitely. (...) In general, without the diverse cerebral synergies, either 
between the two orders [intellectual and affective] o f  fundamental faculties, 
or between the different functions o f  each order, it would be impossible to 
analyze judiciously most o f actual acts” (Id.).
To remedy these shortcomings, Comte recommended five methodological 
improvements. Firsdy, he advocated the renewal of anatomical investigation, which 
most phrenologists too readily abandoned after Gall’s pioneering work. Only a 
more detailed knowledge of the nervous system (taking into account the volume, 
weight, and circulatory activity of the different cerebral organs) could lend 
credence to phrenological localizations: if functions were to be ascribed to specific 
organs in the brain, the identification of these organs had to be made by way of 
observable anatomical features. Comte did not ignore the fact that the “lesser 
dissimilarity and the greater proximity” (Ibid., p. 873) of the cerebral organs made 
such a task a difficult one, but he refused to exempt physiological phrenology from 
a requirement that had been crucial to the development of other branches of 
physiology, such as the study of digestion, respiration, or locomotion.
“Although it is generally agreed that the analysis o f functions must 
undoubtedly shed much light on that o f  the organs, the breaking down o f  the 
organism into systems, and o f  systems into organs, is by its nature no less 
independent from physiological analysis, to which, in turn, it serves as an 
essential preliminary basis, as all physiologists today agree with regard to the 
other branches o f biological studies. (...). For, granted that the philosophical 
aim o f any biological theory is (...) to establish an exact harmony between 
physiological and anatomical analysis, it obviously presupposes that neither 
had been modeled on the other, and that each had been achieved 
independently beforehand” (Id).
Conversely, and that was the second improvement Comte suggested, more 
attention should have to be paid to the analysis of functions, which should “add to 
the general and direct observation of man and society, a judicious physiological 
appraisal of the most pronounced individual cases, with a special consideration of 
the past” (Ibid., p. 875). For instance, with regard to intellectual abilities, a thorough 
analysis of the achievements of great scientists would help to draw a definitive list 
of the most elementary dispositions necessary for abstract thinking. And by doing 
so, one would also stop the unnecessary multiplication of faculties.
“Whatever the extreme variety o f  the diverse animal natures, or even that o f  
the different human types, may be, it is nevertheless the case that, since 
genuine acts almost always presuppose the cooperation o f several 
fundamental faculties, this actual multiplicity, even if  it were greater, would be 
sufficiently represented by a very small number o f  elementary functions
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relative to the two kinds into which the moral and the intellectual order are 
subdivided” (Id.).
The obvious methodological benefit expected by Comte from the 
independent pursuit of anatomical and physiological analysis was that the former 
could serve as corroborating evidence for the latter (if a function was fundamental, 
it had to correspond to a cerebral organ) and vice versa (if an organ was singled out 
anatomically, it had to be responsible for a definite function). Furthermore, the 
very fact that the two analyses were conducted separately was supposed to 
guarantee that when they matched, it would not be because the endorsement of 
one hypothesis had biased the researcher with regard to the other.
Thirdly, Comte emphasized the usefulness of clinical evidence drawn from 
the consideration of psycho-pathological phenomena: given that, according to 
Broussais’s principle of the continuity of normal and pathological states and the 
cerebral etiology of mental diseases accepted by most alienists, these disorders 
were caused by an excessive irritation of the brain and resulted in specific 
alterations of certain affective and intellectual dispositions (the various mania), the 
minute survey of these affections would therefore shed light on the most 
fundamental mental functions (because madness “tends to bring them out 
forcefully by displaying each of them in a predominant exaltation, which 
distinguishes it neatly from all the others”[Ibid., p. 877]), and their specific seats 
(which became easier to localize because they were distinguished by certain 
anatomical features).
Fourthly, Comte called for a wider use of the comparative method in the 
study of mental functions. For, since man was after all an animal, it was likely that 
he shared with other animals a certain number of affective and intellectual 
functions whose origin and development would be more easily grasped if referred 
to the entire animal scale. If one was searching for fundamental functions, Comte 
held, that was certainly the best way to find them:
“Cerebral faculties, intellectual or affective, being the necessary complement 
o f animal life as such, it would be difficult to conceive that all those which are 
genuinely fundamental would not be, by the same token, absolutely common, 
in whatever degree, to all higher animals, and maybe to the entire group o f  
the Osteozoa” (Ibid., p. 878).
Fifthly, more attention paid to the various synergies and sympathies 
existing between the different functions (which would stop the inflation in faculties 
characteristic of phrenology) n, and between the brain and other organs ( which
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would give a more realistic turn to phrenology, since the brain was only “a 
necessary mediation between the action of the external world on the animal 
through sensorial impressions and the final reaction of the animal by way of 
muscular contractions”^ /^ ., p. 880]) would guarantee the study of the mental 
functions “an enduring weight [“consistence”, in French], and a rational 
development, which would eventually secure its right to be heard within the 
scholarly world” {Ibid., p. 873).
However, the fruits reaped from phrenology were not merely theoretical, 
for practical outcomes were also in view. To be sure, Comte recalled, many of its 
opponents inveighed against its alleged denial of human freedom. If mental 
dispositions were held to be inborn, how could one be free of choosing how to 
behave? If the conduct of individuals was constrained by their innate affective and 
intellectual endowments, how could they be praised for their virtues or blamed for 
their vices? What of responsibility?
Comte did not dismiss the objection but thought it depended on an 
erroneous understanding of natural causation. He thus suggested that one should 
not conflate determinism, i.e. “the subordination of phenomena to invariable 
laws”, with fatalism, i.e. “their necessary and irresistible realization” (Ibid., p. 869). 
Comte claimed that the more complex a phenomenon was, the more modifiable it 
became, since its complexity presupposed its dependence on distinct and 
independent sets of conditions, the presence or the absence of each of which 
conditioned the production or non-production of the given phenomenon. Given 
that mental acts required an extremely diverse set of conditions (physical, chemical, 
biological, and social), their advent became “less and less irresistible, because the 
conditions on which they necessarily [depended] exhibited more and more varied 
combinations”^ .) .
Moreover, Comte made clear that phrenology only argued for the existence 
of dispositions to act, but never maintained that the acts derived mechanically from 
the dispositions: the interaction with the environment was a crucial element in the 
process leading to action. Furthermore, continued Comte, Gall and Spurzheim 
emphasized that
“real acts almost always depend on the joint action o f  several fundamental 
faculties” and that “exercise can greatly develop any faculty, just as inactivity 
tends to starve them” {Ibid., p. 870).
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and also maintained that
“the intellectual faculties, which are directly and naturally meant to modify the 
general conduct o f  the animal in accordance with the variable demands o f  its 
situation, mav greatlv alter the practical influence o f  all the other faculties”
(Id.).
In short, claimed Comte, phrenology neither denied the relevance of circumstances 
for the understanding or explanation of one’s behaviour, nor discarded the role of 
reason in the shaping of one’s character, but rather integrated both considerations 
in a more encompassing perspective, which took into account the biological, and 
especially cerebral, endowment of individuals, that is their “human nature”, and 
thereby set the proper limits of its potential development.
“It is therefore vainly (..) that the charge o f ignoring the great influence o f  
education, and o f its necessary legislative extension, has been leveled against 
physiology' because it fixes judiciously the true general limits o f their power”
(Id).
Since a rational education supposed both the existence of the various elementary' 
faculties and the knowledge of the laws of their respective development and of the 
ways they interacted with one another, the establishment and diffusion of 
phrenological expertise was a crucial element in any attempt at reorganizing 
society.
Eventually, as Comte had noticed earlier in the Forty-Fifth Lesson, a 
fortunate counterpart of this focus on cerebral organization was that it permitted 
the defintive refutation of some faulty conceptions of human learning. For 
instance, Comte claimed that Gall’s innatism dealt a lethal blow to the 
sensationalism of the French school from Condillac to the Ideologues, for it 
demonstrated that the acquisition of knowledge depended on inborn capacities to 
collect and organize the data at hand, and was not the mere result of its passive 
reception by the mind. Furthermore, phrenology refuted Claude-Adrien Helvetius’ 
“absurd hypothesis”, popularized in his influential book De I’Esprit (1758), of the 
“fundamental equality of all human intelligences, in so far as they are endowed 
with the same external senses”(Jbid., p. 862), and his “absurd exaggerations as to 
the unlimited power of education”(Id), since it drew attention to the fact that 
inter-individual differences in intellectual capacities were not primarily due to the 
individuals’ experience but to their cerebral constitution13. Hence Comte’s 
conclusion:
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“so it is, after all, for cerebral physiology alone to give the philosophical 
problem o f education its rational formulation” (Ibid., p. 870).
Given that phrenology had pronounced women unfit for intellectual 
pursuits because of their cerebral constitution, any attempt at educating them 
would in the end fail. From this followed a straightforward conclusion: their 
present situation of subjection to their fathers, husbands or brothers was the most 
conducive both to their own happiness and to that of society because it was the 
only one compatible with the order of things. It was the nature of their brain that 
dictated women’s fate and role in the “body politic”.
As it now clearly appears, even if he was critical of phrenology14, Comte 
nonetheless held that the theoretical basis on which it was grounded offered “a real 
knowledge of human nature (...), extremely superior to anything that has been 
attempted so far” (Ibid., p. 869). Furthermore, he had no doubt that a more 
positive phrenological physiology developed along the lines he had set would be 
“one of the main elements by which the philosophy of the nineteenth-century 
[would] definitively [distinguish] itself from that of the previous centuries” (Ibid’, p. 
881). Accordingly, one may say that the Cours gave an altogether favorable account 
of phrenology, which did not fail to underline some of its most serious 
shortcomings but also expressed confidence about its prospects. Moreover, by its 
acknowledgement that it offered an appropriate grasp of the “true fundamental 
faculties of human nature” (Ibid., p. 877), it made explicit its relation with “social 
physics” or sociology: the latter “necessarily [took] its immediate roots in biological 
science” (Ibid., p. 882). Therefore, to Mill’s call for the development of “a more 
profound knowledge of human nature, both in its general and in its particular 
applications” (Mill to Comte, September 10, 1842, in Haac [ed.], p. 102) as a 
necessary condition for the settlement of the sexual equality issue, Comte replied 
that phrenology was the most appropriate candidate for the title of “science of 
human nature”.
C -  Mill on Phrenology.
Whereas Comte’s estimate of phrenology is easy to analyse, Mill’s judgment 
on the new “physiology of the brain” is more to difficult to assess since he never 
broached the topic directly or for its own sake. However, as Appendix V shows, it 
is likely that Mill was familiar with the basics of phrenology, given that the first
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years of his intellectual career (the 1830s) were coeval with an intense period of 
phrenological agitation in England.
Accordingly, Mill could not have failed to measure the influence of 
phrenology as a tactical element in the discourse of many social reformers. But 
even if some of them shared certain political goals of the Utilitarians (notably the 
advent of a society cleared of the vestiges of the older social structures and led in 
accordance with reason, not custom or theology), the innatist component of 
phrenology — however mitigated by a possible improvement of one’s nature by way 
of exercise — clashed with the environmental sensationalism of J.S. Mill and his 
associates. From a methodological point of view, Mill was entided to think that the 
scientific status of phrenology had not been established, and that none of its 
specific claims had yet been vindicated. All this might explain Mill’s candid avowal 
to Comte that he had “long regarded this field, at least in its present state, as 
unworthy of occupying the mind of a true thinker” (Mill to Comte, February 25, 
1842; Ibid., pp. 53-4). However, Mill also recognized that Comte’s powerful case 
for phrenology in the Cours de pbilosophie positive had modified his own stance on the 
topic. It was not that Mill was entirely convinced by Comte’s arguments, but the 
latter’s belief in the importance of phrenology prompted him to
“develop (...) a mature opinion, as well based as possible on a subject which
by necessity must exert great influence on [his] future speculations” (Ibid., p.
54).
Behind Mill’s sudden interest in phrenology indeed lay his awareness that Comte’s 
plea for the subjection of women crucially depended on the soundness of
phrenology. Hence the “necessity” of tackling the subject head-on in the
correspondence.
As seen above, Comte had unambiguously stated in the Cours his views on 
both the achievements of phrenology and the improvements it called for. His 
account provided a starting-point for Mill’s theorizing and conditioned his manner 
of dealing with the subject. Yet, Mill’s line of reasoning was not constrained by the 
terms in which Comte chose to address the phrenological issue. Although some 
letters (especially at the start of the correspondence) give the impression that Mill 
merely intended to accommodate Comte’s ideas15, the general tenor of his 
pronouncements indicates that he was determined to demonstrate to Comte the 
cogency of his views on phrenology. However, the strength of Mill’s resolution can
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be grasped only if, in addition to a close reading of the correspondence with 
Comte16, a minute analysis of the first editions of the System of Logic is carried out in 
parallel1'. Similarly, Comte’s rejoinders in the correspondence18, which were often 
elusive, must be read in the light of the phrenological developments of the Cours.
The best way to uncover Mill’s strategy must start from the statement of 
what one takes to be his goal when he decided to engage the phrenological debate. 
As argued earlier, Mill (1) wanted to show that the actual results borrowed from 
phrenology were either false or unwarranted and hence unreliable as evidence for 
the settlement of the sexual equality7 issue, and (2) that, in any case, sociological 
inferences could not be drawn from biology alone. The first claim raises a factual 
objection against phrenological results and questions their evidential power on 
methodological grounds: it was simply not the case that phrenology supported the 
sexist conclusions reached by Comte, and that failure, argued Mill, resulted 
primarily from the inadequate heuristic and probative standard adopted by most of 
its practitioners. The second claim, to which I will turn in the next chapter, is 
concerned with the architectonic of the “moral sciences”, that is the interplay of 
the different disciplines studying human phenomena: even if it were the case that 
phrenology could become a reliable source of information, Mill claimed, on its 
own it could never succeed in producing genuine sociological explanations and 
predictions. To distinguish these claims is crucial for the understanding of Mill’s 
attitude towards Comte, especially in the correspondence, since it enables one to 
explain how, at one and the same time, Mill agreed with Comte that an improved 
phrenology could be of use whilst remaining convinced that such an improvement 
would not alter the grounds on which the sexual equality issue could be settled.
1 - The Scientific Nature of the Phrenological Hypothesis.
As to the first claim, Mill made clear that what was at stake was not the 
cogency of the phrenological hypothesis itself, but the absence of justificatory 
instances for it. The problem was set explicitly in the second section of chapter IV 
(“O f the Laws of the Mind”), Book VI, of the System. Mill summarized as follows 
the conjecture ventured by “many eminent physiologists”, including phrenologists, 
as to the relations between higher mental phenomena such as thoughts, emotions, 
and volitions and their material substratum19:
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“These contend that a thought (for example) is as much the result o f  nervous 
agency, as a sensation: that some particular state o f our nervous system, in 
particular o f that central portion o f  it called the brain, invariably precedes, 
and is presupposed by, every state o f  consciousness. According to this theory, 
one state o f mind is never really produced bv another: all are produced by 
states o f  body” (J.S. Mill, SL, VI, IV, 2, p. 850)'.
In line with the conception of causal explanation developed in Book III of the 
System, Mill claimed that, if it were the case that “laws of mind”, that is uniformities 
o f succession among states of mind, turned out be derivative from “laws of body”, 
that is laws of succession of bodily states, the former could be deduced from the 
latter because genuine causal efficacy was in fact restricted to the domain of 
nervous phenomena. In other words, provided one could prove that these 
material phenomena were the unconditional causes of mental phenomena, it would 
result that the “laws of body” should be considered the “ultimate” laws on which 
depended “laws of mind”. It would have been difficult for Mill to raise an in­
principle objection to this attempt at fleshing out the inferential structure of 
science, for he explicidy agreed that to explain a phenomenon is to deduce it from 
unconditional uniformities, and that the fewer the number of uniformities the 
better. Accordingly, the physiological hypothesis Mill discussed, if substantiated, 
would certainly constitute a notable advance in tenns of simplicity, systematicity, 
explanatory power, and perhaps predictability. In the case of mental phenomena, it 
offered a straightforward answer to the central question of the “investigation of 
nature”, namely that of knowing what “are the fewest general propositions from 
which all the uniformities existing in nature could be deduced” (/£«/., Ill, XII, 6, p. 
472): for “laws of mind”, “laws of body” were perfect candidates.
In case the physiological deduction obtained, what were the implications 
for the epistemic status of the “laws of mind”? As F. Wilson underlines, the 
hypothesis under scrutiny constitutes the core of what is now known as 
epiphenomenalism understood as the “doctrine that body is causally productive of 
mind, but that mind is not causally productive of body”(F. Wilson, Psychological 
Analysis, p. 304). On this conception, the corollary of holding mental uniformities 
as mere empirical generalizations amounted to depriving them of any explanatory 
power: the relevant way of accounting for the advent of a given mental state 
invoked nomological propositions bearing on nervous events but dispensed with 
mental regularities, because the latter were only parasitic on the former. 
Accordingly, concluded Mill, if epiphenomenalism were right,
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“there would be no original mental laws, no laws o f  Mind in the sense in 
which I use the term, at all: and mental science would be a mere branch, 
though the highest and most recondite branch, o f the science o f  
physiology”(J.S. Mill, SL, VI, IV, 2, p. 850).
With the leveling down of “laws of mind” to the status of descriptive 
generalizations, the project of accounting psychologically for mental events had to 
be given up, for it would simply not be able to reach the only scientifically 
significant level of explanation, that of causes. However, it did not follow, on Mill’s 
interpretation of the epiphenomenalist hypothesis, that “laws of the mind” had to 
be eliminated or regarded as illusory: it was not the reality of uniformities of mental 
successions that was denied, but their explanatory power. Just as the smoke was a 
mere side effect of the machine that produced it, states of the mind were mere side 
effects of states of body. But still they were real, as real as the smoke was.
To be sure, the kind of epiphenomenalism Mill was discussing extended 
beyond the ranks of phrenologists. If what was at stake was the endorsement of 
the proposition that states of mind causally depended on states of the brain, many 
physiologists of the day, despite their opposition to phrenology, certainly qualified 
as epiphenomenalists. For what they generally objected to in phrenology7 was the 
unwarranted modular conception of brain functions and its dubious cranioscopic 
pronouncements. On the other hand, they enthusiastically supported the 
assumption of a unilateral causal relation existing between states of the brain and 
states of mind, so long as it was compatible with a more unitary view of the 
cerebral workings.
However, there is little doubt that the target of Mill, at least in the first 
edition of the System, was the phrenological movement and those it inspired. As he 
took pain to specify in the 1843 version, Mill singled out Comte’s interpretation of 
phrenology20 as perfecdy representative of the sort of epiphenomenalism he had 
just described, especially
“when he claims the scientific cognizance o f moral and intellectual 
phenomena exclusively for physiologists” (Id).
When it came to assess the soundness of the phrenological version of the 
epiphenomenalist hypothesis, Mill was at one with Comte’s estimate of its genuine 
positivity. In a footnote of the chapter “O f the Limits of the Explanation of Laws 
of Nature; and of Hypotheses” of Book III of the System, Mill argued that
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“the attempt to localize, in different regions o f  the brain, the physical organs 
o f our different mental faculties and propensities, was, on the part o f its 
original author, a strictly legitimate example o f  a scientific hypothesis; (...)
Whatever there may be o f reality in the connexion between the scale o f  
mental endowments and the various degrees o f  complication in the cerebral 
system, the nature o f  that connexion was in no other wav so likelv to be 
brought to light as by framing, in the first instance, an hypothesis similar to 
that o f Gall” (Ibid., I ll, XIV, 6, p. 498).
What conferred on phrenology the status of a “strictly legitimate example 
of a scientific hypothesis” were its testability and its compatibility with previous 
discoveries concerning the physiological origins of certain psychological 
phenomena. As for testability, Mill agreed with Comte’s opinion that Gall’s theory 
of Cerebral localization could be, at least in theory, corroborated or refuted by 
empirical findings about the correlation, or absence of correlation, between 
psychological functions and specific brain parts. In a comparison reminiscent of 
the Cours2', Mill’s footnote made clear that the phrenological hypothesis was as 
justified as Broussais’ conjecture about the localization of the source of diseases in 
the mucous membrane of the alimentary canal. To be sure, Broussais’ conjecture 
proved erroneous, but it did so because it was amenable to empirical refutation; it 
was simply not the case that all diseases originated in the digestive system. 
Furthermore, its failure prompted the framing of other hypotheses more 
conformable to the phenomena: for the diseases not accounted for by Broussais’ 
conjecture, where were they localized in the body? Eventually, Gall’s hypothesis 
displayed a formal structure that likened it to a very common type of conjectures in 
the physical sciences. For, according to Mill’s classification of hypotheses, when 
Gall ascribed precise and definite portions of the brain to the various intellectual 
and affective functions, he was just doing what Newton’s predecessors did when 
they proposed various hypotheses “respecting to the law of the planetary central 
force” (Ibid., Ill, XIV, 4, p. 490): he singled out the likely vera causa of psychological 
phenomena (the brain), and he conjectured the laws according to which mental 
and nervous phenomena were related (for instance, by postulating that the 
development of a penchant, quality, or faculty was proportional to the volume of 
the organ in which it was localized). On Mill’s theory of hypotheses, it was 
therefore the case that the phrenological hypothesis fulfilled “a condition of a most 
genuinely scientific hypothesis”, that of being “proved or disproved by that 
comparison with observed facts which is termed Verification” (Ibid., p. 494). If 
mental phenomena really depended on nervous phenomena, what remained to be
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ascertained was their “precise mode of dependence”, that is “the law of the 
variation of the effect according to the variations in the quantity or in the relations 
of the cause” (Id.). From a methodological point of view, the different theses 
(Innateness, Localization, Modularity, Proportionality, and Cranioscopy) advanced 
by phrenologists were in principle as many “modes of dependence” that could be 
confronted to the facts.
The second feature of the phrenological hypothesis that may have 
convinced Mill of its scientific status was its compatibility with previous discoveries 
concerning the physiological origins of certain psychological phenomena. As Mill 
recalled, recent developments in the anatomy and physiology of the nervous 
system had established the causal dependence of sensations on specific bodily 
mechanisms:
“With regard to those states o f mind which are called sensations, all are 
agreed that these have for their immediate antecedents, states o f bodv. Every 
sensation has for its proximate cause some affection o f  the portion o f  our 
frame called the nervous system; whether this affection originate in the action 
o f  some external object, or ins some pathological condition of the nervous 
organization itself. The laws o f  this portion o f our nature — the varieties o f  
our sensations and the physical conditions on which they proximately depend 
-  manifestly fall under the province o f Physiology” {Ibid., VI, IV, 2, p. 850).
In that instance, Mill was just taking stock of the latest findings of physiology. To 
put it briefly, the works of P. Flourens, F. Magendie, and J. Muller had been 
instrumental in demonstrating the sensory-motor function of the spinal roots and 
of some higher structures of the nervous system22. Accordingly, sensations, that is 
“states of mind” (Ibid., VI, IV, 1, p. 848), could be said to have been explained 
physiologically, that is deduced from “laws of the body”. But, as the case of 
sensations illustrated, if it had been possible to deduce certain “laws of mind” from 
certain “laws of body”, why would one want to stop there? Why not extend 
epiphenomenalism to other mental phenomena? Everything considered, the 
phrenological hypothesis, which related intellectual and affective functions to the 
brain, was certainly the natural step to take. However, as Mill rightly underlined , 
there was no consensus as to the legitimacy of such a move, especially along the 
lines set by phrenology.
“Whether any other portion o f our mental states are similarly dependent on 
physical conditions, is one o f  those scientific questions respecting human 
nature which are still in abeyance. It is yet undecided whether our thoughts, 
emotions, and volitions are generated through the intervention o f  material
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mechanism; whether we have organs o f thought and o f emotion, in the same 
sense in which we have organs o f  sensation” {Ibid., VI, IV, 2, p. 850).
As the reference to “organs of thought and emotion” suggested, what Mill was 
concerned with was not a dualistic objection to the dependence of mental states on 
brain states, but rather the cogency of the phrenological picture of the brain. And it 
was indeed the case that many physiologists stopped short of extending the 
localisatory approach to higher psychological functions. Just to take the three 
pioneers of sensory physiology: Flourens, whilst ascribing sensation and motion to 
the lower centres of the nervous system, claimed that the cortex was a unitary 
organ for a unitary mind; Magendie reverted to introspective psychology when the 
physiology of the brain was concerned; and Muller discarded Gall’s attempts at 
brain localizations by distinguishing the organs of mind and motor functions. 
However, for all that, the determination of the functions of the brain remained an 
empirical question, and the phrenological hypothesis, if properly worked out, 
certainly was worth developing.
This conclusion, Mill seemed to have shared. As he told Comte several 
times, and as the previous analysis of the System bears out, he admitted the 
scientific and progressive potential of the phrenological hypothesis: he even 
recognized that he was
“just about convinced there is something true in it [Gall’s theory] and that our 
propensities and elemental capacities, whatever they be, each depend on a 
particular part o f the brain” (Mill to Comte, June 9, 1842; in Haac [ed.], p.
74),
and said he believed that Gall’s “theories” had “irrevocably opened the way to truly 
positive research, and of the first importance” (Mill to Comte, July 11, 1842; Ibid., 
p. 83). This conversion, which turned Mill’s reluctance regarding the quack science 
of “physiological phrenology” into the belief that it could be a subject worthy of 
“occupying the mind of a true thinker” (Mill to Comte, February 25, 1842; Ibid., p. 
53-4), Mill credited to his discovery that Comte believed “in phrenology, at least in 
its basic principles” (Id., p. 54). As we have seen, it was indeed the case the Cours 
and the System agreed on the scientific nature of the phrenological hypothesis as 
testable and compatible with previous psycho-physiological findings. Accordingly, 
one should not be surprised by Mill’s proximity with Comte on that account.
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2 -  Phrenology, An Unsubstantiated Hypothesis.
Although Mill agreed with Comte on the scientific status of the 
phrenological hypothesis, he also insisted, unlike Comte, on the lack of empirical 
evidence adduced in its support. That the hypothesis was testable was a necessary 
condition for taking it seriously, suggested Mill, but it had to be actually verified so 
as to become a proper piece of knowledge. As long as this condition was not 
fulfilled, neither phrenology nor the various claims it licensed (such as those 
concerning the alleged inferiority of women) could claim to be true.
Mill’s conviction that such a requirement had not yet been met was 
expressed in very different terms in the correspondence with Comte and in the 
System. For, whereas in the former, although he admitted being “faced with major 
difficulties”, he nonetheless submitted his “difficulties only as questions, and not as 
arguments” (Mill to Comte, June 9, 1842; Ibid., pp. 75-7) against phrenology, in the 
latter Mill adopted a more clear-cut position as to the epiphenomenalist hypothesis, 
which a fortiori included its phrenological version. It was far from certain, claimed 
Mill, “that every mental state has a nervous state for its immediate antecedent and 
proximate cause” (].S. Mill, TL, VI, IV, 2, p. 851). Such a change in tone might 
have been prompted by Comte’s reluctance to take into account Mill’s objections 
and by his refusal to draw from them the only conclusion legitimate in Mill’s eyes: 
phrenology had not been empirically vindicated.
The letter to Comte dated June 9, 1842, summarized Mill’s strictures on the 
evidence adduced in support of the phrenological hypothesis. The first objection 
Mill raised against phrenology was that of the inaccuracy of its cerebral 
localizations. Even if he did it in a somewhat idiosyncratic manner, Mill merely 
reiterated the most common line of criticism used by anti-phrenologists: it was 
simply not the case that cranioscopic analysis fitted the physiological analysis.
“First you will admit, all efforts at particular localization are premature; 
indeed, there is ample proof to show that those so far proposed are 
inaccurate. I shall cite myself as an example. The only thing I know for sure 
about the development o f  my cranium is that the so-called organ o f  
constructivity is very pronounced in my case. A phrenologist exclaimed when 
he saw me for the first time: ‘What do you do with your constructiveness?’
But actually I am almost completely deficient in this faculty. I lack mechanical 
aptitude, and my incapacity in all operations that require manual dexterity is 
really prodigious” (Mill to Comte, June 9,1842; in Haac [ed.], p. 75).
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How did Comte reply? Following the line he had set in the Cours, he 
acknowledged that most of Gall’s localisatory attempts had been inconclusive, but 
nonetheless argued that
“the need he felt to localize [the brain functions] — I keep thinking that 
without this he would have not stirred up significant philosophical reactions — 
has been in his case, above all a fertile source o f views” (Comte to Mill, Paris 
19,1842; Ibid., p. 8 0 )23.
In short, Comte claimed that what mattered was the progressive impetus Gall’s 
hypothesis gave to the study of the intellectual, moral, and affective functions by 
relating it, contrary to the prevalent dualistic approach, to the facts of the human 
biological organization. But that response was missing Mill’s point, for what wTas 
challenged was not the progressive or even the scientific character of phrenology, 
but its claim to be empirically supported. Even if it conformed to all 
methodological standards, if it was not vindicated by the facts, phrenology had to 
be discarded in favour of other hypotheses which would account with more 
success for the phenomena under scrutiny. Apparendy, neither the necessity of 
amending the evidential shortcomings of the phrenological hypothesis nor the 
potential benefits such a process could bring to the study of man appeared to 
Comte. In that instance, however, it seems that Mill’s position was the sensible 
one.
Secondly, Mill questioned the hasty correlations established between the 
outward features of a given individual and her alleged intellectual, moral, or 
affective capacities. For instance, the well-worn association of a large forehead and 
superior mental abilities was certainly nothing more than a coincidence:
“I have often seen remarkable intelligence in a small head or in a forehead 
receding backwards, while we commonly find enormous heads and 
protruding foreheads with mediocre intelligence” (Mill to Comte, June 9,
1842; Ibid., p. 76).
This remark produced no reply from Comte, probably because the latter also 
regarded cranioscopic analysis as a somewhat dubious tool for assaying the 
materiality of brain functions. Accordingly, one may assume that Comte agreed 
with Mill as to the unreliability of the correlations established by such a method. 
Furthermore, what is interesting in that objection, as is also the case for the 
previous one, is that it belonged to the stock of traditional down-to-earth prima facie 
refutations of phrenological claims. The very fact that they were so easy to discard
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was undoubtedly instrumental in framing Mill’s low estimate of their scientific 
worth. Comte’s refusal to take it into account might also have convinced Mill that 
his addressee would not surrender to purely empirical considerations.
The third point raised by Mill concerned the tendency of phrenologists to 
multiply “organs” without necessity. For instance, Mill argued that when Comte 
soberly limited himself to a tripartite division between “animal[ affective], moral, 
and intellectual faculties” {Ibid., p. 75)24, nothing in Gall’s theory would prevent 
others — as it was indeed the case — from assuming the existence of an indefinite 
number of organs. For, if the phrenological method licensed the postulation of an 
organ as the only way to explain the display of any marked character trait, the likely 
outcome of such a process would be an “organological” inflation.
“judged by Gall, it seems to me that there could be just as many proofs for a 
great number o f  specialized organs than for [one] general result” (id.).
O f course, one might have argued against Mill that the postulation of 
organs was not in itself objectionable, as long as anatomical confirmation was 
given. But, as seen previously, neither the phrenologists nor Comte lived by that 
kind of empirical standards. Yet, Comte made clear in his reply to Mill, as he 
already did in the Courf\ that he took a dim view of the actual trend in 
phrenology. But if Comte did not see this endless multiplication of organs as a 
desirable move, it was primarily because it clashed with his pragmatic quest for an 
“economic” theory of human nature:
“The number o f  organs, above all, has always seemed much too large to me.
Even so, without having done special research in determining this, I do not 
believe, just looking at it, that one can admit less than ten distinct forces 
(intellectual or emotional) without falling into useless subtleties o f  
metaphysical distinctions, nor more than fifteen without infringing on the 
cohesive unity o f  human nature” (Comte to Mill, June 19, 1842; Ibid., p. 80)26.
However, and even if Comte recognized that Gall’s “initial analysis of basic forces, 
mental and moral, was not carried out in sufficient depth and was not 
accomplished as exactly as it should [have been]”(7<7.), he did not dwell on how one 
was to draw a better list.
This absence of a clear method for singling out the most elementary 
faculties led to Mill’s third remark. For the “organological” inflation was certainly 
due to the lack o f agreement among phrenologists as to what constituted the 
proper way of identifying the basic functions characteristic of the human mind. A
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good case in point, was that of our basic instincts. Mill had no doubt that these 
innate propensities would, sooner or later, be connected “either to the marrow of 
the spinal column or to a precise ganglia” (Mill to Comte, June 9, 1842; Ibid., p. 76). 
In fact, in the System, he even admitted that
“the various instincts o f animals, and the portion o f human nature which 
corresponds to those instincts (...) may probably be found to have as 
positive, and even perhaps as direct and immediate a connexion with physical 
conditions o f  the brain and nerves, as any o f our mere sensations have”(J.S.
Mill, SL, VI, IV, 4, p. 859)
But, in his letter to Comte, he also added that
“whether there are few or rather a large number o f such primitive instincts, 
still remains a great problem in mv eyes” (Mill to Comte, ]une 9, 1842; Ibid., 
p. 76).
There was no consensus, underlined Mill, as to what was counted as a primitive 
instinct. For instance, Gall and Spurzheim considered the instinct to possess a 
basic one. But was not one entitled to think that what was responsible for it was, 
instead of any special faculty, just the result of associating one’s desires with our 
knowledge of the means to fulfil them. After all, Comte himself used a similar 
argument when he rejected “the sense of justice from among the special faculties” 
(Ibid., p. 77), since he held it to be derived “from a kind of sympathy associated 
with different intellectual faculties” (Id.). What lay at the root of the problem, 
according to Mill, was the absence of a common method to identify the most 
elementary faculties out of which the other mental dispositions were made. In that 
respect, Comte could well claim that the principles of the “plurality and 
independence of organs and forces” (Comte to Mill, March 4, 1842; Ibid., p.58) had 
been established, such a pronouncement nevertheless remained hollow, since 
phrenology only gained true empirical content when the number, relation, and 
localization of the different functions had been established. And that, Mill 
suggested, had not yet been achieved.
Eventually, the System of Logic pointed out a further shortcoming of the 
phrenological approach. For it was not only that what was to be localized was not 
clearly defined, but also that the nature of the substratum with which it was 
correlated remained mysterious. To put things briefly, the phrenological hypothesis 
assumed that different faculties gave rise to different kinds of mental states 
(affective, moral, intellectual), which could be conjectured to be distinguished both 
by their localization in the brain and the intrinsic composition of the nervous states
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on which they depended. However, as Mill rightly maintained, the grounds for this 
latter distinction were provided neither by the anatomy nor the physiology of the 
nervous system:
“even- one must admit that we are wholly ignorant o f  the characteristics o f  
these nervous states; we know not, nor can hope to know, in what respect 
one o f  them differs from another” (J.S. Mill, SL, VI, IV, 2, p. 851).
As it now clearly appears, Mill indeed gathered, both in his correspondence 
and the first edition of the System, a wide array of objections or strictures against 
the phrenological hypothesis. To summarize, Mill argued that most of the claims of 
phrenology were not empirically vindicated, and that this was due to the 
unreliability of the methods used to determine what were the most elementary 
faculties, the irrelevance of the majority of the correlations established between 
mental capacities and their alleged material substratum, and the absence of precise 
knowledge about nervous states themselves. In brief, the phrenological hypothesis 
was not borne out by the facts. If this was the case, as Mill claimed, the first 
corollary of this failure was that any claim to have reduced “laws of the mind” to 
“laws of the body” was unfounded. Hence Mill’s conclusion in the System-.
“The successions, therefore, which obtain among mental phenomena, do not 
admit o f  being deduced from the physiological laws o f our nervous 
organization: and all real knowledge o f  them must continue, for a long time at
least, if  not always, to be sought in the direct study, by observation and
experiment, o f  the mental successions themselves” (Id.).
The second corollary, which was crucial to Mill’s refutation of Comte’s plea 
for the subjection of women, was that, as things stood, no support could be drawn 
from phrenology as evidence for the setdement of the sexual equality issue. 
However Comte never accepted such a conclusion. In that respect, this refusal 
illustrates the shift in his attitude between the Cours and the correspondence: for, 
whereas in the former Comte emphasized that phrenology was not “a mature 
science, but a science still entirely in the making” (A. Comte, PP, p. 851), in the 
latter he remained deaf to Mill’s strictures and reverted to a dogmatic defence of
the new “science of human nature”. This might also partly explain Mill’s
“hardening” in the correspondence, as testified by this terse pronouncement:
“you already know that the general principles which in your view, are the only 
ones observed so far by the science o f  phrenology, do not appear proved in 
his book [Gall’s Rechercbes sur lesfonctions du cerveau\ in any way. (...) everything
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I have read or thought so far leads me to believe that nothing has been truly 
established, that everything is still vague and uncertain in this type o f  
research” (Mill to Comte, October 30,1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 198-9).
However, as John Skorupski underlines, Mill’s argument could not be 
taken as a definitive demonstration of the irrelevance of phrenology for the study 
of mental phenomena, but only as a defense of a “weak or methodological 
autonomy of psychology” (J. Skorupski, John Stuart Ait’ll, p. 261). For Mill did not 
deny that, in principle, it might have been possible to reduce mental successions to 
nervous successions:
“the laws o f mind may be derivative laws resulting from laws o f animal life, 
and (...) their truth therefore may ultimately depend on physical conditions”
(Id.).
This, in turn, sheds light of the reasons why Mill resisted the naturalist drive 
towards the reduction of psychological to physiological laws. It was not, as his own 
conception of causal explanation illustrated, that Mill refused the theoretical 
possibility of reducing psychology to physiology, but rather that the physiology7 
available was not robust and reliable enough to allow this kind of reduction. Quid 
juris, Mill accepted the relevance of reductionist naturalism. Quid facti, he thought 
the time was not yet ripe for achieving it. But if so, and to that question I turn in 
the next chapter, how could one achieve the proper understanding of mental 
phenomena on which the setdement of the sexual issue hinged?
1 See II, n. 15.
2 Certainly J. G. Spurzheim, Essaiphilosophique sur la nature morale et intellectuelle de I’bomme. See II, n. 
15.
3 Probably the French version o f  Spurzheim’s 1821 View of the Elementaiy Principles of Education (see II, 
n. 23): the Essai sur lesprincipes elementaires de I’education. Paris: Treutell & Wiirtz, 1822.
4 See II, n. 19.
5 For the exact reference, see II, n. 14.
6 For the exact reference, see II, n. 15. Comte first mentioned the Kecherches in an earlier letter to 
Mill, dated March 4,1842 (in Haac [ed.], p. 59).
7 See Jan Goldstein, “Bringing the Psyche into Scientific Focus”, in T.M. Porter & D . Ross, The 
Cambridge History of Science. Vol. 7: The Modem Moral Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003, pp. 131-53. Goldstein defines the “operationalization” o f the theories o f  the moral sciences as 
their “application to concrete social practices, their conversion into social technologies, their 
invocation to validate practices o f  otherwise dubious origin” (p. 132).
8 This lesson was written between December 24 and December 31, 1827, and was published in the 
third volume o f  the Cours in 1838. Appendix IV details the likely sources o f  Comte’s phrenological 
knowledge.
9 His conception o f  phrenological physiology merely amounted to an adaptation o f  the 
methodological principle Comte took to be governing biological investigation as defined in the 
Fortieth Lesson o f the Cours-. “given the organ or the organic modification, find the function or the act, and vice- 
verscC (A. Comte, PP, p. 684).
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10 For the instinct o f  propagation, see F. J. Gall, Recherches sur les fonclions du cerveau, III, pp. 85-164. 
On the localization o f  the instinct o f  propagation, see M. Shortland, “Courting the Cerebellum: 
Early Organological and Phrenological Views o f  Sexuality”, British Journal of the History of Science 
1987, 20, pp. 173-99; and E. Clarke, E. & L. S. Jacyna, L.S., Nineteenth-Century Origins of Neuroscientific 
Concepts. Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 1987.
11 Comte attributed this distinction to Gall and Spurzheim, but, as A. Sinaceur remarks (A. Comte, 
PP, p. 868, n. 54), it was in fact Spurzheim’s own, as exposed in his 1818 Observations sur la 
phrenologier. Gall criticized it in his Anatomie etphysiologie, III, pp. XXV-XXVIII.
12 Comte estimated that twelve to fifteen elementary functions would do (see A. Comte, PP, p. 875).
13 C.-A. Helvetius, De I’D sprit. Paris: Durand, 1758. Helvetius’ environmental sensationalism, when 
allied with his dismissal o f  sexual physiological organisation as a relevant factor to explain 
intellectual differences, logically implied that men and women were, at least potentially, equal at 
birth, and that inequalities were due to differences in education and environment. On Helvetius’ 
theoretical endorsement o f women’s equality and his inability to implement it in his practical and 
political writings, see E.J. Gardner, “The Philosophes and Women: Sensationalism and Sentiment”, 
in E. Jacobs, ed., Woman and Society in Eighteenth-Century France : Essays in Honour of John Stephenson 
Spink. London: Athlone Press, 1979, pp. 19-27 (esp. pp. 19-23).
u His refusal to propose a phrenological head might have been due to his scepticism about 
Cranioscopy. As for the Proportionality Thesis (the development o f  a penchant, quality', or faculty- 
is proportional to the volume o f  the organ in which it is localized), it is likely that Comte accepted 
it.
15 See in particular the letter to Comte dated July 11, 1842: “N ow to speak o f Gall: I am afraid I 
have given you an exaggerated idea o f my present opposition to his theories. I am far, indeed, from 
finding them unworthy o f serious consideration”(in Haac [ed.], p. 83).
16 Besides that quoted in the previous note, relevant material is to be found in the following letters 
from Mill to Comte: December 18, 1841; February 25, 1842; March 22, 1842; May 6, 1842; June 9, 
1842; and December 8,1843.
17 Especially o f  the manuscript version, and the first two editions (1843 and 1846) o f the System. 
The details o f  the drafting o f  the System suggest that the discussion on phrenology in the 
correspondence prompted Mill to operate changes in the content and organization o f the Sixth 
Book on the “Logic o f  the Moral Sciences”. For instance, the Fourth Chapter on “the Laws o f  
Mind”, which contains some o f Mill’s developments on phrenology, was written sometime between 
July 1842 and early 1843 (see J.S. Mill, SL, pp. lxxiv-lxxv), whilst Comte and Mill were broaching 
the subject in their letters. Such an addition was certainly part and parcel o f  the “complete revision” 
(January 28, 1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 130) o f his book Mill announced to Comte.
18 The relevant letters from Comte are those dated January 17, 1842; March 4, 1842; May 29, 1842; 
June 19, 1842; July 22, 1842; and November 14,1843.
19 General accounts o f  Mill’s conception o f the relations between bodily states and mental states 
can be found in J. Skorupski, John Stuart Mill, pp. 259-264; F. Wilson, Pychological Analysis and the 
Philosophy of John Stuart Mill. Toronto: University' o f  Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 294-311.
20 Mill referred to Comte’s Cours in the footnote appended to the passage quoted, but erroneously 
mentioned the Forty-Third Lesson instead o f the Forty-Fifth.
21 See A. Comte, PP, p. 871.
22 On this, see R.M. Young, Mind, Brain, and Adaptation, Chap. 2.
23 In fact, Comte was repeating what he had said in previous letters to Mill: “In spite o f  all the 
radical faults in trying to localize [the functions o f  the brain], it certainly represents a true victor)' o f  
the positive spirit in intellectual and moral studies concerning the individual”(Comte to Mill, March 
4, 1842; in Haac [ed.], p. 58); “Once we forget all the rash and even evidently mistaken attempts to 
localize the functions o f  the brain, there remain for our use truly general conclusions which have 
been fused for so long with my own philosophy that I regard Gall as one o f my most essential 
precursors” (Comte to Mill, May 29,1842; Ibid., p. 73).
24 Comte mentioned that distinction (“a first general division o f the brain into three areas which 
correspond to three types o f manifestations”; Comte to Mill, March 4, 1842; in Haac [ed.], p. 58) in 
an earlier letter, which roughly echoed his presentation o f penchants, sentiments, and intellectual 
faculties in the Cours.
23 See IIB.
26 Mill concurred with Comte’s numerical estimate: “basing myself on arguments derived solely 
from common observation, I find it probable, as you do yourself, that there are no less than ten 
fundamental forces, either intellectual or affective, but I am unable to list them in detail or identify 
the proper organ for each” (Mill to Comte, July 11,1842; in Haac [ed.], p. 84).
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IV — The Explanation of Moral Phenomena: Comte and Mill on the 
Architectonics of the Moral Sciences.
Having shown that the actual results borrowed from phrenology were either 
false or unwarranted and hence unreliable as evidence for the setdement of the sexual 
equality issue, Mill’s next task amounted to demonstrating that, even if a proper 
knowledge of how to derive “laws of mind” from “laws of body” were at hand, 
conclusions about “moral” phenomena, which included mental capacities and character 
traits, could not be drawn from biology alone.
Whereas in the correspondence the first point had mosdy been carried out 
regardless of its implications for the sexual equality issue, Mill chose to raise the second 
with explicit reference to it. As he told Comte in a somewhat convoluted manner:
“what I would have to say in support o f my principal heresy would be entirely drawn 
from principles o f  biology, which doubtless are very imperfect. [This] not only because 
I lack sufficient knowledge o f biology, but perhaps also due to today’s insufficiency o f  
biological theory7 itself as it applies to sociological speculation” (Mill to Comte, July 13,
1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 174).
However, the purpose of Mill’s argument went beyond the consideration of the sexual 
equality issue, for what was at stake in the discussion with Comte was the entire 
architectonic of the “moral sciences”, that is the interplay of the different disciplines 
which attempted to explain human phenomena. In fact, Comte’s plea for the subjection 
of women, Mill argued, resulted from his faulty conception of the “logic” of the moral 
sciences.
This chapter starts by contrasting the conception of the explanation of “moral” 
phenomena Mill endorsed with other approaches he found defective or partial (IVA). 
This survey paves the way for an analysis of the correspondence between Mill and 
Comte, which reveals that, at least at a superficial level, both thinkers acknowledged that 
mental differences, which were at the heart of the sexual equality issue, resulted from a 
composition of causes (IVB). However, when it came to fleshing out the proper way of 
explaining those phenomena, the agreement broke down. On the one hand, Mill and 
Comte were opposed as to the role played by psychological laws in these explanations 
(IVC). On the other hand, they favoured a different factor as the dominating influence 
in the production of “moral” phenomena: whereas Comte gave precedence to biology, 
Mill preferred an environmental account (IVD).
89
A — The Explanation of “Moral” Phenomena.
As seen previously1, Comte held that social statics demonstrated that the 
patriarchal model was an essential feature of the social order. The hierarchic structure 
on which the model rested was said to derive from the respective capacities of its 
members, and it was maintained that there existed a sex-based distinction, supported by 
Gall’s phrenology, according to which males were endowed with greater intellectual and 
moral capacities than women. Consequendy, the acknowledgment of brain-based 
differences in mental capacities legitimated a piece of Comtian social statics, namely the 
patriarchal model.
Now, what Mill objected to in Comte’s argument was not only the conclusion it 
reached (the necessary subjection of women) and the premises from which it was drawn 
(phrenology’s dubious claims), but also the way the derivation obtained. As he 
diagnosed in the second edition of the System (1846), “to construct the theory of the 
mind solely on such data as physiology at present affords, seems to me as great an error 
in principle, and even more serious one in practice” (J. S. Mill, SL, VI, IV, 2, p. 851). 
Comte’s almost exclusive reliance on phrenology to determine the intellectual capacities 
of individuals undermined his social theory, because it ignored many other factors 
relevant to the explanation of human phenomena. In particular, it completely 
misconstrued the nature, origin, and development of mental abilities or character traits, 
the knowledge of which was crucial to Comte’s reorganization of society. As Mill put it, 
such a failure was the sign that “the intellectual basis of static sociology [had] not yet 
been sufficiently prepared”(Mill to Comte, October 30, 1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 197). 
Granting Comte that social dynamics had been established on safe grounds, mainly 
through the elaboration of the law of the three stages, Mill nevertheless contended that 
it was not so for social statics and that
“transforming [it] to a truly positive state consequently requires, if  we compare it to 
social dynamics, a far greater perfection in the individual science o f man” (Ibid., p. 197- 
8).
On the contrary, Comte maintained that it was “presently possible to demonstrate the
t
basic principles of static sociology” (Comte to Mill, November 14, 1843; Ibid1, p. 206), 
and thought he had done so with respect to the sexual equality issue. Such was the root 
of what Comte regarded as their “only profound disagreement in sociology” (Comte to 
Mill, October 5, 1843; Ibid., p. 179) and what Mill held to be an “important topic of 
biology and sociology” (Mill to Comte, August 30,1843; Ibid., p. 185).
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In that instance, the point of contention between Comte and Mill was that of 
how one was to explain a specific kind of “moral” phenomena, namely mental 
capacities. As seen above2, Mill’s general conception of explanation was of a deductive 
process through which a fact is derived from the law(s) of causation responsible for its 
production. Similarly, one can explain a law by showing that it can be deduced from one 
or other laws as one of their particular instances. In short, explanation either of a 
particular instance or of a uniformity was primarily a matter of nomological 
subsumption3. Although he did not mention explicidy the possibility of “explaining a 
law”, Comte also endorsed this proto-version of the covering-law model. He even made 
it a distinctive feature of the “positive” turn of mind
“to consider all phenomena as subjected to invariable laws o f  natures, whose minute 
discovery and reduction to the fewest number possible are the aims o f all our efforts”
(A. Comte, PP, p. 25-6).
Accordingly, for both a “positive” explanation of a phenomenon amounts to the 
detailed analysis of the circumstances of its occurrence and the statement of the 
regularities that unite them. However, this convergence did not extend beyond a 
somewhat vague agreement on the general nature of scientific explanation. As soon as 
the specifics of the explanation of a given phenomenon (that of mental capacities) were 
touched upon, the gap between Comte’s and Mill’s positions became visible.
In his letter to Comte dated June 9, 1842, Mill introduced the different causes he 
thought relevant to the explanation of human intellectual faculties, besides that invoked 
by Gall’s phrenology:
“one must, as you have yourself observed, pay attention not only to the extent o f  
activity o f  an organ but to the total amount o f  education the individual has received, 
considered in the broadest definition o f  the term, and to which Gall has certainly not 
accorded sufficient importance. Helvetius’ exaggerations had at least the advantage o f  
giving a strong push forward to the difficult field o f  education, a theory so neglected 
today that most thinkers do not even know how far general conditions together with 
the degree o f  general nervous sensitivity can, according to the laws o f  physiology and o f  
the mind, not only modify [man’s] character, but sometimes even determine its type.
Differences in individual or national character, which can be sufficiently well explained 
by circumstances with which we are most familiar, are commonly resolved by the 
simple expedient o f an unknown difference in physical organization, or even, among 
metaphysicians, by basic differences in psychic constitution” (Mill to Comte, June 9,
1842; in Haac [ed.], p. 76; slightly revised translation).
For clarity’s sake, Mill’s argument may be rephrased as follows. In order to explain the 
character of an individual (and especially her intellectual abilities) or its modifications, 
one must appeal to at least three different kinds of laws that interact so as to give rise to 
the phenomenon under scrutiny. Firstly, laws governing what Mill called “general 
conditions” or “circumstances”, that is laws about facts present in one’s environment
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and which may constitute inputs for the activity of one’s mind. These include the purely 
perceptual data of one’s experience as well as the culturally determined elements one is 
exposed to in social relations: hence, Mill’s insistence on education. Secondly, “laws of 
physiology”, which specify both the capacity to be affected by sensory inputs (the 
“nervous sensitivity” of the individual) and the material substratum required to carry out 
all mental operations. Thirdly, and in accordance with Mill’s demonstration of the 
autonomy of psychology vis-a-vis physiology, “laws of mind”, that is the uniformities of 
succession according to which one mental state succeeds another, is caused by, or 
follows another”. These were, Mill claimed, the laws through which one could hope to 
explain a person’s character and mental capacities.
Mill made clear that the neglect of any of those three sets of causes would lead 
to a distorted account of the nature, origin, and development of mental abilities or 
character traits. An exclusive emphasis on the formative circumstances of character, for 
instance, would “dissolve” the unity of the individual by postulating an indefinite 
malleability of human nature, which was in reality pardy constrained by physiological 
data and psychological patterns. Mill’s reference to “Helvetius’ exaggerations” (Jd.) as an 
illustration of this faulty conception was certainly intended as an accommodating move 
towards Comte, for whom he represented the consummate embodiment of 
sensationalism4. But, as Mill himself underlined in accordance with his Utilitarian 
commitments, Helvetius’ contribution had been instrumental in orienting research in 
the right direction concerning learning processes5. In fact, Mill judged that the social 
reformer and industrialist Robert Owen, who endorsed an extreme version of 
environmentalism according to which one’s character was the necessary result of social 
conditioning, made a much more credible culprit than Helvetius, for the former gave 
credence to “fatalism” (the belief that one was necessitated to feel and act in a certain 
way by the circumstances), and rejected the belief in human autonomy and responsibility 
by depriving one’s desire to mould one’s character or to improve oneself of its efficacy. 
As Mill put it,
“a necessitarian, believing that our actions follow from our characters, and that our 
characters follow from our organization, our education, and our circumstances, is apt to 
be, with more or less consciousness on his part, a fatalist as to his own actions, and to 
believe that his nature is such, or that his education and circumstances have so moulded 
his character, that nothing can now prevent him from feeling and acting in a particular 
way, or at least that no effort on his own can hinder it” (J. S. Mill, SL, VI, II, 3, p. 840).
Besides being morally repulsive, Mill held that such a view unmistakably revealed an 
inadequate understanding of the different factors at work in the shaping of one’s
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personality and the control one could have on such a process. For a character was in 
fact the result of the interplay of “circumstances” with one’s “particular organization”, 
and one’s “own desire to mould it” {Ibid., p. 840). At least, when the desire to change 
was there and the circumstances could be altered, as they often were, the shaping of 
one’s personality was possible.
Another way to misrepresent the interaction of these factors was to put all the 
explanatory weight on “organization”, that is on the “laws of physiology” specifying 
both the “nervous sensitivity” of one’s individual and the material substratum required 
to carry out all mental operations. Indeed, one could either ascribe mental differences to 
peculiarities of the bodily frame at large (as was common practice in the traditional 
medicine of temperaments, where the physical and mental constitution of an individual 
was held to be determined by the relative proportion of the four cardinal humours of 
the body), or, as phrenologists did, only to the proximate cause of mental phenomena, 
i.e. the brain.
When it came to single out a representative figure of this latter excessive 
emphasis, Mill was in no quandary: in the 1846 version of the System, he stated that
“no writer, either o f  early or o f  recent date, is chargeable in a higher degree with this 
aberration from the true scientific spirit, than M. Comte” (Ibid., VI, IV, 4, p. 859).
Now, Mill did not deny that differences in organic constitution might be 
connected to differences in mental capacities. Accordingly, he explicitly argued that 
“organization” was a key factor to take into account:
“that differences o f  bodily structures also co-operate, is the assertion not only o f  
phrenologists, but, to a greater or less extent, o f all physiologists who lay any stress 
upon the magnitude o f  the hemispheres o f the brain, indicated by the facial angle, as a 
measure o f natural intelligence, or upon temperament as a source o f  moral and 
emotional peculiarities” (Ibid., p. 856-7)6.
Similarly, Mill added, data drawn from comparative anatomy were to be counted in:
“it is equally clear that when physiologists, taking into account the whole animal 
creation, attempt, by a judicious application o f the Method o f Concomitant Variations, 
grounded chiefly on extreme cases, to establish a connexion between the strength o f  
different mental propensities or capacities and the proportional or absolute magnitudes 
o ff different regions o f  the brain; the evidences which are or may be produced in 
support o f this pretension, ought to be taken into serious consideration by 
psychologists” (Ibid., p. 858).
However, for all his in-principle willingness to accept “laws of physiology”, Mill 
was in fact quite guarded as to the extent of the reliance one could have on them for the 
explanation of “moral” phenomena.
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“What portion o f  these assertions the physiological school o f  psychologists, whether 
phrenologists or otherwise, have either succeeded in establishing, or shown ground for 
supposing it possible to establish hereafter, I would not undertake to say” {Ibid., p. 857).
As his attempt to convince Comte reveals, Mill held that almost none of the claims of 
the phrenologists had been empirically vindicated and that the physiology of higher 
mental functions remained enigmatic. Consequently, he held that neither at present 
constituted a basis reliable enough for drawing any inference whatsoever, besides the 
almost vacuous one that mental phenomena depended on the nervous system for their 
production.
The last questionable manner of accounting for “moral” phenomena listed by Mill 
resulted from an exclusive emphasis on “laws of mind”. That was the charge Mill 
levelled against “metaphysicians”, who resorted to “basic differences in psychic 
constitution” in order to explain differences in mental capacities. In that instance, Mill’s 
actual target was not primarily, despite his referring to a “German school of 
metaphysical speculation” {Ibid., p. 859), Kant, Fichte, Schelling, or Hegel, but rather 
British intuitionists, whose most vocal proponent was Mill’s favourite foe William 
Whewell'. To summarize roughly, the intuitionist maintains that the human mind is 
endowed with a certain number of inborn capacities of reflection and judgment 
(intellectual and moral), which are the basis of one’s cognitive and ethical abilities and 
which enable one to discover certain truths by an introspective rational process 
independent of observation and experience. For instance, from the fact that we have 
moral feelings and that we make moral judgments, and that those are radically distinct 
from any other kind of feelings or judgments, the intuitionist concludes that
“the distinction between right and wrong is an ultimate and inexplicable fact; that we 
perceive this distinction, as we perceive the distinction o f colours, by a peculiar faculty”
(J. S. Mill, “Sedgwick’s Discourse”, p. 51)8.
Just as the phrenologist took for granted the existence of innate capacities determined 
by one’s biological make-up, without trying to see whether those could not be the result 
o f psychological or environmental agencies, the “metaphysician” assumed that 
individuals were equipped with inborn cognitive and moral faculties. But, contrary to 
the phrenologist, he took those to be independent from any anatomical or physiological 
substratum. One corollary of this position was that when a difference was observed 
between, say, the intellectual achievements of two individuals (or groups of individuals, 
such as men and women for example), the discrepancy was accounted for by a
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difference in inborn potential, that is by the lesser or greater power of one’s faculties. To 
put it in Mill’s terms, “differences in individual or national character” are resolved “by 
basic differences in psychic constitution” (Mill to Comte, June 9, 1842; in Haac [ed.], p. 
76).
Mill objected to this approach on two grounds. On the one hand, he held that 
metaphysicians were too easily satisfied with taking for granted the existing set of mental 
dispositions of an individual and wrongly eschewed the search for the possible causes 
that might have explained differences between individuals. On the other hand, he 
charged them with furthering social conservatism, for if the metaphysicians took for 
granted that differences in mental achievements were primarily due to differences in 
mental capacities, that is to one’s inborn and immutable faculties, they would necessarily 
refuse, say, educational reforms because they thought it could not improve the lot of 
those who were “mentally” worse off. This argument, Mill regarded as “the main 
doctrinal pillar of all the errors which impede human improvement” (J. S. Mill, 
Autobiography, p. 232).
Finally, as Mill made clear in the System, the charges of methodological short­
sightedness and social conservatism could be levelled both against “obsessive” 
physiologists and “inveterate” metaphysicians:
“The majority o f those who speculate on human nature, prefer dogmatically to assume 
that the mental differences which they perceive, or think they perceive, among human 
beings, are ultimate facts, incapable o f  being either explained or altered, rather than take 
the trouble o f  fitting themselves, by the requisite process o f thought, for referring those 
mental differences to the outward causes by which they are for the most part produced, 
and on the removal o f  which they would cease to exist” (J. S.‘Mill, XL, VI, IV, 4, p.
859).
On the other hand, and despite the possible errors the exclusive emphasis on “laws of 
circumstances” could lead to, Mill explicitly regretted in his letter to Comte dated 
October 30, 1843, that
“the reaction o f  the nineteenth-century against the philosophy o f  the eighteenth has 
resulted in a contrary bias, tending to accord too great a role to basic differences and, in 
a number o f  respects, to disguise their true nature” (Mill to Comte, October 30, 1843; 
in Haac [ed.], p. 198).
This review of Mill’s strictures on partial accounts of the origins and nature of 
individual mental differences is also crucial in the sense it sheds light on who Mill took 
his adversaries to be. O f course, as the Autobiography made clear, the System was intended 
as a weapon against the Intuitionist school represented by William Whewell and later by 
William Hamilton. It attacked these thinkers on their own ground, that of the
95
philosophy of mathematics and the physical sciences, by demonstrating that alleged 
necessary truths and psychological faculties could be explained empirically through 
associative processes, and were not innate items or inborn capacities. And if Mill 
decided to enter the fight, it was not merely because he thought that the Intuitionist 
school had its epistemology wrong, but also because its theories led to harmful 
consequences in morals, politics, and religion. In particular, he singled out the tendency, 
characteristic of “the reaction of the nineteenth century against the eighteenth”, to
“regard all the marked distinctions o f human character as innate, and in the main 
indelible, and to ignore the irresistible proofs that by far the greater part o f  those 
differences, whether between individuals, races, or sexes, are such as not only might but 
naturally would be produced by differences in circumstances, [as] one o f  the chief 
hindrances to the rational treatment o f great social questions and o f  one the greatest 
stumbling blocks to human improvement” (J. S. Mill, Autobiography, p. 270).
But if “innateness” and “indelibility” were really at issue, then Comte, who had claimed 
that phrenology was “one of the main elements by which the philosophy of the 
nineteenth-century [would] definitively [distinguish] itself from that of the previous 
centuries” (A. Comte, PP, p. 881) and rested his case for women’s subjection on its 
nativist claims, also qualified as a primary target for Mill. In short, the debate on the 
explanation of moral phenomena put on the same side of the philosophical divide the 
“Intuitionists” and the “Physiologists”, i.e. Whewell and Comte, whereas Mill stood 
resolutely with the “Experiential school”.
B — Mental Differences: A Case of Composition of Causes.
So far, Mill had made a sensible case for the acknowledgment of the different 
factors at work in the production of moral phenomena. However, more was needed to 
turn his commonsensical point that one’s education, one’s turn of mind, and one’s 
bodily constitution may joindy explain inter-individual mental differences into a 
workable scientific hypothesis. The TL’s analysis of causation and its account of 
eliminative methods provided Mill with the appropriate tools for achieving this 
transformation.
As previously shown, Mill held that to explain the character of an individual (and 
especially her intellectual abilities), one must appeal to at least three different kinds of 
laws that interact so as to give rise to the phenomenon under scrutiny, namely “laws of 
circumstances”, “laws of physiology”, and “laws of mind”. The assumption under which 
Mill operated was that of a case in which the cause of the phenomenon at hand was not 
simple but consisted of an assemblage of separate causes. Accordingly, it was to be
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regarded, in line with Mill’s analysis of the different types of causation, as a case of 
“composition of causes”, in which “several agents, or causes, concur as conditions to 
the production of an effect” (J. S. Mill, SL, III, VI, 1, p. 370). This should not have 
come as a surprise, for, as Mill had informed his reader, it was “a case in truth almost 
universal, there being very few effects to the production of which no more than one 
agent contributes” (Id). “Moral” phenomena illustrated the pervasiveness of this kind of 
causality.
Comte did not object in principle to Mill’s conception of “moral” phenomena as 
results of a “composition of causes”. In fact, he stated explicidy in the correspondence 
that he regarded the attempt to explain the latter with the sole resources of the “laws of 
physiology” (which he equated with Gall’s phrenology) as a serious methodological 
mistake, since
“it limits itself to considering the individual and fails to rise directly to the social point 
o f view (the only view that can bring such studies to true fruition” (Comte to Mill, May 
29, 1842; in Haac [ed.], p. 73).
In a later letter, Comte developed his point even more fully:
“intellectual and moral studies cannot appropriately base themselves purely on biology, 
since individual man represents an ambiguous and even false starting point here. It is 
only through sociology' that this endeavour can be guided, for our true evolution 
remains unintelligible without payung constant and preponderant attention to the social 
conditions in which all the different aspects are, incidentally, fully interdependent”
(Comte to Mill, June 19, 1842; Ibid., p. 81).
If one construed sociology as the all-encompassing science dealing with human 
beliefs and actions, either studied synchronically (social statics) or diachronically (social 
dynamics), it surely included a large part of the “laws of circumstances” alluded to by 
Mill (notably those concerning education and inter-individual relations). Moreover, in 
line with Comte’s ideas according to which each science depends on the one(s) which 
precede(s) it in the classification of the sciences9, the sensory elements of one’s 
experience would be accounted for by physics and physiology. And even if Comte 
ascribed the study of “laws of mind” to phrenology, whereas Mill thought it was of no 
avail, the overall picture thus obtained was strikingly similar to that of Mill, that is of an 
explanation of moral phenomena in terms of the joint operation of different laws. For 
instance, Comte’s emphasis on the nexus of relations constitutive of social phenomena 
can only be cashed out empirically if the nomological ingredient of sociological 
explanations is kept in mind:
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“It is clear indeed that not only political institutions as such and social mores on the 
one hand, and mores and ideas on the other hand, must be constantly interdependent; 
but also that this whole must always be, by its nature, linked to the corresponding state 
o f  the integral development o f mankind, considered in all in various modes o f  
intellectual, moral and physical activity” (A. Comte, PS, p. 114).
Comte thus underlined the specific feature that characterized his own 
conception of social science, namely its intrinsically historical nature. It was only by 
taking into account, he argued, the “necessary influence of the various human 
generations on the following generations” that the positive study of humanity would 
become something else than a “mere spontaneous extension of the natural history of 
man” (Ibid., p. 148). This view tallied with Comte’s endorsement of a non-reductionist 
view of science, since it provided the factor by which to differentiate animal and human 
societies: the latter had a past on which they built whereas an endless present delineated 
the horizon of the former.
The details of the architectonic relations of sociology, which Comte regarded as 
the relevant discipline for the explanation of “moral phenomena”, with the other
sciences were spelt out in the Forty-Ninth Lesson of the Cours on the “Necessary
Relations of Social Physics with the Other Fundamental Branches of Positive 
Philosophy”1". As for its dependence on the previous sciences of the classification, 
Comte schematised it as the result of a fundamental dualism between mankind and its
milieu. On the one hand, the sociological study of the first term of the dualism
necessarily depended on “organic philosophy”, that is biology, which “alone introduces 
to the real law’s of human nature” (Ibid., p. 156). On the other hand, “inorganic 
philosophy”(astronomy, physics, and chemistry) was held to account for the “external 
conditions of the existence of mankind” (Id.).
“In short, one o f  the two great departments o f natural philosophy determines, within 
sociology, the agent o f the phenomenon; the other, the milieu in which it develops”(
Id).
Comte particularly emphasized the specific connection existing between biology 
and sociology, since he viewed the advent of the latter as having been direcdy 
conditioned by what he had called earlier “the important philosophical revolution which 
gave birth to cerebral physiology” (Ibid., p. 80), namely Gall’s physiological phrenology. 
Taking stock of what he had established in the Forty-Fifth Lesson of the Cours, Comte 
explained that it was through the “transcendent part of biology relative to the general 
study of intellectual and moral phenomena” that the “direct subordination of sociology 
to biolog)7” (Ibid., p. 157) took place.
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Comte distinguished between two kinds of dependence of sociology on biology. 
On the one hand, there existed what he termed a “primitive” dependence, according to 
which biology provided the starting point of investigations of social statics by 
accounting for “human sociability and the various organic conditions which determine 
its specific character”(Id.). By this, Comte meant that the source of man’s social 
existence should be found in his “nature”, that is in his biological constitution11. The 
second kind of dependence of sociology on biology consisted in having “biological 
indications” used as a “precious general auxiliary and, above all, as an essential and 
fundamental means of control”(Jbid., p. 159) of sociological generalizations.
As for the “primitive” dependence of sociolog)7 on biology, Comte did not 
merely argue for the well-worn explanation of human societies as means of 
compensating for the bodily weaknesses of isolated individuals. What he specifically 
aimed at was the inborn tendencies which could provide a rationale for the variety of 
social relations existing between individuals. It was indeed the case that such traits could 
be found in phrenology, for, if one reviewed Spurzheim’s works, whose classifications 
Comte regarded as “more concise” and “written much more methodically” (Comte to 
Mill, March 4, 1842; in Haac [ed.], p. 59) than Gall’s, his list of faculties mapped exacdy 
the most prevalent social ties. Take for instance Spurzheim’s 1818 Observations sur la 
phrenologii2: the penchants of “Amativeness” and “Philoprogenitiveness” accounted for
heterosexual intercourses and the existence of the family; the sentiments of✓ 7
“Benevolence” and “Veneration” for hierarchical social relations; the sentiments of 
“Self-love” and “Approbativeness” for competitive relations; etc. These different 
faculties not only explained the existence of society as the environment in which man 
could fulfil his various needs, but also its most basic structures.
Furthermore, by emphasizing the role of the affective faculties (and most 
notably the other-directed ones), Comte held that Gall had refuted the proto-utilitarian 
views of Helvetius and the French Jdeologistes of man as “an argumentative being, 
constandy carrying out a multitude of imperceptible calculations without knowing it” 
(A. Comte, PP, p. 856) and their promotion of “egoism as the necessarily unique 
principle of any natural morals proper” (Jbid., p. 862). On the contrary, phrenology 
substantiated a picture of man as a being whose ends were set by his affections, 
penchants, and passions and reached with the help of his intellectual faculties, and 
whose moral nature balanced egoism with sympathy. As Comte suggested (Jbid., p. 856 
& 863), Gall had “cerebralized” the theory of human nature:
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“the essentially spontaneous sociability o f the human species, in accordance with an 
instinctive penchant for communal life and independently o f  all personal calculation, 
and often despite the strongest individual interests, would be questioned, as o f  course, 
by those who have not paid enough attention to the essential light shed on the subject 
by the sound biological theory o f  our intellectual and moral nature”(A. Comte, Physique 
sociale, p. 177).
Finally, phrenology accounted for “human sociability and the various organic 
conditions which determine its specific character” (A. Comte, PS, p. 157) in one last 
sense. Within the explanatory framework Comte adopted for his social statics, the 
knowledge of the respective capacities of the different individuals (the “nature” of their 
predominant faculties) explained their place and status in society. Ideally, in a society 
based on natural endowments, everybody would be assigned the role which would suit 
best one’s particular biological make-up. In other words, the division of labor in society 
mirrored the plurality of the organs in the human brain. The phrenological 
naturalization was complete, and supported Comte’s own sociological speculations: it 
explained the existence of human societies and singled out the spontaneous basis on 
which social relations thrived. It provided the conditions of possibility of social 
existence.
Yet, Comte also warned would-be sociologists that an exclusive reliance on 
biolog)7 would be detrimental to a proper understanding of social phenomena. For, if it 
was the case that the “theory of human nature” informed us on what inborn faculties 
called for and rendered possible man’s social existence, it did not determine on its own 
the actual details of social organization. It was only through the consideration of 
mankind’s historical experience and of the various forms in which it was realized that 
one could get a sense of the laws of sociological phenomena. For instance, the fact that 
different portions of mankind had been exposed to different climatic or geographic 
conditions (to different “milieux” as Comte would say) or to different historical 
circumstances (such as wars, invasion, epidemics) might have explained that they had 
adopted different forms of social organization, which in turn supposed the fostering of 
certain faculties in preference to others. Phrenology was blind to this aspect of social 
facts, because it merely studied the human mind statically, whereas sociology was at root 
a developmental science of human phenomena13. As Comte remarked, this neglect of 
history could lead to serious sociological blunders, mainly by prompting one “to 
consider as inherent in man’s fundamental nature, and consequendy as indestructible, 
temporary social modifications characteristic of a specific state of human development” 
(Jbid., p. 160). Gall himself fell prey to such an error, when he attempted to demonstrate
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“the alleged immobility o f  the military tendencies o f mankind, despite the sum o f  
historical evidence which, on the contrary, indicate so obviously that the military spirit 
declines as human development takes a place” (Id.).
However, Comte argued that even if the historical dimension of social development 
made it impossible to draw sociological inferences from the cerebral “theory of human 
nature” alone, the latter still remained a useful tool for controlling the cogency of 
sociological hypotheses. For Comte maintained that any sociological account should be 
accepted only if it was compatible with “the known laws of human nature” (Jbid., p. 
158), that is the picture of the human mind and its faculties provided by phrenology. 
This was what Comte called the “continuous” mode of dependence of sociology on 
biology14.
Having specified the two kinds of dependence of sociology on biology, Comte 
concluded that neither threatened the specificity of sociology:
“instead o f  being a mere appendix o f biology, social physics must certainly be 
conceived as a perfectly distinct science, directly established on bases o f its own, but 
profoundly connected, either in its point o f departure or in its continuous development, 
to the entire system o f  biological philosophy” (Ibid., p. 61).
Everything considered, Comte’s case for the autonomy of sociology seems to 
hold. For if all that biology does is to list the human faculties involved in social 
existence and thereby circumscribes the field of possible forms of social organization, 
but without licensing any inference as to what forms actually exist, it follows that only 
historical analysis can determine the developmental laws of social phenomena. 
Moreover, as we have seen with the case of moral phenomena, it also appears that 
Comte shared Mill’s general conception of sociological explanation as a process dealing 
with facts resulting from a composition of causes and whose explanation necessarily 
involve different and irreducible sets of laws. Accordingly, the previous development 
lends credence to the thesis of Comte’s endorsement of a non-reductionist view of 
science, and more notably of sociology.
But if this is the case, Mill was certainly misguided in charging Comte with 
attempting “to construct the theory of the mind solely on such data as physiology at 
present affords” (J. S. Mill, SL, VI, IV, 2, p. 851). By the same token, my contention 
that it would be inaccurate to regard Comte as sociology’s forefather and as an early 
advocate of the “disunity of science” thesis would be mistaken. Indeed, some Comtian 
scholars have argued that Mill erred when he singled out Comte as one of those who 
tried to reduce sociology to biology. For instance, R. Scharff claims that in the SL, “as
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typically elsewhere [probably the correspondence and Auguste Comte and Positivism], Mill 
is silent about the social behaviourist side of Comte’s view of mental phenomena” (R. 
Scharff, Comte After Positivism, p. 41)15. Similarly, L. Clauzade maintains that Mill’s 
analysis is “unable to grasp Comte’s position” with respect to the knowledge of human 
nature, because “it radically ignores what could be called (...) the a posteriori mode 
characteristic of Comtian philosophy and which consists in reversing the order of 
foundation in favour of the actual and the collective” (L. Clauzade, “Auguste Comte et 
Stuart Mill”, pp. 51-2)16, that is in having sociology taking over biology for the 
explanation of human phenomena.
The following alternative might explain Mill’s interpretation of Comte: either 
Mill was wrong because he did not pay attention to what Comte had written, or he had 
good reasons to uphold his interpretation. As to the first explanation, Mill’s 
perceptiveness as a reader and the fact that his reading of the last three volumes of the 
Cours prompted the “complete revision” (Mill to Comte, January 28, 1843; in Haac [ed.], 
p. 130) of the last book of the System makes it very unlikely that he had missed the gist 
of Comte’s developments about the specificity of sociology. Furthermore, as Clauzade 
acknowledges, Mill could not have ignored it, since “it was not only stated in the 
conclusions of the Cours, but it also appeared in the correspondence” (L. Clauzade, 
“Auguste Comte et Stuart Mill”, p. 52). Mill indeed agreed, in his letter dated June 9, 
1842, that Comte himself had “observed” that attention should be paid, when dealing 
with intellectual differences,
“not only to the extent o f activity o f  an organ but to the total amount o f education the
individual has received, considered in the broadest definition o f the term” (Mill to
Comte, June 9,1842; in Haac [ed.], p. 76).
This remark certainly testified to Mill’s awareness that Comte’s views were in principle 
perfectly compatible with his own conception of social explanation. Accordingly, the 
true interpretation of Mill’s stance should probably be sought in the other branch of the 
alternative: if Mill ascribed a reductionist view of sociology to Comte, it was because he 
came across a case in which Comte did not live by his own principles. The case in point 
was of course that of the explanation of women’s mental aptitudes, and I will dedicate 
the last section of this chapter to an analysis of the reasons why Mill, despite the 
pronouncements of the Cours, felt entitled to argue that Comte had attempted “to 
construct the theory of the mind solely on such data as physiology at present affords” (J. 
S. Mill, SL, Book VI, Chap. IV, Sect. 2, p. 851). But before turning to this, we have to 
dispel the impression of a complete agreement as to what a sociological explanation
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consists of which a mere prima facie interpretation of Comte’s and Mill’s writings up to 
the correspondence might have produced. For when it comes to spell out the specifics 
o f the proper way to assess one the phenomenon of inter-individual differences in 
mental aptitudes (especially between men’s and women’s), it becomes apparent the 
convergence was only superficial.
C -  The Centrality of Psychology in the Explanation of Moral Phenomena.
As described above, Mill held “moral” phenomena to be the effects of a 
composition of at least three different kinds of causes (environmental in the broadest 
sense of the term, physiological, and psychological). Accordingly, the explanation of 
these complex phenomena appealed to the various sets of laws governing these causes. 
Given that the ordinary methods of observation and experiment could not be used in 
cases of complex phenomena, the only mode of investigation practicable was what Mill 
called the “Deductive Method”, which inferred “the law of an effect, from the laws of 
the different tendencies of which it is the joint result” (J. S. Mill, SL, III, XI, 1, p. 454). 
Mill regarded such process as a threefold operation: it started with an appraisal of the 
laws of the different causes involved in the production of the phenomenon under 
scrutiny (“direct induction”), then carried out the calculation of how the different causes 
composed with one another (“ratiocination”), and ended with the comparison of the 
results of the deduction with the direct results of observation when available 
(“verification”).
What was striking about Mill’s presentation of the deductive method was that, 
even if it argued that the procedure was designed to deal with complex phenomena in 
general, it nonetheless took as its first illustration of its possible applications the case of 
social and historical phenomena:
“Thus, if  the subject be social or historical phenomena, the premises o f the Deductive 
Method must be the laws o f  the causes which determine that class o f  phenomena; and 
those causes are human actions, together with the general outward circumstances under 
the dominion o f  which mankind are placed, and which constitute man’s position in this 
world” (Id.).
Now, this choice is puzzling, because, as Bain recalled (A. Bain, John Stuart Mill, p. 67), 
Mill had been somewhat reluctant to use examples drawn from the “moral sciences” to 
substantiate his account of the various scientific methods17. However, he did exactly that 
for the Deductive Method. Why? The lack of knowledge about the exact details of the 
drafting of Book III prevents one from assuming that, in that instance, Mill’s remark
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echoed his discussion with Comte. But it certainly testifies to the Mill’s commitment to 
a pluralistic and non-reductionist conception of sociological and historical phenomena.
According to Mill’s account, the first step of the Deductive Method was that of 
“direct induction”, that is the ascertainment of the different causes required for the 
explanation of the phenomenon at hand and of their laws. In that first regard, Mill did 
not doubt that it was possible to identify the causally relevant factors.
“In the last case mentioned, this first condition is o f  easy fulfilment. That social 
phenomena depended on the acts and mental impressions o f human beings, never 
could have been a matter o f any doubt, however imperfectly it may have been known 
either by what laws those impressions and actions are governed, or to what social 
consequences their laws naturally lead” (J. S. Mill, SL, III, XI, 1, p. 455)l8.
Hence the following agenda:
“The Deductive Method, applied to social phenomena, must begin, therefore, by 
investigating, or must suppose to have been already investigated, the laws o f human 
action, and those properties o f outward things by which the actions o f human beings in 
society are determined. Some o f these general truths will naturally be obtained by 
observation and experiment, others by deduction: the more complex laws o f human 
action, for example, may be deduced from the simpler ones; but the simple or 
elementary laws will always, and necessarily, have been obtained by a directly inductive 
process” (Ibid., p. 454-5).
This last constraint was instituted so as to avoid that the method in question be 
conflated with the hypothetical method described in Chapter XIV of Book III: the 
structure of the process was indeed deductive, but the origins of the premises 
guaranteed the empirical nature of its conclusions, insofar as the laws of the causes 
considered had been obtained via the four methods of experimental inquiry. But was it 
really the case for social phenomena? What was the status of the lawTs involved in the 
production of mental phenomena?
In the light of his exchange with Comte and the relevant developments of the 
System19, there is no doubt that Mill believed that the “laws of physiology” had not yet 
been properly established in an inductive manner. Furthermore, Mill agreed that the 
“laws of circumstances” broadly construed remained mysterious: except for the fact that 
sensory physiology had shed some light on the perceptual mechanisms, it seemed that 
everything was still to be done in that field. For instance, the influence of social 
conditioning (and especially of education) on the formation of character had not 
received any satisfactory explanation. As he told Comte in one of his letters, the type of 
study initiated by Helvedus “[had] found no one to continue it” (Mill to Comte, 
October 30, 1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 197). However, the situation was different for the 
“laws of mind”.
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Both in the System and the correspondence, Mill endorsed association psychology 
as the theory which best accounted for the laws of mental phenomena. As argued in the 
System, if epiphenomenalism failed to make the case for the dependence of laws of 
mental states on the laws of the nervous states, one was left with uniformities of 
succession of states of mind to explain.
“The successions, therefore, which obtain among mental phenomena, do not admit o f  
being deduced from the physiological o f our nervous organization: and all real 
knowledge o f  them must continue, for a long time at least, if  not always, to be sought in 
the direct study, by observation and experiment, and o f  the mental successions 
themselves. Since therefore the order o f  our mental phenomena must be studied in 
those phenomena, and not inferred from the laws o f any phenomena more general, 
there is a distinct and separate Science o f  Mind” (J. S. Mill, SL, VI, IV, 2, p. 851).
As shown previously2", Mill did not deny that, in principle, it might be possible to 
reduce mental successions to nervous successions. He merely defended a “weak or 
methodological autonomy of psychology” (J. Skorupski, John Stuart Mill’ p. 261) in the 
sense that only the absence of an actual reduction of mental phenomena to nervous 
phenomena guaranteed the independence of the “Science of Mind” or psychology. 
However, as long as the reduction had not been achieved, Mill thought that the 
investigation of mental phenomena qua mental phenomena wTas a worthy enterprise and 
that indeed an impressive body of knowledge had already been collected.
What Mill described with caution to Comte as a belief “in the possibility of a 
positive psychology” conceived as an “analysis of our intellectual and affective faculties” 
(Mill to Comte, December 18, 1841; in Haac [ed.], p. 42), appeared in a somewhat 
different light in the third section of chapter four of the sixth Book of the System-, there, 
it was not merely for the possibility of a scientific psychology that Mill argued, but for 
the recognition of its actual existence. Dealing with mental phenomena, the “Science of 
Mind” was concerned with finding the laws of succession according to which 
psychological states followed or caused one another, just as the “Science of Matter” was 
concerned with the laws of physical phenomena21.
Accordingly, it should not have come as a surprise that Mill considered the 
associationist “laws of the mind” as a crucial element of his conception of social 
explanation. One of the aims of the fourth chapter of the sixth Book of the System was 
to bring his readers to accept that point. Having shown that the epiphenomenalist 
thesis, and particularly its phrenological version, could not deliver the actual reduction 
of the laws of mental states to nervous state it promised, Mill concluded that the study 
of the former would remain for the time being a distinct and separate discipline
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concerned with the uniformities of successions among states of mind and that, 
consequently, no satisfactory explanation of “moral” phenomena could spare itself the 
trouble of taking it into consideration. Mill’s concern in the System was therefore 
primarily architectonic, in the sense that it attempted to define what would count as a 
good sociological explanation. And that is exacdy how one is to understand the remark 
added to the 1846 edition of the System, and implicitly targeting Comte, in which Mill 
maintained that the exclusive reliance on “laws of physiology” and the neglect of the 
“laws of mind” appeared to him
“an infringement o f  the true canons o f  inductive philosophy, which must produce, and 
which does produce, erroneous conclusions in some very important departments o f the 
science o f  human nature” (J. S. Mill, SL, VI, IV, 2, pp. 851-2).
What is striking is that this aspect of Mill’s position has been overlooked by most 
of the recent scholarship dealing with the controversy on psychology between Comte 
and Mill22. Instead of paying attention to the architectonical issue, the majority of 
commentators have focused on what they took to be the heart of the debate, namely 
Comte’s proscription of psychology from the encyclopaedic scale of the sciences and 
Mill’s defence of its scientificity. What was at stake, on the received view of the matter, 
was the methodological status of the primary instrument of psychology, i.e. 
introspection23.
In brief, Comte held that introspection could not be regarded as a genuine 
process of observation, because it did not satisfy what may be called the dualistic 
requirement, that of having some kind of distance, or heterogeneity, between the observer 
(the subject) and what is observed (the object). In contrast, interior observation blundy 
conflated the two terms of the relation: “we observe phenomena with our mind; but 
with what do we observe the mind itself, its operations, its way of proceeding? We 
cannot divide our mind, that is to say, our brain, in two parts, one that acts, while the 
other watches it to see it goes to work” (Comte to Valat, September 24, 1819; A. Comte, 
Correspondance generate et confessions. Vol. I., 1814—1840, p. 58). Therefore, interior 
observation in fact constituted an epistemological oxymoron. Introspection was 
worthless because the observations it was supposed to gather were empty. Hence, no 
science of mental phenomena could be based on it. Introspective psychology was 
doomed to fail.
Surely, when he started corresponding with Comte, it is true Mill was perfecdy 
aware that Comte had vehemendy objected to the very possibility of an introspective
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psychology for many years, especially in the First Lesson of the Cour,f4. For instance, as 
already noted, Mill cautiously mentioned at the very beginning of the correspondence 
that his belief in the possibility of a “positive psychology” might lead Comte to suspect 
him of “metaphysical tendencies” (Mill to Comte, December 18, 1841; in Haac [ed.], p. 
42). Similarly, the System recalled that Comte denied introspective psychology “the 
character of a science, but places it, in the chimerical nature of its objects and 
pretensions, almost on a par with astrology” (J. S. Mill, SL, VI, IV, 2, p. 850-1).
Now, from Mill’s knowledge of Comte’s proscription of psychology and the fact 
that the associationist psychology John Stuart Mill endorsed relied almost exclusively on 
introspection to establish the “laws of mind”25, Heyd, Wilson, and Petit conclude that 
John Stuart Mill felt compelled to refute Comte’s methodological objections to it. In a 
somewhat different vein, Sharff argues that Mill was after a refutation of Comte’s 
strictures on the introspective method of psychology, but that he failed to understand 
that Comte was not specifically attacking associationist psychology26. In support of that 
interpretation, these authors adduce textual evidence predominantly drawn from two 
paragraphs of Mill’s later Auguste Comte and Positivism (1865)2/, in which Mill indeed seems 
to address Comte’s objections. However, for all its plausibility, I claim that this 
emphasis on Mill’s concern with justifying introspection derives from a partial and 
incomplete reading of Mill’s writings.
Firstly, none of the commentators notice that the scientific status of 
introspection as a psychological method was touched upon neither in the System nor in 
the correspondence with Comte, two sources in which one might have expected to find 
the matter broached i f  Mill really did care about it. But that simply is not the case: Mill 
made no mention of it whatsoever in these texts. Why? Because, as he put it in Auguste 
Comte and Positivism, he considered Comte’s proscription of psychology an “aberration” 
resulting from “a fallacy respecting which the only wonder is that it should impose on 
any one” (J. S. Mill, Auguste Comte and Positivism, p. 296). And it certainly did not impose 
on Mill, for, as he claimed in the System,
“it remains incontestable that there exist uniformities o f succession among states o f
mind, and that these can be ascertained by observation and experiment”(J. S. Mill, S L
Book VI, Chap. IV, Sect. 2, p. 851).
Everything considered, one is tempted to think that Mill never took seriously Comte’s 
objections to introspection and that his alleged refutation of them was merely a piece of 
self-serving polemics in a book that Mill intended as a scathing criticism of the harmful 
aspects of Comte’s thought28. O f course, knowing the later fate of introspection in
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scientific psychology29, one might argue that Mill should have paid more attention to 
Comte’s objections and that he was at fault in not grasping the shortcomings of the 
procedure30. But such a criticism simply overlooks the historical context in which Mill 
developed his thought.
Secondly, Mill re-asserted twice his architectonic concern with Comte’s 
proscription of psychology for the study of “moral phenomena” in the course of three 
pages of Auguste Comte and Positivism: as already noted, he started with the claim that the 
omission of psycholog}7 led to aberration of “great practical importance” (J. S. Mill, 
Auguste Comte and Positivism, p. 296), that is that his erroneous views of sociological 
explanation led to dubious policies, and concluded that it was connected with “serious 
errors in his attempt to create a Social Science”, since it resulted in his failure to 
“appreciate the influence which circumstances exercise, through psychological laws, in 
producing diversities of character, collective or individual” (Ibid., p. 298).
When this emphasis on the structure of sociological explanation and the 
detrimental consequences brought about by a faulty conceptualisation of it is 
acknowledged, it is difficult to agree with Clauzade when he maintains that Mill regarded 
his controversy with Comte over psychology “as an issue affecting merely the scientific 
status of interior observation” (L. Clauzade, “Auguste Comte et Stuart Mill”, p. 46). As I 
have just shown, it is simply wrong to claim that Mill treated “the argument against 
interior observation as an independent argumentative unit, from which it would be 
possible to draw conclusions as to the manner Comte generally conceives science” (Ibid., 
p. 56). Firstly, because Mill right from the start assumed the viability of introspective 
psycholog}7 and never really took seriously Comte’s objections. Secondly, because what 
prompted Mill to engage the discussion with Comte was not an abstract concern for the 
study of intellectual and affective phenomena, but the pressing practical issue of 
women’s subjection. Since Comte supported his views on women with a certain 
account of the origin and nature of sex-based mental differences, Mill was forced to 
meet him on his own grounds. Accordingly, Mill’s motivation for broaching the issue of 
psycholog}7 with Comte was primarily a social and political one. Eventually, as already 
noted, Clauzade fails to see that if Mill ascribed a reductionist view of sociology to 
Comte, it was because Mill realized that Comte’s explanation of the mental aptitudes 
belied his advocacy of sociological explanations as necessarily including the “collective 
and historical reality” (Jbid., p. 53) of the human mind. To this last point, I will now 
turn.
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D — The Explanation of Moral Phenomena and the Method of Residues.
As shown in the previous section, Mill’s developments on psychology in the 
System were part and parcel of the first step of the Deductive Method as applied to the 
explanation of “moral” phenomena, that of the ascertainment of the different causes 
required for the explanation of the phenomenon under scrutiny and of their laws. Now, 
one relevant set of laws (the laws of mind as established by association psychology) has 
been reviewed. But what about the others?
Mill acknowledged, as noticed before31, that the phase of “direct induction” with 
respect to the “laws of circumstances” and the “laws of physiology” had not been 
successful so far. But if this was really the case that the different laws at work in the 
production of “moral” phenomena had no been asserted properly, the immediate 
consequence of this was the impossibility of explaining moral phenomena by way of the 
deductive method: as Mill made clear, complex phenomena resulting from a 
composition of causes could be explained deductively if and only if the laws of the 
concurrent causes were known independently from one another beforehand. As he put 
it in the System,
“this supposes a previous process o f observation or experiment upon each cause 
separately; or else a previous deduction, which also must depend for its ultimate 
premises on observation or experiment” (J. S. Mill, SL, III, XI, 1, p. 454).
Given that in the case at hand the laws of some concurrent causes were not known, the 
explanation of “moral” phenomena was compromised before it even started: there was 
not enough material to proceed to the ratiocinative step of the Deductive Method. 
However, Mill did not believe that this lack of inductive support was an insurmountable 
obstacle on the way to the explanation of moral phenomena.
As for the “laws of circumstances”, the System had set up the lines along which a 
“science of the formation of character” or “Ethology” could develop (Ibid., VI, V). In the 
early days of the correspondence, Mill was extremely confident about the success of 
such an endeavour and expressed his desire to contribute to it:
“Even though human life is short, we can look forward to seeing the state o f society 
and the national character o f each important segment o f mankind related to the laws o f  
human nature and to the characteristics o f  the general or particular organic milieu to 
which they pertain; though, to be sure, the link will not be as complete as that we find 
today in the most advanced sciences. I would be happy, indeed, if  I thought myself
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capable o f  playing a truly important role in this great enterprise, even if only a 
secondary one” (Mill to Comte, March 22, 1842; in Haac [ed.], p. 61).
Furthermore, Mill constantly emphasized to Comte the fact that the development 
of Ethology, the “theory of how external circumstances, either individual or social, 
influence the formation of moral and intellectual character” (Mill to Comte, October 30, 
1843; Ibid., p. 198), would remedy the poor state of social statics, a discipline about 
which both agreed that it was the key to the sexual equality issue.
However, Mill did not deny that this inquiry about the environmental 
determinants of character seemed “to be the least advanced of all scientific speculations 
of any importance” (Id.): the absence of upholders o f Helvetius’s views, added to the 
twin compulsions of “obsessive” physiologists and “inveterate” metaphysicians for the 
exclusive consideration of “laws of physiology” and “original and ultimate facts” of the 
mind, diverted almost all interest from this kind of investigation.
“True acquaintance, if only empirical, with this type o f  natural relationship [between 
one’s character and one’s environment], appears to be the rarest o f all, and sound 
observations are likewise (partly because the subject is so difficult, partly due to the 
tendency, which most often prevails in this kind o f  research, to consider inexplicable 
what one was unable to explain” (Id., p. 198).
Given this situation and the fact that Mill’s conception of Ethology in the System, 
as we will see in Chapter VI, remained largely programmatic, what made him so sure 
that a satisfactory explanation of “moral” phenomena was nevertheless within reach? A 
hint as to what may have prompted his belief in the near advent of Ethology had to do 
with the relation of the latter with psychology. Without entering into details that will be 
covered in due time, one may nonetheless say that Mill assumed the “laws of mind” as 
the major causal regularities involved in the deduction of ethological propositions. 
Accordingly, Mill felt he could argue that the soundness of psychological laws was likely 
to guarantee, at least roughly, the soundness of ethological conclusions, even if the 
obtaining of precise ones still required wiggling with the other relevant causal factors. 
Now, this might explain Mill’s optimism concerning the prospects of his ethological pet- 
project, thereby licensing his hope that explanations of “moral” phenomena were 
attainable. But this also reveals one implicit assumption for which Mill never provided 
arguments: he consistendy held that psychological and ethological laws weighted more 
on the formation of character traits than physiological laws. As we will see shortly, this 
bias clearly surfaced in the way he thought one could arrive at a precise determination of 
the different causal influences involved in “moral” phenomena..
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What about “laws of physiology”? Even if Mill did not deny that in principle 
laws of mental states could be reduced to laws of nervous states, he nonetheless 
regarded (and was entitled to regard) the actual attempts at such reduction as having 
been unsuccessful so far. But if so the project of obtaining deductive explanations of 
“moral” phenomena was compromised once again: since the laws of one of the 
concurrent causes was not known independently of the others beforehand, “moral” 
phenomena, which were resulting from causal composition, could not be accounted for 
via the Deductive Method.
However, Mill thought he had the resources for coping with this imperfect 
knowledge of physiological laws. The solution of the predicament lay in one of the four 
methods of experimental inquiry developed in the System, namely that of Residues (J. S. 
Mill, SL, III, VIII, 5). The Fourth Canon of Mill’s methods went as follows:
“Subduct from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous inductions to be 
the effect o f  certain antecedents, and the residue o f the phenomenon is the effect o f the 
remaining antecedents” (Ibid., p. 398).
In cases where one knew some of the causes involved in the production of a 
phenomenon, the subtraction of the parts of the effect due to known causes would lead 
to the determination of a residuum uniquely resulting from “antecedents which had 
been overlooked, or of which the effect was as yet an unknown quantity” {Jbid., p. 397).
As for the explanation of “moral” phenomena, the situation was the following: 
according to Mill, one could rely on “laws of the mind” and, provided one accepted his 
views on the dependence of ethology on psychology, one could estimate roughly for 
which part of the effects the “laws of circumstances” were responsible; given that, as he 
agreed with Comte, human physical organization was probably the only other agent 
involved, the features of “moral” phenomena that could not be accounted for by 
previous inductions would have to be ascribed to it.
Such a line of argument was in complete accordance with Mill’s belief that 
nervous physiology was far less developed than psycholog}7, and that consequently, from 
a purely pragmatic perspective, the latter constituted a far more appropriate starting 
point for the estimation of the respective amount of causal influence exercised by the 
different agents considered.
That Mill thought appropriate the application of the Method of Residues to 
deductive explanations of “moral” phenomena is evidenced by two passages in the 
System. In Book III, Chap. IX, Mill took the case of mental abilities as a conclusive
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illustration of the cogency of the Method of Residues. In that instance, his target was 
the “metaphysicians” who ascribed mental differences to what he called in a letter to 
Comte “basic differences in psychic constitution” (Mill to Comte, June 9, 1842; in Haac 
[ed.], p. 76):
“if  it be possible to establish, what is generally rather assumed than proved, that there is 
in one human individual, one sex, or one race o f mankind over another, an inherent 
and inexplicable superiority in mental faculties, this must be proved by subtracting from 
the differences o f  intellect which we in fact see, all that can be traced by known laws 
either to the ascertained differences o f physical organization, or to the differences 
which have existed in the outward circumstances in which the subjects o f the 
comparison have hitherto been placed” (J. S. Mill, SL, III, IX, 5, pp. 428-9).
O f course, what Mill proposed here was the just the experimental setting in 
which the claims of the “metaphysicians” of the Whewellian brand could be assessed, 
for, as we have seen, Mill was quite guarded as to the reliability7 of the actual laws dealing 
with “physical organization”. But still, he held that only if it turned out that “laws of 
circumstances” (and those included the considerations of the “laws of mind”) and “laws 
of physiology” could not account for the entirety of the phenomenon of inter-individual 
mental differences, then the residuum arrived at “would be evidence of an ulterior 
original distinction, and the measure of its amount” [Ibid., p. 429). For the time being, 
Mill concluded,
“the strongest assertors o f  such supposed differences have hitherto been very negligent 
o f providing with these necessary logical conditions o f  the establishment o f  their 
doctrine” (Id.).
Book VI rehearsed the same argument, but against “physiologists” this time:
“ Even admitting the influence o f cerebral conformation to be as great as is contended 
for, it would still be a question how far the cerebral development determined the 
propensity itself, and how far it only acted by modifying the nature and degree o f  the 
sensations on which the propensity may be psychologicaDy dependent. And it is certain 
that, in human beings at least, differences in education and in outward circumstances, 
together with physical differences in the sensations produced in different individuals by 
the same external or internal cause, are capable o f accounting for a far greater portion 
o f  character than is supposed even by the most moderate phrenologists” (Ibid., VI, IV,
4, p. 858).
The explanatory scheme mobilised by Mill remained the same, but he 
introduced a variant which was especially relevant to the issue of inter-individual mental 
differences. Drawing on the psychological account proposed by the Unitarian minister 
and educator James Martineau32, Mill argued that the laws of the association of ideas 
could account for these kinds of differences. On the one hand, it was true that one’s 
character traits or mental abilities depended on one’s capacity7 to be affected by
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sensations: for instance, a high level of nervous sensitivity led to a greater susceptibility 
of being affected by simultaneous sensations, whereas a lesser susceptibility made one 
more receptive to successive sensations. However, this differential susceptibility could 
be extended to mental events independently of sensations, because of the influence of 
laws of the association of ideas. But if so, one’s character traits or mental abilities could 
be the result of conditioning (outward or self-induced). As Mill quoted from Martineau,
“where nature has endowed an individual with great original susceptibility, he will 
probably be distinguished by fondness for natural history, a relish for the beautiful and 
great, and moral enthusiasm; where there is but a mediocrity' o f  sensibility, a love o f  
science, o f  abstract truth, with a deficiency o f  a taste and o f  fervour, likely to be the 
result” ( Id.).
What is striking about this argument is that it in fact dispensed with the 
postulation of faculties (and their corresponding organs) as a necessary element in the 
explanation of “moral” phenomena. So when, Mill referred to “diversities in organic 
constitution” or “differences in bodily organization”, he in fact was not alluding to the 
differences in cerebral conformation, but to mere nervous sensitivity. Accordingly, the 
“laws of physiology” he was talking about had nothing to do with the kind of laws the 
phrenologists endorsed: they were just the common laws of sensory physiology that any 
empirically minded associationist had to postulate to set the whole cognitive machine to 
work.
Surely, Mill agreed that people differed in their capacity to be affected by 
sensations, but this was a far cry from endorsing that people’s mental abilities where 
constrained ab initio by their “organization”, since, as Mill made clear, one could be 
conditioned (outwardly or by a self-induced process) to acquire or develop certain 
abilities by favouring certain associations of ideas over others. Just by postulating 
sensations, ideas and the laws of association, one was able to explain what made a mind 
fit for “natural history”, the estimate of “the beautiful and great”, and “moral 
enthusiasm”, and another for “science” as the pursuit of “abstract truth”(/<7.), for these 
character traits and mental aptitudes were in fact mostly the outcome of one’s 
experience. If one recalls J. Fodor’s remark that the explanatory scheme favoured by 
associationism led to “an account of the ontogeny of mental processes which dispensed 
with the postulation of innate cognitive architecture — which in short, dispensed with 
the need for faculties” (J. Fodor, The Modularity of Mind, p. 27-8)33, this certainly applied 
to Mill’s conception of the higher mental capacities of man.
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Mill had no doubt that this kind of associationist explanation of “mental 
peculiarities” would account for a considerable number of inter-individual differences in 
intellectual and moral capacities. Yet, he also agreed that not all phenomena would be 
accounted for in a similar manner, and that the “laws of physiology” would be appealed 
to, via the Method of Residues, to provide a rationale for theses cases. As Mill put it,
“I by no means seek to imply from this that they [the “laws o f  mind”] will account for 
all; but that which remains to be otherwise accounted for is merely a residual phenomenon-, 
and the amount o f  the residue can only be determined by persons already familiar with 
the explanation o f  phenomena by psychological laws” (J. S. Mill, SL, VI, IV, 4, p. 858).
Such was Mill’s proposal for the explanation of mental differences. As any 
complex phenomenon, it was to be resolved in the laws of its concurrent causes. Since 
some of the laws remained unknown, the Method of Residues had to be introduced so 
as to determine the weight of the various agents involved in the phenomenon. This 
would in turn enable one to grasp more precisely the part of the effects for which the 
causes not yet accounted for were responsible, and thereby initiate investigations as to 
the nature of the actual laws governing them. Once these laws would be ascertained, a 
straightforward deduction could be achieved.
However, what has rendered this development about the Method of Residues 
necessary was not only that it enables one to spell out fully Mill’s stance on the 
explanation of “moral” phenomena and to demonstrate that the System provided him 
with the theoretical resources for coping with likely objections to his approach; but also 
because, when the correspondence started focusing on the origin and nature of sex- 
based intellectual differences (a “moral” phenomenon indeed), Mill and Comte, whilst 
agreeing on the cogency of the method for solving the issue, disagreed as to the proper 
way of putting it to use.
The first reference to the method was made by Mill in his letter to Comte dated 
October 30, 1843. Taking stock of the inconclusiveness of the evidence brought in 
support of the phrenological claims about female intellectual inferiority, Mill argued that 
almost everything remained to be done in that field of research. He also pointed out 
that, “as long as ethological analysis of the influence of external factors, even the most 
general, [was] as little advanced as it [was]” (Mill to Comte, October 30, 1843; in Haac 
[ed.], p. 199), the advancement of knowledge would be severely impeded. He concluded 
by claiming that, for the time being, “anatomical differences” would only contribute to 
the explanation of moral phenomena as “residues (to use the terms of my Logic, after 
subtraction of everything that can be explained some other way” (Id; slightly revised
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translation). It thus appeared that Mill regarded the “laws of mind” broadly construed as 
the mainspring of the inquiry and relegated physiological agency to the role of a last 
resort explanatory agent.
In his letter dated November 14, 1843, which can be considered his definitive 
attempt to respond to Mill’s strictures, Comte gave a twofold reply, “scientific” and 
“logical”. As to the first, he contended, contrary to Mill, that biology should figure as 
the prevalent explanatory tool in accounting for the specific kind of “moral” 
phenomena at hand, that of women’s alleged intellectual inferiority:
“I believe that the preliminary insights which we have derived from biology alone and 
which take on greater importance, especially for the problem at hand, are already far 
more advanced than you seem to admit, in spite o f the rather unsatisfactory state o f  our 
biological studies” (Comte to Mill, November 14,1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 207).
This pronouncement was an echo of a long-standing position of Comte on the 
subject, according to which the sexual equality issue could be resolved by appealing 
uniquely to biological data, although he was also ready to resort to other kinds of 
argument. Comte’s belief that the issue could be settled on biological grounds 
independendy of any other consideration implied that the difference in intellectual 
capacities between sexes was primarily a natural phenomenon depending the respective 
organization of men and women. Accordingly, he surely regarded it, to use Mill’s own 
words, as “innate, and in the main indelible” (J. S. Mill, Autobiography, p. 270). In short, 
biological agency prevailed on all other factors in the production of intellectual 
differences.
Comte made no mystery of which sort of evidence he believed supported his faith 
in the necessary prevalence of biology in the explanation of this kind of moral 
phenomena: it was primarily Gall’s phrenological Innatism.
“Gall, who fittingly brought out the preponderant influence o f  the original organism, all 
too much neglected that o f education, which had been so overemphasized by 
Helvetius. But, while the truth assuredly lies in between these two extremes, I certainly 
do not see it exactly half way between these views; it lies far closer to the modern view 
than to the earlier one”(Comte to Mill, November 14,1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 207).
Clearly, Mill’s criticism of phrenology had no impact whatsoever on Comte. 
Notwithstanding the lip service he paid to the environmentalist approach, Comte’s 
stance was clear: it was women’s organism, and more especially the brain, that was the 
key-element for explaining inter-sexual mental differences. But if so, what about 
Comte’s alleged commitment to a specific approach to “moral phenomena” and its 
emphasis on' its historical component? What about his acknowledgement that those
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phenomena were complex, and therefore accountable for only as the result of a 
composition of causes? More generally, what about his endorsement of a non­
reductionist view of science, and more notably of sociology? In the case at hand, none 
o f this applied. As his last comment on the “scientific” aspect of the question illustrated, 
Comte took the matter to be straightforwardly biological:
“organic questions must certainly be given prime importance since it is the organism 
and not the milieu that has made us into men rather than into monkeys or dogs, and it 
[the organism] even determines our special kind o f  humanity and circumscribes it to a 
much greater degree that one is often given to believe” {Id).
This last point unmistakably marked Comte’s inability to operate by the 
standards he himself set up for the study of “moral phenomena”. Furthermore, it amply 
vindicated the charge levelled by Mill against Comte that, contrary to what he 
advocated, he had attempted “to construct the theory of the mind solely on such data as 
physiology at present affords” (J. S. Mill, SL, VI, IV, 2, p. 851). Accordingly, when R. 
Scharff claims that in the SL, “as typically elsewhere, Mill is silent about the social 
behaviourist side of Comte’s view of mental phenomena” (R. Scharff, Comte After 
Positivism, p. 41), and when L. Clauzade maintains that Mill’s analysis “radically ignores 
(...) the a posteriori mode characteristic of Comtian philosophy” (L. Clauzade, “Auguste 
Comte et Stuart Mill”, p. 51) in having sociology taking over biology for the explanation 
of human phenomena, they are wrong: as already seen, it was not that Mill had 
overlooked these aspects of Comte’s thought; rather, the correspondence made him 
realize that this was a mere facade with respect to the sexual equality issue. Maybe that 
was just an “aberration” in Comte’s philosophy, but it was enough for Mill to single him 
out as one of those who tried to reduce sociology to biology.
This Comtian endeavour came to light when the “logic” of the Method of 
Residues, that is the proper way of putting it to use, was touched upon. Comte 
acknowledged its cogency for solving the sexual equality issue but disputed what he 
called Mill’s “order of partial eliminations” (Comte to Mill, November 14, 1843; in Haac 
[ed.], p. 207. Comte hold that it should take place
“in the order o f decreasing importance, which a first general estimate intuitively assigns 
to the different identifiable influences. This means that in biological research one must 
often invert the order o f  steps which you [Mill] believe to be always preferable, the 
progression from outside to inside [from the milieu to the organism]” (Id).
What is striking about Comte’s conception of the method of residues was that it 
revealed his biological a priori. Comte held that to function, it necessarily had to assign 
right from the beginning the appropriate causal weight to the different factors involved
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in the production of the phenomenon considered. Accordingly, he took for granted that 
biological considerations should take precedence. But such a move both prejudged of 
the weight of that kind of agency and missed one of the uses of the Method of 
Residues, i.e. the discovery of the respective amount of the effect each cause was 
responsible of. For what was at stake in the debate between Comte and Mill was not the 
nature of “the different identifiable influences” (Id), but their respective share in what 
was obtained. If the very Method of Residues was resorted to, it was indeed because the 
incomplete knowledge of the various laws involved stopped one from deducing the laws 
of moral phenomena.
Mill’s reply to Comte shed further light on Comte’s different way of applying the 
Method of Residues. Contrary to Comte, Mill held the Method of Residues, used 
experimentally, was first and foremost guided by pragmatic considerations. To be sure, 
he thought that the “laws of mind” would explain most “moral phenomena”, including 
inter-individual differences in intellectual faculties. But if everything seemed to hinge on 
them in Mill’s account, it was only because they were the only laws he thought he could 
count on. He made clear to Comte that their primacy was epistemic, not ontological:
“It seems to me that one must first eliminate the causes whose effects admits direct 
evaluation with the most ease and precision: these will be, most often, those which have 
the greatest real importance, but this may not always be the case” (Mill to Comte,
December 8, 1843; Ibid., p. 213).
Given “the rather unsatisfactory state of our biological studies” (Comte to Mill, 
November 14, 1843; Ibid., p. 207) that Comte himself had diagnosed, and in the light of 
his criticisms of the unfounded claims of phrenology, Mill was justified in preferring to 
start his investigations with the little that was already established with respect to “moral” 
phenomena, namely their dependence on the laws of association. But he also knew that 
the conclusions thereby reached were merely tentative: for the whole problem was to 
know whether individual or structural features significandy limited the causal role 
environment could play in bringing about certain “moral” characteristics.
Consequendy, one must not be deceived by Mill’s strategic appeal to the Method 
of Residues as a manoeuvre not to exclude completely from the explanations of moral 
phenomena the consideration of biological factors. For when Mill suggested considering 
first how the different environmental circumstances (education, social position, etc.) 
contributed to the development of the various types of personality, and then, if certain 
traits remained unexplained, to set down the residuum to the account of congenital 
predispositions, he overtiy assumed that biological factors played a minor role. But this
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was a claim to be adjudicated only case -by-case and with the help of empirical 
evidence, not to be decided a priori. Furthermore, Mill did not seem to be true to the 
spirit o f the Deductive Method when he advocated the use of the Method of Residues. 
For the gist of the deductive procedure lay in the compounding of all the separate and 
various causes involved, whose laws had been established beforehand during the 
Inductive step of the process. And the better the laws of these different causes were 
known, the more reliable the deductions obtained from them would be. So, instead of 
relegating the search for physiological determinants to the margin of ethological inquiry, 
methodological consistency wTould have expected Mill to support, on a par with the 
search of environmental determinants and parallel to it, the development of a more 
accurate biological knowledge. His failure to do so might have resulted from his fear 
that such knowledge would give ammunition to his opponents.
However, for the time being, the wisest course of action was to investigate the 
factors which admitted “direct evaluation with the most ease and precision” (Mill to 
Comte, December 8, 1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 213): in the case at hand, it was certainly 
easier to assess the amount of influence of the “circumstances” than of the organism, 
for whereas the latter could be varied (intentionally, just as when one compared 
different pedagogical methods, or not), the assessment of organic features proved 
infinitely more difficult. In any case, the procedure Mill suggested was the only capable 
of adjudicating on experimental grounds the issue of sexual equality. As we have seen, 
Comte remained deaf to Mill’s proposal: for him, the case was already settled. Women 
were constitutionally inferior to men with respect to intellectual faculties. At least, that 
was what he drew from biology.
As I have tried to show in these previous pages, the debate between Comte and 
Mill on sexual equality did not bear merely on factual questions (was phrenology 
evidence of women’s intellectual and moral inferiority?) but also broached general 
methodological problems such as the nature of explanation in the “moral sciences”. In 
the course of this chapter, we have seen how Mill uncovered Comte’s false sociological 
commitments with respect to the understanding of moral phenomena, whilst developing 
an explanatory scheme of his own to account for them. However, the battle was not 
won for Mill. For, on the one hand, Mill’s conception of the explanation of “moral” 
phenomena needed to be perfected, most notably by substantiating his claim that 
environmental factors took precedence in the formation of mental capacities. Hence the
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necessity of developing “Ethology”. On the other hand, even if Comte’s biological 
argument had been refuted, Mill also had to rebut the sociological arguments on which 
Comte grounded his sexist plea.
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inspection o f one’s consciousness the existence o f  the thinking substantial Self (the indivisible 'mo?) and 
of extended bodies as causes o f one’s sensations. These two substances in turn found their own cause in 
God, the absolute substance, cause o f  itself. And to these three substances corresponded the three 
faculties o f  the human mind, namely Feeling (‘la sensibility'), Will (Jla volonti), and Reason (‘la raison7), which 
enable us to have cognisance, by way o f a spontaneous and intuitive apperception, o f  Beauty, Good, and 
Truth. O f course, Comte objected to the entire argument and relied on Gall, on comparative biology, and 
on psychopathology to dispute the simplicity and the immateriality o f  the Self. Mill was perfectly aware o f  
that, as the correspondence clearly evidences, for he told Comte that i f  he “did not seem as taken” by 
what Comte called the “antiontological doctrine o f  Gall” (Comte to Mill, July 22, 1842; in Haac [ed.], p. 
89) it was only “because they were not essentially new to [him], who had so often read and thought about 
the corresponding sections o f [Comte’s] Court7 (Mill to Comte, July 11,1842; Ibid., p. 83-4, slightly revised 
translation). However, Mill did not have to endorse phrenology to refute spiritualism, for his empiricist 
pedigree had already vaccinated him against substantialist doctrines, as the definition o f  the mind in the 
System illustrates: “There is a something I call Myself, or, by another form of expression, my mind, which I 
consider as distinct from these sensations, thoughts, &c.; a something which I conceive to be not the 
thoughts, but the being that has the thoughts, and which I can conceive as existing for ever in a state o f  
quiescence, without any thoughts at all. But what this being is, though it is myself, I have no knowledge, 
further than the series o f its states o f consciousness”(J. S. Mill, System of Logic, Book I, Chap. Ill, Sect. 8, p. 
64). On Mill’s conception o f  the self, see A. Hamilton, “Mill, Phenomenalism, and the S elf’, in J. 
Skorupski (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to John Stuart Mill, pp. 139-75.
27 J. S. Mill, Auguste Comte and Positivism, in J. S. Mill, Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, pp. 296-7.
28 To the best o f  my knowledge, none o f  the commentators have paid attention to the two authors Mill 
referred to for support in his alleged refutation o f  Comte: William Hamilton, one o f the leaders o f  the 
Intuitionist school on whom Mill was writing a scathing criticism at the very same time he worked on the 
articles which resulted in Auguste Comte and Positivism, (see J. S. Mill, Examination of Sir William Hamilton V 
Philosophy, Textual Introduction, pp. lxxi-lxxix), and Jean Jacques Severin de Cardaillac, an obscure French 
substitute professor at the Sorbonne between 1824 and 1829, who belonged to the Spiritualist branch o f  
the Ideologues. If  Mill really looked for convincing arguments in defence o f  introspection, he certainly 
could have found them somewhere else than in the writings o f representatives o f  two philosophical 
schools for which he had no serious consideration. One may object to my interpretation by arguing that 
Mill also referred to Association psychology7 and some o f its figures (Hartley, Brown, and James Mill), but 
he did so to demonstrate that even if the phrenological hypothesis turned out to be true, Comte would 
still have to rely on introspection to prove the correspondence o f a faculty or psychological disposition 
with a cerebral localization. For “to establish a relation between mental functions and cerebral 
conformations, requires not only a parallel system o f observations applied to each, but (as M. Comte 
himself, with some inconsistency, acknowledges) an analysis o f  the mental faculties, des ‘diverses facultes 
elementaires,’ conducted without any reference to the physical conditions, since the proof o f  the theory7 
would lie in the correspondence between the division o f the brain into organs and that o f  the mind into 
faculties, each shown by separate evidence. (J. S. Mill, Auguste Comte and Positivism, p. 297). In that instance, 
what was at issue wTas not the objectivity o f  introspective psychology7 (for Mill took it for granted all 
along), but the viability o f  phrenology7 as a science o f  mental phenomena.
29 On that issue, see W. Lyons, The Disappearance of Introspection. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986.
30 The defence o f  introspection against Comte’s strictures has been a crucial element in the establishment 
o f scientific psychology7 in the last third o f the nineteenth century: part o f the story7 is recounted in V. 
Guillin, “Theodule Ribot's Ambiguous Positivism”.
31 See IVA.
32 The article referred to by Mill was James Martineau’s “On the Life, Character, and Works o f Dr. 
Priestley7”, Monthly Repository 1833, VII, pp. 19-30, 84-8, 231-41. It had already been mentioned in the 
System in III, XIII, 6, when Mill illustrated the explanatory7 power o f  the laws o f association. As Mill 
underlined, he himself pursued this “interesting speculation” and tried to explain through it “the 
peculiarities o f  the poetical temperament” (Ibid., p. 481) in his 1833 “Thoughts on Poetry7 and its 
Varieties” (J. S. Mill, Autobiography, pp. 341-365).
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V -  A Never Ending Subjection? Comte, Mill, and the 
Sociological Argument against Sexual Equality.
Despite Mill’s criticisms, Comte never relinquished his belief that biology 
(and especially phrenology) legitimated women’s subjection by demonstrating their 
intellectual inferiority. Furthermore, notwithstanding his admission that “moral” 
phenomena resulted from a composition of causes, Comte made no allowance for 
the kind of multifactorial analysis of mental capacities Mill proposed so as to take 
into account environmental influences. Now, if there was no more to Comte’s 
sexist stance than the previous set of arguments, my claim that, in the case of 
women’s subjection, Comte infringed his own methodological principles by 
reducing a sociological question to a biological matter would rest on safe grounds. 
But Comte had other resources in store that seem to belie my interpretative 
hypothesis.
It was a characteristic feature of Comte’s treatment of the sexual equality 
issue, in both the Cours de philosopbiepositive and the correspondence with Mill, that 
it repeatedly underlined the twofold nature of the argument for women’s 
subjection, namely its biological and sociological aspects. The Fiftieth Lesson of 
the Cours explicitly stated that sociology showed the “radical incompatibility of any 
social existence with this chimerical equality of the sexes” by “supplementing, in its 
own way, [the] essential scientific assessment” provided by the “sound biological 
philosophy” developed by Gall and others (A. Comte, PS, p. 186). Similarly, 
Comte’s letters to Mill referred to their controversy as their “serious difference of 
opinion in sociological and biological aspects of the condition and social destiny of 
women” (Comte to Mill, October 5, 1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 188) or as their “great 
biologic-sociologic discussion” (Comte to Mill, November 14, 1843; Ibid., p. 206). 
As for Mill, he readily acknowledged the two-pronged nature of their debate on 
this “important topic of biology and sociology” (Mill to Comte, August 30, 1843; 
Ibid., p. 185). What is more, both thinkers took it that the sociological argument 
was independent from its biological counterpart. This was what Mill wanted to 
convey when, stating that he would “lay aside considerations of anatomy”, he 
realized that “quite apart from any such considerations, [Comte] believfed] that 
precise analysis of general experience, both everyday and historical, [was] sufficient 
to establish [his] conclusions” (Mill to Comte, October 30, 1843; Jbid., p. 199). And
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although he scolded Mill for discarding what he regarded as relevant data, Comte 
agreed to broach the “sociological argument, separately considered”(Comte to Mill, 
November 14, 1843; Ibid., p. 209).
Now, if Comte really had an independent sociological argument to prove 
his case for the subjection of women, the charge of biological reductionism 
levelled at him would founder. By the same token, the view of Comte as the 
forefather of an autonomous sociology would regain some of its plausibility, even 
if the previous chapter has shown that when pressed by Mill to recognize the 
possible influence o f “circumstances” on the formation of mental capacities, 
Comte asserted the primacy of biological factors. For if a genuine sociological 
argument for women’s subjection can indeed be found in Comte, it is enough — at 
least logically - to salvage the consistency of his methodological plea for the 
autonomy of sociology with his actual treatment of the sexual equality issue from 
the uncompromisingly biological perspective Comte tried to impose on Mill. 
Undoubtedly, the possibility of such an “argumentative recovery” would appeal to 
anybody eager to preserve the systematicity Comte upheld as one of the main 
virtues of his “Positive Philosophy”. However, I will argue that a minute analysis 
of his writings on the topic dispels the illusory coherence of Comtian thought.
As I will try to demonstrate in this chapter, none of the versions of the 
sociological argument for the subjection of women put forward by Comte can 
stand without appealing to some more or less implicit biological assumptions. 
More precisely, neither the “static” argument, which relies on phrenology to 
establish that women’s innate mental capacities do not allow them to be treated as 
men’s equals, nor the “dynamic” argument, which is based on a biologically- 
inspired developmental scheme that legitimates the continuation of the subjection 
of women by referring to the history of the relations between the sexes, can qualify 
as sociological arguments. In my analysis, I will emphasize the extent to which 
Mill’s call for the development of “ethology” and his conception of sociological 
explanation shed light on the biologically-driven nature of Comte’s sociological 
arguments against sexual equality. Furthermore, the review of Mill’s objections to 
Comte reveals how the correspondence with the French philosopher paved the 
way for some of the arguments later developed in Mill’s Subjection of Women.
I start this chapter by assessing Mill’s qualified appraisal of Comte’s 
contributions to sociology (VA). After having introduced Comte’s static argument
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for the subjection of women and Mill’s criticisms of it (VB), I show how it belies 
Comte’s plea for an autonomous sociology (VC). Following the same mode of 
presentation for Comte’s dynamic argument, I first provide a general introduction 
to Comte’s conception of the historical method typical of sociology and how it 
applies in the case of women’s subjection (VD) and then uncover to what extent a 
biological inspiration suffuses Comte’s treatment of the problem at hand (VE).
A — “Method” and “Doctrine”: Mill’s Qualified Appraisal of Comte’s 
Contributions to Sociology.
As shown in Chapter I, Mill regarded Comte’s “scientificisation of politics” 
as a perspective relevant to his own concern for a sound conception of reform. His 
desire to arrive at a clearer conception of the nature of social theory, social practice 
and of the relations between the two may partly explain his decision to approach 
Comte directly1. Furthermore, Mill stated explicitly in many of his writings the 
importance of Comte’s contribution to sociology, even if the somewhat bitter 
termination of their correspondence, the later authoritarian and religious 
developments of Comte’s thought, and the passing of the years had tended to 
render Mill’s tribute less vibrant2. However, and despite his belief that Comte’s 
works marked a watershed in the advancement of social science, Mill was careful to 
underline that not all elements of Comte’s sociology were of equal value.
The first edition of the System of Yjogic is the primary source from which to 
draw a more precise idea of what Mill praised and what he criticised in Comte’s 
sociology3. The part of the System that most clearly bore the imprint of Comte’s 
influence was the Sixth Book “On the Logic of the Moral Sciences”, which Mill 
redrafted after having read the sixth volume of the Cours\ Its ninth and tenth 
chapters (“O f the Physical, or Concrete Deductive Method” and “O f the Inverse 
Deductive, or Historical Method”) proposed a highly appreciative account of some 
aspects of Comte’s sociological thought. Mill celebrated Comte as the
“greatest living authority on scientific methods in general, and the only 
philosopher who, with a competent knowledge o f  those methods, has 
attempted to characterize the Method o f Sociology” (J. S. Mill, SL, VI, IX, 1, 
p. 897).
What particularly struck Mill in Comte’s methodological characterization of 
sociology was his distinction between social statics and social dynamics. Whereas 
social statics studied the synchronous interactions of the various elements (state of
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civilization, institutions, mores, laws, customs) constitutive of social phenomena - 
what Mill called “states of society” — and attempted to arrive at the formulation of 
the laws of coexistence linking these different elements, social dynamics aimed at 
the establishment of the laws of succession linking “states of society”. Mill also 
stressed the importance o f taking into account the social consensus existing between 
the different components (state of civilization, institutions, mores, laws, customs) 
o f “states of society” and illustrated his point with a quotation made out of four 
pages of the Forty-Eight Lesson of the Cours. But what impressed Mill most was 
Comte’s conception of social dynamics. Yet, even if he did not spare his praises, 
Mill made clear that whereas he was at one with Comte on “method” (especially on 
the method — the “Inverse Deductive Method”, as Mill Called it - for verifying the 
accuracy of the historical generalizations, to which we I will turn in the last section 
of this chapter), he was more circumspect about “doctrines”, that is about the
content of some of the general conclusions Comte issued as to the course of the
evolution of mankind. Accordingly, he summarized the essentials of the law of the 
three states and commended its breadth and richness as a tool for interpreting the 
historical development of the human mind, but nonetheless remained guarded 
about others general pronouncements issued by Comte:
“It is not here that a critical examination can be undertaken o f  the results o f  
[Comte’s] labours; which besides are as yet, comparatively speaking only in 
their commencement. But his works are the only source to which the reader 
can resort for practical exemplification o f the study o f social phenomena on 
the true principles o f  the Historical Method. O f that method I do not hesitate 
to pronounce them a model: what is the value o f  his conclusions is another
question, and one on which this is not the place to decide” (Ibid., VI, X, 8, p.
928).
These quotations show that although Mill thought Comte was right about the 
method appropriate to social dynamics and that some of his “doctrinal” 
conclusions (most notably the law of the three states) were likely to be accurate, he 
nevertheless suggested that it was not true of all his historical generalizations and 
that, accordingly, the practical measures Comte derived from them were to be 
treated with circumspection. As we will see shortly, this was exactly what Mill’s 
remarks in his exchange with Comte suggested as well. But even if it was due to 
the correspondence to state these points fully, but the attentive reader of the System 
had already been warned that Comte’s conceptions were not entirely free from 
shortcomings.
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It seems that his reading of the System did not help Comte realize Mill’s 
reservations about some aspects of his sociology. Or if he did, he did not feel the 
need to dwell on them:
“it is not in my power to thank you sufficiently, at least today, for having so 
generously seen to it that, every time the occasion presented itself, I received 
the full philosophic appreciation which you considered my due” (Comte to 
Mill, May 16,1843; in Haac [ed.], pp. 153-4).
But, as already noticed in II, the following letters progressively introduced Comte 
to what Mill considered possible sources of disagreements, especially the question 
of women’s subjection as one. Mill was at pains to underline that he subscribed to 
Comte’s presentation of “the general laws of social dynamics and of the historical 
development of humanity” (Mill to Comte, June 15, 1843; Ibid., p. 165). But he 
stressed that, with respect to the sensitive topics of marriage, divorce, and sexual 
inequality, his concerns lay in “the doctrines of static sociology” (Id.) advocated by 
Comte, something glossed over in the System. A few letters later, when Mill had 
realized that Comte would remain deaf to his objections, he eventually summarized 
where he stood regarding the present state of sociology and the support one could 
expect from it to adjudicate as difficult an issue as that of sexual equality:
“You have definitively established social dynamics, and no emancipated mind 
sufficiently acquainted with positive thought can fail to recognize in your 
great law o f human development and its various corollaries a true explanation 
o f  the social past and the prophesy o f  an indefinite future. What matters now  
is to bring social statics to the level o f  social dynamics, for as you rightly say, 
without this it cannot be sufficiently rational and especially it cannot counter 
the present anarchy in social theory” (Mill to Comte, December 8, 1843; Ibid., 
p. 213).
Comte partly agreed with Mill: social statics still had to be exposed as fully as social 
dynamics had been in the Cours de philosophic positive. This was to be the purpose of 
the Traite de politique positive Comte had planned to write after the completion of the 
Cours. But he vigorously denied that social statics as it presently existed was unable 
to solve practical problems such as that of the subjection of women:
“However, although the positive formulation o f [social dynamics] is far more 
developed today and, at the same time, is fortunately by far the more urgent, I 
believe that it is presently possible to demonstrate the main basis o f  static 
sociology” (Comte to Mill, November 14,1843; Ibid., p. 206 [slightly modified 
translation]).
Obviously, Comte ignored Mill’s criticisms. As we will see in the next 
section, neither Mill’s claim that the facts Comte adduced in support of his static
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analysis of women’s necessary mental inferiority were either inaccurate or 
irrelevant, nor his methodological objection that social statics could not be fully 
established independently of ethology received any consideration from Comte. But 
in any case, Mill had made clear what he endorsed and what he rejected in Comte’s 
general conception of sociolog}7: dynamics was methodologically sound, had 
reached interesting conclusions, and could be easily perfected; but social statics had 
to be built from scratch.
B — The Static Argument for Women’s Subjection.
Mill’s recurring concerns about the soundness of the sociological argument 
for women’s subjection convinced Comte that their disagreement was more deep- 
seated than he first thought. Moreover, the fact that his addressee’s opposition 
contrasted so radically with what he took to be his general endorsement of the 
most basic tenets of positive philosophy gave rise to a certain resentment in 
Comte. Even if he still predicted that agreement could be reached, pessimism as to 
the likeliness and proximity of Mill’s complete conversion progressively took over. 
Their preceding exchange, Comte sadly recorded,
“shows how difficult adequate agreement today has become even among 
thinkers o f  the elite who, apart from natural sympathy already share a logical 
understanding as fundamental as ours and who, in spite o f this, arrive at 
different conclusions, at least for the moment, concerning one o f  the most 
basic issues sociolog)' can present, the main elemental base, in truth, o f  any 
social hierarchy. Such a spectacle might even be enough to inspire a kind o f  
philosophic despair because, just as religious minds claim, it may be ultimately 
impossible to constitute true intellectual agreement on purely rational 
grounds” (Comte to Mill, October 5,1843; Ibid., p. 188).
This gave the correspondence a new turn and prompted Comte to deliver in his 
following letters the most comprehensive account he had written on the subject of 
sexual equality7 so far, except for the related developments in the Cours.
As I have argued in IC1, Comte’s case for the subjection of women can be 
conceived as a functionalist argument whose minor premise was supposed to 
establish that women were deprived of the specific character traits which would 
enable them to compete with men for intellectual and organizational tasks. For, if 
such inferiority existed, it followed that the existing sexual hierarchy was legitimate. 
As I have also shown in Chapters II and III, Comte undoubtedly believed that 
biology (and especially phrenology) provided empirical back up for that claim. As 
he warned Mill,
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“you do not attach enough importance to the true consequence o f [women’s] 
inborn inferiority” {Ibid., p. 189).
In the light of Mill’s legitimate refusal to accept any of the biological arguments 
adduced by Comte, one may be tempted, so as to give Comte’s claim that he had 
an independent sociological argument for women’s subjection a chance, to modify 
his functionalist argument by removing from it any reference to the cause or origin 
o f women’s character traits. One then ends up with a weaker argument for 
subjection, in the sense that it relies only on the assessment of women’s mental 
capacities as they existed in the social settings coeval with Comte and Mill, and 
therefore license subjection only for those settings (because it is not assumed that a 
change in social setting could not induce a change in mental capacities, as the 
functionalist argument based on biology had it). Such a transformation provides 
Comte’s argument with a “sociological” basis (broadly construed) independent of 
biology. Moreover, it is in line with Mill’s contention that Comte believed that 
“precise analysis of general experience, both everyday and historical, [was] 
sufficient to establish [his] conclusions” (Mill to Comte, October 30, 1843; Ibid., p. 
199). Finally, it fits Mill’s own conception of sociological explanation, since he 
argued in the System of Logic that
“Supposing (...) the laws o f  human actions and feelings to be sufficiently 
known, there is no extraordinary difficulty in determining from those laws, 
the nature o f  the social effects which any given cause tends to produce” (J. S.
Mill, SL, VI, IX, 1, p. 896).
So, let us interpret the following quote by Comte in that way, that is by 
severing it from its biological context and limiting its scope to the existing social 
setting:
“[Women’s] characteristic ineptitude in abstraction and intellectual argument 
[and] their almost total inability to eliminate the inspiration o f passion from 
logical reasoning must continue to deny them indefinitely any elevated 
position in the immediate direction o f  human affairs” (Comte to Mill,
October 5,1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 189).
In accordance with his tripartite distinction between intellectual, affective, 
and practical faculties, Comte maintained that women were inferior to men with 
respect to the first and the third. Neither were they able to display the logical and 
methodical capacities required in science, philosophy, the arts or industry, nor were 
they capable of running any kind of commercial or industrial venture, or command
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a military operation. Comte went so far as to claim that women were “all the more 
incapable of government, even in the home, but can handle only lower level 
administrative tasks” (Id.). On the other hand, the sympathetic part of their 
affective faculties (that is the one responsible for altruistic inclinations) and their 
ability to deal with details being superior to that of men, women could compensate 
for the selfish bias and abstract nature typical of men’s decisions:
“Their role is essentially one o f consultation and suggestion [to modify a plan] 
in places where a passive position permits them to put their characteristic 
sagacity and interest in momentary detail to best use” (Id).
This brief overview was all Comte felt compelled to provide, and this was 
in fact a mere rehash of the developments on sexual equality already broached in 
the Fiftieth Lesson of the Court*. Now, one might have expected that a sociological 
argument, even in its “static” version, would have taken a somewhat more refined 
form, but the weak version of Comte’s functionalist argument for the subjection of 
women only required that he be able to show how the present capacities of women 
explained (and justified) their condition. In that respect, the rough-and-ready 
generalizations Comte invoked were enough, if true and well founded. In defense 
of their warrant Comte made clear that his observations were empirically 
grounded, or at least grounded on a certain kind of personal experience. As he 
curiously put it to Mill,
“I have been able to observe the feminine organism from very close, even in 
several outstanding exceptions. I could, incidentally, refer here also to my 
own wife who, while she fortunately has written nothing, at least so far, really 
possesses more intellectual strength, more depth and, at the same time, more 
good judgment than most so justly praised members o f  her sex” (Id)6.
What he concluded from that experience was simple: regarding practical capacities, 
in “no domain [were women] fit to direct or execute” (I b i d p. 189-90); as for 
intellectual capacities, Comte arrived at the verdict that “a very insufficient ability 
to generalize relationships, to make consistent deductions, also to give reason 
precedence over passion” (Ibid., p. 190) were some of the characteristic traits of the 
“feminine” type; with respect to affective capacities, “women [were] naturally 
destined to be domestic auxiliaries of spiritual forces, by sustaining with sentiment 
the practical influence of [male] intelligence and to modify morally the natural reign 
of material force” (Id).
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Mill’s tried to accommodate as much as possible Comte’s touchiness but 
nonetheless demonstrated either that the generalisations made about women’s 
mental capacities by Comte were not accurate or that they were not inconsistent 
with female emancipation. What is striking is that Mill did not choose to challenge 
Comte on the present intellectual qualities of women, because he recognized, in 
accordance with his professed environmentalism, that “nothing in their education 
[was] organized to develop” the “aptitude for continuous and prolonged 
intellectual work”, “while for men, the study of science and even of dead 
languages, certainly tend[ed] to do just that” (Mill to Comte, August 30, 1843; Ibid., 
pp. 183-4). On the other hand, he strenuously denied Comte’s assertions on the 
lack of practical abilities of women. He argued that women, because their domestic 
existence forced them to pay attention to a multifarious range of details, had 
“wider interests” (Ibid., p. 184) and a less narrow intelligence. Furthermore, Mill 
adamantly objected to Comte’s refusal to grant women any managerial skills and 
claimed that their day-to-day running of the household demonstrated their 
organizational abilities (Mill to Comte, October 30, 1843; Ibid., p. 200). He added 
that, to the extent that women had been involved in the management of industrial 
establishment — he acknowledged those had been mosdy of very modest size -, 
there was “no record of their handling the task less well than men” (Id.)1.
As to perseverance understood as “the ability to stick to a specific project 
or given plan until it has been put to a test” (Id.), Mill contended that “in matters 
of importance, one [did] not find as much patience and forbearance anywhere than 
among women” (Ibid., p. 200-1), suggesting that since women could not get the 
better of men by opposing them, they generally tried to win their approval by a 
long drawn out sap-digging and, if unsuccessful, had to resign themselves. In the 
same vein, Mill underlined that, contrary to what Comte maintained, the actual 
situation of women led them “to assign a priority to reason over passion” (Ibid., p. 
201) to the extent that they were not allowed to fulfil their impulses and desires, 
for
“giving up what they desire is the common rule o f life for them, while for
masculine heads o f  family, such sacrifices occur except on special occasions”
(Id.).
Eventually, Mill claimed that if the preponderance of reason over desire was 
“proportional to the habit of self-examination, of being aware of one’s character
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and faults” (Id), men were no better than women since that disposition was as 
exceptional in both sexes, although “general opinion grant[ed] women a conscious 
more scrupulous than that of men. Now what is conscience if not the submission 
of passion to reason?” (Id).
What was exactly Mill’s strategy when he attempted to qualify Comte’s 
claims regarding women’s capacities? One may suggest that when Mill argued for 
their efficiency in managerial matters and the virtues they presendy exhibited, he 
wanted to convince Comte that the emancipation of women and their participation 
in activities so far restricted to men could be socially beneficial. In other words, 
Mill did not sing the praises of domestic existence for its own sake but for the 
advantages they could bring if applied to occupations outside the home. As we will 
see in Chapter VII, this very argument would be put to good use by Mill in his later 
Subjection of Women8.
The second aspect of Mill’s criticism bore on Comte’s account of women’s 
affective capacities. For Mill did not believe that the greater development of 
sympathy in women was genuinely a moral feature, since he held to be just “an 
egoism extended to several persons” (Mill to Comte, August 30, 1843; Ibid., p. 
184), that is a concern restricted to one’s circle of relatives9. Furthermore, Mill 
questioned one of the assumptions made by Comte in the Cours according to 
which true sympathy could coexist with subordination10:
“Without any empty sentimentality, I find that the affection a person o f a 
somewhat elevated nature may feel for another being who is subject to his 
authority is always somewhat imperfect, acceptable only because one cannot 
feel more complete svmpathv for another” (Mill to Comte, ]ulv 13, 1843;
Ibid., p. 174).
O f course, this implied that marriage could be considered as a situation favouring 
true sympathy if and only if it was conceived as a relation between equals11. The 
appeal to “elevated natures”, which echoed the “higher natures” of the 
unpublished 1832-1833 piece “On marriage” 12, signified that this new standard of 
morality should alter deeply the nature of human, and especially domestic, 
arrangements, since it presupposed that all agents, male or female, had the same 
ethical standing and could expect that their rights as moral subjects to be respected 
within the marital relation. But if women had to be treated as moral subjects on par 
with men, one could not ignore their feelings and desires:
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“here is a matter where I do not believe I can be wrong: to decide this type o f  
question, philosophy needs the experience o f  women as much as that o f  
men” (Id).
Clearly, this approach radically contrasted with Comte’s personal manner 
o f broaching the question and his dependence on his own experience. Mill called 
for the experience of women because, in the utilitarian scheme he applied to moral 
matters, the individual was always the main source of information about her needs, 
desires, and interests. So, if one was after the “greatest happiness of the greatest 
number”, women included, one would better lend one’s ear to what they had to 
say. As Mill concluded,
“the influence on the intimate and moral life o f one living in a kind o f  
dependency cannot be decided solely according to the ideas and the 
experience o f those superior” (Ibid, pp. 174-5).
Now, Mill was also aware that such an experience, that of self-aware and 
autonomous individuals, was not the common share of a majority of women, who 
still lived in a partial or complete state of subjection. Drawing on what he had 
discussed with Harriet Taylor ten years before13, he recognized that such an 
“experience” was not available, mainly because of the social conditioning proper to 
women:
“It was only the day before yesterday that women began to think, only 
yesterday when they began to express their thoughts, and, what matters still 
more, their life experience[s]. Most women who write do so for men, or at 
least in fear o f their disapproval, and their testimony is no more to be trusted 
than that o f  the very small number o f those who are in a state o f  open 
rebellion” (Ibid, p. 174).
In a later letter (Mill to Comte, October 30, 1843; Ibid., pp. 199), Mill 
suggested that this conditioning of women rendered the analysis of their capacities 
a tricky question, for the fact that their present subjection only required from them 
a very limited range of behaviours (mainly that of daughters, wives, and mothers) 
prevented the displaying of other dispositions that they may have had but that 
were not called for by the circumstances. This predicament seriously compromised 
the emphasis Comte put on the generalizations about women’s capacities to back 
up his plea for female subjection. As Mill repeatedly pointed out in the 
correspondence, and despite Comte’s confidence, social statics was not yet a 
securely established subfield of sociology: as Mill’s objections revealed, many of the 
claims made by Comte about women were far from being immune to criticism.
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Moreover, as Mill hinted at when dealing with the consequences of social 
conditioning, the methodology itself of social statics was not without serious 
shortcomings. To this last point, I will now turn.
C -  The Shortcomings of the Static Argument.
As seen above, even though he agreed with Mill that social statics was not 
as fully developed as social dynamics, Comte claimed that it was nonetheless able 
to provide guidance on practical issues such as women’s subjection. In the light of 
Mill’s objections, one might have expected Comte to have lost some of his 
confidence in his claims. But Comte’s conviction that he was right seemed 
unshakeable despite Mill’s arguments.
Moreover, it is in fact very unlikely that Comte himself would have 
accepted the terms in which I have rephrased his argument in order to render it 
compatible with his plea for an autonomous sociology. For, as already pointed 
out, the revised version of the static functionalist argument only licensed 
subjection on account of the existing mental capacities of women: it considered 
women as they were in a given social setting and justified their condition by the 
dispositions they exhibited in that very setting. But since it did not mention the 
origin of these dispositions, the argument could not extend further, for it might 
have been the case, as Mill believed, that a different social setting would tend to 
develop in women the dispositions they were so far lacking, and would have 
therefore legitimated their emancipation. Or it might have also been the case that a 
change in social setting would have prompted a change in the organizational 
structure of society and, for instance, ended the discrimination against women with 
reference to their capacities. In short, the scope of the weak version of the static 
argument was excessively limited: it merely justified subjection “here and now”.
Surely, Comte wanted to prove much more than that, since he explicitly 
told Mill his position was that
“the subjection o f  women in society will necessarily last indefinitely, even 
though made to coincide more and more with the universal type o f  
behaviour, because it is directly based on a natural inferiority which nothing 
can undo” (Comte to Mill, October 5,1843; Ibid., p. 191).
What he needed was both a demonstration that women’s capacities would remain 
the same whatever changes would occur in their environment and a demonstration 
that the grounds on which women’s subjection had been justified would not be
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altered by a modification in the organizational structure of society. Only if these 
two conditions were fulfilled could the permanence of women’s subjection be 
assured. But neither proposition followed form the weak version of the static 
argument.
Once the exact content of Comte’s position is clarified and the inability of 
the weak version of the static argument to deliver what it requires is outlined, 
Comte’s uncompromising reliance on phrenology can be grasped more easily: 
because phrenology held mental capacities to be innate and unchangeable beyond a 
certain limit, it provided Comte for his missing premise according to which 
nothing could modify the mental make-up of women. In short, Comte’s case for 
women’s subjection did not hold if the weak version of the static argument was not 
supplemented by phrenological data.
This explains why phrenology filtered in some of Comte’s sociological 
developments. For instance, in the extracts I have quoted from the Fiftieth Lesson 
of the Cours4, I deliberately bracketed Comte’s reference to phrenology so as to 
give his claim that he had an independent sociological argument a chance. Yet, as a 
matter of fact, Comte openly declared in those that his “perfunctory appraisal of 
the social attributes of each sex” was to be “essentially linked to the noblest 
properties of our cerebral nature” (A. Comte, PS, p. 187). In the same vein, he 
argued that any change in the structure of the family (and most notably in the way 
women were subjected to their male relatives) would presuppose a “chimerical 
transformation of our cerebral nature” (Ibid., p. 186).
The problem with this line of argument, besides the fact that it rested on 
very dubious empirical assumptions as Mill demonstrated with reference to 
phrenology15, was that it clearly evidenced that at least in one case — that of sexual 
equality - Comte plainly belied his advocacy of the autonomy of sociology. For 
phrenology, understood as the “general study of intellectual and moral 
phenomena”, was by Comte’s own admission part of biology, even if its most 
“transcendent” (Ibid., p. 157) offshoot. So, it was not only that the static argument 
adduced by Comte failed to prove what he was after. It was also the case that, in its 
very structure, the argument infringed Comte’s own methodological principles16.
However, one may nonetheless stand for Comte by arguing that my 
reading of his argument for the autonomy of sociology cannot be sustained 
because it downplays another essential component of his philosophy of science,
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namely his encyclopaedic scale of the sciences. As seen previously17, Comte also 
developed an account of the dependence of sociology on biology that does not 
allow one to conceive the distinction between the two sciences in terms of a sharp 
break. In particular, Comte argued that there existed a “primitive” dependence of 
social statics on biology, in the sense that phrenology accounted for “human 
sociability and the various organic conditions which determine its specific 
character” (Id.), that is for the condition of possibility of social phenomena. In that 
respect, it might be argued that my interpretation is not faithful to Comte’s ideas, 
to the extent that he regarded as perfecdy legitimate, and even as necessary, the use 
of some biological data in sociology. Accordingly, the contradiction I have spotted 
between Comte’s general methodological pronouncements and his actual 
sociological practice would in fact merely result from an inadequate understanding 
of Comte’s writings.
On the contrary, I argue that it is because my interpretation does not 
depart from Comte’s conception of the relations between biology and sociolog)7 
that it is able to demonstrate how his sociological practice belies his methodology. 
For it has to be remembered that Comte also underlined that, if it was indeed the 
case that phrenology informed us on which human capacities made social existence 
possible, it did not determine on its own the actual details of social organization. 
What was needed to grasp fully the laws of sociological phenomena was the 
consideration of mankind’s experience and of the various forms it had taken 
throughout history. Comte especially underlined that to overlook that historical 
dimension of social phenomena would result in considering “as inherent in man’s 
fundamental nature, and consequendy as indestructible, temporary social 
modifications characteristic of a specific state of human development” (Ibid., p. 
160), as Gall’s belief in the immutability of the warlike tendencies of mankind 
illustrated18. Comte warned that “the vicious preponderance of biological 
considerations and the irrational contempt for historical notions” led to the 
misunderstanding of “true social evolution” and to the unsupported ascription of 
“a chimerical fixity to dispositions which are essentially variable” (Id.). But was not 
it the case that Comte did exacdy that in the case of sexual inequality? When he 
argued that it was possible to “demonstrate the main basis of static sociology” 
(Comte to Mill, November 14, 1843; Ibid., p. 206 [slighdy modified translation]), 
Comte was in fact suggesting that the subjection of women was a closed case
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because he thought phrenology alone was allegedly able to prove that women’s 
mental capacities would not change, thereby falling prey to the same kind of 
“vicious preponderance of biological considerations” he denounced in Gall.
As it now appears, in the case of women’s subjection, Comte overstepped 
the limits he set on the use of phrenology in social statics by trying to solve a 
socio-historical problem with the sole resources of biology. Comte unduly assumed 
that women’s mental capacities were innate and therefore would not change, 
although Mill rightly underlined that such an assumption would remain unfounded 
as long as the hypothesis of an environmental account of character traits had not 
been refuted. Hence Mill’s call for the development of ethology. What is striking 
here is that, as already noted, Comte dismissed from the outset Mill’s idea of 
accounting for moral phenomena by way of composition of causes whereas this 
proposal could have been accommodated within his own methodological 
framework. Surely, as Mill also acknowledged, Comte was right in maintaining that 
sociological explanations should refer, one way or another, to the biological 
properties of human beings. But his own use of biological data was flawed: firstly, 
because the claims of phrenology he endorsed were not corroborated; secondly, 
because biology took precedence over sociology and left no room for other factors 
to appear in sociological explanations. But if the static argument did not hold, what 
about the dynamic argument for the subjection of women?
D — The Dynamic Argument for Subjection.
Unlike social statics, social dynamics did seem to constitute a common 
ground on which Comte and Mill mostly agreed. As shown earlier19, Mill praised 
Comte’s methodological conceptions with respect to social dynamics and 
acknowledged that some of the “doctrinal” conclusions he had reached were likely 
to be accurate. However, Mill also had serious reservations about some of Comte’s 
historical analyses, and most notably about the condition of women.
1 — The Basics of Social Dynamics.
As Comte defined it in the Forty-Eighth Lesson of the Cours,
“The true general spirit o f  social dynamics consists in conceiving each o f  
these consecutive social states as the necessary result o f  the preceding one 
and the indispensable driving force behind the following one (...). In this
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view, the object o f science is to discover the constant laws which govern this 
continuity, and the aggregate o f which determines the necessary course o f  
human development” (A. Comte, PS, p. 123).
Comte insisted on the intrinsically historical nature of social dynamics as 
what marked out sociology from biology:
“Only it can definitively provide the new science as a whole with its most 
distinctive philosophical character, by making the notion that distinguishes 
most sociolog}’ from mere biolog}’ prevail, that is the master-thought (“idee 
mere” in French) o f  a continuous progress, or rather o f  the gradual 
development o f humanity” (Id.).
One striking feature of Comte’s account was the primary role it ascribed to the 
development of the mind in its explanation of the historical evolution of mankind. 
For Comte held that “ideas rule and change the world” (A. Comte, PP, p. 38), that 
is that the transformations occurring at the levels of institutions, mores, laws, or 
customs were the results of the transformations affecting our conceptions of the 
world and of our place in it. This view led him to distinguish the different epochs 
of mankind’s history with reference to the dominant mode of thinking by which 
they were characterized and to present human evolution as marked by a gradual 
transition from a theological state (in which phenomena were explained by non­
natural causes), through a metaphysical state (which resorted to abstractions to 
account for phenomena), to a positive state (in which the mind searched for the 
laws of succession and coexistence of phenomena). This was Comte’s famous “law 
of the three states”, which Mill considered as a highly powerful interpretative 
framework. In particular, Mill was at one with Comte in singling out “the state of 
the speculative faculties of mankind; including the nature of the speculative beliefs 
which by any means they have arrived at, concerning themselves and the world by 
which they are surrounded” as the “one social element which is (...) predominant, 
and almost paramount, among the agents of social progression” (J. S. Mill, J j L ,  VI, 
X, 7, p. 926).
What is interesting about Comte’s intellectualistic conception of social 
dynamics and its emphasis on mind development as an historical index is that it 
deliberately interpreted human evolution in terms of the development of human 
capacities. That is, the fact that the products of the mind (such as proverbs and 
maxims, scientific theories, religious beliefs, political ideas, artworks, and their 
multifarious concrete translations in the real world) evolved through time
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presupposed a similar evolution in the capacities of the mind itself. This 
assumption led Comte to conceive dynamic sociology as
“the successive appraisal o f  the various states o f humanity which shows, in 
the light o f  all the historical facts, the continuous reinforcement o f any given 
disposition, either physical, intellectual, moral or political, and the indefinite 
waning o f  the opposite disposition” (A. Comte, PS, p. 151).
Comte added, and that was the point where the science of society made contact 
with the art of politics, that this appraisal would result “in the scientific prevision 
of the final predominance of the former disposition and the definitive fall of the 
latter” (W.). Now, these two features — the focus on capacities and the ability to 
predict the way they were to evolve — were obviously at the heart of the debate on 
sexual equality. Accordingly, one might assume that what Comte was expecting 
from the dynamic argument was evidence both for the unchangeability of women’s 
capacities (and especially of their intellectual capacities) and the permanence of the 
social structure justifying their subjection. Without that, his whole argument for 
women’s subjection would collapse.
A last general point about social dynamics is worth mentioning since it 
illustrates well the extent to which the sexual equality created a tension in Comtian 
thought. For when it came to describe the general trend characteristic of human 
evolution, Comte claimed that it amounted to
“farthering our most eminent faculties (...) either by constantly reducing the 
empire o f physical appetites and by stimulating more the various social 
instincts, or by continuously sustaining the development o f the intellectual 
functions, even the highest, and by spontaneously increasing the customary 
influence o f  reason on man’s conduct” (Ibid., p. 204)20.
But if so, would it not be strange that women, who were after all members of 
humanity, did not partake in this general movement, especially with respect to the 
development of their intellectual faculties? What could explain such a difference 
between the sexes?
2 — What History Tells Us.
Comte introduced his dynamic argument for women’s subjection when he 
realized that his disagreement with Mill over sexual equality was much more 
serious that he had first thought. In a letter dated July 16, 1843, which provided an 
overview of his arguments, Comte invoked biology and then turned to sociology:
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“From a completely sociological point o f  view, modern life, characterized by 
industrial activity and positive spirit, must develop with no lesser finality, 
though differently, [concerning] these fundamental differences [between the 
sexes], than the military and theological life o f the peoples in years gone by”
(Comte to Mill, July 16, 1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 180).
Unless one is conversant with Comte’s Cours de philosophic positive, it is 
difficult to see clearly how what Comte says here support his case. So, in order to 
clarify the gist of his argument, let us consider again the two propositions which 
needed to be fulfilled for Comte’s plea for women’s subjection to hold. On the one 
hand, Comte needed to show that women’s capacities (and especially their 
intellectual capacities) would not change. On the other hand, he needed evidence 
of the permanence of the social structure justifying their subjection It was this 
second premise that the above quotation was supposed to support. In other words, 
Comte maintained that the historical record of mankind indicated that the 
subjection of women had been a constant feature of social life and, therefore, that 
it would remain so in the future. However, in the correspondence, Comte provided 
no detailed demonstration for this claim. But such an attentive reader as Mill could 
not have failed to notice the various developments on the subject with which
Comte punctuated the historical lessons of the Cours. Hence the usefulness of a
review of Comte’s long-term history of the relations between the sexes.
Whilst Comte readily acknowledged that the family had undergone several 
substantial modifications in its constitution during the course of history (the 
transition from polygamy to monogamy; from the extended family including the 
servants to the nuclear couple and its children), he nonetheless argued that it had 
always been structured according to “two fundamental orders of necessary 
relations, namely the subordination of the sexes, which institutes the family, and 
that of the ages, which maintains it” (A. Comte, PS, p. 184). As to the first, Comte 
claimed that women’s subjection had become more and more pronounced with 
human development, which in his view proved its lasting predominance as a social 
trend. This argument was part and parcel of Comte’s progressive conception of 
history to the extent that, since it had been observed that women had become 
more and more subordinate and since Comte considered the general course of 
history to be progressive, subordination was also progressive.
According to Comte, the whole historical record of mankind testified to 
the growing intimacy of the relations between spouses, the strengthening of the 
moral authority of the husband, and the progressive confinement of women to the
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domestic sphere. It was during the theological state that the first major 
breakthrough in the history of the relation of the sexes had taken place:
“It was under the reign o f  Polytheism that humanity irrevocably rose to a true 
monogamistic life” (Ibid., p. 300).
This move changed the status of the inter-sexual relation from that of a purely 
organic appetite to that of a genuine social need. Whereas women had so far been 
considered as mere instruments of male pleasure, they came to be regarded more 
as companions, even if of an inferior kind. Comte added that polygamy (as 
practiced bv the polytheistic-theocratic Egyptians) had also contributed in its way 
to the improvement of women’s condition to the extent that it exempted (some of) 
them from hard toil:
“their customary reclusion, which was indeed a necessary consequence o f  
polygamy, already constituted in reality a first general tribute and an 
involuntary token o f consideration, for it tended to grant them a position in 
the elementary order o f  society which was more and more compatible with 
their true characteristic nature” (Ibid., p. 304).
Comte held the progressive spread of monogamy and the development of 
domestic life as signs of the “gradual improvement” of marriage, which he argued 
amounted to “developing the nature proper to each sex for the common benefit of 
mankind” (Ibid., p. 300).
However, Comte also underlined that, as long as the domination of men 
over women remained based on “primordial brutality”, that is physical strength, 
woman’s true social role was also not yet properly understood, as “the political 
importance of women” under Polytheism illustrated. In this instance, Comte 
referred to “the constant though secondary participation of women in sacerdotal 
authority, which was direcdy granted to them under Polytheism, and irrevocably 
taken from them by monotheism” (Id.). The historical fact of women’s involvement 
in the running of public affairs (for “sacerdotal authority” referred both to religious 
and political responsibilities) undoubtedly faced Comte with a serious problem: if it 
had been the case that women had once been associated to these activities, his 
account of an enduring exclusion of women from the public sphere was 
threatened. Moreover, the historical existence of “women priests” indicated that 
they were not completely deprived of intellectual abilities. Comte’s rejoinder was 
somewhat convoluted, since he did not challenge the claim of women’s public 
involvement, but argued that it was no proof that this situation benefited them21.
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Moreover, Comte seemed to suggest that in these early stages of human history, 
the intellectual differences between men and women were not marked out so as to 
give rise to a proper sexual division of labour. In other words, the fact that women 
of past ages had been involved in the managing of public matters was no sign of an 
intellectual equality with men, since in those times the simplicity of the problems 
fitted their capacities :
“Civilization essentially develops all the intellectual and moral differences, 
those between the sexes as well as all the others, so that this female 
priesthood characteristic o f  polydieism does not constitute a more favourable 
presumption o f  the corresponding condition o f women than the one that 
might be induced from the almost contemporary existence o f  huntresses and 
women warriors, which was too common in such a social age to be 
completely mythical, how strange it might now seem” (Id).
The next major step in the history of the relations o f the sexes was, 
according to Comte, the development of domestic morals under the influence of 
Catholicism. Whereas Polytheism focused on personal morality (by praising the 
virtues of the individual) and public morality (by stressing the ethical importance of 
citizenship), Catholicism had given its proper place to the private sphere and, 
especially to family. By establishing marriage as a sacred institution and by 
enforcing its indissolubility, it had given to spouses “the sense of their duties to 
each other”, had strengthened paternal authority, and had softened the lot of 
children. Comte made clear that “as far as to the most fundamental tie of all was 
concerned, (...) the only thing left to do [was] to consolidate and complete what 
Catholicism [had] so happily organized” (Ibid., p. 365). In particular, Comte 
claimed that part of the beneficial influence of Catholicism resided in having 
deprived women “of any participation whatsoever in sacerdotal functions, even in 
the constitution of the monastic orders in which they were admitted” (Id) and in 
“barring them from kingship in all the countries where its political influence had 
been effective enough”(M). These exclusions from the “spiritual” and the 
“temporal” domains led Comte to maintain that “the improvement of women’s 
condition carried out by Catholicism mainly consisted in securing the due liberty of 
their interior life by confining them more and more to their essentially domestic 
existence” (Id). He also insisted that the indissolubility of marriage and the 
proscription o f divorce were also morally and materially progressive features since 
they prevented or contained “the fickleness of our views and the uncertainty of our 
plans” (Id), and gave the wife “an imprescriptible right, independent even of her
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own conduct, to an unconditional participation in not only all the social advantages 
of the one who had once chosen her, but, as far as possible, also in the 
consideration he enjoyed”(Ibid., p. 366). It was difficult, Comte added, “to imagine 
any practicable arrangement more favourable to the dependent sex” (Id). Finally, 
drawing on the example of the women of the upper class whom he thought 
representative of the normal feminine type in their removal from the public sphere 
and their dedication to the running of the household and the support of their 
relatives, Comte concluded that
“far from tending towards a chimerical emancipation and a no less vain 
equality (...), civilization, by developing the essential differences between the 
sexes as well as all the others, deprives women more and more o f  all the 
functions that can distract them from their domestic vocation” (Id.).
However, Comte also pointed out that there had been attempts to 
challenge this Catholic conception of marriage that had been developing steadily 
throughout the course of history. For the advent of the metaphysical state and the 
rise of the critical spirit did not fail to spark the questioning of the basis on which 
the domestic relation rested. In particular, Comte regarded Protestantism, with its 
blending of equalitarianism and free inquiry, as having started a movement aiming 
at the dissolution o f all established social structures, including marriage: by 
supporting “the universal practice of divorce”, Reformation testified to its negative 
and corrupting character. Fortunately, Comte added, there had been resistance to 
that dissolving trend, “against which the modem mores have always fought 
spontaneously, as a necessary result of the natural law of human evolution that 
relates to the family” (Ibid., p. 437). In other words, the general opposition to 
divorce proved that traditional marriage was one of these “fundamental conditions 
of modem civilization, that no one could change” (Ibid., p. 438).
Eventually, it was for the positive state to give the relations between the 
sexes its full and definitive development. The end of the warlike period, the 
abolition of slavery, the growth of the “industrial element”, all these factors 
contributed to give the majority of mankind access to the “emotions of the 
family”:
“Only then could appear the full and direct illustration o f  the final destination 
o f almost all civilized men for domestic life, which had been among the 
Ancients either forbidden to the slaves or disliked by the caste o f  freemen, 
who where usually drawn from it by the clamorous emotions o f  the city and 
the battle-field” (Ibid., p. 502).
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By turning most men into workers, this new historical epoch had brought closer 
together men and women, who could now search for happiness within the 
domestic realm. O f course, Comte did not ignore that the industrial revolution 
resulted in more social mobility, the appearance of female workers in factories, and 
a certain degree of emancipation from traditional moral codes. But he refused to 
interpret these phenomena as the harbingers of “the dissolution of domestic ties” 
(Ibid., p. 503). Both in the Cours and the correspondence, Comte acknowledged 
that a superficial view of the situation might have led one to think that the 
subjection of women and their confinement to the domestic sphere were about to 
disappear and be replaced by a world in which men and women would be on a par:
“It is true that up to now the newness o f this situation has not yet permitted a 
sufficient manifestation o f  these ultimate differences [between the sexes], 
while the earlier distinctions seemed to fade away” (Comte to Mill, July 16,
1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 180)22.
Yet, he was also convinced that this was only a transitory phase and that, sooner or 
later, the tendency he had identified at work throughout the course of the history 
of mankind would take over once again and finally establish itself as the end-stage 
of human evolution.
“In making women more and more suited for their true general destination, I 
am convinced that the modern regeneration [of society] will increasingly 
return them completely to their essentially domestic life, its disarrangement 
being very much part o f  the great transition which, I believe, temporarily 
steered them away [from their essential function in the home] toward 
different secondary concerns” (Comte to Mill, October 5,1843; Ibid., p. 192).
In fact, Comte had already spotted the first signs of such a process in
“the popular tendency (...)  to shift numerous professions originally practiced 
by women to men, so that women be more and more confined to their 
eminently domestic destination and could only enter the careers fully 
compatible with the fundamental course o f  human evolution” (A. Comte, PS, 
p. 503) z\
This analysis provided the conclusion of the first part of Comte’s dynamic 
argument for women’s subjection: according to his interpretation of the historical 
record of mankind, the gradual development of the social structure included more 
and more predominantly as one of its constitutive elements the subordination of 
one sex to the other, and there was no indication that this situation was about to 
change.
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What about the second element necessary for Comte’s case to hold, i.e. the 
evidence that women’s capacities would not evolve in such a way as to enable 
them to carry out the same activities as their male counterparts? There again 
Comte resorted to social dynamics to make his point. Once again in line with his 
progressive theory of history, Comte acknowledged that the history of modem 
western societies had been characterized by a gradual process of emancipation 
which drove the majority of men out of a state of slavery, through serfdom, to 
public freedom and private independence. The reason why this liberating 
movement succeeded was that the inequality on which their subjection was 
grounded was not natural, i.e. they exhibited capacities that enabled them to 
overcome it. As Comte put it,
“The great mass o f  our species has long been submerged everywhere in social 
conditions o f  an infinitely greater inferiority than that on account o f  which 
one takes to pitying women today; but it has been able to emerge gradually 
[from inferiority] ever since the early Middle Ages among elite populations , 
because this abject state, a temporary phase o f  the sociability o f  earlier days, 
was really not grounded in any organic difference between the rulers and the 
ruled” (Comte to Mill, October 5, 1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 191).
Now, suggested Comte, what could explain that women, who had as much time as 
the majority of men to emancipate themselves, had so far failed to do so? Why did 
the analogy between the emancipation of the lower male elements of society and 
that of women break down? Comte had no doubt as to where the difference lay: 
“the subjection of women in society will necessarily last indefinitely (...) because it 
is directly based on a natural inferiority which nothing can undo” (Id). Comte thus 
held the fact that women had not been able to free themselves from male 
domination as evidence of them being deprived of the mental capacities necessary 
for such an emancipation. In any case, he saw no other way to “explain the 
consistently inferior social status of the feminine sex”(W.). With that 
demonstration, Comte was apparently convinced he had gathered all the elements 
he needed for his case for women’s subjection to hold: evidence of the necessary 
inferiority of women’s capacities and evidence that the social structure which 
justified sexual discrimination was not to change. Quite predictably, Mill was not 
convinced.
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E — The Shortcomings of the Dynamic Argument.
The task of refuting Comte’s dynamic argument was not, on the face of it, 
an easy one for Mill. Since he accepted the law of the three stages and its 
intellectualistic interpretation of the history of mankind, it seemed that Mill had 
also to accept the historical account of women’s subjection Comte presented as a 
specific instance of his general theory of history. For instance, how was he to 
defuse Comte’s claim that the contrast between males slaves’ gradual emancipation 
and women’s enduring subjection proved women’s inferiority? How was he to 
“explain the consistently inferior social status of the feminine sex”, as Comte put 
it, without premising it on an “organic difference” (Id.)?
As I will show, the necessity imposed on Mill to come up with an 
alternative explanation o f women’s lasting subjection prompted him to propose an 
account rival to that of Comte and which helps to flesh out a bit more fully the 
outlines of his projected ethology. Moreover, Mill’s insistence on “verifying” 
historical generalizations clarifies both the sociological relevance Mill ascribed to 
ethology and Comte’s unshakeable commitment to phrenology. Finally, Comte’s 
puzzling insensitivity to the weaknesses of his generalizations about women’s place 
in society suggests that his views were suffused with a biologically-inspired 
understanding of historical phenomena that belied his plea for an autonomous 
sociology.
1 -  Mill’s Alternative Ethological Account of Women’s Lasting Subjection.
Although Mill was impressed by the methodological grasp of social 
dynamics and the power of historical synthesis demonstrated by the last three 
volumes of the Cours, his consideration for these achievements did not extend to a 
blanket endorsement of all of Comte’s ideas. Mill was in fact sceptical about some 
of the social and political conclusions Comte drew from his historical 
generalizations, most notably the one contending that the history of women’s 
warranted their subjection. On the contrary, Mill held that women’s enduring 
subordination to male power was no proof that they were deprived of the moral 
and intellectual abilities characteristic of men.
In the correspondence, Mill introduced his views by challenging Comte’s
“argument based on the persistence in our day o f  the social subordination o f  
women, compared to the gradual emancipation o f  the lower classes in the
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most advanced nations, although these classes began everywhere as slaves”
(Mill to Comte, October 30, 1843; Ibid., p. 201-2).
After having made clear that he understood that Comte explained “this difference 
in historic development” by “the organic inferiority of women”, Mill introduced 
what he took to be “a satisfactory reply to the argument” {Ibid., p. 202). The gist of 
his rejoinder consisted in maintaining that women had been continuously subjected 
not because they did not have and could not acquire the capacities to emancipate 
themselves, but because the social environments to which they had been confined 
had left no room for those capacities to develop or to be expressed. The 
ethological rationale was obvious: the moulding of women’s character traits was 
ascribed to the formative influence of “circumstances” alone, with no appeal to 
“organic differences”.
Mill substantiated his point by drawing a parallel between women and male 
household slaves. For, Mill argued, it was not the case that all male slaves had been 
able to rise to freedom and social equality. Contrary to serfs, who enjoyed a relative 
independence (they owned a little plot of land from which they had to eke out their 
living; they were responsible of their wife and children; they could make some 
choices of their own as to how they wanted to live, etc.), household slaves had 
been kept under an infinitely more severe yoke which stifled even the slightest 
attempt to exhibit initiative. Obedience was all that was expected from them. 
Consequently it was normal that the latter never had accomplished their own 
emancipation, whereas the serfs, because they had benefited from a certain degree 
of autonomy, were able to develop the capacities (self-discipline, foresight, self- 
reliance, etc.) that eventually entitled them to claim and to obtain equal rights. In 
that case, what made the difference was not an organic factor but the social 
environment which was responsible for the formation of the moral and intellectual 
qualities required by emancipation.
The next step of Mill’s argument was to assimilate women to household 
slaves, a polemical comparison which was happy given Comte’s insistence on their 
“domestic destination”. Mill did not consider the present situation of women to be 
worse than that of serfs (even if it might in fact have been an appropriate 
description for most lower class women in nineteenth century Europe), but 
nonetheless argued that the state of subjection in which they were maintained had 
effects similar to those which prevented household slaves from emancipating. 
Their servitude might have been milder in the sense that it was not primarily based
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on brutality, but it still was servitude. Extending to all the aspects of women’s lives 
(the handling of their property, the education of their children, the election of their 
occupations and leisure, etc.), its pervasiveness insured that women had no 
opportunity to choose for themselves. But it was not only that “circumstances” 
prevented women from having a hold on the running of their existence, it was also 
the case they could not represent themselves as being individuals with personal 
interests. An education primarily aimed at the finding of a husband; a domestic life 
entirely dedicated to the well-being and happiness of one’s relatives; a marital 
relation that implied sexual subjection; all these elements conspired to smother the 
spirit o f autonomy and individuality Mill regarded as “the principal source of the 
impetus by which, little by little, [oppressed groups] rose to liberty” (Ibid., p. 203). 
In these conditions, it was unlikely that women could emancipate themselves. Mill 
was convinced that
“These considerations would seem more than sufficient to explain the almost 
endless delay in the social emancipation o f women, without our being able to 
infer that it is never to be realized. At least you will grant me that it could take 
place only long after that o f  the serfs, which itself is not a verv ancient event”
(Ibid., p. 203).
However, the interest of Mill’s environmental account of the causes of the 
enduring subjection of women was not only that it provided a plausible rejoinder 
to Comte’s biologically-based argument about women’s capacities. Firstly, it 
offered a more developed presentation of the kind of explanation ethology was to 
offer for the formation of character traits and the way they could be expressed or 
not according to the social setting in which an individual was placed. Secondly, and 
to this aspect o f the debate I will now turn, Mill’s ethological considerations were 
supposed to play a central evidential role in the verification of sociological 
hypotheses.
2 — Sociology, Ethology, and the Inverse Deductive Method.
The dynamic argument proposed by Comte was easily chargeable with 
being an unwarranted generalization. For what would guarantee that the present 
historical trend could not alter its direction? Was it not possible that, for some 
reasons, the subjection of women Comte had observed as increasingly 
characteristic of the relations between the sexes would disappear or be reversed? If 
the dynamic argument was to deliver what Comte expected from it, that is proof
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that the subjection would endure, it needed to be backed up by some other 
element. It was the gist of Mill’s methodological argument to claim that, given the 
inconclusiveness of phrenology and in the absence of a fully developed ethology 
that would setde the question of women’s mental capacities, Comte could not hold 
his analysis of the historical record of mankind to support male domination. In 
other words, it was for a “theory of human nature”, understood as a theory of the 
formation and development of mental dispositions, to corroborate or refute the 
historical generalizations Comte had ventured.
Even if he did not mentioned it in the correspondence, Comte was aware 
of the evidential dependence of social dynamics on this “theory of human nature”, 
since he had theorized it in the Forty-Eighth Lesson of the Cours. As we have seen 
earlier24, the perspective Comte had adopted there made it clear that his account 
of social evolution could be interpreted in mentalistic terms, as
“the continuous reinforcement o f  any given disposition, either physical, 
intellectual, moral or political, and the indefinite waning o f  the opposite 
disposition; a trend from which one could predict scientifically the final 
domination o f  the former and the definitive demise o f  the latter” (A. Comte,
PS, p. 151).
Consequently, Comte claimed that the “theory of human nature” was a “necessary 
means for the continuous verification” (I d of historical generalizations to the 
extent that it stated both the various mental dispositions existing in humans and 
their limits of variability and operated as a theoretical check on the explanations of 
social phenomena. A sociological account, Comte argued, that would postulate the 
existence of a mental disposition not acknowledged by the theory of human nature, 
or that would assume a development of a given disposition beyond what had been 
attested by the theory of human nature would have to be rejected25. Hence,
“no law o f  social succession, even when duly established with the help o f  the 
historical method, should be definitively accepted until it has been rationally 
linked, either directly or indirectly but always unquestionably, with the 
positive theory o f  human nature: all the inductions that could not withstand 
such a test would necessarily end up by being proved illusory by a more 
mature sociological appraisal, either because the observations would have 
been too partial, or because they would not have been extended enough” (Id., 
p. 153).
In the System, Mill stated his agreement with Comte’s characterisation of 
the above procedure as “inseparably inherent in the nature of sociological 
speculation” (J. S. Mill, SC, VI, IX, 1, p. 897) and even singled him out as the only
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thinker who had seen “the necessity of (...) connecting all our generalizations from 
history with the laws of human nature” (Ibid,', VI, X, 3, p. 914).That “necessity” 
was, in Mill’s view, both logical and architectonic.
On the one hand, it was not possible, due to the large numbers of factors 
involved and to our limited knowledge of the manner in which those interacted, to 
deduce historical predictions concerning social phenomena from the joint 
consideration of the psychological and ethological laws of human nature and of the 
circumstances to which individuals were exposed:
“when the question is that o f compounding several tendencies together, and 
computing the aggregate result o f many coexistent causes; and especially 
when, by attempting to predict what will actually occur in a given case, we 
incur the obligation o f  estimating and compounding together the influences 
o f all the causes which happen to exist in that case; we attempt a task to 
proceed far in which, certainly surpasses the compass o f  the human faculties”
{Ibid., VI, IX, 1, p. 896).
However, Mill took what he labelled the “Inverse Deductive Method” to be an 
appropriate manner of coping with the intricacies specific to the study of social 
phenomena. For, whereas the “Concrete Deductive Method”, as exemplified by 
astronomy, amounted to deducing conclusions from ultimate laws and verifying 
them by checking that they were corroborated by empirical generalizations, the 
“Inverse Deductive Method” worked in the opposite direction, starting with 
empirical generalizations (social phenomena) and trying to see whether they could 
be derived from the psychological and ethological principles of human nature26.
From an architectonic perspective, the use of “Inverse Deductive Method” 
tallied with Mill’s belief, as already hinted to in Chapter IV27, that the proper 
“Logic of the Moral Sciences” consisted in taking the various laws responsible for 
the production of mental states as the theoretical basis from which to deduce the 
laws of collective behaviours. In other words, sociolog}7 could not be held to be an
independent science because historical generalizations were derivative from the
laws of human nature:
“The succession o f states the human mind and o f  human society cannot have 
an independent lawT o f  its own; it must depend on the psychological laws 
which govern the action o f circumstances on men and o f  men on 
circumstances. (...) Until that law can be connected with the psychological 
and ethological laws on which it must depend, and, by the consilience o f  
deduction a priori with historical evidence, can be converted from an 
empirical law into a scientific one, it cannot be relied on for the prediction o f  
future events, beyond, at most, strictly adjacent cases” {Ibid., Chap. X, Sect. 3, 
p. 914).
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The gist of the “Inverse Deductive Method” was to try, in cases in which it was 
not possible to deduce propositions explaining the actual course of history that we 
could check again the facts, to find middle-level principles about which we would 
make sure they were compatible with the laws of human nature. So, even if it was 
indeed the case that a deduction of social phenomena from psychological and 
ethological laws was practically impossible, the “Inverse Deductive Method” 
nonetheless secured the dependence of the former on the latter by making sure 
that a historical generalization would not contradict the “theory of human nature”.
How would the “Inverse Deductive Method” apply in the case of sexual 
inequality? To back up the dynamic argument according to which the subjection of 
women would persist, it would be necessary to show that the mental capacities 
Comte ascribed to women would not improve or develop so as to put them on a 
par with men. In that sense, what Comte needed from the “theory of human 
nature” was a demonstration of the fixity or innateness of mental dispositions. But, 
as Mill tirelessly underlined, this was exactly what remained to be proved. In the 
absence of a sound “ethology” or science of the formation of character and given 
the dubiousness of phrenological conclusions on the subject, there was no way to 
decide which mental dispositions were due to nature or nurture, and to what extent 
they could be altered. Consequendy, in that very case, the “Inverse Deductive 
Method” was of no avail since it was not possible to rely on the “theory of human 
nature” to crosscheck the likelihood of the historical generalization bearing on 
women’s subjection. As long as Mill’s ethology would remain unavailable, the 
dynamic argument could not be corroborated as Comte’s methodology required.
3 — The “Biologizing” of Sociology.
As already pointed out for the correspondence28, Comte’s unwillingness to 
consider Mill’s arguments was particularly striking, especially with respect to Mill’s 
emphasis on the necessity of an account of character-traits formation. Yet, even if 
he was opposed to Mill’s environmentalist tendencies, Comte’s own conception of 
the evidential structure of sociology indeed called for the development of this 
independent “theory of human nature” that would shed crucial light on the origin 
and nature of mental dispositions.
This inability to take on Mill’s ethological suggestions might be ascribed to 
Comte’s implicit attempt to “biologi^ f3 sociology. For what convinced him that the
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dynamic argument won the day for the subjection of women was that he explicidy 
regarded biology (and consequently phrenology) as an appropriate candidate to use 
in the “Inverse Deductive Method”. As he put it in the Forty-Eighth Lesson of the 
Cours, it was in the
“exact and continuous harmony between the direct conclusions o f historical 
analysis and the notions o f  the biological theory o f  man that will reside the 
primary strength o f  sociological demonstrations” (A. Comte, PS, p. 153).
But if so, one comes to realize that what we have seen Comte describe, in the 
previous chapter20, as the “continuous” (Ibid., p. 157) dependence of sociology on 
biology — another way of conceiving the “Inverse Deductive Method” — in fact 
prevents an objective appraisal of the dynamic argument for the subjection of 
women. Since phrenology postulates the innateness of mental dispositions and 
their relative fixity (“the necessary invariability of the human organism” [Ibid., p. 
158], as Comte also put it), it thus dogmatically assumes that women’s mental 
dispositions are unchangeable, the whole problem on knowing whether or not they 
are really so is glossed over. This is the first way Comte “biologized” sociology: by 
using phrenology as a bar on sociological explanations.
However, there was a second and more direct way in which Comte 
“biologized” sociology, particularly its dynamic aspect. As some commentators 
have noted30, the historical views of Comte were deeply influenced by a biologically 
driven scheme mixing the comparative anatomy of Meckel, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire 
and Serres and the somewhat outdated embryological conception of 
“preformation”. All these elements coalesced into what Comte considered the key 
concept for interpreting the historical record of mankind, namely that of 
development, the regular unfolding of human dispositions through a process that 
could be described with the help of historical laws. As Comte put it,
“It is (...)  obvious that humanity constantly develops itself throughout the 
gradual course o f  its civilization, particularly in the most eminent faculties o f  
our nature, be they physical, moral, intellectual or political; i.e. these faculties, 
at first numb, reach, through an ever more extended and regular use, an 
evermore fuller development, within the general limits set by the fundamental 
organism o f  man” (Ibid., p. 128).
It was this developmental scheme that Comte applied to the mental evolution of 
mankind. For instance, the “lawT of the three stages” assumed that the respective 
speed with which the mental dispositions responsible for the theological, 
metaphysical, and positive turn of mind developed in individuals accounted for the
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necessary succession of the different epochs which had characterized the history of 
humanity. On this view, no new disposition could appear during the course of 
history because all the mental capacities were fixed from the outset of the process, 
just as on the preformationist view, all the characteristics of a living being were 
already present in the germ from which it developed. This resulted in Comte’s 
claim that the history of mankind was characterized by
“the simple spontaneous development, gradually aided by an appropriate 
cultivation, o f  the preexisting fundamental faculties which constitute our 
nature, with no introduction o f any new faculties whatsoever” {Ibid., p. 129).
As Dominique Guillo underlines, Comte did not regard this developmental 
law as the mere “analogical transposition of the principles which govern[ed] 
embryonic growth” (D. Guillo, lues figures de I’organisation, p. 326) but held it to 
correspond to an actual organic process taking place in every individual. Drawing 
once again on Gall’s idea of the existence of a fixed number of cerebral organs 
whose volume could vary and which were responsible for specific abilities, Comte 
assumed that phrenology gave a material verification of his conjectures about the 
mental evolution of mankind by showing that
“the succession o f  stages through which human conception goes is universal 
and inflexible because its substratum consists in a genuine organic 
development — that o f  the brain” {Id).
One of the consequences of this preformationist view of mental evolution was that 
it left no room for a possible modification of the number or nature of mental 
dispositions and prompted one to conclude that, if a disposition had not been 
exemplified by a certain kind of individuals during the course of history, it was not 
part of the mental endowment of the kind considered. In the case of women, it is 
likely that Comte took the subjection of women to be an enduring fact of social 
existence because, on his developmental scheme, the historical persistence of male 
domination testified to its necessity. For if women had not been capable of 
competing intellectually and practically with men, it was because they had already 
reached the full measure of their intellectual and volitional development. O f 
course, this conclusion held only if the innate nature of mental dispositions had 
been proved. Perhaps Comte was too dogmatic to recognize that it was not the 
case, whereas Mill rightly saw that his ethology was part of the answer to that 
question. In any case, the biological inspiration that suffused Comte’s
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understanding of social phenomena certainly did not help him to overcome the 
shortcomings of his views on sexual equality.
Finally, what appears more clearly now is that the root of the disagreement 
between Comte and Mill lay in their respective conceptions of what a mental 
capacity was and how it developed. Comte held that intellectual and moral 
dispositions were fixed for every individual from the outset by its biological make­
up and would develop between certain limits also fixed from the outset. At the 
level of mankind, the resulting picture was that of a set of basic capacities that were 
fixed and that would expand and develop throughout a progressive history. Mill 
refused Comte’s concept of ‘basic capacities’ made sense because he held that 
these capacities could change since at least two of their causes (psychological and 
environmental) could also change. For Mill, mental capacities were primarily (and 
especially for intellectual and moral capacities) the result of an exposure to 
environmental influences which were conveyed by the sensory apparatus of the 
individual and whose developmental limits could not be known a priori.
As it now clearly appears, neither the static argument nor its dynamic 
counterpart delivered what Comte expected from them, namely a convincing proof 
that the subjection of women would remain a central feature of the social relations 
between the sexes. Furthermore, two important exegetical lessons can be drawn 
from the analysis of Comte’s arguments and Mill’s rejoinder carried out in this 
chapter. On the one hand, it is now obvious that the views of Comte’s on sexual 
equality glaringly belied his advocacy of an autonomous science of social 
phenomena: for it was not only that Comte rested his case for male domination on 
biological arguments (as shown in the previous chapter), but it was also the case 
that even his sociological argument, both in its static and dynamic aspects, could 
not hold without appealing to biological assumptions. On the other hand, the 
survey of Mill’s objections to Comte’s views testified to the importance of 
developing the long-awaited “ethology” so as to be able to adjudicate, in one way 
or another, the sexual equality debate. To this topic, I will now turn.
1 SeeIA.
2 The withering away o f references to Comte in Mill’s System of Logic between the first and the eight 
edition has been documented by W.M. Simon, European Positivism in the Nineteenth Centuiy. A n  Essa)' 
in Intellectual History. Port Washington & London: Kennikat Press, 1973. “Appendix to Chapter 
V ir ,  pp. 275-9.
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3 For want o f  space, I cannot undertake here a comparison o f  Mill’s appraisal o f  Comte’s sociolog}' 
in the System and the later Auguste Comte and Positivism (1865). However, it may be maintained that, 
except for a difference in tone, Mill’s overall estimate had not changed between the two books.
4 See I, n. 1.
5 In these “Preliminary Considerations on Social Statics or General Theory o f  the Spontaneous 
Order o f Human Societies”, Comte asserted that, with respect to intellectual faculties, “no one can 
contest today the relative inferiority o f woman in this view, unfit as she is, in comparison, for the 
requisite continuousness and intensity o f mental labour” (A. Comte, PS, p. 186). As for practical 
qualities, he claimed that “the radical inaptitude o f  the female sex is there yet more marked, even 
with regard to the most elemental}7 state, and limited to the guidance o f the family, the nature o f the 
task requiring, above everything, an indefatigable attention to an aggregate o f  complex relations, 
none o f  which must be neglected, and an independence o f  the mind from the passions, that is more 
reason”(7</.). He eventually concluded on the “fortunate social destination eminently reserved for 
women”: “women are in general as superior to men with respect the spontaneous expression o f  
sympathy and sociability as they are inferior to them in understanding and reason. Accordingly, 
their proper and essential function in the economy o f the family, and consequently o f  society, must 
be to modify constantly, by a more energetic and more touching unmediated excitement o f the 
social instinct, the general direction necessarily originated by the cold and rough reason which is 
usually distinctive o f  the predominant sex” (Ibid., p. 187).
6 On Mill’s difficult relations with his wife Caroline, see IA & IB..
7 Comte’s only rejoinder to these objections was to regret that Mill confused “the management o f  the 
household and the general government o f  the family”: “In all o f  Western Europe, I believe, just as in 
England, the household is administered by women, but everywhere also, except for unusual 
individual cases, men govern the common affairs o f  the family” (Comte to Mill, November 14, 
1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 209).
s See VUE.
9 Mill took this to be true “except in those (so far very7 rare) cases where education has developed 
the capacity to look at the whole and who have become used to considering the overall effect o f  
whatever conduct they adopt. You know that this is precisely what women’s education lacks more 
than anything else, to the point where one does not even consider it a virtue o f  their sex to prefer 
the general interest to that o f  the family or o f their friends” (Mill to Comte, August 30, 1843; in 
Haac [ed.], p. 184).
10 Comte hold that there was no better case than the subordination o f wife to husband in the family 
to grasp “in the same degree, the most respectful spontaneous obedience, on the part o f  the 
inferior, without the least degradation; an obedience first imposed by necessity7, and then by 
gratitude; and nowhere else do we see in the superior party7 the most absolute authority7 untied to 
entire devotedness, too natural and too gentle to be regarded as duty7” (A. Comte, PS, p.188).
11 Comte agreed with Mill that sympathy could exist between equals, but certainly not between the 
sexes, due to their inequality7: “As to the necessary7 imperfection o f  affections founded on inequality7, 
I agree with y7ou, and here I believe that the fullness o f human sympathies could exist only between 
two eminent men whose moral nature is sufficient to restrain any serious impulse o f  rivalry7. This 
kind o f accord seems to me far superior to any that might exist between one sex and the other. 
However, this could obviously not be the normal type o f the most basic and common relationships, 
where first the natural hierarchy o f  the sexes, then that o f ages, form the most powerful bond” 
(Comte to Mill, July 16,1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 180).
12 See IC2. Mill certainly thought that his relation with Harriet Taydor was o f  that kind. As he 
acknowledged to Comte, it was “quite possible that here [he] judge[d] human nature too much 
according to my own, which may, in several respects, be exceptional” (Mill to Comte, July 13,1843; 
in Haac [ed.], p. 174 ).
13 See IC2.
14 See supra n. 5.
15 See IIIC.
16 One might argue that Comte could have avoided to contradict his methodological principles 
whilst sticking to his belief that the origin o f  women’s inferiority7 was biological: he could have 
endorsed Mill’s proposal to determine first the influence o f circumstances on character formation 
and secondly, by using the Method o f Residues, to ascribe the unexplained effects to biological 
causes. In this instance, the argument is sociological to the extent that it is the failure o f  the 
environmental hypothesis to account for the unexplained effects that tells us that those are due to 





20 Comte gave a phrenological version o f  his general view o f human evolution: “From a 
phrenological perspective, one could clearly characterize such a tendency by claiming that, through 
exercise, the different organs o f the cerebral apparatus gain a greater predominance in proportion 
to their distance from the vertebral region and their nearness to the frontal region” (A. Comte, PS, 
p. 204).
21 In a footnote, Comte invoked the “undisputable proofs which, as Robertson has rightly 
observed, establish with full certainty how radically inferior the social state o f  women was under the 
polytheistic regime o f  Antiquity, compared to what it afterward became under the influence o f  
Christianity' ”(Ibid., p. 300). The historian William Robertson (1721-1793) was one o f  the great 
figures o f  the Scottish Enlightenment and some o f  his works, most notably his History of the Reign of 
the Emperor Charles 1/, with a View of the Progress of Society in Europe (1769) and his History of America 
(1777), correlated the level o f  advancement o f  society' with the condition it granted women. 
Robertson’s narratives were an illustration o f  the interest in the history o f the sexes and its social 
and political relevance which surfaced in the early 1770s in Scotland, as illustrated by Adam 
Ferguson’s Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), John Millar’s Observations concerning the Distinction 
of Ranks (1771), Lord Karnes’ essays ‘O f the Progress o f the Female Sex’ and ‘Manners’ in his 
Sketches of the History of Man (1774), and William Alexander’s History of Women From Earliest Antiquity 
to the Present Time (1779). Notwithstanding serious disagreements, all these authors shared the idea 
that the condition o f  women had improved throughout history and that the advent o f modernity', 
characterized by the growing influence o f Christianity and the development o f  the commercial 
spirit, was a major watershed in that process (on this, see J. Rendall, “Clio, Mars and Minerva: The 
Scottish Enlightenment and the Writing o f Women’s History”, in T.M. Devine and J.M. Young 
(eds.), Eighteenth Century Scotland: New Perspectives. East Linton, Scotland : Tuckwell Press, 1999, pp. 
134-51).
22 In the Cours, Comte reckoned that “one might fear (...) that an uncoordinated industrial 
expansion might end up altering the necessary subordination o f the sexes, by allowing women to 
have too independent an existence” (A. Comte, PS, p. 503).
23 The same point was repeated in the correspondence: “The natural development o f our industry 
certainly tends to shift over to men a number o f professions which were long exercised by women, 
and this spontaneous disposition is, to my eyes, only an example o f the growing trend in our society7 
to exclude women from all occupations which are not sufficiently reconcilable with their domestic 
functions, the importance o f  which will become ever more preponderant” (Comte to Mill, October 
5, 1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 192).
2A See supra D l.
25 As Comte put it in the following lesson, “At any age o f  human evolution, no direct sociological 
outline could be regarded as scientific, however powerful the inductions on which it rests might 
seem to be, if it is contradictor)7 to the known laws o f human nature” (A. Comte, PS, p. 158).
26 How'ever, because he considered that Comte held the Inverse Deductive Method to be the only 
one appropriate for the analysis o f social phenomena, Mill made clear that he thought that 
sociology could resort to other methods. In particular, he underlined the usefulness o f the 
“Concrete Deductive Method” for the study o f those social phenomena that were primarily the 
result o f one specific kind o f cause, as was the case wtith political economy which was concerned 
writh the phenomena resulting from the pursuit o f  wealth (see J. S. Mill, SL, VI, IX, 3: “To What 





30 Most notably G. Canguilhem, G. Lapassade, J. Piquemal & J. Ulmann, Du de'veloppement a revolution 
au X IX 1 siecle. Second Edition. Paris: PUF,1985; and more recently, D . Guillo, Les Figures de 
l\organisation. Sciences de la vie et sciences sociales au X I X  siecle. Paris: PUF, 2003, Part III, Chap. 3, Sect. 1 
(“L’histoire de l’humanite comme “developpemenf a partir d’un germe preforme”).
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VI — The Ethological Fiasco:
The Methodological Shortcomings of the Millian Science of the
Formation of Character.
So far, my analysis of the Comte-Mill relation has mainly consisted in a 
critical appraisal of the sexual equality debate. In each of the previous chapters, I 
have laid out Comte’s arguments for the subjection of women (either biological, as 
in chapter III and IV; or sociological in chapter V), and then introduced the 
objections Mill levelled against them, both with regard to the truth of Comte’s 
premises and the soundness of his inferences. The impression one gets from such 
a review is that of Comte’s failure to make a case convincing. As Mill 
demonstrated, neither the phrenological argument nor the argument based on 
social “statics” and “dynamics” could deliver conclusive evidence in support of the 
indefinite perpetuation of women’s subjection.
Now, the adoption of a critical stance was of course not the whole of Mill’s 
considered position on the issue of sexual equality, since he also intended his 
opposition to be constructive. Accordingly, I try in this chapter to introduce what 
he took to be his positive contribution to the sexual equality debate, namely his 
theorization of ethology or the science of the formation of character. Firsdy, I 
show the centrality of ethology in Mill’s thought (VIA). Secondly, I explain in what 
sense ethology can be understood as a reform science and in what sense this 
characterization provides an adequate interpretative hypothesis for the System of 
Logic (IVB). Thirdly, I analyse the methodology proper to ethology (VIC). I 
conclude by reviewing some rationales for Mill’s failure to develop his ethology 
(IVD).
This chapter contributes two points to the correct assessment of Mill’s 
thought. Firstly, it demonstrates that the taking into account of Mill’s rhetoric is a 
key to an adequate understanding of the argumentative structure of some of the 
most convoluted passages of the System, and that once we take this rhetoric into 
account, the chapter on ethology emerges as far more coherent than has been 
supposed.
Secondly, unlike other commentaries, it singles out Mill’s inability to come 
up with a sensible candidate for a law of composition as the great unsolved 
problem faced by Mill’s ethological project.
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I stress that throughout this chapter I do not intend to give an historical 
account of what actually stopped Mill from developing his ethology. Instead, my 
purpose is to identify the methodological problems that would have stood in the 
way of Mill or any group of researchers who might have taken up his programme.
A -  The N eed for Ethology.
As seen previously, Mill was convinced that the key to the sexual equality 
issue lay in taking “into account the difference in education and in social position” 
(Mill to Comte, August 30, 1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 184) characteristic of the two 
sexes. Whatever inferiority in intellectual and moral powers women exhibited in 
the past or presently exhibit, Mill argued, was not entirely due to certain 
physiological features inexorably developed and fostered within the course of 
history but mosdy resulted from the “circumstances” to which they have been 
subjected. Since nobody denied the possibility of modifying, to a lesser or greater 
extent, the various circumstances (education, access to a profession, political 
participation, etc.) that Mill took to be responsible for women’s subjection, the 
practicability of a reformist feminist agenda was obvious. What could be expected 
of Mill was that he came up with a convincing case for the emancipation of women 
merging these different elements into a coherent whole.
In his correspondence with Comte, Mill made clear that the first step of his 
attempt at a systematic argument for the emancipation of women rested on the 
establishment of the
“science I have called ethology, that is the theory o f  how external 
circumstances, either individual or social, influence the formation o f  moral 
and intellectual character” (Mill to Comte, October 30,1843; Ibid., p. 198).
What rendered this move crucial was the need to cash out into a workable 
explanatory scheme the abstract appraisal of the various factors at play in the 
scientific analysis of “moral”. To list the different laws (“of circumstances”, “of 
physiology”, and “of mind”) likely to contribute to this kind of explanation was 
indeed essential for a correct grasp of the sexual equality issue. But the adjudication 
of the case demanded more than that, namely the precise ascertainment of the 
influence of the different causes involved, including the manner in which they 
acted in conjunction, and the way in which they affected each other.
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To put it briefly, the debate boiled down to the following alternative: either 
(i) women’s intellectual and moral inferiority was determined by biological factors 
alone and then subjection would continue to prevail because there was no way to 
remedy the shortcomings of female “character”; or (ii) their moral and intellectual 
inferiority was primarily due to environmental factors (education, social position, 
etc.) and then avenues for progress could be explored. So far, Mill had just 
assumed that the consideration of environmental factors could explain intellectual 
differences, but he had not actually proved that they did. Such an assumption 
remained tentative as long as it had not been vindicated on empirical grounds, 
through the exact appraisal of the causal influence of the “laws of circumstances” 
on the formation of character. Hence the necessity of founding ethology. Here, it 
is important to remark that Mill often argued as if the development of an 
environmental account was equivalent to a demonstration of the “residual” or 
minor role of biological features in the explanation of moral and intellectual 
differences. But surely, by Mill’s own logical standards, plurality of causes left open 
the possibility that the environmental and the biological explanations could be 
separately sufficient to explain facts about women1. However, Mill decided to frame 
the debate in the terms of an alternative: either one explanation or the other was 
right, but not both. This explains the one-sidedness of Mill’s perspective, which 
put a somewhat exclusive emphasis on the environmental explanation, but also 
helps to understand what made his approach distinctive.
What was merely a hint about a worthy subject of inquiry in the 
correspondence with Comte developed into a more extensive account in Mill’s S L  
chapter V of Book VI was intended as an introduction to the essentials of 
“Ethology, or the Science of the Formation of Character” (J. S. Mill, SL, VI, V, p. 
861), and a blueprint for future developments in the field. But what in 1843 boded 
well for Mill’s scientifically based projects of progressive reforms did not yield 
results thereafter: Mill wrote nothing substantial on ethology in the years following 
the publication of the System2. Given the centrality of ethology in Mill’s plans to 
improve social arrangements through a better knowledge of human nature, the 
failure to establish it on safe grounds represented a major threat to his hopes for 
social progress. What is striking is that Mill seemed to have realized the various 
difficulties associated with the development of a systematic body of ethological
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knowledge at the very moment he tried to convince Comte of its usefulness for 
solving the problems of sexual equality.
Mill’s interest in ethology surfaced years before the writing of the System. 
As Janice Carlile remarks, “Mill began to stake out his claim to the subject of the 
formation of character at the very beginning of his career as a writer” (J. Carlile, 
John Stuart Mill and the Writing of Character, p. 130). In the 1820s and 1830s he 
ventured into ethological analyses in some of his articles and newspaper essays. For 
instance, in 1838, Mill accounted for the tenor of Alfred de Vigny’s prose by 
invoking a varied set of external circumstances — such as the writer’s ancien regime 
upbringing, his unfulfilling career as a soldier, and the impact of recent historical 
events on his thought*. But those were mere trial balloons indicating the possibility 
of a scientific study o f the causal factors at work in the determination of moral and 
intellectual dispositions: no laws were drawn from the cases reviewed; no 
conclusions were offered as to the respective weights of the formative influences 
bearing on human character. Yet, Mill did not doubt that the time was near when 
ethology would become a proper science. As he made clear to Comte, Mill hoped 
that his contribution would place him among the contributors to this collective 
endeavour:
“Even though human life is short, we can look forward to seeing the state o f  
society and the national character o f  each important segment o f  mankind 
related to the laws o f human nature and to the characteristics o f  the general 
or particular organic milieu to which they pertain; though, to be sure, the link 
will not be as complete as that we find today in the most advanced sciences. I 
would be happy, indeed, if  I thought myself capable o f  playing a truly 
important role in this great enterprise, even if  only a secondary7 one” (Mill to 
Comte, March 22, 1842; in Haac [ed.], p. 61).
One may have expected that the laying out of the theoretical basis of 
ethology in Chapter V of Book VI of the SL. would have paved the way for the 
attainment of general explanations bearing on the causes of the different kinds of 
character. Yet none of this happened. As seen in the previous chapter, Mill 
lamented the backward state of ethology, which appeared to him “to be the least 
advanced of all scientific speculations of any importance” (Mill to Comte, October 
30, 1843; Ibid., p. 198). But the problem was that Mill, though he provided 
ethology with its name and foundations, was unable to carry out the task he set to 
himself. The correspondence with Comte testified to the unforeseen obstacles Mill 
encountered on his way and the growing disillusionment he experienced as to the
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prospects for ethology. Despite what he had contributed in the System, Mill told 
Comte ethology remained to be created and this was to be done by
“properly evaluating the nature and the extent o f the ethological effects 
produced either by organization or by external conditions” (Mill to Comte,
December 8,1843; Ibid., p. 213; slightly modified translation).
As Bain remarks, Mill might have found in his study of the writings of the 
French historian Jules Michelet4, who endeavoured to explain the feelings, 
thoughts, and beliefs of populations of the past by referring them to a mix of 
racial5, geographical, political, and social factors, material for the book he “was 
projecting in his mind (...), which was to be on the new science, first sketched in 
the EogitP (A. Bain, John Stuart Mill, p. 78). By late 1843, Mill had not advanced in 
the completion of his project, as he told Bain:
“I do not know when I shall be ripe for beginning “Ethology”. The scheme 
has not assumed any definite shape with me yet” (Mill to A. Bain, late 1843; 
in J. S. Mill, Harder Letters, p. 617).
In April of 1844, realizing that his “meditations on ethology will not be 
ripe for some time” (Mill to Comte, April 3, 1844; in Haac [ed.], p. 228), Mill 
informed Comte that he had decided to give up momentarily his ethological work 
in order to engage in a project easier to handle, namely the writing of the Principles 
of Political Economy. In fact, although he expressed the desire to do so throughout 
the reminder of his career6, Mill never returned to his “Ethology”. O f course, one 
could find in many of his subsequent writings fragments of ethological analyses on 
national, social, and of course sexual differences, but nothing that would qualify as 
a systematic presentation of ethology’s methods and results7. This failure to 
complete the “Ethology”, which jeopardized Mill’s specific approach to social 
reform (including his plea for women’s emancipation), had various methodological 
causes that I will attempt to single out in the following sections of this chapter.
B — Mill’s Style and Ambitions as a “Moral” Scientist and Social 
Reformer.
Mill’s inability to bring to fruition his ethological project is certainly a good 
reason for suspecting the presence of flaws in the chapter of the SE  which was 
supposed to provide the new science with its impetus. The account of ethology 
offered by Mill is indeed fraught with methodological difficulties. But the 
acknowledgment of these shortcomings is a far cry from asserting that this chapter
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clashes with the rest of the book because of an alleged lack of clarity, as for 
instance J. Carlile suggests8. On the contrary, I will contend that the argument of 
the System’s chapter on ethology is, in fact, quite clear, once one connects it to 
Mill’s style and to his goals as a social and political reformer (and especially to his 
feminist commitment).
As A. Ryan has pointed out, much of the appeal of the SL  “stems from the 
fact that it is clear that it is part of Mill’s reforming programme, even if is not clear 
how” (A. Ryan, J. S. Mill' p. 60)y. Fortunately, the chapter on ethology sheds light 
on the manner in which the System could function as “a reformer’s book” (Ibid., p. 
85). Let us take up the issue of sexual inequality as an illustration. In the 
functionalist framework common to Comte and Mill, the most rational and 
efficient organization of society was the one that took into account the whole 
range of individuals’ needs, desires, and capacities and arranged them so that the 
co-operative structure thus obtained would be the most beneficial both to the 
individuals and society. Now, these social arrangements, be they supervised or left 
to the individuals’ initiative, presupposed a precise and detailed knowledge of 
human needs, desires and capacities, and especially of the way those might be 
unequally distributed in the population under consideration. This knowledge, 
according to Mill, most often took the form of maxims or general propositions 
which constituted what he called the “practical knowledge of mankind” (J. S. Mill, 
SL, VI, V, 1, p. 861) or the “common wisdom of common life” (Ibid., Sect. 2, p.
864). For instance, as Mill put in it in the manuscript of the System", it was the case 
that “women are observed to be different from men in a long series of qualities” 
(Ibid., 3, p. 868), and the existence of these differences in, say, intellectual capacities 
or moral dispositions was held to explain and legitimate actual arrangements 
between the sexes (i.e. the subjection of women to men’s authority). Accordingly, 
if these general descriptive propositions bearing on the various constituents of 
human character were the grounds on which social arrangements had to be based, 
they had better be accurate. Mill had serious doubts about the latter fact, which 
doubts in turn explain his reformist tendencies.
The System’s chapter on ethology indeed started by voicing Mill’s suspicions 
about the exact status of these generalizations. Let us return to sexual differences. 
According to Mill, it could hardly be denied that the fact that men and women 
differed in their needs, desires, and capacities was the result o f the different causes
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(such as physiological constitution, education, or social situation) involved in the 
formation of their respective characters. For instance, it would not have been 
unreasonable to ascribe the distinctive features of the feminine character in the 
Victorian era to the education girls were receiving (which aimed at rendering them 
obedient to, and supportive of, their husband) and to the role to which they were 
confined (the management of the household). But if their character was so 
determined, the determination it resulted from could only take place in situations 
in which the causal factors listed above were present and operative. Consequently, 
the deceptively general proposition according to which “women are observed to be 
different from men in a long series of qualities” (Ibid, 3, p. 868), that is 
intellectually inferior to men and deprived of moral qualities such as courage or 
fortitude, needed to be severely qualified: it was true only of the social settings in 
which the currently unknown or “yet-to-be-discovered” causal factors responsible 
for these character traits prevailed. Because such “familiar maxims” as the one 
relating to sexual differences were merely “collected a posteriori from observation of 
life” [Ibid., 1, p. 861), their epistemic status was that of “empirical laws”, i.e. 
uniformities which “holds true in all instances within our limits of observation” 
(Id). Therefore, the scope of these propositions did not extend beyond these limits, 
for it might well be the case that different “circumstances” — that is a different 
arrangement of causal factors — result in different outcomes that might turn out to 
be beneficial to both individuals and society. As Mill suggested in the System’s 
manuscript, this might well happen in the case of women:
“it becomes customary, perhaps, to give [women] an education more 
approximating to that o f  a man, and in the next generation the differences, 
though still real, are no longer the same” {Ibid., 3, p. 868).
By pointing out that that the generalizations describing human character 
were empirical laws that may hold only for certain times and places and subject to 
change if circumstances altered, Mill exposed the logical blunder of inferring from 
the existence of a given state of affairs to its necessity and the impossibility of any 
alternative to it. In the manuscript of Book V of the System (which drew a 
classification of the different sorts of fallacies), Mill spotted an instance of this 
blunder in the argument of those who maintained that since women “as a class, 
have never hitherto been equal in intellectual energy and compass to men,
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therefore they are necessarily inferior” (Ibid., V, V, 4, p. 788). This inference, Mill 
argued, was to be counted among the “fallacies of generalization”:
“Their fallacy consists in this, that they are inductions without elimination: 
there has been no real comparison o f instances, nor even ascertainment o f  
the material facts in any given instance. There is also the further error, o f  
forgetting that such generalizations, even if well established, could not be the 
ultimate truths, but must be results o f  laws much more elementary; and 
therefore, until deduced from such, could at most be admitted as empirical 
laws, holding good within the limits o f  space and time by which the particular 
observations that suggested the generalization were bounded” {Ibid., p. 789).
Those who argued that the fact of being a woman implied inferiority with 
respect to intellectual achievements just fell prey to the shortcomings of induction 
by simple enumeration. What they did, suggested Mill, was to collect instances 
featuring property W (being a woman) and property I (being intellectually inferior) 
and concluded that the former was the cause of the latter, that is that there existed 
a constant conjunction between the two. Now, as Mill suggested, a “real 
comparison of instances” would have revealed that other properties, say, E and S 
(being uneducated and being not in an intellectually stimulating social position) 
were always associated with W, and could in fact be held as the primary causes of I, 
since in cases where E and S were present but W was absent (as in the case of, say, 
working class males), I also obtained. In short, a cautious application of the 
method of agreement would have spared one a logical howler.
This analysis of the opening sections of the chapter on ethology helps 
resolve Ryan’s concern as to how the System carried out “Mill’s reforming 
programme”. For the first reformist effect of these pages was to operate as a 
logical solvent against deep-seated prejudices. If, as T. Ball has remarked, “Mill 
regarded pernicious political doctrines as the result o f flawed reasoning” (T. Ball, 
“The Formation of Character: Mill’s ‘Ethology’ Reconsidered”, p. 29), it was not 
only because this lack of argumentative rigour fostered ideas or conceptions he was 
opposed to. It was also because it constituted a serious obstacle to the 
development of a proper understanding of human phenomena. Hence the 
usefulness of exposing and criticizing the “faulty modes or methods of reasoning 
upon which such conservatism rested”(M).
This way of arguing, which dwelt on the erroneous views and 
methodological dead-ends associated with unsatisfactory accounts of character 
formation, might explain that some commentators have judged the System’s chapter 
on ethology to be crippled by a constitutive backwardness. J. Carlile for instance
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claims that the “exposition trips and stumbles, variations in tone from brash 
certainty to meek insinuation seem misplaced and uncoordinated, and the 
organization of the argument proceeds in a fashion that can be described as simply 
backwards” (J. Carlile, John Stuart Mill and the Writing of Character, p. 134). Carlile 
here refers to what she righdy takes to be one of the striking features of the 
structure of the chapter on ethology, namely the fact that a sustained emphasis on 
the countless obstacles standing in the way of ethology was followed by Mill’s 
claim that the “Science of Character” had been “formed” (J. S. Mill, SL, VI, V, 4, 
p. 869). Given the catalogue of problems he had listed and the essentially 
theoretical nature of his blueprint for ethology, Carlile concludes that Mill’s 
confidence partakes more of wishful thinking than of a sensible appraisal of the 
achievements of ethology.
I think two points might help diminish the strength of Carlile’s claim. 
Firsdy, when Mill said that ethology was “formed”, he meant that, although “all 
things [were] prepared” for the creadon of ethology, this science was “still to be 
created” {Ibid., Sect. 6, p. 872-3). As the correspondence with Comte illustrates and 
as his comments on how to develop ethology indicate, Mill did not consider that 
ethology was a fully established science, which had already achieved momentous 
results. However, if by “established” science one means “constituting a sensible 
research programme worth implementing”, Mill surely thought that it was the case, 
even if — and on that I agree with Carlile - he eventually proved too sanguine as to 
the practicability of the project.
Secondly, the mode of exposition adopted in the chapter on ethology was 
typical of Mill’s bent at “dramatizing” methodological predicaments, his favourite 
stratagem consisting in first introducing two opposite but equally unsuccessful 
solutions to the problem under consideration and then in offering a last theoretical 
resort o f his own11. This made the importance of Mill’s contribution stand out, 
even the more so in the field of “Moral Sciences” in which, as Mill recalled,
“the most sagacious minds have occupied themselves from the earliest date, 
with every assistance except that o f a tried scientific method, and have never 
succeeded in establishing any considerable body o f  truths, so as to be beyond 
denial or doubt” (J. S. Mill, XL, VI, 1 , 1, p. 834),
This was exactly the rhetorical ploy Mill resorted to when it came to 
assessing the proper way of establishing the laws of the formation of character: if 
Mill emphasized as much as possible the shortcomings of the previous attempts to
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deal with a specific problem, it was in order to introduce his proposal as the eagerly 
awaited solution of the problem under scrutiny.
To grasp Mill’s rhetoric, let us return to these problematic “familiar 
maxims” and how character traits could be inferred from them. Let us take the 
claim that women were intellectually inferior to men. What did that generalization 
refer to? To dispositions to act in a definite way. For instance, to be intellectually 
inferior was to be unable to compete on a par with others in situation involving 
certain kinds of mental operations. But surely, Mill suggested, these dispositions to 
act were dependent on some psychological features, that is on some definite 
dispositions to think in certain ways, i.e. what was called a character. Accordingly, 
the laws of how we act depend on the laws of how we think. As seen previously12, 
Mill enthusiastically endorsed the principles and findings of classical associationist 
psychology. Now the problem was to discover the exact nature of this dependence 
of behavioural laws on psychological laws.
Could one simply infer the former from the latter? No, for psychological 
laws were universal laws stating unconditional relations between individual mental 
events (such as Hume’s “correspondence principle”, which associated every mental 
impression with an idea) holding for any human individual, whereas human 
behaviours were characterized by their variety. What could explain such variety? 
According to Mill and in line with the typically empiricist approach of 
associationist psychology, the various mental dispositions on which behavioural 
dispositions depended were the causal outcome of “the universal or abstract 
portion of the philosophy of human nature” (Ibid, p. 861), i.e. psychological laws, 
and a set of environmental factors (what Mill called “circumstances”). Mill 
therefore arrived at a conception of ethology understood as the
“science which determines the kind o f character produced in conformity to 
those general laws [the laws o f psychology], by any set o f  circumstances, 
physical or moral” (Ibid., Sect. 4, p. 869).
This account, which echoed that of the correspondence with Comte13, 
gained authentic methodological value only when the procedure for establishing 
the laws of the formation of character was spelt out in detail. Predictably, it was at 
this crucial point of his argument that Mill chose to “dramatize” his whole 
development by emphasizing the serious difficulties associated with the pursuit of 
ethology. Drawing on what he had said about the variety of causal factors at play in
165
the formation of character, Mill was at pains to underline that “both the character 
of any human being, and the aggregate of the circumstances by which that 
character has been formed, are facts of a high order of complexity” (ibid., Sect. 3, 
p. 865). But if so, Mill pointed out, the student of ethology was faced with exacdy 
the same methodological predicament which crippled the natural scientist when 
she dealt with phenomena resulting from a composition of causes: neither 
experiment nor observation could help in ascertaining the causal laws giving rise to 
phenomena.
As for experiment, Mill underlined the impossibility of setting up a 
scientifically reliable procedure to assess the nature and the extent of the causal 
influence of the various circumstances on the formation of one’s character traits. 
For the experimental approach was not only ethically dubious14, but also practically 
unmanageable:
“The instances requisite for the prosecution o f  a directly experimental inquiry 
into the formation o f  character, would be a number o f human beings to bring 
up and educate, from infancy to mature age. And to perform any one o f  these 
experiments with scientific propriety, it would be necessary to know and 
record ever}7 sensation or impression received bv the young pupil from a 
period long before it could speak; including its own notions respecting the 
sources o f all those sensations and impressions” (Id.).
Two assumptions implied by Mill’s remark on the impossibility of performing 
ethological experiments are worth noting. Firstly, it was not premised on our 
inability to modify the “circumstances” under scrutiny. As Mill’s reference to 
Rousseau’s and Helvetius’ pedagogical writings made clear (ibid., p. 866), a good 
part of modem educational theory regarded the exposure to a set of carefully 
selected and aptly arranged “circumstances” as a necessary condition for one’s 
successful upbringing. Rather it was due to the inability to take into account 
accurately all the variables involved. Unlike the astronomer, the ethologist was not 
deprived of means of altering many of the circumstances of the phenomena she 
studied, but the profusion of factors seemed to exceed by far her computational 
capacities. Secondly, this inability to register all the circumstances at play, Mill 
insisted, was all the more unfortunate given the extreme sensitivity of human 
character:
“One apparently trivial circumstance which eluded our vigilance, might let in 
a train o f  impressions and associations sufficient to vitiate the experiment as 
an authentic exhibition o f  the effects flowing from given causes” (Id.).
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But this also testified a contrario to the plasticity of the individual, a feature that was 
in agreement with Mill’s associationist-empiricist approach to the human mind, 
even if it might have been difficult to conciliate with his reformist endeavours. If 
even a “trivial circumstance” could have this momentous effects, the task of the 
educator might be more difficult than generally conceived15. In that instance, one 
might agree with Carlile that Mill’s strategy of exaggerating the obstacles standing 
on the way of the student of character was counterproductive, since the above 
assertion rendered the internalization of a character — that is of a set of ingrained 
purposes and habits — impossible, thereby ruining the very project of an ethology. 
However, this kind of exaggeration remained an exception throughout Mill’s 
argument.
As for observation, Mill was also keen to underline its obvious 
shortcomings when used to establish the laws of ethology. Firsdy, he argued that 
the initial step of the procedure resorted to in order to discover the circumstances 
responsible for a given character proved tricky, since the very object of study wTas 
in itself difficult to determine.
“Consider the difficulty o f  the very first step -  o f ascertaining what actually is 
the character o f  the individual, in each particular case that we examine. There 
is hardly any living person concerning some essential part o f  whose character 
there are not differences o f  opinion even among his intimate acquaintance; 
and a single action, or conduct continued only for a short time, goes a very 
little way indeed towards ascertaining it” {Ibid., p. 866).
This was due to the dispositional nature of character traits, that is the fact that they 
were capacities to act or react in a definite manner when subjected to certain 
conditions. And since they were highly dependent on the environment for their 
manifestation, the ethologist would be subject to the endless task of assessing one’s 
behaviour in various milieus to verify whether or not one had a certain character 
trait. The obvious drawback of such a method was that when there was no way to 
observe one’s person reactions to a specific kind of situation, the ascription of 
character traits became impossible, since the absence of manifestation could not be 
taken as a proof of the absence of the character trait itself. Just as the sugar’s 
dispositional property of being soluble revealed itself when put in a glass of water, 
the display, say, of warlike virtues could hardly be manifested in a tightly regulated 
society at peace with its neighbours.
Secondly, the gathering of observations merely amounted to the 
enunciation of approximate generalizations which were short of providing one
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with a detailed appraisal of the causal mechanism involved in the shaping of one’s 
personality:
‘W e can only make our observations in a rough way, and en masse; not 
attempting to ascertain completely in any given instance, what character has 
been formed, and still less by what causes; but only observing in what state o f  
previous circumstances it is found that certain marked mental qualities or 
deficiencies oftenest exist” (Id.).
Thirdly, as any instance of mere observation, such a process was unable to 
arrive at unconditional statements as to which specific set of circumstances could 
produce a specific type of character. Besides the dispositional nature of character 
traits (which rendered them difficult to identify) the plurality of causes was a 
stumbling block on the road to the establishment of ethological laws, for it might 
well happen that different arrangements of causal factors lead to the same 
outcome:
“So numerous and various, moreover, are the circumstances which form 
individual character, that the consequence o f any particular combination is 
hardly ever some definite strongly marked character, always found where that 
combination exists, and not otherwise” (Id.)16
The most one could get by “the most extensive and accurate observation” was a 
“mere comparative result” (Id.) expressed in contrastive terms (for two given 
populations, one would find different distributions of character trait X). These 
comparisons could certainly direct investigations towards some elements likely to 
explain causally the differences registered, but they could not lead on their own to 
“a real induction” (Ibid., p. 867). In short, observation was no better than 
experiment for the discovery of ethological laws.
So, if J. Carlile considers that the System’s chapter on ethology proceeds in 
an awkward manner, it is partly because she neglects the rhetorical dimension of 
the negative preamble with which Mill chose to open his chapter on ethology. 
Eager to make sure that his contribution would not be overlooked by his readers, 
Mill used various expository ploys — most notably the “dramatization” of 
methodological predicaments — to ensure this general recognition of the important 
part he had taken in the development of the study of human phenomena. In the 
early 1840s, it was for ethology, as he coined the science he aimed at creating (just 
as Comte had done for sociology), to secure Mill’s place in the intellectual 
Pantheon. And the greater his theoretical feat, the higher his rank among them. 
Hence Mill’s strategic emphasis on the serious difficulties associated with the
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pursuit of ethology. But this was only the first part of his argument: for only a 
positive theoretical contribution to the new science would mark out MilTs 
originality as a social scientist.
C -  Ethology and the Deductive Method.
For the careful reader of the previous books of the System, the gist of Mill’s 
remedy for the methodological predicaments of ethology is no surprise17, since the 
template for his solution is borrowed from Book III: given that the formation of 
one’s character is the result of a complex of various influences, only the deductive 
method can be used to account for the outcomes resulting from the plurality of 
causes productive of one’s personality.
“the logical principles according to which this question is to be decided, must 
be those which preside over even’ other attempt to investigate the laws o f  
very complex phenomena. For it is evident that both the character o f  any 
human being, and the aggregate o f the circumstances by which that character 
has been formed, are facts o f a high order o f  complexity. N ow  to such cases 
we have seen that the Deductive Method, setting out from general laws, and 
verifying their consequences by specific experience, is alone applicable” (J. S.
Mill, J jL, VI, V, 3, p. 865).
Mill’s disillusioned comments on the impracticability of the methods of 
observation and experiment contrast dramatically with his faith in the successful 
application of the Deductive Method to the establishment of ethological laws: he 
considers it “the most perfect mode of investigation, and which it [was] one of the 
principal aims of philosophy to extend” {Ibid., 4, p. 869) and takes its introduction 
in the “Moral Sciences” as one of the conditions of their improvement. What is 
more, Mill’s account of the Deductive Method is particularly interesting because it 
intends to single out and clarify two crucial aspects of the explanations of “moral 
phenomena” otherwise glossed over in the System and in the correspondence with 
Comte18: namely the precise logical structure of the explanations of “moral 
phenomena” and the “tendencial” nature of some of the laws involved in these 
explanations.
Consider first the structure of the explanations bearing on “moral 
phenomena” (including character). On that topic, Book VI improved on the views 
previously presented to Comte by distinguishing more clearly the nature and role 
of the different elements called on in these explanations.
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In Section 4 of Chapter V, Book VI, Mill argues that the ethological laws 
accounting for a specific character trait or a particular mental capacity result from 
the joint consideration of the “laws of mind” and a certain set of “circumstances”:
“The laws o f the formation o f  character are (...) derivative laws, resulting 
from the general laws o f  the mind; and they are to be obtained by deducing 
them from those general laws; by supposing any given set o f  circumstances, 
and considering what, according to the laws o f mind, will be the influence o f  
those circumstances on the formation o f character” {Id).
However, a few pages later, Mill states that “Ethology, the deductive science, is a 
system of corollaries from Psychology, the experimental science” {Ibid., Sect. 5, p. 
872). Since these descriptions of ethological laws are not equivalent, some 
clarification is to the point here.
If by “corollary”, one understands a proposition appended to another 
which has been demonstrated, and following immediately from it without new 
proof, one might be tempted to view ethological propositions as logical 
consequences drawn from the laws of psychology. Now, it is not sure that this is 
the right way to understand the relation existing between ethological and 
psychological laws. For what distinguished ethological propositions is the fact that, 
by feeding in the set of circumstances which give their “matter” to the laws of the 
association of ideas — the basic generalizations Mill took to be constitutive of 
psychology —; they enable one to discover the laws which give rise to the character 
traits of individuals or groups. The overall picture one ends up with is as follows: 
laws of ethology are obtained by specifying how the “laws of mind” (psychological 
laws) operate in given social, individual, or physiological conditions, these 
conditions being expressed under the form of lawlike statements describing general 
cases or situations.
The already quoted example Mill borrows from James Martineau might 
help to understand how the scheme works19. Let us consider how “Imagination”, 
i.e. the turn of mind which consists in conceiving “things in pictures and in the 
concrete, clothed in all their attributes and circumstances” (Ibid., Ill, XIII, 6, p. 
481) which Mill holds to be typical of painters and poets, is formed. According to 
the associationist psycholog}7 Martineau and Mill endorse, when impressions are 
associated synchronically, they give rise to stronger associations of ideas than if 
they were merely sequentially associated. It is a psychological law that experience 
of synchronous impressions results in stronger associations of ideas than
170
experience of successive impressions “in proportion to the pleasurable or painful 
character of the impressions” (Id.). For instance, let us assume that the feeling of 
man’s humble condition can be evoked by the contemplation of majestic peaks and 
the feeling of the purity of nature might be felt at the view of an unspoilt lake. 
According to the laws of association, the two feelings will be more strongly 
associated if the two impressions appear synchronically (just as when one sei2es in 
one glance an imposing mountain scenery composed of an unspoilt lake 
surrounded by majestic peaks) than if they appear sequentially (just as when one 
looks first at the lake and then at the peaks). Furthermore, Mill recalls Martineau’s 
claim that “in minds of strong organic sensibility [that is in individuals with sensory 
physiological dispositions that render them more sensitive to perceptual 
experience] synchronous associations will be likely to predominate” (Id.). In the 
light of these elements, one can surmise the following ethological law for the 
formation of “Imagination”: given the laws of association of ideas, persons 
endowed with a “strong organic sensibility” who have been subjected to a wide 
range of experiences which engender in them a feeling of elation, and have turned 
these experiences into objects of aesthetic enjoyment can be expected to develop a 
tendency to conceive “things in pictures and in the concrete, clothed in all their 
attributes and circumstances” (Id.), that is an imaginative turn of mind. So, it seems 
to be the case that by “deduction” of ethology from psychology, Mill means the 
inferential operation by which the consideration of the “circumstances” (lawlike 
statements relating to physiological constitution, kinds of experience, etc.) indicates 
which laws of psychology will be at work and what kinds of character traits they 
are likely to produce.
A comparison made by Mill supports this interpretation of the “deduction” 
of ethology from psychology:
“Ethology stands to Psychology' in a relation vert? similar to that in which the 
various branches o f natural philosophy stand to mechanics. The principles o f  
Ethology are properly the middle principles, the axiomata media (as Bacon 
would have said) o f  the science o f  mind: as distinguished, on the one hand 
from the empirical laws resulting from simple observation, and on the other 
from highest generalizations” (Ibid., VI, V, 5, p. 870).
If one accepts the parallel, the following picture ensues: Newton’s laws state the 
universal laws of motion; by stipulating the initial conditions of the system in 
which the universal laws apply (i.e. the planetary system consists of large mass 
surrounded by X bodies, etc.), one is able to deduce the laws of the actual
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planetary motions — Kepler’s laws; which in turn explain astronomical regularities 
(what Tycho Brahe observed). Therefore it is not the case that the “middle 
principles” or axiomata media (Kepler’s laws and ethological laws) are entailed by the 
“highest generalizations” (Newton’s laws and psychological laws) alone.
I think this example illustrates what N. Capaldi wants to convey when he 
says that Mill means that ethology is deduced from psychology
“only in the sense that the laws o f  psycholog}' are more general than the laws 
o f  ethology. We should recall that ethology is ‘deduced’ not only from the 
laws o f psycholog}' but from environmental conditions as well” (N. Capaldi,
“Mill’s Forgotten Science o f Ethology”, p. 418).
Accordingly, some consequences derived from the laws of psychology (which are 
by definition held to be universally true) might turn out to be false (i.e. do not 
correspond to any real state of affairs) because, say, the circumstances they 
suppose are absent or non-existent, just as in a world constituted differently 
Kepler’s laws would not be true. This marks out, as Capaldi also underlines, the 
autonomy of ethology since its propositions, notwithstanding the fact that they 
have to be consistent with psychological laws, cannot be “deduced” in the sense of 
being eliminated using psychological laws:
“The laws o f  psycholog}' do not include consideration o f the circumstances 
which affect human behaviour, and thus the concepts which embody the laws 
o f the influence o f circumstances are not eliminable in favour o f  
psychological concepts” {Ibid., p. 417).
So, on the one hand ethology cannot do without psychology as the 
inferential basis from which it draws its tentative explanations of the formation of 
human character (hence Mill’s defence of psychology against Comte’s strictures); 
on the other hand, it is the fact that it takes circumstances into account that 
connects ethology with the actual world of flesh-and-blood characters. More 
precisely, these circumstances are similar to the initial conditions that serve as 
factual premises in physical explanations: Mill conceives them as being descriptions 
of the various social, individual, and physiological conditions intervening in the 
formation of human character. Finally, both features make ethology the “Exact 
Science of Human Nature” (J. S. Mill, SL, VI, V, 4, p. 870). Firstly, in the logical 
sense that ethological laws are incorporated in a larger deductive structure dealing 
with causal mechanisms and not merely rough generalizations. Secondly to the
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extent that it comes up with explanations for the various laws of the formation of 
character which can be empirically tested.
One important aspect of this model is that a proper understanding of 
“moral phenomena”, and consequently of character, requires at least in theory the 
consideration of the causal role of physiological factors, as Mill recognizes both in 
the correspondence with Comte and the preceding chapter of the System (VI, IV: 
“O f the Laws of Mind”)20. The chapter on ethology does not depart from this 
principled position, since in one of the definition offered for the science of the 
formation of character Mill appealed to “physical circumstances”, which certainly 
refers to physiological factors:
“Ethology will serve for the subordinate science which determines the kind o f  
character produced in conformity to those general laws [laws o f  psychology], 
by any set o f  circumstances, physical and moral” {Ibid., p. 869).
But, just as in the correspondence with Comte, the acknowledgment of the causal 
role of physiological factors does not lead to a theoretical structure in which they 
play a positive inferential role. The reason Mill invokes to resist the use of 
biological data in ethological theory is primarily epistemic and mirrors the doubts 
he has already expressed to Comte: what is problematic, Mill argues, is
“the degree o f  uncertainty which still exists as to the extent o f the natural 
differences o f  human minds, and the physical circumstances on which they 
may be dependent” {Ibid., 6, p. 873).
Yet, one may claim that to dispose of physiological data because they are uncertain 
is to deprive ethology of relevant material: one has to work with whatever bits of 
knowledge available, however imperfect.
To that objection, it is likely that Mill would have a twofold reply. On the 
one hand, as the example of the ethological law of the formation of the imaginative 
turn of mind illustrates, Mill is ready to take into account certain physiological 
determinants (such as the various “organic sensibilities” of individuals) as long as 
they are compatible with the associationist theory of mental phenomena. What 
matters is that character traits and mental dispositions result from the kind of 
sensory experience favoured by empiricists, that is that complex mental states are 
built out of more basic discrete, atomic mental states. In that respect, it would be 
hard for Mill to deny that the laws of sensory physiology explaining the causal 
mechanism, which turned sensations into impressions and ideas, should be
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altogether ignored. In fact, Mill welcomes the consideration of this kind of 
physiological information because he does not see it as a decisive threat to his 
environmentalist approach of individual differences. For Mill assumes that only in 
a few extreme cases are differences in organic sensibility to explain “the natural 
differences of human minds”, since when “considering mankind in the average or 
en masse” (J. S. Mill, XL, VI, V, 6, p. 873), individuals appear to be endowed with 
the same potential for perceptual receptiveness. In other words, given his 
presupposition that most people are on a par in terms of organic sensibility, the 
mental differences existing between them should be ascribed to other factors than 
physiological ones.
On the other hand, as seen previously21, what Mill objects to is the 
question-begging postulation of innate “faculties” to account for specific mental 
abilities or character traits, as when phrenologists explain women’s love for their 
children by the existence of a typically female inborn faculty of 
“philoprogenitiveness”. Moreover, given the utter lack of empirical support 
gathered for the localizations of these faculties, Mill was indeed entitled to think 
that one should rather do without phrenology22.
However, one should be clear about what exactly Mill is entided to claim 
here with respect to the respective actual influences of the various factors at work 
in the formation of characters traits and mental abilities. His considered position, 
which favours environmentalist over innatist explanations, does not offer any 
knock-down argument against the kind of organicist views upheld by Comte and 
his likes: as long as an actual complete deduction of ethological laws has not been 
performed, which would require a dramatically improved kind of biological 
knowledge, environmentalism and organicism remain equally speculative.
The second feature of the use of the Deductive Method in ethology worth 
mentioning is the qualification Mill feels compelled to add right after having 
singled out the dependence of the science of the formation of character on 
psychology. The “exactness” of ethology, Mill argues, is of a special sort, which is 
marked out by the kind of lawlike statements it arrives at. For, Mill claims,
“It is (...) (as in all cases o f  complex phenomena) necessary to the exactness 
o f  the propositions, that they should be hypothetical only, and affirm 
tendencies, not facts” (Id.).
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To what is this “tendencial” nature of ethological statements due? One might 
invoke two different but complementary reasons. On the one hand, one might take 
the term “hypothetical” in the weak epistemic sense of “likely but not 
demonstrated”: in that respect, as Mill takes pains to emphasize, ethological laws 
will remain “hypothetical” as long as all the circumstances entering into the 
formation of human character have not been exhaustively considered, a prospect 
far removed, if not unattainable, given the cognitive limits of the human mind. 
Furthermore, shortcomings in the procedure for the computation of the joint 
effect of these initial conditions might also compromise the accuracy of 
explanations. This explains why, according to Mill, it would be
“vain to expect (however completely the laws o f  formation o f  character might 
be ascertained) that we could know so accurately the circumstances o f  any 
given case as to be able positively to predict the character that would be 
produced in that case” {Ibid., p. 869).
However, Mill puts forward a second reason why ethological laws are 
tendency laws which, unlike the first, is not dependent on how we come to know 
ethological phenomena, but relates to the way the various causes responsible for 
these phenomena interact. As Mill makes clear, the formation of a given character 
is the result of the influence of an “aggregate of circumstances” (Ibid., Sect. 2, p.
865). As shown previously23, the gist of the Deductive Method is to appraise 
separately the laws of the different causes involved in the production of the 
phenomenon under consideration (the “inductive” step as Mill calls it) and then to 
determine which effects ensue from their compounding (the “ratiocinative” step). 
Now, the problem is that, in ethology as in physics or political economy, causes 
can counteract one another. Hence, ethological propositions “must not assert that 
something will always, or certainly, happen; but only that such and such will be the 
effect of a given cause, so far as it operates uncounteracted” (I b id p. 870).
To take up an example from Chapter I24, it might be reasonable to 
maintain, as Mill does, that if women were educated so as to be able to earn their 
livelihood, i.e. were trained in a certain profession, they would be exposed to the 
virtues generally associated with such a training (perseverance, ingenuity, etc.) and 
would become self-reliant. In other words, circumstance X (professional training) 
moulds character trait Y (self-reliance). However, it is equally reasonable to think 
that the character trait of self-reliance will thrive only if women can actually try it in 
real-life situations, i.e. if social arrangements (i.e. a job market open to women, a
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sharing of the workload of parental duties, etc.) sustain the development of this 
character trait. In that case, circumstance X' (the exclusion of women from the 
public sphere) can be said to thwart Y and foster —> Y (dependence). If it turns out 
that the influence o f X' prevails over that of X, then character trait Y might not 
result because of the intervention of countervailing circumstance X'. But still, Mill 
argues, it is accurate to claim that ‘professional training tends to foster self-reliance 
in women’ is “a scientific proposition”, since ethological claims “being assertive 
only of tendencies, are not the less universally true because the tendencies may be 
counteracted” (Id).
Mill concludes that the “tendencial” nature of ethological statements does 
not in any way compromise the reformist potential of the science of the formation 
of character. O f course, one might have hoped that ethology, as the science which 
corresponds to the art of education, would infallibly provide us with the means to 
realize our ends, i.e. to arrange the various circumstances so as to produce the 
character most productive of happiness for each individual. Unfortunately, as 
previously indicated, the multiplicity of agencies involved in the formation of 
character prevents one from being able to “predict the character that would be 
produced” {Ibid., p. 869) in specific cases. But still, even if a complete knowledge 
of causes at work in specific cases and of the way they interact is out of reach, a 
patchy knowledge of tendencies will do, for it enables us to expect with confidence 
that a certain set o f circumstances will bring about the desired effect.
“It is enough that we know that certain means have a tendency to produce a 
given effect, and that others have a tendency to frustrate it. When the 
circumstances o f  an individual or o f  a nation are in any considerable degree 
under our control, we may, by our knowledge o f  tendencies, be enabled to 
shape those circumstances in a manner much more favourable to the ends we 
desire, then the shape which they would o f themselves assume. This is the 
limit o f our power; but within this limit the power is a most important one”
{Ibid., 4, p. 869)25.
For example, it is likely that women who have been professionally trained and who 
are free to compete on a par with men on the job market will develop a capacity 
for self-reliance. If not, the ethologist will have to search for sufficient 
supplementary causes to explain this failure and hand in to the reformer the means, 
if any, to remedy the situation. Ethology allows us to predict the improvement of 
outcomes following the introduction of a positive tendency even if we cannot 
predict the exact outcomes. If we know that X tends to produce Y, then
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introducing X should improve things (so long as we do not introduce 
contraveners) even though we cannot calculate the exact output since we are 
ignorant of all the causes. In situations of incomplete knowledge, that is the best 
one can hope for.
D -  The Ethological Fiasco: Complementary Explanations.
Although commentators have seldom failed to underline Mill’s ethological 
fiasco, only a few of them have attempted to investigate the possible reasons of 
this failure. In this section, I will review some explanations that have been adduced 
for it in the secondary literature and assess their relevance. In doing so, I will 
emphasise one factor that I hold to be crucial in Mill’s failure, namely his inability 
to come up with a proper account of how to “compound” the various ethological 
laws so as to arrive at the explanation of actual characters.
As its tide suggests, L.S. Feuer’s “John Stuart Mill as a Sociologist: The 
Unwritten Ethology” deals with the very question we are now addressing. Feuer 
declares in the opening sections of his article that he intends to single out the 
“intellectual problems” that made it impossible for Mill, despite “his immense 
learning, practical experience, and logical acumen” (L. S. Feuer, “John Stuart Mill 
as a Sociologist”, p. 87), to write the ethological treatise which was to provide the 
theoretical basis for his reformist endeavours.
His account takes as its starting point the contrast existing between Mill 
and other nineteenth century thinkers such as Hegel, Marx, Spencer, and of course 
Comte: for whereas the latter came up with historical (dialectic, materialist, 
evolutionist, or positivist) laws of human development, Mill never arrived at “a 
system encompassing the evolution of humanity” (I b id p.86). What may explain 
this difference?
According to Feuer, Mill’s prejudice-free approach, unlike that of 
ideologically biased thinkers, enabled him to
“do justice to all the competing drives and motives o f human nature; he 
would never banish from his consciousness the knowledge o f  the many- 
sidedness and many levelledness o f  social reality” {Ibid., p. 87).
Feuer’s point seems to be the following: contrary to all those who tried to reduce 
the historical development of mankind to a causal scheme into which one single 
factor would take precedence over the others (the self-realization of the universal
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Geist in Hegel’s dialectics; the intellectual impetus in Comte’s law of the three 
stages; the economic factor in Marx’s historical materialism; or the progressive rise 
of individualism in Spencer’s evolutionary liberalism), Mill’s recognition of the 
varieties of, and tensions between, the different phenomena occurring within 
society prevented him from giving into the illusory belief in an all-encompassing 
law that would account for the whole of human reality, past, present, and future. 
For instance, Feuer claims, Mill recognized the existence of two empirical 
sociological laws “which stood as contraries to each other — progress and 
mediocritization” (Ibid., p. 90) — but nonetheless coexisted to give modem societies 
their characteristic dynamics. Similarly, Mill distinguished between various mental 
dispositions — craving for truth or the spirit of liberty7, bent for domination or the 
spirit of conformity7 — which ran counter to each other. Now, at this point of his 
argument, it seems that Feuer loses track, for the impression one gets from reading 
him is that Mill failed in establishing ethology because he acknowledged the 
varieties of (and tensions existing between) certain social or “moral” phenomena. 
But one might be tempted to rejoin that the existence of different, or even 
contradictor)7, mental dispositions in a given population was exactly the kind of 
facts ethology was supposed to provide a rationale for.
For instance, it was the aim of ethological analysis to explain why in 
modem European societies men generally seemed more equipped to carry out 
abstract intellectual tasks and had developed a taste for independence whereas 
women were less capable of the former and not driven by the latter. After all, 
ethology was first and foremost the science of the influence of circumstances on 
the human mind and the formulation of its results in terms of “tendencies” 
testified to the variability of characters. Accordingly, it is very unlikely that the 
recognition of the “competing drives and motives of human nature” (Ibid., p. 87) 
caused Mill to discard ethology: rather, it might have constituted a good incentive 
to pursue it, so as to demonstrate the real causes of the differences in character 
traits between individuals.
On the other hand, Feuer’s analysis points towards a genuine obstacle to 
the development of ethology: it was not so much the contradictoriness of the 
“competing drives and motives of human nature” that was at issue as the sheer 
number of them. For it might simply have been the case that the mere taking into 
account of the various causes explaining an actual human character proved too
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complicated or too time and energy consuming. This suspicion is supported by the 
fact that Mill never developed a precise and workable classification of the various 
circumstances that were supposed to give rise to the different character traits: as 
seen in the previous accounts of ethology he gave, Mill always remained at a very 
high level of abstraction when it came to list the different kinds of circumstances. 
He generally contented himself with distinguishing “social” from “physiological” 
circumstances, without trying to specify further what these two sets corresponded 
to26. But in order to get off the ground, the whole ethological project needed such 
a classification of circumstances. Without it, one could not even start to assess 
inductively and separately the various ethological laws that produced actual 
characters and on which the use of the Deductive Method was premised.
This lack of elementary ethological laws would in turn account for Mill’s 
incapacity to arrive at sociological laws. Once again, contrary to what Feuer seems 
to suggest, Mill’s problem was not so much that contradictory empirical 
generalizations existed, for one was dealing with tendencies which could counteract 
one another. The challenge consisted in explaining them. In the light of the 
architectonic of the “Moral Sciences” set out in Book VI of the System, it indeed 
seemed that the predicament lay in the middle principles that were supposed to 
link psychological laws to sociological generalisations, namely the ethological 
axiomata media. As Mill made clear, he took uniformities bearing on collective 
phenomena to be logically dependent on laws relative to the character of the 
individuals involved in those phenomena:
“The laws o f  the phenomena o f  society are, and can be, nothing but the laws 
o f the actions and passions o f  human beings united together in the social 
state. Men, however, in a state o f  society, are still men; their actions and 
passions are obedient to the laws o f  individual human nature. (...)  Human in 
society have no properties but those which are derived from, and may be 
resolved into, the laws o f  the nature o f  individual man”(J. S. Mill, SL, VI, VII, 
l ,p .  879).
In brief sociology depends on ethology. Now, granted one concurred with Mill 
that both the psychological laws from which ethological considerations were to be 
deduced and the sociological empirical laws were already available, it would be 
natural to ascribe Mill’s inability to compete with his contemporaries in terms of 
grand historical panorama to some ethological shortcomings, either in the 
derivations of ethological propositions themselves or in the derivation of 
sociological laws from them. In any case, Feuer rightly points towards a first likely
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reason for Mill’s ethological fiasco: the sheer number of “circumstances” relevant to ethology 
that might have prevented the working out of a manageable theory from which to deduce 
explanations for character formation and the absence of a conceptual classification to sort out the 
different kinds of circumstances involved in the formation of character traits.
J. Carlile also takes “the problem of method” to be “the main subject of 
the chapter” 0. Carlile, John Stuart Mill and the Writing of Character, p. 138-9) on 
ethology in the System. Besides various criticisms bearing on the argumentative and 
rhetorical aspects of the chapter — which I have tried to defuse in an earlier 
section27 J. Carlile focuses on one point that she believes partly account for the 
failure of Mill’s ethology.
J. Carlile maintains that the elusiveness of character does not render it 
amenable to a genuinely scientific study. She suggests that the following quote 
from Mill’s chapter on ethology might be taken as “an indirect recognition of its 
central problem” (Ibid,’, p. 137):
“Consider the difficulty o f  the very first step — o f  ascertaining what actually is 
the character o f  the individual, in each particular case that we examine. There 
is hardly any living person concerning some essential part o f  whose character 
there are not differences o f opinion even among his intimate acquaintance; 
and a single action, or conduct continued only for a short time, goes a very 
little way indeed towards ascertaining it” (J. S. Mill, SL, VI, V, 3, p. 866).
From this, she concludes:
“If the object under examination is the character o f a specific individual, if  
that object cannot be apprehended because, as Mill points out, it is defined 
only by the opinions o f those who observe it, (...) then it is pointless to try’ to
determine the causes that have created an indeterminate outcome” (J. Carlile,
John Stuart M ill and the Writing of Character, p. 137).
However, the conclusion reached by Carlile does not apply to Mill’s 
conception of ethological inquiry. As she herself recalls, this quotation is “buried in 
the middle of the chapter, midway in the discussion of a method that Mill rejects as 
inapplicable to his endeavour” (Id.). That method was, as we have seen, that of 
observing actual instances of character traits and trying to infer their causes from 
these observations. The drawback of such a procedure, according to Carlile, is that
the identification of one’s character seems to be subjective and therefore highly
unreliable, even the more so because of the dispositional nature of character traits. 
But the Deductive Method advocated by Mill preserves ethology against the threat 
of subjectivism and indetermination. Firsdy, a character trait will be ascribed to an 
individual if two conditions are met: 1) if the character trait can be deduced from
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the laws of psychology (which are universal generalizations, and therefore are not 
person-relative: they apply to any normal human mind whatsoever) and the set of 
circumstances (such as education, social position, etc., which are observable 
conditions) the ethologist knows the subject has been exposed to; and 2) if in 
specific conditions, the individual exhibits the character trait considered. Such a 
procedure dispels the charge of subjectivity, and that is why, far from making “a 
virtue of (...) this necessity” of resorting to the Deductive Method, Mill 
wholeheartedly endorsed its use28.
The issue of indetermination is trickier: character traits are dispositions to 
the extent that they are dependent on the environment for both their formation 
and their manifestation (especially in the sense that circumstances can counteract 
one another and thereby prevent the manifestation of character traits). This 
explains, as Mill claims, that “a single action, or conduct continued only for a short 
time, goes a very little way indeed towards ascertaining it” (J. S. Mill, SL , VI, V, 3, 
p. 866). But this has nothing to do with any intrinsic indetermination of human 
character: rather, it is the consequence of our limited knowledge of the influence of 
circumstances in the formation and manifestation of one’s character. Accordingly, 
one might reasonably hope that ethology, by studying one by one the laws of the 
different sorts of circumstances, could better our predictions about one’s actions 
or reactions in a given situation, even if it is likely that nobody would be able to 
know all the relevant laws and thus predict the exact outcomes.
However, one can still take on board a critical point suggested by Carlile’s 
analysis with regard to the difficulties associated with the precise identification of 
characters. For, in order to pursue the Deductive Method, one needs specific 
outcomes to deduce so as to corroborate ethological explanations — the third step 
of the method called Verification. But here, as Carlile underlines, it seems that one 
cannot even delineate a set of outcomes -  a definite set of character traits — in the 
first place, which renders the whole procedure otiose. To use the astronomical 
parallel favoured by Mill, it would be just as if one was deprived of Kepler’s laws 
and nonetheless tried to test the adequacy of Newton’s laws. O f course, the 
attempts at deduction could help sort out what the outcomes might be (e.g. 
elliptical orbits vs something like them consistent with astronomical observations 
but not deducible from Newton’s laws). But still, it would be incredibly difficult to 
get started if our knowledge of the relevant outcomes was too weak29, as seemed to
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be the case in ethology. Accordingly, one might list as a serious methodological 
predicament the lack of precise ethological empirical generalisations against which to test 
ethological deductions.
The last reason for the failure of ethology I review in this chapter focuses 
on the method recommended by Mill for the pursuit of ethological investigations, 
namely the Deductive Method. According to F. Wilson3", Mill’s inadequate 
understanding of the requisite of the Deductive Method when dealing with 
complex phenomena (either material or “moral”) crippled his general conception 
of scientific explanation. Now, Wilson has not argued specifically that the failure of 
ethology resulted from this incorrect grasp of the Deductive Method. So I will first 
show how one may extend Wilson’s general claim about Mill’s Deductive Method 
to the particular case of ethology. Secondly, I will argue that even if Wilson’s 
criticism in fact does not hold against Mill, it nonetheless points towards a serious 
defect in Mill’s account, i.e. its silence about the manner in which the different 
ethological laws compound to produce an actual instance of character.
Let us first turn to the way one might want to extend Wilson’s general 
claim about Mill’s misunderstanding of the Deductive Method to ethology. Mill’s 
general strategy when it came to studying complex phenomena resulting from a 
composition of causes was to recommend the use of the Deductive Method, that is 
the appraisal of the joint effect of the various causes at work in the case at hand. 
As already discussed, this method consisted in three steps: firstly, one listed the 
different variables concerned and the laws according to which they exercised their 
influences (Induction); secondly, one ascertained the result of the interaction of the 
different variables given their specific laws (Ratiocination); thirdly, one checked 
that the conclusions deduced were consistent with the empirical generalizations 
available, if any, or some given phenomena (Verification). As Mill explained, 
complex phenomena were the outcome of “an intermixture of laws, producing a 
joint effect equal to the sum of the effects of the causes taken separately”. 
Accordingly, the “law of the complex is explained by being resolved into the 
separate laws of the causes which contribute to it” (Jhid,Ill, XII, 2, p. 464).
As Mill made clear, intellectual and moral phenomena were complex 
phenomena. Consequently, they were said to be deduced from the ultimate laws of 
psychology and the “circumstances” to which individuals were subjected. Now the 
number of “circumstances”, that is of the variables, that would explain similarities
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and differences between individuals was so considerable as to render observational 
or experimental approaches to character traits impracticable. On the other hand, 
Mill assumed that some of these circumstances weighed more in the process of the 
formation of the human character: education and social position were among 
those, as well as the “effect of institutions or social arrangements upon the national 
character” [Ibid., VI, IX, 4, p. 905)31 and the commercial and industrial conditions 
typical of modern societies which were the objects of political economy32. By 
contrast, Mill downplayed the causal influence of what he termed “physical 
circumstances”. However, and irrespective of Mill’s own bias in favour or against 
the respective weight of these various factors in the explanation of human 
character, the procedure for arriving at ethological conclusions would call for the 
taking into account of a complex set of circumstances. For a person’s character 
was the outcome of the interaction of different kinds of circumstances, i.e. the 
result of a process of what Mill called a “composition of causes”. Hence the 
necessary application of the Deductive Method to ethology. However the success 
of the extension of the Deductive Method to mental phenomena was premised on 
the fact that Mill actually got the workings of the general method right. It is 
Wilson’s contention that Mill did not. An example might help to see his point.
Out of the stock of illustrations he resorted to in the System, Mill held the 
example furnished by astronomy as the “most perfect” (7bid., Book VI, Chap. IX, 
Sect. 1, p. 895) to characterize the essence of the Deductive method33. The case of 
the explanation of the motions of the planets in the solar system indeed gives a 
fairly good idea of what Mill had in mind, especially when it came to accounting 
for the “ratiocinative” step of the deductive process. Wilson draws almost 
exclusively on it to support his claim that Mill got the details of the Deductive 
Method wrong. Imagine one is willing to predict the position of a given planet in 
the solar system for a given date. A way to proceed is to arrange the solar system 
(that is the various bodies relevant to the case at hand, i.e. the sun and the seven 
planets known in Mill’s days) in sub-systems composed of two bodies for which it 
is relatively simple, thanks to Newton’s laws, to compute the motions the objects 
would have in case this system would be isolated. This is the inductive step of the 
procedure: the different forces at work in the case considered are ascertained 
independently from each other.
What about Ratiocination? Mill held that
183
“if  we happen to know what would be the effect o f  each cause when acting 
separately from the other, we are often able to arrive deductively , or a priori, 
at a correct prediction o f  what will arrive from their conjunct agency” (Ibid.,
Ill, V I, 1, p. 370).
Wilson argues that Mill’s above statement assumed that one is in a position to 
deduce the state of the system at large from the knowledge of the laws of the sub­
systems alone. According to Wilson, Mill had it that complex phenomena were the 
result of the “conjunct agency” (Id.) of simple causes, and that “the joint effect of a 
plurality causes is identical with the sum of their separate effects” (Ibid., p. 371). 
What is missing from Mill’s account, Wilson contends, is “a knowledge of 
additional initial conditions telling one the relational structure by which the objects 
are arranged in the complex system” (F. Wilson, Psychological Analysis, p. 91) and a 
composition law54, that is a law “that enables one to deduce the law for the complex 
systems from this structural knowledge and from the laws for the simple systems” 
(id.).
Taking up the case of planetary motions, Wilson claims that if one were to 
proceed as Mill advocated, it would be
“much as if Newton failed to take into account the relative positions o f the 
planets when he inferred the forces acting in the solar system from the 
assumption that gravity would act among the planets and the sun taking them 
pairwise” (F. Wilson, “Mill on Psychology and the Moral Sciences”, p. 244).
In particular, Wilson argues that it would ignore the composition law governing the 
interaction between the elementary systems, namely the law of vector addition of 
accelerations or forces35. Without these ingredients, Wilson concludes that it is not 
possible to achieve the deductive process leading to the explanation of complex 
phenomena. But if Mill really misconceived the general requisites of the Deductive 
Method, this misunderstanding is very likely to have affected his conception of 
ethology, since Mill held the Deductive Method to be the only procedure capable 
of coping with “moral” phenomena. This might in turn partly explain why the 
science of the formation of character never got off the ground. For ethology was 
all about discerning the respective influences of the various “circumstances” 
(physical, “moral”, and social) responsible for the shaping of one’s personality and 
about ascertaining of how they interacted. But just as it was impossible in 
astronomy to predict the position of a planet in the absence of a knowledge of the 
various forces to which it was subjected and how the latter were to be 
compounded, it was impossible to deduce the character of a person or a group in
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the ignorance of the “forces” which conditioned it and of the manner in which 
they interacted. In short, Mill’s blindness as to the importance of a composition 
law ranging over the relations existing between the different kinds of 
“circumstances” and his subsequent incapacity to establish one might have pardy 
accounted for his inability to bring his ethological pet-project to fruition.
Let us now discuss the above explanation of Mill’s ethological failure. For 
clarity’s sake, I think it is important to distinguish its twofold nature. For, whereas 
I do not believe that Wilson’s reading of Mill’s general conception of Deductive 
Method is accurate, I nevertheless agree that Mill’s inability to come up with a 
sensible candidate for a law of composition for ethology might have prevented him 
from developing the science of character formation.
As to the first aspect of the question — did Mill really misunderstand the 
way the Deductive Method operates? -, I fear that Wilson’s argument operates as a 
reductio ad absurdum of his own claim. For, on the face of it, it would be very unlikely 
that Mill, who rested his analysis of the composition of causes in Book III, Chap. 
VI, Sect. 1 & 2 of the System primarily on the example of mechanics, would have 
neglected to incorporate in his account of this kind of causal interaction some of 
the relevant facts (namely the relative positions of the planets), as Wilson would 
have it. The unlikelihood of such an oversight from Mill seriously undermines the 
plausibility of Wilson’s claim.
Furthermore, there is nothing in what Mill says that suggests that the initial 
conditions specifying the relational structure by which the objects are arranged in a 
complex system such as the solar system can be overlooked. To be sure, Mill 
claims that
“if  we happen to know what would be the effect o f each cause when acting 
separately from the other, we are often able to arrive deductively , or a priori, 
at a correct prediction o f  what will arrive from their conjunct agency” {Ibid.,
Ill, V I , 1, p. 370).
But Mill does not say that this is all we need. So one might wonder why in the case 
of celestial mechanics Wilson exacts from Mill that he assumes that we do not 
need to know some facts which are actually relevant to the phenomena we 
consider. If the explanation of cases of composition depends on relational facts 
about their causes, why think Mill would not expect to use these facts?
As to Mill’s alleged omission of a composition law that would enable one 
to deduce the laws for the complex phenomena from the laws for of its causes, I
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admit I cannot make sense of Wilson’s claim, especially when it is considered in 
the light of the example of celestial mechanics: Sect. 1 and 2 of Chap. VI, Book III 
of the System clearly testifies to Mill’s awareness of the necessity of having a law to 
compound the different causes involved in the production o f motion, since he 
modelled his account of the “Composition of causes” after what he called the 
“principle of the Composition of Forces” (Ibid., p. 370), that is on the law of vector 
addition of forces in mechanics. In short, it appears that Mill’s general account of 
the Deductive Method neither discarded the consideration of relational facts in the 
explanation of complex phenomena nor overlooked the necessity of relying on a 
law of composition.
I nevertheless agree that Mill did not provide an adequate account o f the 
scientific method appropriate for ethology, since he was unable to come up with a 
sensible candidate for a law of composition ranging over “moral” phenomena. O f 
course, when he dealt with political economy, Mill assumed that the law of 
composition dictating how the separate effects specified by the different tendency 
laws combine when a number of causes act joindy was modelled on the law of 
vector addition at work in Newtonian mechanics36. But in that very case, the only 
mental cause to consider was the “desire for wealth”. To be sure, Mill 
acknowledged that a realistic explanation of men’s characters and conducts would 
have to take into account a myriad of other moral and intellectual features. But he 
never ventured any hypothesis as to how they would combine. And in that regard, 
it does not seem that the model offered by mechanics describes adequately the 
conflicting compounding of opposite character traits characteristic of some 
instances of human nature.
For instance, only a very shallow psychologist would claim that one’s 
tendency for frankness and one’s concern for others’ feelings would counteract 
one another so as to result in a state of quiet indifference, just as two opposite 
forces exerted on a body would result in rest. A much more realistic picture would 
have it that such conflict would produce some sort of moral discomfort. In 
another vein, one may suggest that when reinforcement of certain character traits 
goes past a certain limit, it brings about an ethological feature opposite to the one 
that was aimed at: for example, an education focused on the development of 
autonomy and self-reliance might induce insecurity and indecisiveness if those who 
are subjected to it cannot cope with the ever more demanding trials imposed on
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them. In that case, conditioning does not add up like vector forces. More generally, 
Mill gave no reason as to why the composition law for ethological phenomena 
might take the form of a vector addition and fell short of proposing any sensible 
candidate for such a role.
With this last reason, one can conclude by singling out three likely causes 
for the failure of Millian ethology: 1) the sheer number of “circumstances” relevant to 
ethology which prevented the working out of a manageable theory from which to deduce 
explanations for character formation and the absence of a conceptual classification to sort out the 
different kinds of circumstances involved in the formation of character traits 2) the lack of precise 
ethological empirical generalisations against which to test ethological deductions 3) the absence of a 
composition law governing the combination of ethological causes. Given the obstacles standing 
in the path of its development, the prospects of an ethological settlement of the 
question of sexual equality were somewhat bleak. But, if so, was Mill left deprived 
of any support for his case against the subjection of women? To this question, I 
will now turn.
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VII — How To Discover One’s Nature: 
Mill’s Argument for Emancipation 
in the Subjection o f  Women.
In a letter dated February 21st of 1849 written to his beloved Harriet, John 
Stuart Mill contended that he saw only “two things” capable of shaking the “non­
sensical prejudice” commonly entertained as to women’s nature and capacities”: “a 
better psycholog)7 & theory of human nature, for the few; & for the many, more & 
greater proofs by example of what women can do” (Mill to Harriet Taylor, 
February 21, 1849; in J. S. Mill, The Later Letters, pp. 12-3).
Mill never brought to fruition the first prop he mentioned: his pet-project 
of an ethology did not get off the ground. Consequently, he had not been able to 
arrive at an environmental explanation of character traits that would definitively 
discard the kind of biological arguments advanced, among others, by Comte. 
Furthermore, he had not succeeded in identifying precisely the causal mechanisms 
that would enable one to modify characters and to carry out the needed 
transformations of the social structure. As a result, Mill’s reformist blueprint lost 
much of its appeal since it lacked the proper theoretical basis that would 
distinguish it from mere “empirical” approaches to social reform.
That failure to develop the scientific account on which to ground his case 
for the emancipation of women might help explain Mill’s silence on the subject in 
the years following the publication of the System of Logic. Not that his commitment 
to the cause had faded, for one finds in Mill’s post-1843 writings numerous 
statements echoing the following declaration from the second edition (1849) of the 
Principles of Political Economy.
“The ideas and institutions by which the accident o f  sex is made the 
groundwork o f  inequality o f  legal rights, and a forced dissimilarity o f  social 
functions, must ere long be recognised as the greatest hindrance to moral, 
social, and even intellectual improvement” (j. S. Mill, ’Principles of Political 
Economy, IV, VII, 3, p. 765) b
Two years later, Mill published under his name an article written by his wife 
Harriet Taylor on the “Enfranchisement of Women”, which testified to the 
unfailing interest of the couple in the issue2. However a newspaper article was a far 
cry from the kind of investigations that, as Mill once told Comte, would setde the 
sexual equality debate: “what he needfed]”, as S. Collini points out, “if his case 
[was] to rise above mere assertion [was] some systematic demonstration of the
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ways in which circumstances [had] moulded and [could] mould certain types of 
character” (S. Collini, “The Tendencies of Things: John Stuart Mill and the 
Philosophic Method”, p. 156)\ However, for many years. But Mill wrote nothing 
substantial on the subject. S. Collini suggests that his reluctance to air his views on 
the women’s question might be pardy accounted for by the fact that
“Mill’s failure to make any progress with the Ethology7 deterred him from 
attempting a systematic exploration o f an issue which (...)  was so closely 
dependent on that project as he conceived it” (S. Collini, Public Moralists, p.
149)4.
Yet, by the end of the 1860s, Mill seemed to have overcome the ethological 
predicament for he offered the public a book-length argument in support of 
female emancipation, namely his 1869 Subjection of Women .
However, even a casual glance at the book reveals that one is not to find in 
the Subjection of Women a unique line of reasoning according to which Mill’s 
argument for the emancipation of women would develop throughout the chapters. 
On the contrary, one gets the impression that Mill attempted to turn anything that 
supported his views to good account. Hence the broad range of his arguments: 
Mill invoked arguments from justice (the subjection of women infringed their 
rights as members of society), from freedom (the subjection of women thwarted 
them in their personal development as human beings), and from utility (the 
subjection of women was detrimental to the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number, most notably because, by keeping women at home, it divided by half the 
pool of human resources available for the job market and because, by promoting a 
degrading model of inter-sexual dependence, it compromised the moral 
improvement of mankind).
Many commentators, especially among scholars assessing Mill’s intellectual 
legacy to contemporary feminism, have taken issue with his argumentative 
eclecticism on the ground that they believe it to be inconsistent6. As Julia Annas 
puts it, Mill’s “desire to have things too many ways at once, to do justice to all the 
complexities of a topic which even now is far from being adequately clarified” 
results in “deep confusions” (J. Annas, “Mill and the Subjection of Women”, p. 
180)7.
In this chapter, I attempt to demonstrate that, although Mill’s way of 
arguing is not always crystal-clear, many of his arguments in the Subjection of Women 
can be saved if replaced in their historical context and related to other aspects of
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his thought. More precisely I argue that the criticisms levelled at Mill’s plea for 
women’s emancipation are most of the time misguided for three different reasons.
Firstly, most critics do not pay enough attention to the various ways in 
which Mill appealed to the concept of ‘human nature’ to support his views. I 
maintain that this neglect often leads them to regard as contradictory statements 
which are in fact complementary when their meaning is properly construed.
Secondly, an assessment of the arguments developed in the Subjection of 
Women benefits from taking into account the argumentative strategy Mill adopted 
to get a fair hearing for his message and to convince his readers that the legal, 
social, and moral reforms he championed were practicable. Mill knew that for his 
plea in support of sexual equality to succeed, it was necessary to convince those 
who were responsible for women’s subjection — men in general -, and more 
specifically, those who theorized that subjection (the likes of Comte), that neither 
reason nor interest called for its perpetuation.
Thirdly, the failure of the ethological project brought about a change in 
Mill’s approach to the sexual equality issue, which eventually resulted in the 
specific argumentative structure of the Subjection of Women. One may say that 
instead of trying to prove sexual equality, Mill attempted to disprove sexual 
inequality. Whereas the System of Logic and the correspondence with Comte 
assumed that ethology would establish that, since mental differences between men 
and women were primarily the results of environmental influences, both sexes 
were endowed with the same moral and intellectual capacities, the Subjection of 
Women took stock of the demise of ethology and changed tactics: the aim of the 
book was to prove that none of the reasons so far adduced for justifying the 
subjection of women were sound. But this change in approach was also part and 
parcel of a more essential shift in Mill’s social thought, which progressively moved 
away from the System of Logic1 s idea that large-scale reforms ought to be based on a 
“Science of Human Nature” to a less grandiose, but politically more promising, 
form of liberalism.
In the following sections, I will attempt to show how these three features — 
the appeal to the concept of human nature, the use of rhetoric, and the 
endorsement of a liberal approach to the sexual equality issue — structure the 
Subjection of Women. I start by exposing Mill’s conception of equality and explain 
how it provides him with a critical framework from which to argue (VIIA).
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Secondly, I turn to Mill’s actual refutation of what he takes to be the two main 
arguments adduced for women’s subjection, namely a historical argument (VIIB) 
and an argument based on human nature (VIIC). I then introduce what I call Mill’s 
analogical argument for the emancipation of women (VIID). Eventually, I defend 
the consistency of Mill’s feminist case against the various objections levelled 
against it in the secondary literature (VIIE).
A — Inequality, Justice, and Expediency.
To grasp the new perspective adopted by Mill in the Subjection of Women, it 
is appropriate to adopt the interpretative approach suggested by F.R. Berger in his 
seminal study of Mill’s moral and political philosophy Happiness, Justice, and 
Freedom8. According to Berger, along with an appeal to a principle of freedom, 
“considerations of justice — an appeal to equality — (• ••) played a crucial role” (F.R. 
Berger, Happiness, Justice, and Freedom, p. 196) in Mill’s argument for the 
emancipation of women. These considerations are to be understood in the light of 
a “baseline” conception of equality that constitutes the theoretical background 
against which any political or practical claim can be assessed. This conception can 
be reduced to four tenets:
1. Substantive inequalities of wealth, education, and power are prima facie 
wrong, and require justification.
2. Substantive inequalities must not permit any to “go to the wall”; 
redistribution to provide subsistence must be guaranteed.
3. Inequalities must not undermine the status of persons as equals. In concrete 
terms, this means that inequalities must not result in some gaining complete 
power over the lives of others, or in some persons being degraded.
4. Only certain kinds of grounds serve to justify inequality — that the inequality 
will make no one worse off, or that it is the result of rewarding according to 
desert. Advantages must be earned through voluntary effort {Ibid., pp. 159- 
60).
As Berger remarks, it was with respect to this conception of equality, and most 
particularly its first and fourth propositions, that Mill denounced the subjection of 
women as unjust. And what supported his denunciation was an appeal to the facts 
of human nature.
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In practical matters, as Mill put it, the “tf priori presumption [was] in favour of 
freedom and impartiality” (J. S. Mill, The Subjection of Women, p. 262) and it fell on 
those
“who contendfed] for any restriction or prohibition; either any limitation o f  
the general freedom o f  human action, or any disqualification or disparity o f  
privilege affecting one person or kind o f persons, as compared to others” (Id.)
to prove that the practical measures they upheld were the right ones. Accordingly, 
there could be no reason for discriminatory treatment except when “required by 
the general good” and “the law (..) should treat all alike, save where dissimilarity of 
treatment [was] required by positive reasons, either o f justice or o f policy” (Id.). By 
putting the issue of sexual inequality in these terms, as S. Collini notes, Mill 
adopted “a recurring motif in radical arguments against the order of things” which 
assumed that “individuals should be treated equally unless good cause can be 
shown to do otherwise” (S. Collini, Public Moralists, p. 138).
What were the “positive reasons of justice” that supported sexual 
inequality? Surely not the mere fact of being bom belonging to one of the two 
sexes. For this was a purely contingent fact which could neither entitle one to 
privileges nor legitimate one’s subjection. There was no voluntary exertion 
involved in being born a man or a woman, and hence birth was neutral with 
respect to considerations of justice. In that regard, the facts of human nature 
(being bom  male or female) were irrelevant to the question of sexual inequality.
Surely, most of Mill’s opponents concurred with him in what constituted 
desert and what authorized one to claim specific rights for oneself. Even Comte 
regarded merit as a key-element for the social allocation o f positions and resources. 
But Comte would have added that the mere consideration of birth in the abstract 
was not enough to adjudicate the case in favour of sexual equality. With respect to 
justice, Mill had a point: sex seemed irrelevant. But with respect to expediency, this 
was a different story.
Mill’s baseline conception of equality was not a conception of strict 
equality since it allowed for departures from the latter as long as they derived from 
“positive reasons, either of justice or of policy”. For instance, as Berger points out, 
“in areas where some will exercise power over others, “policy” requires that 
competence be a basis for higher status” (F.R. Berger, Happiness, Justice, and Freedom, 
p. 197). This was exactly the line of argument chosen by Comte to argue for sexual
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inequality, for he maintained that women were deprived of the capacities required 
to take part in the activities characteristic of the public sphere and argued that they 
should be confined to a submissive position within the household because of the 
limitations of their volitional capacities. Since women lacked the “competence” to 
speculate, organize, and command, expediency required that only men, who were 
endowed with such capacities, ruled over the destinies of society. How was Mill to 
respond to this argument?
Mill’s refutation focused on the appeal to human nature (more precisely to 
“competence” and “capacities”) on which the argument for subjection depended. 
But, whereas in the case of the argument from equality Mill showed that some facts of 
human nature had no relevance, in the case of the argument from expediency Mill 
attempted to demonstrate that the present knowledge of some other facts of human nature 
could not settle the question. By doing so, Mill did not have to rely on his unwritten 
ethological treatise.
What was the form of the argument from expediency in support of 
women’s subjection? The problem was to know whether “any of the other social 
arrangements of mankind”, that is any arrangement different for the present one in 
which women were subjected to men, would not be more “advantageous to 
humanity in general” (J. S. Mill, The Subjection of Women, p. 275). For instance, would 
it not be possible that an equalitarian society would be more expedient in reaching 
the goal aimed at? The most sensible way to decide between the different 
alternatives would be to compare their respective ability to achieve the intended 
result. Therefore, it would be appropriate to organize a social experiment in which 
women’s capacities would be tried and see what happened. However, neither 
Comte nor Mill’s opponents vrould have any of this, since they claimed they knew 
beforehand that such an experiment would fail and therefore felt entitled to claim 
that the subjection of women was the most expedient social arrangement. The a 
priori reasons they invoked were rooted in an alleged knowledge of what women 
could and could not do. O f course, it was the accuracy of this knowledge of human 
nature that Mill questioned.
B - Inequality and History.
In an alternative reminiscent of Comte’s historical and biological 
considerations on women9, Mill distinguished between two sources of support for
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female subjection: on the one hand, a reference to the “experience of mankind” 
(Ibid., p. 276); on the other hand, an appeal to “the nature of the two sexes” (Id.). 
As to the first, Mill held the advocates of subjection to claim that since there had 
not been any example in human history of a society in which women had 
competed with men on equal terms, it was therefore proof that they lacked the 
capacities for doing so. But this was just begging the question: as Mill took pains to 
demonstrate in the opening pages of Chapter I (esp. pp. 263-72), the subjection of 
women was not the result of a carefully designed historical experiment in which 
women’s capacities had been put to the test and had turned out not to be on a par 
with those of men. If women had not exhibited the capacities looked for, one 
could surmise that it was because they were maintained in a state of subjection in 
which nothing called for the exercise of these capacities. In other words, female 
subjection might not need be the result of women’s inferior capacities, but the 
reason why of they had not been able to develop their capacities to the full. 
Accordingly, Mill refused to accept that the “experience of mankind” had 
pronounced in favour of subjection, i.e. that history has proved than only men 
possessed the competences for speculation, organization, and command:
“Experience cannot possibly have decided between two courses, so long as 
there has only been experience o f one. (...)  All that is proved in [favour o f  
subjection] by direct experience, is that mankind have been able to exist 
under it, and to attain the degree o f improvement and prosperity which we 
now see; but whether that prosperity has been attained sooner, or is now  
greater, than it would have been under the other system [sexual equality], 
experience does not say” (Ibid., p. 276).
The only way “the experience of mankind” could have provided an answer to the 
question of sexual equality would have been to run the “social experiment” of 
emancipation, which only could try women’s capacities. But, as Mill put it, nobody 
knew what were women’s “capabilities (...), not even themselves, because most of 
them have never been called out” (Ibid., p. 278). Therefore, since all possible social 
arrangements -and most notably that consisting in emancipation -  had not been 
assayed, the historical record could not qualify as an unquestionable source of 
support for the advocates of subjection.
Yet, S. Collini suggests that Mill’s treatment of historical evidence is not 
consistent throughout the Subjection of Women. For on the one hand, Collini argues, 
“Mill attempts systematically to undermine the standing of any evidence about ‘the 
natural subordination of women drawn from past experience’ ” (S. Collini,
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“Introduction”, p. xxxiii)10. But, on the other hand, “Mill’s ban on evidence drawn 
from history” is removed “where that evidence may seem to suggest a positive 
conclusion about women’s capacities”, thereby leading to “its doubtful 
epistemological credentials [being] treated more leniendy” (Jd.), as it is the case 
when Mill refers in Chapter III to female monarchs, regents and rulers as “proofs 
by example o f what women can do” (Mill to Harriet Taylor, February 21, 1849; in 
J. S. Mill, The Tater Tetters, p. 13) 11. Now, Collini is wrong when he maintains that 
Mill put a “ban on evidence drawn from history” (S. Collini, p. xx), if he means 
that Mill altogether eschewed history as a source of evidence for settling the sexual 
equality issue. What Mill argued was that history afforded “no presumption in 
favour of the arrangements which place women in social and political subjection to 
men” (J. S. Mill, The Subjection oj Women, 272), but not that history “could not in 
principle furnish” (S. Collini, “Introduction”, p. xx) that evidence. If, as Mill 
suggested, the social experiment of emancipation had been tried and had failed to 
produce better results than subjection, history would have given evidence 
supporting the latter. And when he referred to “proofs by example of what women 
can do”, Mill did not insidiously appeal to evidence he refused his adversaries to 
use. He just resorted to singular instances of women having displayed intellectual 
capacities and volitional dispositions comparable to that of men to refute the 
following inference: “if there had never been any woman exhibiting intellectual 
capacities and volitional dispositions comparable to that of men, it is because 
women as a group lack these capacities and dispositions”. What Mill showed was 
that there had been such women and that consequently the proposition holding 
that women were universally and in all circumstances inferior in intelligence did 
not hold. Moreover, the lesson Mill wanted his reader to draw from his assessment 
of the “experience o f mankind” was that there was no reason to assume that the 
full extent of women’s capacities and competences had already appeared in the 
historical record12.
C - Inequality and the Science of Human Nature.
The appeal to a historical knowledge of human nature having failed them, 
Mill suggested that advocates of subjection might fall back on an appeal to human 
nature per se. The claim would thus become that “the nature of the two sexes adapts 
them to their present functions and positions and renders them appropriate to
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them” (Ibid., p. 276). Once again, the knowledge on which the case for subjection 
rested was a knowledge of human nature, this time understood as the mental and 
moral endowment inherent in each of the sex and which grounded their capacities 
and competences. Once again, it was the soundness of this knowledge that Mill 
questioned. He bluntly denied that
“any one knows, or can know, the nature o f the two sexes, as long as they
have only been seen in their present relation to one another” (Id.).
Three main reasons were invoked by Mill to explain his scepticism about the 
reliability of the knowledge of human nature: the patchiness of the biological 
knowledge, the absence of a fully-developed ethology, and the artificiality induced 
in women’s character by their subjection.
1 - Inequality and Biology: The “Craniological” Argument for Women’s 
Subjection.
As the position of Comte demonstrates, biological knowledge appeared to 
many as a good source of information on human mental capacities. The
psychophysical approach, which tied mental and moral characteristics to their 
anatomical and physiological substratum, had an air of scientific respectability 
about it which attracted rationally minded reformers. However, despite the 
twenty-five years that had elapsed, Mill’s opinion on the topic in the Subjection of 
Women remained similar to that he had expressed in the System of Logic and the 
correspondence with Comte13: Mill did not believe that the nature of the relation 
existing between body and mind (and especially between the brain and
psychological dispositions) had been clarified enough so as to enable one to reduce 
states of the latter to those of the former. Although Mill acknowledged the 
plausibility of a close relation between mind and brain, he also observed that
“the precise relation which exists between the brain and the intellectual 
powers is not yet well understood, but is a subject to great dispute” (Ibid., p.
311).
Mill’s could then return to his longstanding advocacy of the indispensability of a 
psychological analysis of mental capacities, which he thought biologically oriented 
inquirers were not qualified to pursue.
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“the preliminary knowledge” o f  “what the differences between the sexes now  
are (...)  is still in the crudest and most incomplete state. Medical practitioners 
and physiologists have ascertained, to some extent, the differences in bodily 
constitution; and this is an important element to the psychologist: but hardly 
any medical practitioner is a psychologist. Respecting the mental 
characteristics o f  women; their observations are o f no more worth than those 
o f  common men” {Ibid., p. 278).
As seen previously14, Mill held that these observations, being empirical 
generalizations, could not be taken as a reliable ground for inferring the entire 
scope of women’s capacities. Mill complemented this in-principle rebuttal with a 
criticism of some of the recent biological data used to back up the thesis of 
women’s intellectual inferiority. Such a concern testifies to Mill’s awareness that 
the scientific context had changed since the publication of the first edition of the 
System ofljogic.
For it was indeed the case that most advocates o f sexual inequality had lost 
confidence in phrenology, whose repute seriously dwindled during the 1840s so as 
to have become generally disregarded by the end of thel860s. They now relied on 
the data afforded by the budding science of physical anthropology to support their 
case15. As C. Russett has documented in her Sexual Science, physical anthropology 
threaded on the same path as phrenology by trying to establish the biological basis 
o f mental dispositions, but differed both in its method and focus. On the one 
hand, it appealed to quantitative procedures of investigation of various somatic 
variables (bone size, facial angles, blood flow, menses, etc.) whereas phrenologists 
only considered the brain and generally stuck to the impressionistic method of 
skull reading. On the other hand, whilst physical anthropology focused on racial 
differences to demonstrate the superiority of the white race, phrenology, at least in 
its “classical” form, remained highly ethnocentric by considering diversity only 
within its European specimens. Yet, as C. Russett points out,
“While it is true that the main thrust o f physical anthropology was toward the 
classification o f races, the problem o f the sexes posed too many similarities 
too ignore. This was all the more true because mid-century women were 
exhibiting a disturbing propensity to challenge long-established social 
arrangements with respect to their rights and duties” (C. Russett, Sexual 
Science, p. 27).
Whilst the Civil War and the campaign for the abolition of slavery in America 
sparked an intense debate on racial inequality, the agitation caused by the 
“Women’s Rights” question placed at the forefront o f the discussion the
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consideration of the biological differences existing between the sexes. And in this 
last respect, it was the brain that received most attention.
In his Subjection of Women, Mill singled out clearly the crucial biological claim 
of his opponents:
“But (it is said) there is anatomical evidence o f  the superior mental capacity 
o f men compared with women: they have a larger brain” (J. S. Mill, The 
Subjection of Women, p. 310).
Now, just as in the case of phrenology16, it is difficult to specify exactly where from 
Mill drew this “anatomical evidence”. But it was undoubtedly the case, as many 
commentators have noted17, that the measuring zeal of the physical anthropologists 
gave rise to a rejuvenated “craniology” which took as one of its favourite subjects 
women’s heads.
The whole enterprise was based on the assumption that “bigger was 
better”, i.e. that there was a correlation between brain-size and intelligence. As the 
neurologist and founder of the Societe d’anthropologie de Paris Paul Broca put it, “other 
things being equal, there is a remarkable relationship between the development of 
intelligence and the volume of the brain” (quoted in C. Russett, Sexual Science, p. 
33). This resulted in an avalanche of comparative quantitative charts and, although 
their figures were often far from matching, most European physical 
anthropologists claimed that their measurements revealed the existence of a ten 
percent discrepancy in absolute brain-size in favour of men. For instance Karl 
Vogt’s lectures on Man1*, which Mill might have read19, reported that the English 
physician Boyd had weighted the brains of 2,086 males and 1,061 females of all 
ages and found that the weight of the adult brain varied from 1,366 to 1,285 grams 
in men and from 1,238 to 1,127 in women. In the 1855 edition of his Principles of 
Human Physiology, W.B. Carpenter came up with different figures, probably because 
he considered the encephalon whereas other researchers tended not to include the 
cerebellum in their weightings: he reported that the size of men’s encephalon 
varied from 40 to 60 oz, averaging around 50 oz, whereas women’s varied from 36 
to 50 oz, averaging around 45 oz (W.B. Carpenter, Principles of Human Physiology, p. 
536)2u. These “missing five ounces of female brain”, as they came to be known, 
were held to account for the differences in mental capacities between the sexes.
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Mill’s rebuttal of this “craniological” argument was twofold. Firsdy, he 
argued that not all women’s brains were smaller than men’s or the average of men’s 
and that some may have been bigger than many men’s:
“in the first place the fact itself is doubtful. It is by no means established that 
the brain o f a woman is smaller than that o f  a man. (...)  It is certain that 
some women have as large a brain as any man. It is within my knowledge that 
a man who had weighed many human brains, said that the heaviest he knew 
of, heavier even than Cuvier’s (the heaviest previously recorded), was that o f  
a woman” (J. S. Mill, The Subjection of Women, p. 310)21.
So even if it were true that intelligence was correlated with brain-size, it was 
nonetheless the case that the factual premise on which physical anthropologists 
relied could be and was challenged on purely empirical grounds22. In passing, Mill 
also operated a clever reductio ad absurdum of the claim that intelligence was 
dependent on brain weight. For if one brain’s weight was inferred from one’s 
bodily frame (and in particular from the size of the skull), it would follow that
“A tall and large-boned man must on this showing be wonderfully superior in 
intelligence to a small man, and an elephant or a whale must prodigiously 
excel mankind” {Ibid., pp. 310-1).
If only the absolute brain size was considered as an index of intelligence23, it clearly 
appeared that man was not nature’s most intelligent offspring: more massive 
mammalians outdid him.
This jest led Mill to his second objection against the “craniological” 
argument. Flis point was that, even if one had to acknowledge that the function of 
an organ depended on its size, it was certainly not the only factor to consider for 
the explanation of mental capacities. The composition of the brain and the kind of 
activity it developed were also relevant elements. For instance, a finer fabric of the 
nervous tissues and a more intense blood circulation might compensate for 
women’s smaller brains, if it was proven that they had smaller ones24.
Yet, at this point Mill’s demonstration took a surprising course. One might 
have expected that he would have argued that various compounding causes could 
account for the same phenomenon: for example, that a less active but bigger brain 
would be equivalent in terms of intellectual achievements to a smaller but more 
active one. But Mill surmised that men’s bigger brains and women’s more active 
brains could well account for “the differences actually observed between the 
mental operations of the two sexes” (Jbid., p. 311). On the one hand, the slowness 
of men’s mental operations, their capacity to bear more work, and their sticking to
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the same kind of objects would be explained by the inertia associated with the size 
of their brain. On the other hand, women’s impressionability, their ability to 
change the focus of their attention rapidly, their lesser endurance but greater power 
of recovery would be ascribed to their more active brain.
This way of arguing is certainly intriguing in so far as the conclusion goes 
counter the very purpose of Mill’s demonstration, which was to rebut the 
“craniological” argument based on the idea that biology alone could explain 
psychological differences. As we have seen25, Mill’s strategy was to show that the 
available biological knowledge did not provide any sure grounds for a reliable 
theory of human nature. But here Mill appears to contradict himself since he now 
argues that differences in organization might explain differences in intellectual 
dispositions. It is this kind of stepping backward that gains Mill the charge of being 
confused. In that regard, Julia Annas’ comments readily express the feelings of 
many commentators, for she finds Mill’s argument “quite pathetic” and is 
surprised that “Mill feels that he needs to argue at all on this level” (J. Annas, “Mill 
and the Subjection of Women”, p. 186).
Now, one can still make sense of Mill’s convoluted way of arguing by
paying attention to one explicit and one implicit element of his demonstration. On
the one hand, Mill clearly specifies that his physiological explanation of
psychological differences is a “speculation [that] is entirely hypothetical; it pretends 
to no more than to suggest a line of inquiry” (J. S. Mill, The Subjection of Women, p.
312). So, he is not saying that biology has explained some existing psychological 
differences between men and women. Secondly, and that is the implicit element in 
his reasoning, if Mill argues on the biological level, it is because a proper account 
of “moral” phenomena has to include, by his own explanatory standards, the 
consideration of biological factors. For note that Mill is not presently arguing that 
no biological factor whatsoever would be relevant to the question at hand, but 
rather that the “craniological” argument based on brain weight was inconclusive 
and that his biological “speculation” about brain activity had the merit of being at 
least more realistic. Nowhere in this passage does he say that this biological 
“speculation”, if true, would account for the phenomenon of inter-individual 
mental differences in its entirety, since some other factors (such as education or 
social position) might well enter the picture.
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In fact, when one considers Mill’s explanatory scheme for “moral 
phenomena”, his way of arguing seems sound. For it seems reasonable for him to 
rejoin to the claim that the smaller brain of women (X) is the cause the intellectual 
inferiority of women (Y) by maintaining that 1) probably X is false, 2) that it has 
not been proven that X supports Y, and 3) that even if X were true and did 
support Y, Y could still be offset by Z (say, education). O f course, it sounds a bit 
odd to claim at one and the same time that biology at present cannot afford an 
explanation of mental phenomena and to come up with a conjecture as to how 
differences in organization might relate to differences in psychological differences. 
Perhaps Mill’s refutation of the “craniological” argument would have been more 
convincing if he had abstained from dabbling in neurology26.
2 -  The Acknowledgment of the Ethological Failure and Its Consequences.
The second key-element of Mill’s demonstration of the unreliability of the 
knowledge of human nature consisted in his acknowledgment of the absence of a 
fully developed ethology. One might have expected the failure of ethology to have 
seriously compromised his case for sexual equality. But Mill turned that weakness 
into a strength, by showing that, in the absence of ethology, no argument for 
women’s subjection grounded on knowledge of human nature was admissible.
Let us remember what exacdy was the gist of Mill’s ethological argument. 
Comte and his likes maintained that there existed “natural” {i.e. biological) 
differences between men and women that accounted for the inferior intellectual 
achievements of the latter, and that since the causes of such an inferiority were 
congenital (and therefore not liable to be altered), women’s subjection was 
naturally justified in the sense that no other social arrangement was possible. On 
the contrary, Mill claimed that environmental factors might explain this inferiority, 
and argued that since some of the factors (such as education or social position) 
responsible for women’s actual characters were amenable to change, other social 
arrangements could be tried and, if conducive to more happiness for society at 
large, adopted. Understood in those terms, the whole debate between supporters 
and opponents of sexual equality was premised on a specific interpretation of the 
epithet “natural”: whereas the former argued that mental differences between sexes 
were “natural” in the sense of being innate, hence not modifiable, and 
consequently were necessary properties of the individuals who had them, the latter
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took these differences to be contingent properties depending on the presence or 
absence of certain conditions, some of which were within the reach of human 
agency.
Unfortunately, the sexual equality issue could not be setded since neither 
side had much evidence to support their respective claims. As Mill previously 
argued, the “craniologicar’ argument was flawed. But his environmental account 
fared no better, as he acknowledged: he bemoaned the “unspeakable ignorance and 
inattention of mankind in respect to the influences which form human character” 
and the lack of cultivation of the “analytic study of the most important department 
of psychology, the laws of the influence of circumstances on character” (Ibid., p. 
277)27. The debate had apparendy reached a stalemate. Within the framework 
elaborated by Mill for the explanation of “moral” phenomena, this dual lack of 
physiological laws and laws of the influence of circumstances prevented one from 
carrying out the ethological deduction, since the ultimate biological and 
environmental generalizations on which it depended were in fact non-existent.
However, in the light of the previous conclusion, it is surprising to observe 
Mill arguing as if his environmental hypothesis was on a better footing than the 
innatist. For, after having underlined our ignorance about “the laws of the 
influence of circumstances on character” (Id.), Mill asserted that the evidence of 
the naturalness of the intellectual and moral differences existing between men and 
women could only be “negative”, meaning that
“Those only could be inferred to be natural which could not possibly be 
artificial — the residuum, after deducing even7 characteristic o f either sex 
which can admit o f  being explained from education or external 
circumstances. The profoundest knowledge o f the laws o f  the formation o f  
character is indispensable to entitle any one to affirm even that there is any 
difference, much more what the difference is, between the two sexes 
considered as moral and rational beings; and since no one, as yet, has that 
knowledge (for there is hardly any subject which, in proportion to its 
importance, has been so little studied”(Id.).
As noted previously28, Mill’s sustained reference to the Method of Residues was 
somewhat questionable, since it covertly assumed a priori that the role of biological 
factors in the explanation of “moral” phenomena was minor. But given his 
acknowledgment that the causal role of circumstances in character formation was 
unknown, Mill’s presumption that an environmental explanation could account for 
the greater part of the mental differences between the sexes now became outright 
empty. Moreover, the appeal to the Method of Residues was pure rhetoric: the gist
204
of the Fourth Method of induction was to subtract from the parts of the effect due 
to known causes a residuum that was assumed to depend on antecedents which 
had been overlooked. But in that very instance, Mill himself recognized that the 
laws of what he took be the main causes (i.e. environmental factors) of the effect 
under scrutiny (mental capacities) were not available. There was simply nothing to 
subtract from! Apparendy, Mill’s willingness to champion the feminist cause with 
the support of his conjectural environmentalism caused him to forget what he had 
preached regarding the study of moral phenomena: that a definitive explanation 
would have to take into account all the relevant causes, whatever their nature. 
Therefore, whereas Mill was entitled to criticize the unscientific methods of those 
who considered only biological causes, the very same methodological objection 
could be fired back at him assuming the truth of the environmentalist account.
However, if one set aside Mill’s unfounded claim about the primacy of 
environmental factors, the soundness of his point remained: the absence of a 
comprehensive scheme taking into account all the factors (biological and 
environmental) involved in the explanation of “moral” phenomena forbade any 
scientifically based pronouncement as to what constituted the natural intellectual 
endowment of women. Consequently, one was entitled to discard any argument for 
women’s subjection allegedly grounded on knowledge of human nature.
3 - The Unnaturalness of Women’s Subjection.
The above declaration of ignorance might seem a bit farfetched if one loses 
sight o f the kind of knowledge Mill thought one was deprived of. For he was not 
contending that no empirical generalizations were available, quite the contrary29. 
What he argued was that the sort of causal knowledge that would allow the solving 
of the problem of the natural capabilities of women, and thereby corroborate or 
refute these empirical generalizations, was lacking. Yet, one might have retorted 
that, short of that causal knowledge, one had to rely on what was available, i.e. on 
these imperfect empirical generalizations. Perhaps one was ignorant of the causes 
that brought about these effects, but at least the effects could be observed and 
perhaps a tentative conclusion reached.
This suggestion prompted Mill to introduce the third reason he had for 
claiming that the current state of the knowledge of human nature (and especially of
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women’s nature) prevented any successful theoretical attempt at adjudicating the 
cause at hand. He argued that
“the knowledge which men can acquire o f women, even as they have been 
and are, without reference to what they might be, is wretchedly imperfect and 
superficial” (Ibid., p. 279).
Firstly, Mill claimed that in matters psychological (which comprised the 
identification of intellectual capacities), the introspectionist account was crucial in 
the analysis of the phenomena under scrutiny. But men dogmatised on that subject 
without ever, or only exceptionally, listening to what women had to say. Secondly, 
Mill pointed out that the actual position of women, which confined most of them 
to their home with no chance of gaining access to the public sphere, restricted 
severely the sample of instances on which male analysts could rely. For most of 
them, their female relatives or those of their circle of sociability would be their 
unique, and necessarily incomplete, source of information. In these circumstances, 
social and national distinctions would be hard to come by.
Now, none of these predicaments were insuperable: nothing in principle 
prevented the development of a first-hand acquaintance with a larger sample of 
women joined with a more extensive reliance on their own account of their 
character traits and mental dispositions.
However, Mill singled out another methodological predicament that a mere 
improvement in the observational procedure would not accommodate as easily. 
For he maintained that
“What is now called the nature o f women is an eminently artificial thing — the 
result o f forced repression in some directions, unnatural stimulations in 
others” (Ibid., p. 276).
It was not only that the appraisal of women’s character traits was difficult. More 
radically, Mill maintained that what was observable was a deformation of women’s 
nature. Drawing covertly on an ethological account of how the subjection of 
women by men’s power moulded the former, this motif of the influence of the 
circumstances on women’s personality ran throughout his book. O f course, given 
Mill’s previous recantation of the availability of an ethological analysis, his claim to 
show how the conditions women were subjected to impacted on their character 
sounds strange. But even if this account could certainly not qualify as scientific by 
Mill’s own standard, it was nonetheless a plausible one. As Mill put it,
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“Conjectures are all that can at present be made; conjectures more or less 
probable, according as more or less authorized by such knowledge as we yet 
have o f  the laws o f  psychology, as applied to the formation o f character”
(Ibid., pp. 278).
So Mill conjectured, rather convincingly in my view, about the manner in which 
women’s present lot guaranteed the continuation of their subjection. For 
everything was made so that the actual paternalistic order would endure:
“All women are brought up from the very earliest years in the belief that their 
ideal o f  character is the very opposite to that o f  men; not self-will, and 
government by self-control, but submission, and yielding to the control o f  
others. All the moralities tell them that it is the duty o f  women, and all the 
current sentimentalities that it is their nature, to live for others, to make 
complete abnegation o f  themselves, and to have no life but in their 
affections” (Ibid., pp. 271-2).
Women’s education, based on the idea that all the mental cultivation girls needed 
to receive was circumscribed to the few skills necessary to the entertainment and 
pleasures of their male associate; their domestic life, which narrowed their interests 
to the care and nurturing of the members of their family; and their social position, 
which excluded them from taking an active part in the productive and political 
aspects of the public sphere; all these circumstances were likely to explain why 
women had not been able to compete on a par with men in various respects, 
including intellectual ones. Their character had been shaped so as to best serve the 
purposes men ascribed to women: that of a loving servant. And as Mill himself 
remarked, the utter cunningness of the whole process culminated in the fact that it 
instilled in women the belief that their present condition was natural: hence “it is 
accepted voluntarily; women make no complaint, and are consenting to it” (Ibid., p. 
270).
What is problematic about Mill’s account of women’s deformation, besides 
his issuing some sort of ethological analysis, is that it apparently contradicts his 
previous point about the lack of an adequate knowledge of human nature. For on 
the one hand, as seen above, Mill argued that nobody knew what women’s nature 
was (what G.W. Smith labels the Ignorance Claim or IC)3U. But, on the other hand, 
Mill claimed that the character women displayed as a result of their subjection was 
unnatural (the Unnaturalness Principle, or UP). But is it possible to know that a 
certain state of a given thing is unnatural if one ignores the nature of the thing 
considered?
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David Stove has argued that this joint upholding of UP and IC, that is “the 
conjunction of ‘I know that the subjection of women to men is unnatural’, with 
‘the nature of women is quite unknown, or else there is no such thing’, constitutes 
the “central mistake in the Subjection ofWomerf (D. Stove, “The Subjection of John 
Stuart Mill”, p. 12)31. According to Stove, Mill’s howler derives from his not 
realizing that the knowledge of what is not natural for a thing supposes the 
knowledge of what is natural for that thing, which renders the assertion of UP 
dependent on a knowledge of women’s nature and therefore belies IC. Because he 
judges Mill’s inconsistency “too obvious to make a detailed analysis of it worth the 
trouble” (Ibid, p. 8), Stove leaves us with an example that is supposed to expose 
Mill’s logical blunder:
“Suppose we were asking about the nature o f  a certain kind o f  physical 
object, the X ’s. And suppose that the question were, more specifically, what 
the natural or proper shape o f an X  is; whether it is spherical , or a disk, or like 
a bullet, or what. Then someone would contradict himself if  he held that no 
one knows anything about the natural shape o f  X ’s but also claimed to know 
that certain particular X ’s have been pushed out of shape by something or 
other” (Id.).
Now, most commentators’2 agrees that Stove’s point does not hold, 
because there is nothing contradictory in maintaining that something is pushed 
into an unnatural shape whilst claiming that one does not know the nature of that 
thing.
Let us take Stove’s example of shape to see why. Imagine that I enter a 
garden in which I encounter several trees of apparendy the same species but whose 
respective foliages have been pruned so as to represent different animals. In that 
case, even if I do not know what is the natural shape of the trees when left uncut, I 
surely know that their actual shape is unnatural. Knowing nothing about the 
natural shape of a thing does not entail knowing nothing about what is not its 
natural shape, for the latter kind of knowledge derives from our awareness of 
human intervention. In the case of women, we know that they are moulded by 
male power and we know that this moulding makes them different from a situation 
in which no such moulding would take place, even if we are not able to tell what 
exacdy the difference amounts to.
Mill’s own line of argument, which drew heavily on a horticultural 
metaphor close to that of the “tree” example I have just mentioned, reinforces the 
interpretation proposed by Stove’s critics. As Mill put it,
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“in the case o f  women, a hot-house and stove cultivation has always been 
carried on o f  some o f the capabilities o f their nature, for the benefit and 
pleasure o f  their masters. Then, because certain products o f the general vital 
force sprout luxuriantly and reach a great development in this heated 
atmosphere and under this active nurture and watering, while other shoots 
from the same root, which are left outside in the wintry air, with ice purposely 
heaped all around them, have a stunted growth, and some are burnt o ff with 
fire and disappear; men, with that inability to recognize their own work which 
distinguishes the unanalytic mind, indolently believe that the tree grows o f  
itself in the way they have made it grow, and that it would die if  one half o f  it 
were not kept in a vapour bath and the other half in the snow” 0 . S. Mill, The 
Subjection of Women, pp. 276-7).
This analogy was supposed to suggest that male intervention thwarted the 
spontaneous development of women’s character by favouring the manifestation of 
certain traits (submissiveness) and frustrating some other dispositions (self-will). It 
assumed that the natural character of women would appear if male interference 
was removed or, to use Smith’s able phrase, women’s nature would be known only 
when the “human topiary” (G.W. Smith, “J. S. Mill on What We Don’t Know 
about Women”, p. 43) practised by men over women would cease. Apparendv, the 
horticultural metaphor saves Mill from the charge of inconsistency: it would not be 
contradictory to maintain the conjunction of IC and UP.
Yet, as G.W. Smith remarks, a closer inspection of the metaphor reveals 
that it does not deliver what Mill is after. Firsdy, because it gives a conception of 
character formation that is at odds with Mill’s view. Secondly, because it evokes a 
totally unMillian manner of ending women’s subjection. And thirdly, because it 
actually fails to prove that IC and UP are compatible claims.
What was implied by the horticultural metaphor regarding the formation of 
human character? Here again, it is helpful to stop to consider the meaning Mill 
ascribed to the words “natural” and “unnatural”. As the topiary simile suggests, the 
difference between the two lies in the fact that a state of affairs is “unnatural” (or 
artificial) when it results from human agency, whereas it is “natural” when it results 
from a purely material agency. Consequendy, the contrast conveyed by the 
metaphor is that of an opposition between nature and society, which assumes that 
women’s natural character would appear with the removal of human (and most 
notably male) intervention. But this view is incompatible with Mill’s own 
conception of character formation. For, as seen previously33, both Mill’s empiricist- 
associationist theory of knowledge and his environmentalism induced him to 
consider one’s personality as primarily the effect of the human influences one is
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subjected to. As G.W. Smith claims, “human beings depend precisely upon social 
circumstances for the development of their potentialities and powers” (Ibid., p. 44). 
So the idea of a character developing in a human vacuum belies Mill’s deeply 
rooted conception of the gist of the ethological process, according to which any 
character, deformed or not, is artificial.
Secondly, it seems that the topiary simile advocates some sort of sexual 
seclusion — women being put out of reach of men’s influence — that would let the 
potential of women express unfettered. But Mill’s feminism is certainly not about 
creating some sort of sexual apartheid: what he wants to promote is equality within 
a society comprised of men and women.
Thirdly, the nub of Mill’s horticultural metaphor also threatens Mill’s 
feminist argument in so far as it rests on the conjunction of IC and UP. For Smith 
points out that if Mill wants to conserve the topiary image, he must find what 
distinguishes between “constraining” and “unconstraining” male social 
intervention. Given Mill’s earlier emphasis on the conditioning of women by their 
present paternalistic subjection, which “mis-shape their wants, narrow their mental 
horizons and constrict their aspirations” (Ibid., p. 46), he cannot rely on women’s 
own actual desires and longings since those are not ultimately theirs but rather 
those created by their male oppressors. But if so, Mill can only distinguish between 
“liberating” and “oppressive” conditions because he assumes a priori what desires 
and longings are natural or not for women to have, which is incompatible with IC. 
As Smith suggests, that is exactly what the reasoning behind the topiary image 
requires, since
“just as the gardener needs to know the nature o f  a plant before he can 
distinguish inhibiting from enabling growth-conditions -  the circumstances 
which enable the cactus to flourish will kill the lily — so Mill requires a prior 
conception o f  female nature in terms o f  which to distinguish desire- 
constraining (i.e. ‘unnatural’) from desire-liberating (i.e. ‘natural’) social 
circumstances” (Id).
At first glance, there seems no easy solution to this conceptual predicament. To get 
rid of either component of the incriminated conjunction will not do. For to give up 
IC would amount to arguing that Mill is in possession of a reliable knowledge of 
women’s nature, a position very few would endorse in the light of Mill’s own 
acknowledgment of the failure of ethology. Furthermore, it would weaken his 
attack on the biological arguments for subjection. On the other hand, the 
abandonment of UP would sap the call for a reformist plan in favour of women’s
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emancipation, since it is the awareness of the detrimental effects of subjection on 
women in particular, and of society at large, that legitimated the urgency of the 
transformation of existing social arrangements. Obviously, neither solution is 
satisfactory: the former claims an epistemic basis that Mill’s argument lacks; the 
latter makes light of his deeply-held conviction that the subjection of women was a 
social evil to be tackled head-on. One is left wondering whether, besides the 
“topiary” metaphor, Mill can provide a valid alternative argument for the 
emancipation of women.
D - The Analogical Argument for Women’s Emancipation.
The gist of Mill’s challenge resided in being able to assert jointly IC and 
UP. The former claim was supposed to discard any argument for women’s 
subjection based on an unreliable knowledge of female nature, whereas the latter, 
by stressing the deleterious effects of sexual domination, gave part of its 
motivation to the feminist struggle. And the problem lay in not having UP 
depending on IC, that is in avoiding assessing women’s present condition as 
unnatural in the light of knowledge of women’s nature which Mill had, at the 
outset of his analysis, claimed we do not have.
Interestingly enough, one finds an argument to that effect in the first 
chapter of the Subjection of Women, which rested on the parallel existing between the 
present case of women and that of groups which had been oppressed in the past 
on account of their alleged natural inferiority but eventually got emancipated. The 
interest of this line of reasoning34, which we have first encountered in the 
correspondence with Comte35, is that it enables one to defuse the charge of 
inconsistency addressed to Mill’s topiary metaphor. For it allows him to stick to his 
declaration of ignorance as to “what is, or is not, [women’s] vocation” (J. S. Mill, 
The Subjection of Women, p. 280) whilst arguing that the social subordination of 
women (...) stands out an isolated fact in modem social institutions” {Ibid., p. 275 
), is a “relic of the past [that] is discordant with the future, and must necessarily 
disappear” {Ibid., p. 272). In that instance, there is no contradiction involved in the 
joint upholding of IC and UP because the unnaturalness of women’s condition is 
not premised on an acquaintance with their nature but rather on the consideration 
of mankind’s social progress and a comparison of it with women’s present lot.
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Mill’s argument drew both on a contrast and an analogy. As for contrast, 
Mill distinguished two kinds of social arrangements which he held to be 
characteristic of pre-modem and modem societies respectively. In the former, 
individuals were subjected to a fixed social position determined by their birth and 
status and were held at this position by law and custom. A slave could not become 
a freeman, or a commoner could not become a noble. The rationale for such an 
organization was that society needed to be hierarchically structured so as to 
minister most diligendy to the needs of its members. As Mill put it,
“The old theory was, that the least possible should be left to the choice o f the 
individual agent; that all he had to do should, as far as practicable, be laid 
down for him by superior wisdom. Left to himself he was sure to go wrong”
(Ibid., p. 273).
On the other hand, modern societies had chosen to leave to the unfettered choice 
of individuals the election of a career or an occupation because unrestricted 
competition between various contenders proved socially more productive and 
more efficient. Given the unreliability of the grounds on which pre-modern social 
organization was premised (birth or status) and the fact that a task is generally 
carried out more satisfactorily when freely chosen, the acknowledgement of the 
“general principle of social and economical science” {Ibid., p. 274) that considered 
each to be the best judge of her interests had resulted in the liberalization and 
deregulation of most human activities. Accordingly,
“In consonance with this doctrine, it is felt to be an overstepping o f  the 
proper bounds o f  authority to fix beforehand, on some general presumption, 
that certain persons are not fit to do certain things” (Id.).
So the contrast between modem and pre-modern societies can be 
summarized as follows: in modern societies,
“human beings are no longer bom to their place in life, and chained dowrn by 
an inexorable bond to the place they are bom to, but are free to employ their 
faculties, and such favourable chances as offer, to achieve the lot which may 
appear to them most desirable” (Ibid., pp. 272-3).
The analogy could then be set to work, for Mill suggested — as we have seen him 
doing in his correspondence with Comte - that the present condition of women 
was strikingly similar to that of certain oppressed male groups in pre-modern 
societies. For just as, say, slaves in antiquity had not been held capable to live the 
same kind of rational life as freemen, or commoners had been denied a voice in the
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conduct of military affairs because they were supposed to lack warlike virtues, 
women had been refused freedom of choice and action because they had been said 
to lack the necessary moral and intellectual qualities necessary for an existence of 
that kind. But just as the new ruling principle typical of modern societies had 
permitted slaves and commoners to display and put in practice for their own 
benefit and that of society the qualities they have been so far denied to have, the 
same could expected for women if only they were given the chance to try out their 
potential.
“But if  the principle is true, we ought to act as if we believed it, and not to 
ordain that to be born a girl instead o f  a boy, any more than to be born black 
instead o f  white, or commoner instead o f a nobleman, shall decide the 
person’s position through all life — shall interdict people from all the more 
elevated social positions, and from all, except a few, respectable occupations”
(Ibid., p. 274).
In other words, the disabilities to which women were subject on account of their 
sex were unnatural, that is contrary to the “whole stream of modem tendencies” 
(Ibid, p. 272), because they contradicted the progressive trend typical of advanced 
societies, which favoured the free and autonomous development of individuals 
unless it impinged on the rights of others30.
Now, the obvious question to ask is whether the analogy applies to the 
case at hand. Can one extend wThat is true of formerly dominated male groups to 
presendy oppressed women? Could not one say that it just begs the question to 
assume that a parallel could be drawn between men and women when what one is 
really after is the appraisal of the differences between the sexes? To that objection, 
one could reply that the above argument was not intended as a demonstration of 
sexual equality (even if Mill believed that men and women had similar moral and 
intellectual capacities) but as a proposal for an experimental setting in which this 
claim could be assessed. To avoid any confusion, it is helpful to distinguish three 
related but logically independent theses one might attribute to Mill. Firstly, there is 
the “positive thesis for sexual equality”, which claims that both sexes are on par in 
terms of intellectual endowments. Secondly, there is the “negative thesis for sexual 
equality”, which maintains that none of the grounds so far adduced justify the 
subjection of women. Thirdly, there is the “emancipation thesis”, which maintains 
that the removal of all social, legal, and political barriers imposed on women is the 
crucial test for assessing the capacities of women. In the Subjection of Women, Mill 
defended only the “negative thesis for sexual equality” and the “emancipation
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thesis”, even if he certainly hoped that the “emancipation thesis” would provide 
the experimental setting in which to establish the truth of the “positive thesis for 
sexual equality”. For, since we have no independent reliable knowledge on which 
to ground our analysis, the only way to decide what women can or cannot do is to 
let them try and see what happens. Just as Aristode’s speculations as to the 
existence of “different natures among mankind, free natures, and slave natures” 
(Jbid., p. 269) had been refuted by the fact that emancipated slaves could live as 
rational and virtuous a life as that of their masters, the nature and scope of 
women’s abilities could only be known when called out. In both cases, our 
ignorance could be remedied only by experiment, that is by emancipation. Mill’s 
analogical argument was meant to deliver this practical message.
But the argument had other — rhetorical — advantages. Firsdy, by resorting 
to historical evidence, Mill encroached on one of the favourite domains of his 
opponents and showed that there existed another interpretation of the “experience 
of mankind” which reached conclusions opposed to that of Comte3'. Secondly, by 
setting women’s emancipation in the larger context of the gradual enlargement of 
civil and social freedom characteristic of modernity, Mill turned the support of 
women’s emancipation into a matter of political consistency and dulled some of 
the revolutionary aspects of the cause 'that might have alienated many of his 
Victorian readers. For if one had welcomed the Reform Acts of 1832 and 1867, 
which granted voting rights to previously disfranchised citizens, and if one had 
celebrated the victory of the abolitionist party in the American Civil War, Mill’s 
argument suggested there was no reason to shrink from extending the liberating 
movement to women
Moreover, by singling out women’s subjection as “a single relic of an old 
world of thought and practice exploded in everything else, but retained in the one 
thing of most universal interest” (J. S. Mill, The Subjection of Women, p. 275), Mill 
clearly indicated what was the next social evil to address, thereby conveying the 
sense of urgency and the need for change he already hinted at with UP.
In addition, the analogical argument had practical consequences that could 
only please a liberal social reformer of Mill’s stamp. Firstly, it called for an immediate 
emancipation of women as the proper way to settle the sexual equality issue. 
Secondly, it fit Mill’s conception of a knowledge-based reformism, even if to 
some extent rather different from the one imagined in the System of Logic: reform
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produced knowledge, since the acquisition of the knowledge of human nature that 
would transcend IC was inseparable from the reform process itself. Thirdly, the 
kind of emancipation proposed (the granting of opportunities to women so to 
enable them to test their capacities) tallied perfectly with the liberal baseline 
conception of equality Berger ascribes to Mill38, in which inequalities were 
warranted only as long as they were deserved or earned through voluntary effort. 
As Mill put it, it was not that “all persons [were supposed] to be equally qualified 
for everything” (Ibid., p. 273), and therefore that there should not be any 
departures allowed from a strict conception of equality. Rather, it would be the 
case that the merit of individuals would be judged according to their achievements, 
and irrespective of their sex. Certainly, people would end up with unequal lots, but 
this would be the consequence of what they do, not what they are. This was the 
gist of Mill’s liberal feminism.
For now one might conclude that the analogical argument for women’s 
emancipation provides a satisfactory way to defuse the logical charge of 
inconsistency levelled against Mill’s joint upholding of IC and UP: for it allows one 
to claim that the subjection of women is unnatural even if we are ignorant of what 
women’s nature is. However, even if as a matter of logic the analogical argument 
seems to be valid, many feminist commentators have underlined that some of 
Mill’s actual statements in the Subjection oj~ Women appear to belie one of its 
components, namely IC. It is to that objection that I now turn.
E -  Mill on “Feminine” Traits: 
Logical Inconsistency or Rhetorical Ingenuity?
One major source of the criticisms levelled against the soundness of the 
case for female emancipation in the Subjection of Women resides in the allegation that 
Mill blatandy contradicted his declaration of ignorance as to women’s nature in 
Chapter I by offering in Chapter III a description of “the capacities of women in 
general” (Ibid., p. 201) he thought could justify their involvement in social, 
professional, and political activities so far closed to them. For instance, by drawing 
on the examples of female monarchs, regents and rulers39, Mill attempted to show 
that certain women had contributed as successfully as men to the running of public 
affairs. Mill also suggested that women’s capacity of intuitive perception and sense 
of reality would prove useful in practical matters outside the household. But, so the 
argument goes, by doing so Mill fell prey to inconsistency for, whereas he had
215
earlier claimed that one could not know women’s true nature because their 
character has been distorted by men’s subjection, he nonetheless embarked on 
what he had so far deemed impossible, i.e. a disquisition on what were the 
“peculiar tendencies and aptitudes characteristic of women” {Jbid., p. 304).
Several commentators have castigated Mill for having committed what they 
take to be a crucial logical mistake, and have tried to show how this howler 
compromises Mill’s overall case for sexual equality and his argument for women’s 
emancipation. Jennifer Ring claims that Mill’s invocation of alleged “feminine” 
practical qualities to support women’s wider participation in the public sphere 
merely constitutes a “capitulation to stereotypes” (J. Ring, Modem Political Theoiy and 
Contemporary Feminism, p. 66) and comforts the traditional patriarchal conception of 
women’s nature, most notably by insinuating that they are deprived of speculative 
abilities40. Julia Annas contends that the fact of “arguing from a few examples to 
the capacity o f women in general in a specific respect — e.g. from a few women 
rulers to women’s bent for the practical” amounts to committing “the fallacy of 
arguing from the behaviour of a few to the behaviour of all members of a class like 
women” (J. Annas, “Mill and the Subjection of Women” pp. 183-4), the very 
fallacy of which Mill had accused his opponents. Moreover, Annas maintains that it 
is dangerous ground for a feminist to argue from such a historical sample, for 
“there have always been many more women who have failed to rise above their 
education than have succeeded” (Jbid., p. 184). Finally, Mary Lyndon Shanley 
underlines the oddness of Mill’s reliance on women’s present character traits, 
which he nonetheless regarded as the product of their subordination, to support 
“his brief for eliminating barriers to their participations in public life” (M.L. 
Shanley, “The Subjection of Women”, p.406)41, and argues that Mill’s way of 
arguing seems to assume that “women be admitted to the franchise and public life 
not because their humanity entided them to the same rights as men, but because of 
various sex-based traits” (Id.). In the reminder of this sub-section, I will attempt to 
show to what extent these various objections can be defused when the exact 
targets and purposes of Mill’s arguments are correcdy identified, their rhetorical 
dimension duly taken into account, and the content o f his liberal feminism 
properly understood.
As for Mill’s “capitulation to stereotypes”, Ring’s charge certainly finds 
textual support in Mill’s unqualified claim that
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“looking at women as they are known in experience, it may be said o f  them, 
with more truth than belongs to most other generalizations on the subject, 
that the general bent o f  their talents is towards the practical” (j. S. Mill, The 
Subjection of Women, p. 305),
a statement Mill declared conformable to “all the public history of women” and 
bome out by “common and daily experience” (Id.). Surely, the hopelessly broad 
scope of that assertion might suggest that Mill was not totally immune from 
entertaining the kind of preconceived and oversimplified ideas of the 
characteristics typifying women he often criticized in others. However, his failure 
to distance himself from some of the prejudices of his time should not prompt one 
to believe that Mill ended up agreeing with his opponents. For Mill would have 
really capitulated to stereotypes if he had maintained that what women presently 
were or did was all they could ever be or do. But that was exactly what he refused 
to conclude when he stated that he was considering
“the peculiar tendencies and aptitudes characteristic o f women, as women 
have hitherto been. I do not say, as they will continue to be; for, as I have 
already said more than once, I consider it presumption in any one to pretend 
to decide what women are or are not, can or cannot be, by natural 
constitution” (Ibid., pp. 304-5).
Moreover, whereas his opponents rooted their stereotypes in what Ring 
rightly calls an “unexamined use of feminine ‘nature’ ” (J. Ring, ““Mill’s The 
Subjection of Women: The Methodological Limits of Liberal Feminism”, p. 39), 
Mill went the opposite way and ascribed women’s present moral and intellectual 
characteristics to environmental influences, for he argued that
“even the least contestable o f the differences which now exist, are such as 
may very well have been produced merely by circumstances, without any 
difference o f  natural capacity” (J. S. Mill, The Subjection of Women, p. 305).
In that respect, the case of women’s capacity of intuitive perception and sense of 
reality offers a good illustration of the manner in which Mill’s conception of the 
formation of character traits prevented him from turning some contingent 
properties into necessary features of one’s nature. For Mill tirelessly repeated in 
Chapter II and III of the Subjection of Women that if women had developed “this 
practical bent”, these capacities of being able to shift quickly one’s attention from 
one thing to another and of adapting general rules to particular instances, it was 
very likely to be the outcome of their daily managing of the multifarious and never- 
ending chores associated with the household existence they were confined to. That
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“capacity of passing promptly from one subject of consideration to another”, Mill 
contended, women
“perhaps have it from nature, but they certainly have it by training and 
education; for nearly the whole o f the occupations o f women consist in the 
management o f  small but multitudinous details, on each o f which the mind 
cannot dwell even for a minute, but must pass on to other things, and if  
anything requires longer thought, must steal time at odd moments for 
thinking o f  it” {Ibid., p. 310).
In other words, the “feminine practical” type was just for Mill the result of at least 
women’s exposition to a certain kind of circumstances which in turn favoured the 
development of certain character traits. As he later concluded,
“Whoever is in the least capable o f  estimating the influence on the mind o f  
the entire domestic and social position and the whole habit o f  a life, must 
easily recognize in that influence a complete explanation o f  nearly all the 
apparent differences between women and men, including the whole o f those 
which imply any inferiority” {Ibid., p. 320).
As seen previously, for all its plausibility, Mill’s environmentalist account 
merely remained an appealing conjecture. But conjecture or not, it was in any case 
radically opposed to the kind of essentialist stereotyping Ring evokes: for what 
most ascribed to a mysterious “nature” so as to defuse further questioning, Mill 
wanted to explain by overcoming (most) preconceived and oversimplified ideas 
about women.
What about Annas’ claim that Mill, by arguing from the examples of a few 
women rulers to women’s bent for the practical, committed the fallacy of 
extrapolating the behaviour of all the members of a given class from the behaviour 
of a few members of that class? I believe Annas misses Mill’s point when she 
suggests that he primarily intended the “women’s rule argument” to prove 
inductively something about women’s nature in general. The examples of female 
monarchs, regents and rulers Mill adduced were meant as so many refutations of 
what he regarded as the only proposition strong enough to justify the exclusion of 
women from competing with men for occupations and functions in the public 
sphere:
“that no women at all are fit for them, and that the most eminent women are 
inferior in mental faculties to the most mediocre o f the men on whom those 
functions at present devolve” {Ibid., p. 300).
As Mill made clear, his use of historical examples of successful woman rulers was a 
polemical weapon aimed at the theoretical groundings of the patriarchal position.
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For in the case at hand, logic had it that one counter-example was enough to refute 
the argument that licensed the exclusion of women from the public sphere. 
Furthermore, this tied in nicely with the other crucial logical point Mill had made 
in the course of his analysis of the arguments bearing of the sexual equality issue42, 
namely that universal negatives (such as ‘women will never become the equals of 
men intellectually’) were groundless. As Mill put it,
“in this case, negative evidence is worth little, while any positive evidence is 
conclusive. It cannot be inferred to be impossible that a woman should be a 
Homer, or an Aristotle, or a Michael Angelo, or a Beethoven, because no 
woman has yet actually produced works comparable to theirs in any o f those 
lines o f  excellence. This negative fact at most leaves the question uncertain, 
and open to psychological discussion. But it is quite certain that a woman can 
be a Queen Elizabeth, or a Deborah, or a Joan o f  Arc, since this is not 
inference, but fact” (Ibid., p 302).
What these examples were conclusive evidence of was that the major premise of 
the patriarchal argument was false: it was simply not the case that the most 
eminent women were inferior in mental faculties to the most mediocre of men. 
Consequently, in the absence of any reliable source of information regarding the 
respective capacities of men and women, the emancipation o f the latter and their 
participation in the competition for professions and occupations was the only way 
the sexual equality issue could be adjudicated.
Now, as Annas rightly underlines, the ground on which Mill argued for 
sexual equality — what I called earlier the “positive thesis for sexual equality” - was 
excessively narrow: he had nothing more to rely on than the possibility that it might 
turn out that women could compete with men (for a few did in the past), but 
certainly no assurance that they muld. This was all his argument warranted.
This emphasis on the precise nature of Mill’s argument for emancipation 
helps us to distinguish two facets in Mill’s commitment to women’s cause: on the 
one hand, Mill surely believed that it was illegitimate to discriminate against, or in 
favour, of individuals on account of sex, because there was no good reason either 
of justice or expediency for doing so; on the other hand, as an individualist liberal, 
Mill also held that what entitled a person to moral praise and social reward was that 
person’s achievements, irrespective of her sex. So, what Mill in the end advocated 
was an equality of opportunity (the removal of all barriers to female freedom of 
action and thought, the possibility of receiving a proper education, etc.).
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Finally, now that peripheral objections to Mill’s way of arguing have been 
dealt with, time has come to focus on the central charge levelled against the 
coherence of the Subjection of Women. M.L. Shanley aptly sums it up as follows:
“Where Mill argued in chapters I and II that one could not know women’s 
true nature because the character o f  women (...) had been distorted by the 
relationships o f  domination and subordination between the sexes, in chapter 
III he frequently invoked women’s nature (that is their present nature) as a 
reason for dropping barriers to their wider social and political participation”
(M.L. Shanley, “The Subjection o f Women”, p. 405).
Several sources of concern motivate Shanley’s questioning of the consistency of 
Mill’s argument. Firstly, his apparent surrender of the claim, which was central to 
his analogical argument for the emancipation of women, that woman’s nature is 
unknown. Secondly, the oddness of appealing to the present character traits of 
women, which Mill himself presented as the products of their subordination, to 
support their integration in the various activities typical of the public sphere. And 
thirdly, the fact that Mill’s way of arguing seems to assume, contrary to the central 
tenet of the feminist liberalism I have ascribed to him, that “women be admitted to 
the franchise and public life not because their humanity entitled them to the same 
rights as men, but because of various sex-based traits” (jbid’, p. 406).
As for the first problem, one finds in Mill’s essay “Nature”43 (one of the 
Three Essays on Religion written between 1850 and 1858) a conceptual distinction 
between two meanings of the term “nature” that helps to clarify what exactly Mill 
assumed when he upheld IC. On the one hand, if the “nature” of women is 
understood as the set of attributes that they would display “without the agency, or 
without the voluntary and intentional agency, of man” (i.e. in the absence of any 
socializing process), Mill certainly thought that it was simply impossible for one to 
know women’s (or men’s) nature: firstly, because mankind was a social species, and 
secondly because he held that human development was the result of socialization. 
Consequently, when Mill reviewed “the peculiar tendencies and aptitudes 
characteristic of women” (J. S. Mill, The Subjection of Women, p. 304) in chapter III, 
he could not have considered these tendencies and aptitudes as “natural”, in the 
sense of resulting from a process in which human intervention had no part. On the 
contrary, Mill emphasized the artificial character of these capacities, which he held 
to be dependent on the social environment in which they thrive. Therefore, on that 
interpretation, Mill did not surrender IC.
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On the other hand, if by the “nature” of a thing one understands “the 
ensemble or aggregate of its powers or properties”, that is “the modes in which it 
acts on other things (...) and the modes in which other things act upon it” (J. S. 
Mill, “Nature”, p. 374), Mill’s ignorance claim should not be interpreted as a claim 
of total ignorance. Mill’s own account of how women’s “practical bent” derived 
from an existence confined to ancillary tasks also indicated that some knowledge of 
their nature, albeit shallow, was already available. So, what Mill wanted to convey 
when he said that no one knew woman’s nature was that the fu ll range of their 
capacities and abilities could not have been observed yet. Since the formation and 
display of these capacities depended on “circumstances” and given that women, 
because of their subjection, had only been exposed to a very narrow range of 
influences (mainly those constitutive of a household life), their “entire capacity of 
exhibiting [mental] phenomena” (Id.) had not been tried out. As D.G. Brown 
argues, what Mill’s position assumed was a “denial of tolerably complete or 
adequate knowledge” but not a denial of “all knowledge” (D.G. Brown, “Stove’s 
Reading of Mill”, p. 125) of women’s nature Now, on this weak reading of IC, Mill 
would have contradicted himself if and only if he had argued in chapter III that the 
capacities he was describing were the only ones that women could exhibit. But, as 
argued above, that was his refusal to make this move that was at the root of his 
argument for the emancipation of women. Accordingly, it is not the case that Mill’s 
reliance on the present character traits of women belied his upholding of IC.
What about Shanley’s concern with Mill’s appeal to the present character 
traits of women, as supporting their integration in the various activities typical of 
the public sphere? At first glance, it is difficult not to agree with Shanley that the 
way Mill proceeded seems somewhat awkward. For if the present character traits 
of women — such as intuitive perception and the sense of reality — were so useful, 
one might be tempted to conclude that women’s subjection was not after all that 
bad, since it fostered those qualities of mind. But if so, why would one want to 
embark on the large scale plan of reforms advocated by Mill with respect to 
franchise, employment, and family? If the daily management of the household was 
conducive to a “practical bent”, the best for men was to keep women at home - 
where they would continue to carry out their usual tasks - and call on them when 
needed. Surely, this kind of emancipation was not what Mill had in mind.
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However, one might argue that Mill’s appeal to women’s present character 
traits, for all its potential drawbacks, also served a psychological and rhetorical 
purpose in his advocacy for emancipation. What Mill tried to do when he held out 
the practical prospects of women’s involvement in public affairs to his readers was 
to convince them that women’s liberation would be socially beneficial. He had to 
show them that, in some respects, the actual improvements it would bring were 
not far in the future, for some of its ingredients were already present. Eventually, 
he had to appease some of the fears aroused by the changes he advocated. By 
arguing that women could use long-time recognized domestic virtues to help men 
in their running of public practical matters, Mill attempted to reach these three 
goals at once. O f course, the range of transformations he called for in the social 
realm was much more ambitious than that. But, as a reformist primarily relying on 
his power of persuasion, the primary condition for Mill’s success in his feminist 
endeavour was for him to lure his audience into his cause.
Unfortunately Mill’s rhetorical engagement to win his readers’ approval 
sometimes blurred his discourse. For, as Shanley remarks (M. L. Shanley, “The 
Subjection of Women”, p. 406), after having underlined the almost slave-like 
condition of women in modem societies and the moral and psychological 
debasement it caused, Mill tipped the balance in the opposite direction by 
emphasizing how well women’s present turn of mind made them apt to intervene 
in public affairs alongside men.
However, one might clear Mill from the charge of inconsistency by once 
again qualifying some of his claims. For although he insisted on the deformation of 
women’s nature so as to convey the necessity and urgency of changes in their 
condition, Mill certainly did not think that nothing could be saved from existing 
social arrangements. In the case at hand, a household life at least had the advantage 
of developing a “practical bent”. Similarly, one might perhaps have argued that 
marital subjection had sown in women the seed of this sense of “restraining 
discipline” Mill regarded as a necessary ingredient of the social union, by training 
them “in the habit, and thence the power, of subordinating [their] personal 
impulses and aims, to what were considered the ends of society” (J. S. Mill, 
“Coleridge”, p. 133)44. This difficulty in disentangling the positive from the 
negative effects of subjection was well illustrated by the problem of the cultivation 
of moral feelings. For on the one hand, as Mill suggested, because the
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“education which women receive from society inculcates on them the feeling 
that the individuals connected with them are the only ones to whom they 
own any duty — the only ones to whom they won any duty” (J. S. Mill, The 
Subjection of Women, p. 321),
they tended to display a form of altruism which, albeit restricted to the family, was 
better than the rank egoism so often found in men. On the other hand, that same 
education left women strangers “even to the elementary ideas which are 
presupposed in any intelligent regard for larger interests of higher moral objects” 
(Id). So, what was truly oppressive in women’s subjection was not so much that it 
favoured practically detrimental or morally contemptible character traits — which it 
certainly did in certain respects, but not in the case of the practical skills referred to 
by Mill -, but rather that it favoured a one-sided development of the individual’s 
full range of capacities.
What is particularly interesting in this manner of qualifying Mill’s claims 
about the deformation of women’s nature is that it links his advocacy of female 
emancipation to some of the prominent themes of his later writings, namely the 
romanticist-inspired advocacy of ‘many-sidedness’, the apology of human 
wholeness, and the plea for “experiments of living” (J. S. Mill, On Uberty, p. 261) as 
the only way to discover one’s individual nature. In a passage of Chapter III of On 
Uberty which announced the development of the Subjection of Women, Mill claimed 
that
“human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do 
exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and 
develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency o f the inwards forces 
which makes it a living thing” {Ibid., p. 263).
For, unlike a machine, which is set to perform a certain purpose and is constrained 
by the very features of its task, a character obeys an internal law of development 
which is proper to itself and which can be nurtured or thwarted by the 
circumstances. Given our inability to predict the content of this character by any 
scientific means, every one should be allowed to try out for himself or herself 
different styles of life (Mill’s “experiments of living”), and choose, through a 
autonomous and self-critical process of trial-and-error, the one which seems to fit 
best one’s character and expectations. This was the only way one could discover 
one’s nature, that is “the ensemble or aggregate of its powers or properties” (J. S. 
Mill, “Nature”, p. 374) one was endowed with. Obviously, this argument, which
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Mill invoked to secure individuals’ rights to engage in whatever kind of life they 
wish unless it harmed others, also bear on the case of women: in the absence of 
any a priori knowledge about their nature, the only way to assess their capacities was 
to emancipate them from men’s rule and see what happened. But if the logic of 
Mill’s general emancipatory argument applies to the case of women, it is because it 
is supposed they partake in a common human nature with (male) individuals in 
general, and not, as M. L. Shanley fears, because of various sex-based traits.
To be sure, Mill’s account of the manner in which the greater involvement 
of emancipated women in public affairs would benefit society at may appear to 
support some of the very prejudices he was opposing: for instance, by limiting the 
role of women to that of a practically-minded check on men’s plans and projects, 
Mill might have given his readers the impression that women were not fit for 
speculative or theoretical tasks.
The danger of such a stance has been clearly spotted by J. Annas when she 
reminds us that
“As long as one admits that women are intuitive and men suited to reasoning, 
one’s best efforts at valuing women’s contribution will be patronizing and 
damaging, encouraging women to think that the most highly regarded 
intellectual achievements are not for them” (J. Annas, “Mill and the 
Subjection o f  W omen”, p. 185).
Now, this reluctance on Mill’s part to challenge more radically some of the 
most traditional representations of sexual differences may once again be ascribed 
to his desire not to alienate his mildly conservative readers from the feminist cause: 
by proposing, as one of the first steps in his plan of social reforms, a very gradual 
extension of women’s participation in the public sphere on account of some of 
their generally acknowledged capacities, Mill surely attempted to convince his 
audience of the viability of female emancipation. Furthermore, in the light of his 
environmentalism, one might suspect that Mill held that a complete transformation 
of the methods and goals of women’s education would be necessary before most 
of them could venture into intellectual and theoretical work on a par with men.
Finally, these strategic arrangements Mill made with his readership’s 
prejudices so as to further women’s emancipation should not obscure the fact that 
his commitment to the feminist cause was grounded in a liberal humanism that 
transcended the sexual divide. For Mill believed that a harmoniously developed 
character would have to include character traits so far deemed “masculine” and
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“feminine”, what N. Urbinati calls “psychological androgyny” (N. Urbinati, “J°hn 
Stuart Mill on Androgyny and Ideal Marriage”, p. 630)45. This ideal of human 
flourishing, which laid stress on human originality and provided “experiments of 
living” with their epistemic rationale, was a long-standing element of Mill’s moral 
views that can be traced back to some of his 1830s writings and his early 
correspondence40. An exchange with Thomas Carlyle aptly summarizes Mill’s views 
on the subject. In a letter to Mill, Carlyle claimed that Madame Roland “was almost 
rather a man than a woman” (Mill to Thomas Carlyle, October 5, 1833; J. S. Mill, 
The Earlier Tetters, p. 184), suggesting that manliness in a woman was unnatural. In 
his reply, Mill did not object to the fact that Madame Roland — the wife of a 
Girondin Minister during the French Revolution and renown salonarde, who was 
eventually guillotined — fit Carlyle’s description, but rather to Carlyle’s doubts 
about the excellence of her character, and, more generally, to his claim that the 
possession of “masculine” traits of character compromised the excellence of the 
“feminine” character”4'.
“I believe that I quite agree in all that you really meant, but is there really any 
distinction between the highest masculine, & the highest feminine character?
I do not mean the mechanical acquirements,; those, o f  course, will very 
commonly be different. But the women, o f  all I have known, who possessed 
the highest measure o f  what are considered feminine qualities, have combined 
with them more o f the highest masculine qualities than I have ever seen in any 
but one or two men, & those one or two men were also in many respects 
almost women. I suspect it is the second-rate people o f the two sexes that are 
unlike — the first rate are alike in both -  except — no, I do not think I can 
except anything” (Id.)
Several elements are worth noting in Mill’s statement. Firstly, Mill assumed 
that moral predicates applied de jure to the entire extension of the concept 
“mankind” irrespective of the “mechanical acquirements, that is of the purely 
physical factors correlated with the two sexes. Secondly, Mill claimed that there 
were some moral traits, traditionally ascribed to women, which had to be regarded 
as elements of human excellence, even if no details are given as to what these 
“feminine” qualities could be48. But it is not so much the properties of a good 
character that mattered here, that the fact that a fully developed character was to 
include several or all of these traits, irrespective of sex. Mill, contrary to a long 
tradition in moral and social thought, defended an androgynous conception of 
morality, which could appear obvious to us but was certainly not for most of Mill’s 
contemporaries49. O f course, this latter conception fitted well with his view of how
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character traits were acquired and developed: the situation of dependence to which 
women were generally subjected impressed on them — by way of social 
conditioning which forced them to adopt certain attitudes and conducts- a debased 
kind of morality. But other aspects of their existence could prompt them to acquire 
and develop genuinely valuable moral traits. Accordingly, traits should not be 
regarded as “sex-based” (understood as biologically determined) but rather as 
“gender-based”, that is as the result o f the endorsement of certain social roles. 
Thirdly, Mill’s distinction between “first” and “second rate” characters indicated 
that the contrast between “masculine” and “ feminine” traits needed to be 
overcome and replaced by a conception of excellence based on human qualities. 
And it was this ideal embodied in a few “first rate” characters that gave Mill’s call 
for female emancipation its ultimate justification. Almost twenty-five years before 
the publication of the Subjection of Women, Mill introduced the same idea to Comte, 
when he argued that
“people have always perceived in the French, to some degree, a nature 
regarded as feminine. Even so, what people has produced greater 
philosophers and more distinguished statesmen?” (Mill to Comte, 30 August,
184”; in Haac [ed.], p. 185).
As I hope to have demonstrated in this last chapter, the argumentative 
structure o f the Subjection of Women marks an evolution in Mill’s approach to the 
“Women’s Questions”. Taking stock of the failure of ethology and giving up the 
System of Logic*s hope of establishing the “positive thesis for sexual equality” on the 
basis of a “Science of Human Nature”, Mill was nonetheless able to provide 
supporters of the feminist cause with convincing arguments against sexual 
discrimination and in favour of women’s emancipation. As I have also tried to 
show, when proper attention is paid to the various senses in which Mill appealed to 
the concept of human nature, to his use of rhetoric, and to his endorsement of a 
typically liberal approach to the sexual equality debate, a clearer understanding of 
the nature and extent of Mill’s contribution results, which fortunately defuses many 
of the objections and charges of inconsistency raised against the Subjection of Women.
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Conclusion:
As I hope to have shown in my thesis, the sexual equality issue provides an 
interesting vantage point from which to investigate the various epistemological, 
methodological, political, social, and moral disagreements existing between Comte and 
Mill, as well as it allows a more accurate grasp of the evolution of Mill’s arguments in 
support of the emancipation of women. In order to single out more precisely what I take 
my research to have added to the existing scholarship on Comte, Mill, and the question of 
sexual equality, I hold it is convenient to consider, as the subtitle of my thesis suggests, its 
contribution under three different heads, namely historical, methodological, and 
philosophical. Once this is done, it will also be easier to distinguish what remains to be 
done and along which lines future work is to be undertaken.
1 — Historical Contributions:
As far as history is concerned, I think that the choice of the sexual equality issue 
has proved particularly appropriate to grasp the precise way the activity of philosophising 
was practiced, say, between the French Revolution and the last quarter of the nineteenth- 
century in France and in England. Whereas today the division of intellectual labour has 
taken over the philosophical field (one may often hear nowadays that ‘a good philosopher 
is a specialized philosopher’), figures like Comte and Mill took philosophy to be a 
systematic and encyclopaedic endeavor in wdiich theory and practice, knowledge and 
action could not be separated.
As I have tried to show, both Comte and Mill thought that the solution of the 
problem of sexual equality lay in the correct articulation of a sound knowledge of human 
nature and its capacities with practicable and beneficial social reforms, what I have 
labelled the “Scientificisation” of Politics. Hence the need to consider jointly both aspects 
and the manner in which their connection obtained: just as Comte’s paternalistic 
proposals cannot be severed from his methodology and philosophy of science, Mill’s 
liberal feminism as it is exposed in the Subjection of Women is not just a political doctrine, 
for it is premised on robust assumptions about the knowledge one can secure regarding 
human nature and is also the result of a long and complicated intellectual history which 
starts even before the publication of the System of Logic.
This attempt at a systematic reconstruction of Comte’s and Mill’s positions seems 
to me to provide for a better historical understanding to the extent that it offers the
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advantage of remaining faithful to the philosophical inspiration of the Comtian and 
Millian intellectual endeavour. In particular, it protects one from the temptation of 
breaking into bits as so many unrelated and independent units the various elements (be 
they methodological, political, moral, social) which constitute the different dimensions of 
the problem under scrutiny, as is usually the case when one comes to studying the various 
aspects of Comte’s and Mill’s thought. In my eyes, even if it may seem paradoxical at first 
glance, a problem-centred approach, which deliberately focuses on a specific issue, might 
well be the best way to grasp the exact nature and extent of the achievements of thinkers 
of Comte’s and Mill’s stamp. Eventually, it has to be noted that, in this particular instance, 
the endorsement of a ‘history of ideas’ perspective for the analysis of the debate between 
Comte and Mill on sexual equality and the cognate question of divorce could not eschew 
the taking into account of the biographical dimension, for it was indeed the case — as I 
have insisted in Chapter I — that both figures (Comte with Caroline Massin and Mill with 
Harriet Taylor) had experienced first-hand the hardships associated with existing legal 
arrangements concerning marriage and their moral and social consequences. Accordingly, 
since Comte’s and Mill’s private situations certainly impacted on their reflections and 
undoubtedly constituted an important reason why they were both so interested in the 
problem of sexual equality and that of divorce, an appraisal of their views on these topics 
could not save itself the foray into intimate details. Here, the consideration of the aspects 
of one’s life was part of the story, that is of history. O f course, to argue for the necessity 
of taking into account the biographical dimension does not amount to saying that 
Comte’s and Mill’s respective solutions to the problem were dictated only, or even 
primarily, by their personal experience or longings. Rather, one may suggest that it has the 
heuristic benefit of reminding us of the variety of motives that need to be considered in 
order to grasp fully, from a historical perspective, their thoughts on the topic.
Furthermore, it is not only the case that a proper historical understanding of 
Comte’s and Mill’s respective views on sexual equality necessitates a synoptic view of 
their works, but it is also the case that the choice of studying their private correspondence 
whilst constandy keeping in mind the importance they both attached to that very issue 
enables one to advance a particularly suggestive and stimulating interpretative hypothesis 
to account for their epistolary exchange. Whereas most commentators have generally 
contented themselves with a cursory review of the various subjects broached throughout 
the correspondence as if none of them was more important than the others, the focus on 
sexual equality provides one with a key to a good many puzzling questions. First of all,
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and in the absence of any other textual evidence bearing on this point, I am convinced 
that Mill’s concern that the “positive” methodology of science could legitimate the 
subjection of women was one of his motives, if not the primary motive, for exchanging 
with Comte, as I have tried to demonstrate in Chapter I. This might in turn explain Mill’s 
reservations about Comtean social statics and some elements of social dynamics, as 
argued in Chapter V, and the puzzling appearance of phrenology in the correspondence 
documented in Chapter II and III. To be sure, as I have underlined in the course of my 
analysis, most of these points were not explicitly addressed within the context of the 
debate on sexual equality and this gives the reader the misleading impression, reinforced 
by the stylistic and rhetorical constraints imposed on both Comte and Mill by the very 
medium they used, that the correspondence resembles more an unarticulated series of 
rambling remarks than a intelligible line of argument made out of the proposals, 
objections, and replies issued by our two thinkers. However, and this certainly constitutes 
the most favourable indication of its relevance as an interpretative vantage point, as soon 
as the sexual equality issue is introduced to structure bits of correspondence which at first 
seem unrelated — such as the discussion about phrenology or Mill’s qualified appraisal of 
Comtian sociology -, one discovers the rationale behind the exchange: just as Mill 
questioned the soundness of Comte’s sociological conclusions because it appeared to him 
that, in at least one instance, they were neither warranted by the facts nor deduced as the 
logic of the moral sciences required, Mill similarly raised the problem of the empirical 
value of phrenology because of its importance in the Comtian justification of women’s 
subjection. In other words, the main merit of choosing sexual equality as the 
interpretative perspective for the Comte-Mill correspondence is that it affords a 
considerable gain in intelligibility.
Eventually, and this will be the last point of historical relevance I will make, I 
would like to emphasize the manner in which a proper appraisal of the phrenological 
debate — which is in itself dependent on the choice of the sexual equality perspective - can 
benefit the understanding of Comte’s and Mill’s thoughts and writings. Firstly, the study 
of this aspect of the Comte-Mill correspondence enables one to shed a precious light on a 
much neglected subject in the secondary literature, that is the nature and extent of Mill’s 
acquaintance with the life sciences, and more particularly with brain science. So far, most 
commentators have agreed with the already quoted comment by Susan Faye Cannon 
according to which Mill “knew little about science”. I think this comment needs 
qualification and that is what I have tried to contribute (especially in Chapter III and VII)
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by showing that, when the topic he was broaching required it — as was the case with the 
sexual equality issue Mill was able to master a considerable amount of scientific data 
and to deal with up-to-date scientific theories. In this regard, what is particularly striking 
is that Mill tried to keep abreast of biological developments throughout the years, as early 
as the first editions of the System of Logic (in the 1840s) and as late as the Subjection of 
Women (in the 1860s). O f course, Mill was certainly not what we would call today a 
“philosopher of biology” nor was he on a par with, say, Whewell in terms of biological 
knowledge. But nor was he a complete layman about these questions, even if his 
biological interests were merely derivative on his concerns for the sexual equality issue. As 
for Comte, I have tried to show (in Chapter III) that his endorsement of phrenology was 
not a mere had hoc manoeuvre used to back up his social views — even if it is obvious that a 
certain interpretation o f phrenology served his political goals, especially with regard to 
sexual equality -, but that his acceptance of phrenological principles also derived from the 
methodological principles of his positive philosophy. Finally, I think it is important to 
insist on the phrenological component of the Comte-Mill correspondence since, to the 
best of my knowledge, no commentator so far has precisely identified the actual point of 
contention existing between the two thinkers about phrenology. As I have documented, 
what was at stake was not the scientific status of the phrenological hypothesis, for both 
Comte and Mill were at one when it came to recognizing that it was a perfectly legitimate 
scientific conjecture, but rather its empirical confirmation. According to Mill, the actual 
results borrowed by Comte from phrenology were either false or unwarranted and hence 
unreliable as evidence for the setdement of the sexual equality debate. As far as I know, 
no study of the Comte-Mill correspondence has insisted on this distinction, which I take 
to be essential to a proper understanding of the methodological and philosophical aspects 
of Comte’s and Mill’s views on sexual equality. Let us now turn to the former.
2 — Methodological Contributions:
As for methodology, I take it that my research has clarified at least three intricate 
problems associated with the kind of scientific knowledge Comte and Mill considered 
essential to tackle the sexual equality issue. The first problem relates to the logic of the 
explanation of “moral phenomena”. The second problem has to do with the role of 
psychology within the explanatory framework characteristic of the “moral sciences”. The 
third problem touches on the centrality of Mill’s Ethology for the understanding of
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“moral phenomena” and the reasons why Mill failed to bring about his pet project of a 
science of the formation of character.
Since the debate about sexual equality hinged on the intellectual and moral 
capacities of women, it was necessary to reach some sort o f agreement as to how one was 
to explain “moral phenomena”. Now, and that is a point generally ignored by 
commentators that I have developed in Chapter IV, Comte and Mill agreed that these 
phenomena were the result of a “composition of causes”, namely physiological, 
psychological and environmental causes. However, when it came to fleshing out actual 
explanations, it became clear that both were biased in favour of some definite set of 
causes, biological for Comte, environmental and psychological for Mill, as their 
controversy about the Method of Residues exemplified. Accordingly, it is important to 
distinguish, something commentators generally fail to do, between Comte’s and Mill’s 
general agreement about the Architectonics of the Moral Sciences and their respective 
and contrary manners o f cashing it out in the case of sexual equality: for whereas Comte 
insisted on the biological factors that he thought were responsible for women’s 
intellectual and volitional inferiority, Mill put a premium on social factors to explain their 
subjection. Only a minute reconstruction of the logic of the explanation of “moral 
phenomena” enables one to identify precisely when and why Comte and Mill parted way.
The second methodological clarification that I have tried to convey in Chapter IV 
is the one bearing on the exact content of Comte’s and Mill’s disagreement about 
psychology. The received view is that the gist of the controversy had to do with the 
scientific status of the psychological method, namely introspection. However, a closer 
inspection of all the textual evidence available reveals that this interpretation is flawed and 
that it is one of the advantages of the study of the sexual equality debate that it dissipates 
this illusion. In fact, I argue that Mill never cared about Comte’s critique of introspection, 
just as any empiricist in her good sense should not worry about sceptical and radical 
doubts raised about the reliability of our senses. What really worried Mill, on the other 
hand, were the consequences of Comte’s repudiation of psychology for the explanation 
of “moral phenomena”, for without psychology no explanations of “moral phenomena” 
were possible.
The last noteworthy methodological contribution of my thesis — given in Chapter 
VI -  lies in the correct assessment of Mill’s ethological pet project and the actual reasons 
for its failure. It consists of a twofold endeavour: on the one hand, I have tried to defuse 
the charge of confusion generally levelled against the System ofljogifs chapter on Ethology;
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on the other hand, I have attempted a critical review of the various causes invoked to 
account for Mill’s ethological fiasco and I have come up with an original explanation so 
far not mentioned by commentators.
Contrary to what is generally maintained, Mill’s developments on ethology in the 
System of Logic are far from clashing with the rest of the book because of an alleged lack of 
clarity. To be sure, Mill’s account is indeed fraught with methodological difficulties, but, as 
I have demonstrated, the argument of the System’s chapter on ethology is, in fact, quite 
clear, once it is connected to Mill’s rhetoric, his style and his goals as a social and political 
reformer. Eager to make sure that his contribution would not be overlooked by his readers, 
Mill used various expository ploys — most notably the “dramatization” of methodological 
predicaments — to ensure the general recognition of the important part he had taken in the 
development of the study of human phenomena. Hence Mill’s strategic emphasis on the 
serious difficulties associated with the pursuit of ethology7, on the erroneous views and 
methodological dead-ends associated with unsatisfactor)7 accounts of character formation: 
all this was intended to secure Mill’s place in the intellectual Pantheon.
As for the ethological fiasco, one may single out three likely causes for it. Firstly, 
the sheer number of “circumstances” relevant to ethology and the absence of a conceptual 
classification to sort out the different kinds of circumstances involved in the formation of 
character traits prevented the working out of a manageable theory from which to deduce 
explanations for character formation. Secondly, in the absence of precise ethological 
empirical generalisations, ethological deductions could not be verified. Thirdly, and that is 
the original point I have brought in, Mill was unable to come up with a composition law 
that would govern the combination of ethological causes. But if so, what became of Mill’s 
defense of the emancipation of women, since it was deprived of the scientific rationale that 
would prove the intellectual and volitional equality of both sexes? This last methodological 
consideration leads us to the philosophical clarifications my thesis intends to convey.
3 -  Philosophical Contributions:
The philosophical ambition of my thesis is twofold, critical with respect to Comte 
and constructive with respect to Mill. On the one hand, the focus on the sexual equality 
issue brings out the crucial role played by biology in Comte’s social thought and 
investigates to what extent this distinctive feature can be reconciled with Comte’s plea for 
an autonomous sociology. On the other hand, it accounts for the evolution o f Mill’s
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argument for the emancipation of women from the System of Logic to the Subjection of Women 
and defends Mill’s mature feminist views against various charges of inconsistency.
As documented in Chapter I, Comte’s Cours dephilosophiepositive theorizes both the 
status of the science of social phenomena as a specific discipline and the relative 
independence of the different sciences. This has led many commentators to consider 
Comte as one of sociology’s forefathers and as an early advocate of the “disunity of 
science” thesis. However, and that is another advantage of choosing this interpretative 
perspective, it turns out that Comte’s treatment of the sexual equality issue seems to 
challenge both descriptions. For it was indeed the case, as shown in Chapter II and III, that 
Comte gave precedence to biology over sociolog)7 in the settlement of the sexual equality 
debate. A minute analysis of textual evidence reveals that what Comte chose to argue from 
to adjudicate the issue of women’s role in society was not an account of the nature and 
history of inter-individual interactions (as would be required of sociology by Comte’s own 
admission) but a biological account of character traits. And, as demonstrated in Chapter V, 
even in what Comte took to be his properly sociological argument for subjection, his ideas 
were suffused with biological assumptions. Neither the “static” argument, which relied on 
phrenology to establish that women’s innate mental capacities did not allow them to be 
treated as men’s equals, nor the “dynamic” argument, which was based on a biologically- 
inspired developmental scheme that legitimated the continuation of the subjection of 
women by referring to the history of the relations between the sexes, could qualify as 
sociological arguments. From this consideration of Comte’s treatment of the sexual 
equality issue a critical philosophical conclusion ensues: because he did not live up to the 
standards of his own methodology and was unable to find independent and genuine 
sociological support for his belief in the necessary subordination of women, Comte had 
failed to reach the status of a true “positive” social philosopher he had yearned for. 
Accordingly, Comte’s depiction as one of sociology’s forefathers and as an early advocate 
of the “disunity of science” thesis needs serious revision.
As for Mill, the philosophical contribution of my thesis is of a more constructive 
character. For, given the centrality of ethology in Mill’s case for women’s emancipation and 
the role he ascribed to it in his architectonic of the “moral sciences”, one might have feared 
that the failure of ethology would have left Mill deprived of argument to support his 
feminism. Yet, as I demonstrate in Chapter VII, Mill was in fact able to overcome this 
predicament and came up with convincing arguments that took stock (and put to good use) 
the ethological failure. In particular, the Subjection of Women, which presented Mill’s mature
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feminist views, developed a new way of addressing the problem, which supposed that the 
liberal component of Mill’s philosophy, and especially its emphasis on the necessity of 
letting individuals engage in “experiments in living”, constituted the proper experimental 
setting in which to adjudicate the sexual equality issue. To grasp the exact nature of the 
changes that took place in Mill’s way of arguing between the System of Logic and the 
Subjection of Women, it is convenient to distinguish three related but logically independent 
theses one might attribute to Mill. Firstly, there is the “positive thesis for sexual equality”, 
which claims that both sexes are on par in terms of intellectual endowments. Secondly, 
there is the “negative thesis for sexual equality”, which maintains that none of the grounds 
so far adduced justify the subjection of women. Thirdly, there is the “emancipation thesis”, 
which maintains that the removal of all social, legal and political barriers imposed on 
women is the crucial test for assessing the capacities of women. As the analysis of the 
System of Logic and the correspondence with Comte has shown (Chapter IV), the “positive 
thesis for sexual equality” could not stand without the development of ethology and failed 
with the demise of the latter. This explains that in the Subjection of Women Mill defended 
only the “negative thesis for sexual equality” and the “emancipation thesis”, even if he 
certainly hoped that the “emancipation thesis” would provide the experimental setting in 
which to establish the truth of the “positive thesis for sexual equality”. For, since we have 
no independent reliable knowledge on which to ground our analysis (for neither the 
stillborn ethology nor faulty or incomplete biological considerations would do in that 
instance), the only way to decide what women can or cannot do is to let them try and see 
what happens. By way of conclusion, it is worth noting that this argument for the 
emancipation of women combines in a non-contradictory manner the two tenets o f the 
philosophical position I have ascribed to Mill in Chapter I, namely “liberal naturalism”: it is 
liberal to the extent that it insists on the importance of letting the individual choose which 
capacities she wants to develop; it is naturalistic to the extent that it grounds its conception 
of human nature in the observation of the variety of ways in which a human individual 
might develop herself.
I hope the perspective I have adopted in these pages has contributed to convince 
the reader that there are still some interesting lessons to be learnt from this episode in the 
history of ideas. Firstly, I am convinced that Comte’s and Mill’s emphasis on the necessity 
of relying on the best knowledge available to solve social or political problems is still 
relevant today. Sound policies are well informed policies. Secondly, the disagreement
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between Comte and Mill about the respective influence of biological and environmental 
factors remains with us today, although phrenology has been replaced with the theory of 
evolution and its psychological and sociological offspring. Accordingly, there is a pressing 
need to come up with a convincing account of the articulation of the biological and 
sociological levels that would take into account all the factors involved in the production of 
human phenomena. Perhaps one could draw on Comte’s and Mill’s attempts to develop a 
satisfactory solution to that problem.
Finally, this thesis has paved the way for future work on Comte and Mill. With 
regard to Comte, I think it would be interesting to study more closely the fate of the 
biological arguments for women’s subjection in his later works (most notably the Systeme de 
politique positive) and see whether they remained as important as they were in the Cours or 
whether Comte found new grounds on which to rest his case. As for Mill, as I have tried to 
show, it would certainly prove fruitful to investigate a bit more closely the way he 
conceived the role of environmental factors in the formation of character and to establish 
more precisely than has been the case here the kind of physiology Mill was ready to 
introduce in sociological explanations.
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Appendix I: Comtean Studies (1993-2005).
A revival o f Comtean studies has .recently taken place. The public has now 
regained access to most of Comte’s writings and a wealth of commentaries bearing on 
almost all the aspects of his thought have been published in the past few years. This 
bibliography intends to provide an overview of this historiographic trend. It takes as its 
chronological starting point the publication of Mary Pickering’s Auguste Comte. A n  
Intellectual biography (1993), a book that has played a crucial role in the renewed interest in 
Comte’s life and philosophy.
Primary Literature:
Comte, A. (1993) Calendrierpositiviste ou systeme de commemoration publique. Presentation by 
P. Tacussel. Fontfroide: Editions Fata Morgana.
Comte, A. (1994) Rede iiber den Geist des Positivismus. Edited by I. Fetscher. Hamburg: F. 
Meiner Verlag.
Comte, A. (1995) Discours sur I’esprit positij. New edition with a chronology, an 
introduction, and notes by A. Petit. Paris: Vrin, 1995.
Comte, A. (1995a) Jjecons sur la sociologie. Cours de philosophie positive, lecons 47 a 51. 
Introduction and notes by J. Grange. Paris: Gamier-Flammarion.
Comte, A. & Mill, J.S. (1995b) The Correspondence of John Stuart M ill and Auguste Comte. 
Translated from the French and edited by O.A. Haac, with an introduction by 
A. Kremer-Marietti. New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers.
Comte, A. (1996a) Philosophie des sciences. Presentation, selection of extracts, and notes by 
J. Grange. Paris: Gallimard.
Comte, A. (1996b) Politique dAuguste Comte. Texts selected and presented by J. Grange. 
Paris: Payot.
Comte, A. (1998a) Auguste Comte and Positivism: The Essential Writings. Edited by G. 
Lenzer. New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers, [reprint of the 1975 
Harper Collins edition of the Lenzer selection]
Comte, A.. (1998b) Cours de philosophie positive. J : lefons 1 a 45. Presentation and notes by 
M. Serres, F. Dagognet, and A. Sinaceur; new edition revised and amended by A. 
Petit. Paris: Hermann.
Comte, A. (1998c) Discours sur Tensemble du positivisme. Presentation, notes, and 
chronology by A. Petit. Paris: Gamier-Flammarion.
Comte, A. (1998d) Early Political Writings. Edited and translated by H.S. Jones. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Comte, A. (1999a) Auguste Comte. Edited by R. Sharp. London: Paragon Press 
Publishing.
240
Comte, A. (1999b) Dizjonario delle idee. Sdenzfa, politica, morale. Edited by S. Mariani. 
Roma: Editori Riuniti.
Comte, A. (2000) Synthese subjective, ou systeme universe I des conceptions propres d I’etat normal de 
I’humanile. Ed. by J. Grange. Paris: Fayard.
Comte, A. (2001a) Discorso sullo spiritopositivo. Edited by A. Negri. Roma: Laterza.
Comte, A. (2001b) System of Positive Polity. 4 volumes, translated by J.H. Bridges, F. 
Harrison, E.S. Beesly, R. Congreve, and H.D. Hutton. Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 
[reprint of the 1875-7 edition]
Comte, A. (2001c) The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte. 2 volumes, abridged and 
translated by H. Martineau. Bristol: Thoemmes Press, [reprint of the 1853 
edition]
Comte, A. (200Id) Plan des travaux sdentifiques necessaires pour reorganiser la societe. 
Presentation and notes by A. Kremer-Marietti. Paris: L’Harmattan.
Comte, A. (2003a) Appeal to Conservatives. Translated by T.C. Donkin. Kila, MT: 
Kessinger Publishing, [reprint of the 1889 edition]
Comte, A. (2003b) Science et politique. Tes conclusions generales du Cours de philosophie positive. 
Presentation and notes by M. Bourdeau. Paris: Pocket.
Comte, A. (2003c) The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte. 2 volumes, abridged and 
translated by H. Martineau. Kila, MT: Kessinger Publishing, [reprint of the 1853 
edition]
Secondary Literature:
Andreani, R. (2003) ‘Le Montpellier d’Auguste Comte/ In A. Petit (ed.), 2003a, pp. 13- 
22.
Alonso, A. (1996), ‘De Positivismo a Positivistas: interpreta9oes do positivismo 
brasileiro/ Revista Brasileira de Informafdo Bibliograjica em Ciencias So dais, 42, pp. 
109-134.
Avelino de La Pienda, J. (2003) ‘Mito del gran tiempo en A. Comte (1798-1857)/ 
Themata, 30 , pp. 119 — 134.
Bagchi, J. (2002) ‘Le positivisme dans rimagination scientifique du Bengale/ In M. 
Bourdeau & F. Chazel (eds.), 2002, pp. 239-253.
Balan, S. (1997) ‘Alexandru Bogza sur le modele de revolution chez Auguste Comte’ 
Revista de Filosojie, 44:3, pp. 223-234.
Battini, M. (2001) Tl dottor Comte e monsieur Bonaparte. Intomo all’opera di Mirella Larizza/ 
In C. Cassina (ed.), 2001, pp. 115-126.
241
Baumgarten, C.A. (1997) ‘Le positivisme et les origines de la critique naturaliste dans le 
Rio Grande do Sul/ Imprevue, 1 & 2, pp. 113-131.
Becquemont, D. (2003a) ‘Auguste Comte et l’Angleterre.’ In A. Petit (ed.), 2003a, pp. 
317-331.
Becquemont, D. (2003b) ‘Positivisme et utilitarisme: regards croises, Comte, Spencer, 
Huxley’ Revue d’histoire des sciences humaines, 8, pp. S I-12.
Ben Chemi-Said, Z. (ed.) (2000) Auguste Comte et le positivisme. Carthage: Academie 
Tunisienne des Sciences, des Lettres et des arts “Beit Al-Hikma”: Orbis.
Ben Cherni-Sai'd, Z. (2003) ‘L’inaccessible dans les sciences de la vie et le “degre de 
liberte en philosophie.’ In M. Bourdeau, J.-F. Braunstein & A. Petit (eds.), 2003, 
pp. 91-110.
Bensaude-Vincent, B. (1999a) ‘Atomism and Positivism: A Legend about French 
Chemistry’ Annals of Science, 56, pp. 81-94.
Bensaude-Vincent, B. (1999b) ‘Le positivisme fait-il obstacle au progres scientifique ? Le 
cas de l’atomisme au XIXe siecle.’ In A. Despy-Meyer A. & D. Devriese (eds.), 
1999, pp. 217-243.
Bensaude-Vincent, B. (2003) ‘Comte et la diffusion des sciences.’ In A. Petit (ed.), 
2003a, pp. 127-134.
Benson, T. (1994) ‘Auguste Comte and Positivist Sociology.’ In P. Halfpenny & P. 
McMylor (eds.), Positivist Sociology and its Critics, vol. 1. Brookfield, Vermont: 
Edward Elgar Publishing Company, pp. 18-45.
Berthelot, J.-M. (2002) ‘Durkheim, lecteur de Comte?.’ In M. Bourdeau & F. Chazel 
(eds.), 2002, pp. 185-206.
Billoux, C. (2002) ‘Une “relique”? Le fonds “Auguste Comte” dans les archives de 
l’Ecole Poly technique.’ Bulletin de la Societe des amis de la bibliotheque de I’Ecole 
poly technique, 30, pp. 65-68.
Blanckaert, C. (2003) ‘Un artefact historiographique? L’anthropologie “positiviste” en 
France dans la seconde moitie du XIXC siecle.’ In A. Petit (ed.), 2003a, pp. 253- 
283.
Bonaiuti, G. (2001) ‘Sistema della societa e identita di popolo. II piano dell’ 
“epistemocrazia” comtiana.’ In C. Cassina (ed.), 2001, pp. 137-149.
Boudon, R. (1997) ‘Peut-on etre positiviste aujourd’hui?.’ In C.H. Cuin (ed.), Durkheim 
d’un siecle a Pautre. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, pp. 265-287.
Bourdeau, M. (1998) ‘Et si Comte avait raison?.’ Dialogue, XXXVII, pp. 361-373.
242
Bourdeau, M. (2000) ‘L’esprit ministre du cceur.’ Revue de Theologie et de philosophie, 132, 
pp. 175-192.
Bourdeau, M. (2002a) ‘Science de l’homme, ou science de l’humanite?.’ In M. Bourdeau 
& F. Chazel (eds.), 2002, pp. 279-297.
Bourdeau, M. (2002b) ‘ “Auguste Comte aujourd’hui”: Colloque de Cerisy’. Bulletin de la 
Societe des amis de la bibliotheque de I’Lcole poly technique, 30, pp. 1-5.
Bourdeau, M. (2002c) ‘La reception du positivisme il y a un siecle: pour un etat des 
lieux.’ Bulletin de la SA B IX , 30, p. 12-19.
Bourdeau, M. (2003a) ‘Introduction.’ Revue d’histoire des sciences humaines, 8, pp. 3-8.
Bourdeau, M. (2003b) ‘Auguste Comte et la religion positiviste: presentation.’ Revue des 
sciencesphilosophiques et theologiques, 87, pp. 5-21.
Bourdeau, M. (2003c) ‘Presentation’ In M. Bourdeau, J.-F. Braunstein & A. Petit (eds.), 
2003, pp. 13-22.
Bourdeau, M. (2004) ‘L’idee de point de vue sociologique. La philosophie des sciences 
comme sociologie des sciences chez Auguste Comte.’ Cahiers intemationaux de 
sociologie, 117, pp. 225 — 238.
Bourdeau, M. & Chazel, F. (eds.) (2002) Auguste Comte et I’idee de science de I’homme. Paris: 
L’Harmattan.
Bourdeau, M. , Braunstein J.-F. & Petit A. (eds.) (2003) Auguste Comte Aujourd’hui. Paris: 
Kime.
Braunstein, J.-F. (1995) ‘Auguste Comte, de l’Europe a l’Occident.’ In F. Chenet- 
Faugeras (ed.), Victor Hugo et I’Lurope de lapensee. Paris: Nizet, pp. 193-206.
Braunstein, J.-F. (1997) ‘Le concept de milieu de Lamarck a Comte et aux positivismes.’ 
In L. Goulvent (ed.), Jean-Baptiste Lamarck 1744-1829, Paris: Ed. du CHTS, pp. 
557-571.
Braunstein, J.-F. (1998a) ‘Antipsychologisme et philosophie cerebrale chez Auguste 
Comte’ Revue intemationale de philosophie, 52:1, pp. 7-28.
Braunstein, J.-F. (1998b) ‘Canguilhem, Comte et le positivisme.’ In F. Bing, J.-F. 
Braunstein, and E. Roudinesco (eds.), Actualites de Georges Canguilhem. Le normal et 
le pathologique. Actes du X  Colloque de la Societe intemationale d’histoire de la psychiatrie et 
de la psychanalyse. Le Plessis-Robinson: Institut Synthelabo — Les empecheurs de 
penser en rond, pp. 95-120.
Braunstein, J.-F. (2002) ‘La philosophie des sciences d’Auguste Comte.’ In P. Wagner 
(ed.), Lesphilosophes et la science. Paris: Gallimard, pp. 787-822.
Braunstein, J.-F. (2003a) ‘La religion des morts-vivants. Le culte des morts chez Auguste 
Comte.’ Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques, 87, pp. 59-73.
243
Braunstein, J.-F. (2003b) ‘Auguste Comte et la philosophie de la medecine.’ In A. Petit 
(ed.), 2003a, pp. 159-176.
Braunstein, J.-F. (2003c) ‘Comte “in context: l’exemple de la sociologie’ In M. Bourdeau, 
J.-F. Braunstein & A. Petit (eds.), 2003, pp. 291-314.
Brenner, A. (2003) ‘Comte, entre les classiques et les conventionnalistes.’ In M. 
Bourdeau, J.-F. Braunstein & A. Petit (eds.), 2003, pp. 49-63.
Brown, R. (1997) Artificial Experiments on Society: Comte, G. C. Lewis and Mill’ 
Journal of Historical Sociology, 10:1, pp. 74-97.
Cachera, M. (1998) ‘La fonction de la sociologie historique des savoirs dans le 
positivisme comtien.’ In Kremer-Marietti A. (ed.), Sociologie de la science: sociologie 
des sciences et rationalite scientifique. Bruxelles: Editions Mardaga, pp. 57-68.
Campos Rodriguez, P. & Macias Gloria, P. (1997) ‘Guanajuato (Mexico) y el nacimiento 
del positivismo.’ Imprevue, 1 & 2, pp. 163-173.
Capuro, R. (2001). He positivis?ne est un culte des morts: Auguste Comte. Tr. by R. Capuro and
C. Le Gaufey, Paris: Epel : translation of Auguste Comte — Actu alidad de una 
herencia. Buenos Aires: Edelp, 1999.
Carneiro, F.L. (2003) ‘Observations sur quelques propositions scientifiques d’Auguste 
Comte.’ In A. Petit (ed.), 2003a, pp. 135-146.
Casalini, B. (2001) ‘L’interpetazione della “sociocrazia” nel pensiero di Lester Frank 
Ward.’ In C. Cassina (ed.), 2001, pp. 151-165.
Cassina, C. (ed.) (2001a) Sociologia, politica e religione: la filosofia di Comte per il diciannovesimo 
secolo. A tti del convegno de Pisa, 12 maggio 2000. Pisa: Edizioni Plus — Universita di 
Pisa.
Cassina, C. (2001b) ‘Comte e il tradizionalismo: appunti per una discussione acora 
aperta.’ In C. Cassina (ed.), 2001, pp. 89-99.
Cassina, C. (2003) ‘Comte devant la dictature.’ In M. Bourdeau, J.-F. Braunstein & A. 
Petit (eds.), 2003, pp. 184-199.
Celebi, N. (2002) ‘Sociology Associations in Turkey : Continuity behind Discontinuity.’ 
International Sociology, 17:2, pp. 253-267.
Chabert, G. (2002) ‘Michel Houellebecq : lecteur d’Auguste Comte.’ Revue romane, 37:2, 
pp. 187-204.
Chabert, G. (2004) Un nouveau pouvoir spirituel. Auguste Comte et la religion scientifique au 
X I X  siecle. Caen: Presses Universitaires de Caen.
Chazel, F. (2002) ‘Introduction.’ In M. Bourdeau & F. Chazel (eds.), 2002, pp. 7-17.
244
Chickering, R. (1995) ‘Der Leipziger Positivismus.’ Comparativ, 5:3, p. 20-31.
Chickering, R. (1997) ‘Der Leipziger “Positivisten-Kranzchen” um die 
Jahrhundertwende.’ In G. Hiibinger, R. Von Bruch, F.W. Graf (eds.), 1997, pp. 
227-245.
Clauzade, L. (2002) ‘Le statut epistemologique du tableau cerebral et la notion de type 
chez Auguste Comte.’ In M. Bourdeau & F. Chazel (eds.), 2002, pp. 111-130.
Clauzade, L. (2003a) ‘Auguste Comte et Stuart Mill. Les enjeux de la psychologie’, Revue 
d’bistoire des sciences humaines, 8, pp. 41-56.
Clauzade, L. (2003b) ‘La “culte” et la “culture” chez Auguste Comte: la destination 
morale de la religion positiviste.’ Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques, 87, 
pp. 39-58.
Collina, V. (2001) ‘Auguste Comte e il sapere ottocentesco.’ In C. Cassina (ed.), 2001, 
pp. 13-20.
Cometti, J.-P. (2003) ‘L’esthetique positiviste: un Dictionnaire des idees revues?’ In M. 
Bourdeau, J.-F. Braunstein & A. Petit (eds.), 2003, pp. 245-269.
Coumet, E. (2003) ‘Auguste Comte. Le calcul des chances, aberration radicale de l'esprit 
mathematiques.’ Mathematiques et sciences humaines, 162 , pp. 9-17.
Da Costa Leal, E. & Pezat, P.R. (1997) ‘La propagande de la religion de l’humanite dans 
le sud du Bresil.’ Jmprevue, 1 & 2, pp. 145-161.
Dagognet, F. (1997) ‘Auguste Comte.’ In M. Ambriere (ed.), Dictionnaire du XIXe siecle 
europeen. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, pp. 272-273.
Dagognet, F. (1997) ‘Positivisme.’ In M. Ambriere (ed.), Dictionnaire du XIX e siecle 
europeen. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, pp. 937-938.
De Boni, C. (2001) ‘La Republica positiva da Comte a Littre.’ In C. Cassina (ed.), 2001, 
pp. 101-113.
Despy-Meyer, A. & Devriese, D. (eds.) (1999) Positivismes. Philosophie, Sociologie, Histoire, 
Sciences, ylctes du colloque international, 10-12 decembre 1997, Universite Ubre de 
Bruxelles. Turhnout: Brepols.
Devulder, C. (1999) ‘Comment l’historien construit son objet d’etude. L’exemple de 
Karl Lamprecht (Fin XIXC -debut XXC siecle).’ In A. Despy-Meyer A. & D. 
Devriese (eds.), 1999, pp. 189-194.
Dezeuze, G. (2005) ‘II positivisme di Auguste Comte e il diritto.’ RJvista intemationale di 
filosofia del diritto, 82:1, pp. 85-108.
245
Dhombres, J. (2002) ‘La pratique philosophique des mathematiques chez Auguste 
Comte: Une conceptualisation de l’espace par l’analytique.’ In M. Bourdeau & F. 
Chazel (eds.), 2002, pp. 21-80.
Dhombres, J. (2003) ‘La posterite mathematiques de Comte.’ In M. Bourdeau, J.-F. 
Braunstein & A. Petit (eds.), 2003, pp. 25-48.
Donzelli, M. (1999) Origini e dedino del positivismo: saggio su Auguste Comte in Italia. Napoli: 
Liguori Editore.
Donzelli, M. (2001) ‘Positivismo italiano e positivismo d’oltralpe.’ In C. Cassina (ed.), 
2001, pp. 127-136.
Donzelli, M. (2003a) ‘Comte, l’ltalie et la France entre le XIXe et le XXe siecles.’ In A. 
Petit (ed.), 2003a, pp. 351-362.
Donzelli, M. (2003b) ‘Auguste Comte et le genie esthetique italien.’ In M. Bourdeau, J.- 
F. Braunstein & A. Petit (eds.), 2003, pp. 270-290.
Engel, P. (1999) ‘Le positivisme et la psychologie.’ In A. Despy-Meyer A. & D. Devriese 
(eds.), 1999, pp. 121-134.
Fedi, L. (2002) ‘Renouvier critique de Comte.’ In M. Bourdeau & F. Chazel 
(eds.), 2002, pp. 153-183.
Fedi, L. (2000a) Comte. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Fedi, L. (2000b), ‘Auguste Comte et la technique’ Kevue d ’histoire des sciences, 53:2, pp. 265- 
293.
Fedi L. (2003a), ‘Auguste Comte, la disjonction de l’ideologie et de l’Etat.’ Cahiers 
philosophiques, 94, pp. 99-110.
Fedi, L. (2003b) ‘Lien sociale et religion positiviste chez les penseurs de la troisieme 
republique.’, Kevue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques, 87, pp. 127-150.
Fedi, L. (2003c) ‘L’organicisme de Comte.’ In M. Bourdeau, J.-F. Braunstein & A. Petit 
(eds.), 2003, pp. 111-134.
Fedi, L. (2005), ‘Le prince des philosophes: Aristote vu par Auguste Comte et Pierre 
Laffitte’ In D. Thouard (ed.), Aristote au XIX" siecle. Lille: Presses du 
Septentrion, pp. 209-230.
Fuchs, E. (1994a) ‘Wissenschaft, Positivismus und Geschichtsschreibung in England 
Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts.’ Zeitschriftfur Geschichtsmssenschaft, 42, p. 197-216.
Fuchs, E. (1994b) Henry Thomas Buckle: Geschistschrihung und Positivismus in England und 
Deutschland. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitat Verlag.
Fuchs, E. (1999) ‘Positivism and History in the 19th century.’ In A. Despy-Meyer A. & 
D. Devriese (eds.), 1999, pp. 147-162.
246
Fuchs-Heinritz, W. (1998) Auguste Comte: Einfiihrung in Leben und Werk. Opladen: 
Wesdeutscher Verlag.
Fuller, S. (1999) ‘What does the Sokal hoax say about the prospects for positivism ?’ In 
A. Despy-Meyer A. & D. Devriese (eds.), 1999, pp. 265-283.
Gane, M. (1997) ‘Durkheim contre Comte dans les Regies’ In C.H. Cuin (ed.), Durkheim 
d’un siecle a I’autre. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, pp. 31-38.
Gane, M. (2001) ‘Reading Gender Futures, from Comte to Baudrillard’ Social 
Epistemology, 15:2, pp. 77-89.
Gane, M. (2003) ‘Dans le gouffre. Entre science et religion. Les premiers sociologues 
francais, de Bazard a Littre.’ In M. Bourdeau, J.-F. Braunstein & A. Petit (eds.), 
2003, pp. 151-169.
Garcia-Parpet, M.-F. (2002) ‘Les usages de la pensee francaise dans le Bresil du XIXe 
siecle: la question raciale, Auguste Comte et Arthur de Gobineau.’ In M. 
Bourdeau & F. Chazel (eds.), 2002, pp. 221-237.
Gen til, B. (2002a) ‘Les notes de cours d’Auguste Comte, eleve a l’Ecole poly technique 
(1814:1816).’ Bulletin de la Societe des amis de la bibliotheque de IE  cole polytechnique, 30, 
pp. 51-56.
Gentil, B. (2002b) ‘La posterite mathematiques d’Auguste Comte: A propos de 
l’intervention de Jean Dhombres au colloque de Cerisy.’ Bulletin de la Societe des 
amis de la bibliotheque de lEcole poly technique, 30, pp. 7-10.
Gentil, B. (2002c) ‘La Maison d’Auguste Comte temoin de l’histoire du positivisme.’ 
Bulletin de la Societe des amis de la bibliotheque de lEcole polytechnique, 30, pp. 21-38.
Gentil, B. (2002d) ‘Paulo E. de Berredo Carneiro (1901-1982), fondateur de 
l’Association intemationale de la “Maison d’Auguste Comte”.’ Bulletin de la Societe 
des amis de la bibliotheque de lEcole polytechnique, 30, pp. 39-42.
Gerard, A. (2001) ‘La Revolution fran9aise d’Auguste Comte.’ In C. Cassina (ed.), 2001, 
pp. 65-87.
Gerard, A. (2003) ‘Les disciples “complets” de Comte et la politique positive (1870- 
1914).’ In A. Petit (ed.), 2003a, pp. 285-302.
Giusti, A. (2002) ‘La maison d’Auguste Comte aujourd’hui.’ Bulletin de la Societe des amis de 
la bibliotheque de IE, cole polytechnique, 30, pp. 43-50.
Graf, F.W. (1997) ‘Die Positivitat des Geistigen. Rudolf Euckens Programme 
neoidealistischer Universalintegration.’ In G. Hiibinger, R. Von Bmch, F.W. 
Graf (eds.), 1997, pp. 53-85.
Grange, J. (1996) Ea philosophie d’Auguste Comte. Science, politique, religion. Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France.
247
Grange, J. (1997) ‘L’utopie positive’, Raison presents, 1, pp. 69-93.
Grange, J. (1998) ‘Du corps politique a l’organisme social.’ Revue intemationale de 
philosophie, 52:1, pp. 95-110.
Grange, J. (1999) ‘Archaisme et actualite du positivisme.’ In A. Despy-Meyer A. & D. 
Devriese (eds.), 1999, pp. 35-51.
Grange, J. (2000) Auguste Comte, Eapolitique et la science. Paris: Editions Odile Jacob.
Grange, J. (2002a) due vocabulaire de Comte. Paris: Ellipses.
Grange, J. (2002b) ‘Lire Auguste Comte aujourd’hui, “Entre Science et societe’” Bulletin 
de la Societe des amis de la bibliotheque de I’Ecole poly technique, 30, pp. 11-20.
Grondeux, J. (2003) ‘Taine et Comte face a l’histoire.’ In A. Petit (ed.), 2003a, pp. 177- 
188.
Guillo, D. (2000) ‘L’empreinte de l’histoire naturelle sur la sociologie comtienne’ 
L  ’annee sociologique, 50:1, pp. 195-216.
Guillo, D. (2003) ljes figures de I'organisation. Sciences de la vie et sciences sociales au XIX" siecle. 
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Haac, O.A. (1998) ‘Auguste Comte et l’Orient.’ Revue intemationale de philosophie, 52:1, pp. 
111-126.
Haac, O.A. (2003) ‘Auguste Comte: le philosophe “systematise”.’ In A. Petit (ed.), 
2003a, pp. 117-125.
Harp, G.J. (1995) Positivist Republic. Auguste Comte and the Reconstruction of American 
Uberalism 1865-1920. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University 
Press.
Harre, (R.) (2003) ‘Positivist Thought in the Nineteenth Century.’ In T. Baldwin (ed.), 
The Cambridge Hisloty of Philosophy 1870-1945. Cambrdige: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 11-26.
Heilbron, J. (1993-1994) ‘Gelijkenissen en schinjverbanden: Meer misverstanden over 
Auguste Comte.’ Kennis en Methode, 17:4, pp. 369-377.
Heilbron, J. (1995) The Rise of Social Theory. London: Polity Press.
Heilbron, J. (1993) ‘Ce que Durkheim doit a Comte.’ In P. Besnard, M. Borlandi, and P. 
Vogt (eds.), Division du travail et lien social. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
pp. 59-67.
Hesse, D.-M. (1996) George Eliot and Auguste Comte: the Influence of Comtean Philosophy on the 
Novels of George Eliot. Frankfurt am Main, New York, Paris: P. Lang.
248
Houellebecq, M. (2003), ‘Preliminaires au positivisme.’ In M. Bourdeau, J.-F. Braunstein 
& A. Petit (eds.), 2003, pp. 7-12.
Jimenez Abad, A. (2001) E l concepto de hombre en la doctrina de la education de yiugusto Comte. 
Madrid: Fundacion universitaria espanola.
Jolibert, B. (2004) A.uguste Comte. E ’educationpositive. Paris: L’Harmattan.
Keller, F. (1998) ‘Soziologie und Utopie: “Auguste Comte” als Chiffre einer 
Unmoglichkeit’ Jahrbuch fur So^ iologiegeschichte, pp. 165-180.
Kerlan, A. (1998) Ea science n’eduquerapas: Comte, Durkheim, le modele introuvable. Bern: P. 
Lang.
Kohnke, C.F. (1997) ‘Neukantianismus zwischen Positivismus und Idealismus.’ In G. 
Hiibinger, R. Von Bruch, F.W. Graf (eds.), 1997, pp. 41-52.
Kremer-Marietti, A. (1998a) ‘Presentation’, Revue intemationale de philosophie, 52:1, 
pp. 3-5..
Kremer-Marietti, A. (1998b) ‘Auguste Comte et l’ethique de Pavenir.’ Revue intemationale 
de philosophie, 52:1, pp. 151-177.
Kremer-Marietti, A. (2001) ‘L’homme biologique selon Comte et les theories 
nouvelles..’ In C. Cassina (ed.), 2001, pp. 21-39.
Kremer-Marietti, A. (2002a) ‘Auguste Comte et la methode subjective.’ In M. Bourdeau 
& F. Chazel (eds.), 2002, pp. 257-277.
Kremer-Marietti, (2002b) ‘Auguste Comte et l’lslam.’ Bulletin de la Sotiete des amis de la 
bibliotheque de I’Ecolepolytechnique, 30, pp. 63-64.
Kremer-Marietti, A. (2003a) ‘Le biologique et le social chez Comte.’ In M. Bourdeau, J.- 
F. Braunstein & A. Petit (eds.), 2003, pp. 64-90.
Kremer-Marietti, A. (2003b) ‘De l’unite de la science a la science unifiee : De Comte a 
Neurath.’ In A. Petit (ed.), 2003a, pp. 189-203.
Kubbinga, H. (1993) ‘Auguste Comte en het molecularisme.’ Kennis en Methode, 17:4, pp. 
343-368.
Kury, L. (2003) ‘Nation, races et fetichisme: la religion de l’humanite au Bresil.’ Revue 
dyhistoire des sciences humaines, 8, pp. 125-137.
Lalouette, J. (2003) ‘Pour une approche des rapports entre Libre Pensee et Positivisme.’ 
In A. Petit (ed.), 2003a, pp. 303-315.
Lalouette, J. (2004) ‘Auguste Comte et le catholicisme.’ Quademi di acme, 66, pp. 33 — 61.
Lanaro, G. (2002) ‘La “seconda camera” di Auguste Comte.’ Rivista di storia filosofia, 57:2, 
pp. 243-251.
249
Lantz, P. (2003) ‘Depolitisation et sciences sociales.’ journal des anthropologies, 92-93, pp. 
83-97.
Lapointe, R. (1994) £Le pouvoir spirituel de la sociologie religieuse.’ Religiologiques, 9, pp. 
43-53.
Larizza-Lolli, M. (1993a) ‘Auguste Comte e gli ambienti scientifici francesi (1814-1848).’ 
RJvista di jilosojia, 84:1, pp. 21-48.
Larizza Lolli, M. (1993b) ‘Le premier rayonnement en France des idees d’Auguste 
Comte (1824-1848): les milieux, les institutions, les homes.’ 1848. Bulletin de la 
societe d’histoire de la revolution de 1848 et des revolutions du X IX  siecle, pp. 69-101.
Larizza-Lolli, M. (1999). Bandiera verde contro bandiera rossa: A.uguste Comte e gli inisj della 
Societepositiviste (1848-1952). Bologna: il Mulino.
Larizza-Lolli, M. (2003) ‘La republique, la science et les passions.’ In A. Petit (ed.), 
2003a, pp. 221-227.
Larizza-Lolli, M. (2004) ‘Auguste Comte: La repubblica, la scienza e le passioni.’ 
Quademi di acme, 66, pp. 181 — 190.
Lazinier, E. (2002) ‘Auguste Comte. La place de la psychologie.’ In M. Dora’i (ed.), 
Psychologie sociale: Reperes historiques et principaux concepts. Paris: In Press Editions, 
pp. 195-210.
Le Bras-Chopard, A. (2003) ‘L’ideal feminin d’Auguste Comte. Convergences et 
dissonances avec ses contemporains socialistes.’ In M. Bourdeau, J.-F. 
Braunstein & A. Petit (eds.), 2003, pp. 170-183.
Lettere, T. (2003) ‘Entre competence et liberte d’opinion: le pouvoir spirituel comtien 
comme modele de sociologie intellectuelle.’ In M. Bourdeau, J.-F. Braunstein & 
A. Petit (eds.), 2003, pp. 200-222.
Loue, T. (2003) ‘L’apologetique de Ferdinand Brunetiere et le positivisme: un bricolage 
ideologique “genereux et accueillant”.’ Revue des sciencesphilosophiques et theologiques, 
87, pp. 101-126.
Macherey, P. (1993) ‘De l’univers infini au monde clos : le systeme d’A. Comte et ses 
limites.’ A.nnali della scuola normale superiore di Pisa, III: X X II/1, pp. 199-226.
Macherey, P. (1996) ‘Auguste Comte.’ M. Canto-Sperber (ed.), Dictionnaire d’ethique et de 
philosophie morale. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, pp. 279-283.
Macherey, P. (1997) ‘Auguste Comte.’ In M. Canto-Sperber (ed.), Dictionnaire d’ethique et 
de philosophie morale. 2nd edition . Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, pp. 279- 
283.
Macherey, P. (1999), ‘Y a-t-il une metaphysique du positivisme comtien ?’ In A. Despy- 
Meyer A. & D. Devriese (eds.), 1999, pp. 53-62.
250
Macherey, P. (2004) ‘Comte dans la querelle des anciens et des modemes : la critique de 
la perfectibilite.’ In B. Binoche (ed.), L'homme perfectible. Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 
pp. 274-292.
Magistrale, G. (1994). i\Jeutrali^ ya t^one, spolitici^ ya i^one, iperpolitici^ yafone: metodo scientifico e 
teoriapolitica in Comte e Mary:. Fasano: Schena.
Martin, J. L. (1998) ‘Authoritative Knowledge and Heteronomy in Classical Sociological 
Theory’ Sociological Theory, 16:2, pp. 99-130.
McClellan, C. (2001) ‘The Legacy of Georges Cuvier in Auguste Comte’s Natural 
Philosophy.’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 32:1, pp. 1-29.
Mesure, S. (1999) ‘La politique positiviste. D’Auguste Comte a la tradition republicaine.’ 
In Alain Renaut (ed.), Histoire de la philosophie politique. Tome IV: les critiques de la 
modemite politique. Paris: Calmann Levy, pp. 277-235.
Mesure, S. (2002) ‘La critique diltheyenne du positivisme comtien.’ In M. Bourdeau & F. 
Chazel (eds.), 2002, pp. 209-220.
Missa, J.-N. (2004) ‘Le soi ou l'illusion d'une conscience unifiee.’ Theologiques, 12:1-2, 
pp. 165-180.
Morra, G. (1998) La sociologia si chiama Clotilde: Comte e la religione deirumanitd. Milano: 
Spirali.
Mostert, M. (1999) ‘Marc Bloch et le positivisme.’ In A. Despy-Meyer A. & D. Devriese 
(eds.), 1999, pp. 195-209.
Muglioni, J. (1995) A.uguste Comte, unphilosophepour notre temps. Paris: Kime.
Negri, A. (2003) ‘Travail et technique dans la pensee d’Auguste Comte.’ In A. Petit (ed.), 
2003a, pp. 147-157.
Pereira da Silva, C. (1995) ‘Otto de Alencar Silva versus Auguste Comte.’ Hull’ 18:34, 
pp. 167-181.
Pesavento, S. J. (1997) ‘Le positivisme dans le sud du Bresil. La republique des gauchos.’ 
Jmprevue, 1 & 2, pp. 133-143.
Petit, A. (1994a) ‘Genese de la classification des sciences d’Auguste Comte’ Revue de 
ynthese, 115:1 -2, p. 71-102.
Petit, A. (1994b) ‘Quelle place pour la psychologie dans le positivisme?’ Revue de synthese, 
3-4, pp. 393-415.
Petit, A. (1995a) ‘De Comte a Durkheim: un heritage ambivalent.’ In Borlandi M. & 
Muchielli L. (eds.), La sociologie et sa methode. Les regies de Durkheim un siecle apfes. 
Paris: L’Harmattan, pp. 49-70.
251
Petit, A. (1995b) ‘La creation de la chaire d’ « Histoire generale des sciences » au College 
de France en 1892 : un heritage du positivisme — P. Lafitte et G. Wyrouboff.’ 
Revue francaise d’histoire des sciences, XLVIIL4, pp. 521-556.
Petit, A. (1995c) ‘Les mouvements positivistes.’ In I. Poutrin (ed.), Le XIX* siecle: science, 
politique, tradition. Paris: Berger-Levrault, pp. 473-491.
Petit, A. (1996a) ‘Comte et les mathematiques.’ In Barbin E. & Caveing M. (eds.), Les 
philosopbes et les mathematiques. Paris: Ellipses, pp. 174-192.
Petit, A. (1996b) ‘Auguste Comte et les positivismes.’ In P. Raynaud & S. Rials (eds.), 
Dictionnaire de philosophie politique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, pp. 110- 
115.
Petit, A. (1997a) ‘L’heritage de Lamarck dans la philosophie positive d’Auguste Comte.’ 
In L. Goulvent (ed.), Jean-Baptiste Lamarck 1744-1829, Paris: Ed. du CHTS, pp. 
543-556.
Petit, A. (1997b) ‘ “Pouvoir spirituel” et “Pouvoir temporel” dans le positivisme 
comtien.’ Jmprevue, 1 & 2, pp. 5-58.
Petit, A. (1998a) ‘Auguste Comte et Clotilde de Vaux: les confidences de 1’ “annee sans 
pareille”.’ In S. Bemard-Griffiths & C. Croisille (eds.), Cahiers d’Etudes sur les 
Correspondances du XJXe siecle, 8, acts of the conference Difficultes d’etre et mal du 
siecle dans les Correspondances et Joumaux intimes romantiques de la premiere moitie du 
XIXe siecle, pp. 303-327.
Petit, A. (1998b) ‘Le corps scientifique selon Auguste Comte.’ In Kremer-Marietti A. 
(ed.), Sociologie de la science: sociologie des sciences et rationalite scientifique. Bruxelles: 
Editions Mardaga, pp. 69-91.
Petit, A. (1998c) ‘Positivisme et Catholicisme.’ Revue intemationale de philosophie, 52:1, pp. 
127-155.
Petit, A. (1998d),‘Le bicentenaire de la naissance d’Auguste Comte.’ bulletin de la Societe 
des amis de la hibliotheque de I’Ecole poly technique, 19, pp. 99-102.
Petit, A. (2000) ‘La fondation de la sociologie.’ In Ben Chemi-Sai'd Z. (ed.), 2000, pp. 
87-115.
Petit, A. (2001) ‘La sociocratie positiviste.’ In C. Cassina (ed.), 2001, pp. 41-63.
Petit, A.. (2002) ‘Conflits et renouveau de la psychologie comtienne.’ In M. Bourdeau & 
F. Chazel (eds.), 2002, pp. 85-110.
Petit, A. (ed.) (2003a) A.uguste Comte. Trajectoires du positivisme,1798-1998. Paris: 
L’Harmattan.
Petit, A. (2003b) ‘Presentation.’ In A. Petit (ed.), 2003a, pp. 7-10.
252
Petit, A. (2003c) ‘Des sciences positives a la politique positiviste.’ In A. Petit (ed.), 
2003a, pp. 87-115.
Petit, A. (2003d) ‘Le pretendu positivisme d’Ernest Renan/ Revue d’histoire des sciences 
humaines, 8, pp. 73-101.
Petit, A. (2003e) ‘Les disciples de la religion positiviste’ Revue des sciences philosophiques et 
theologiques, 87, pp. 75-100.
Picon, A. (2003) ‘A propos du role social de la science. Auguste Comte et les saints- 
simoniens.’ In A. Petit (ed.), 2003a, pp. 241-252.
Pickering M. (1993a) A.uguste Comte. A.n Intellectual Biography, Volume J. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Pickering, M. (1993b) ‘Auguste Comte and the Saint-Simonians’, French Historical Studies, 
18, pp. 211-236.
Pickering, M. (1996) ‘Angels and Demons in the Moral Vision of Auguste Comte.’ 
Journal of Women’s History, 8, pp. 10-40.
Pickering, M. (1997a) ‘A New Look at Auguste Comte.’ In C. Camic (ed.), Reclaiming the 
Sociological Classics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 11-44.
Pickering, M. (1997b) ‘Rhetorical Strategies in the Works of Auguste Comte.’ Historical 
Reflections: Reflexions Historiques, 23, p. 151-175.
Pickering, M. (1998) ‘Auguste Comte and the Return to Primitivism.’ Revue intemationale 
de philosophie, 52:1, pp. 51-77.
Pickering, M. (1999) ‘Auguste Comte e a esfera publica de Habermas.’ In H. Trindade 
(ed.), O Positivismo: Teoria e practica. Porto Alegre: Editora da Universidade, pp. 
59-69. Translated in French, ‘Auguste Comte et la sphere publique de Jurgen 
Habermas.’ In A. Petit (ed.), 2003a, pp. 229-237.
Pickering, M. (2003) ‘L’art de la memoire dans le systeme positiviste.’ In M. Bourdeau, 
J.-F. Braunstein & A. Petit (eds.), 2003, pp. 223-242.
Pie, B. (2000) ‘Auguste Comte on Positivism and Happiness.’ Journal of Happiness Studies,
l ,p p . 423-445.
Pie, B. (2003) ‘Sur le chemin du salut public: de la dispersion du savoir humain a la
guerison intellectuelles de l’homme.’ In A. Petit (ed.), 2003a, pp. 205-219.
Porteret, V. (2001) ‘Societe militaire et societe industrielle chez Saint-Simon et Auguste 
Comte.’ Res Champs de Mars, 10, pp. 9-29.
Pozzi, R. (2001) ‘Sociologia, religione e politica in Comte: considerazioni introduttive.’ 
In C. Cassina (ed.), 2001, pp. 5-12.
253
Pozzi, R. (2003) ‘Comte devant son siecle.’ In M. Bourdeau, J.-F. Braunstein & A. Petit 
(eds.), 2003, pp. 135-150.
Repplinger, R. (1997) La grande crise finale: cp Auguste Comte Krisendiagnosen. Tubingen: 
Sofort Druck A. Brenner.
Repplinger, R. (1999) Auguste Comte und die Lntstehung der Sociologie aus dem Geist der Krise. 
Frankfurt am Main & New York: Corpus Verlag.
Robert, O. (2002), ‘La tentation comtienne de John Stuart Mill: un “disciple” 
indiscipline’ Revue d’histoire des sciences humaines, 7, pp. 129-156.
Rutigliano, E. (2001) Teorie sociologiche classiche: Comte, Marx, Durkeim. Torino: B. 
Boringhieri.
Sacquin, M. (2003) ‘Les manuscrits d’Auguste Comte a la Bibliotheque Nationale de 
France.’ In A. Petit (ed.), 2003a, pp. 401-416.
Schandeler, J.-P. (2003) ‘L’architecture du savoir: ideologic et positivisme.’ In A. Petit 
(ed.), 2003a, pp. 43-51.
Scharff, R.C. (1995) Comte After Positivism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Scharff, R.C. (1998) ‘Comte and Heidegger on the Historicity of Science.’ Revue 
intemationale de philosophie, 52:1, pp. 29-49.
Sebestik, J. (2003) ‘Thomas Garrigue Masaryk ou le positivisme detoume’ Revue d’histoire 
des sciences humaines, 8, pp. 103-123.
Semin, A. (1993) Auguste Comte, prophete du X IX 1 siecle: sa vie, son oeuvre et son actualite. Paris: 
Albatros.
Simon, D. (2004) ‘Auguste Comte e l'economia solidale.’ Sociologia, 37:1, pp. 87 — 
91.
Smith, R. (2002) ‘Brentano et le positivisme.’ Archives de philosophie, 65:2, pp. 291-309.
Soriano, M. (1997) ‘Las fuerzas extranas, positivisme et fantastique en Argentine.’ 
Imprevue, 1 & 2, pp. 175-221.
Stengers, I. (1999) ‘Le probleme du positivisme aujourd’hui.’ In A. Despy-Meyer A. &
D. Devriese (eds.), 1999, pp. 13-34.
Trindade, H. (2003) ‘La republique positiviste chez C om te: theorie et pratique.’ In A. 
Petit (ed.), 2003a, pp. 363-399.
Vaillant, A. (2003) ‘Auguste Comte et l’esprit de systeme : le syndrome de Louis 
Lambert.’ In A. Petit (ed.), 2003a, pp. 71-83.
Valade, B. (2002) ‘La critique comtienne de l’ecole retrograde.’ In M. Bourdeau & F. 
Chazel (eds.), 2002, pp. 133-151.
254
Vatin, F. (2003) ‘Comte et Cournot. Une mise en regard biographique et 
epistemologique.’ Revue d’histoire des sciences humaines, 8, pp. 9-40.
Vidoni, F. (1997) ‘Gli inizi del positivismo in Francia.’ Imprevue, 1 & 2, pp. 59-89.
Wagner, G. (2001) Auguste Comte %ur Einjuhmng. Hamburg: Junius Verlag.
Wartelle, J.-C. (2001) E ’heritage d’Auguste Comte. Histoire de I’ t(Bg/ise”positiviste, 1849-1946. 
Paris: L’Harmattan.
Weirich, P. (1998) ‘Comte et Mill sur l’economie politique.’ In Revue intemationale de 
philosophie, 52:1, pp. 79-93.
Wemick, A. (2000) ‘From Comte to Baudrillard: Socio-theology after the End of the 
Social.’ Theory, Culture &  Society, 17:6, pp. 55-75.
Wemick, A. (2001) Auguste Comte and the Religion of Humanity: the Post-theistic Program of 
Trench Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wils, K. (1997) ‘Gehuld in het schitterend kleed der nieuwste Parijsche mode. Auguste 
Comte in Nederland (1845-1880).’ Bijdragen en Mededelingen betrejfende de 
Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, 112, pp. 26-33.
Wils, K. (1999) ‘Les insuffisances historiques du positivisme. Henry Thomas Buckle en 
Belgique et aux Pays-bas.’ In A. Despy-Meyer A. & D. Devriese (eds.), 1999, pp. 
163-188 : tr. of ‘Het historisch tekort van het positivisme. Henry Thomas Buckle 
in Nederland en Belgie.’ In J. Tollebeek, G. Verbeeck, T. Verschaffel (eds.), De
lectuur van het verleden. Opstellen over de geschiedenis van de geschiedschrijving aangeboden 
aan Reginald de Schryver. ??: Universitaire Pers Leuven, 1998, pp. 273-299.
Wils, K. (2003) ‘Les sympathisants de Comte et la diffusion du positivisme aux Pays-Bas 
(1845-1880).’ In A. Petit (ed.), 2003a, pp. 333-349.
Ziberman, R. (1997) ‘Je t’aime, moi non plus: le positivisme et la litterature bresilienne.’ 
Imprevue, 1 & 2, pp. 91-112.
Yamashita, M. (1995) ‘La sociologie francaise entre Auguste Comte et Emile Durkheim: 
Emile Littre et ses collaborateurs.’ E ’Annee sociologique, 45:1, p. 83-115.
255
Appendix II: Comte and Mill on Biology.
The focus on the biological premises of the sexual equality debate raises an 
important historical issue. As we have seen, Comte suspected that Mill’s reluctance to 
accept biological evidence was due to his inadequate scientific education. Accordingly, it 
is to the point to check whether Comte’s charge held against Mill. What is ironic is that 
Comte’s concern about Mill’s alleged ignorance of biology was turned back against 
Comte himself by later critics. For instance, Thomas Huxley, who had been criticized by 
the English Positivist Richard Congreve for not having paid tribute to Comte’s 
contribution to the development of science, retorted that, as far as he was concerned, he 
could not grant him any role in it1. Evoking his reading of the Cours, he recalled how 
superficial Comte’s account appeared to him: “What struck me was his want of
apprehension of the great features of science; his strange mistakes as to the merits of his 
scientific contemporaries; and his ludicrously erroneous notions about the part which 
some of the scientific doctrines current in his time were destined to play in the 
future”(T. H. Huxley, “The Scientific Aspects of Positivism”[1869], p. 149)2. He went 
on to point out what he considered Comte’s various misunderstandings of scientific 
theories and practices, emphasizing his shortcomings vis-a-vis the life sciences, Huxley’s 
own favourites: he underlined Comte’s outright rejection of microscopic observation in 
anatomy, his endorsement of phrenology, his refusal of cell theory, and -  of course the 
charge most dear to Huxley — his dismissal of all evolutionary hypotheses as 
“foolish”(Ibid., p. 155)3. Less than a century later, F. A. Hayek castigated Comte for his 
amateurism, defined as the lack of proper scientific culture4.
Once the importance of the scientific background to the debate of sexual equality 
is taken into account, the appraisal of the extent of Comte’s and Mill’s biological 
knowledge becomes crucial for the understanding and assessment of their respective 
arguments. However, more than a tinge of relativism should colour our appraisal, for 
the question we have to address is not that of the conformity of Comte’s and Mill’s 
opinions with today’s biological knowledge, but rather that of their conformity with the 
biological knowledge available to them: to use a Comtian expression, were Comte and 
Mill “thinkers truly on the same level as their century”5 when they started discussing the 
biological aspect of the sexual equality issue?
As far as Comte’s biological education is concerned, his acquaintance with the life 
sciences is well-documented. Originally trained as a mathematician at Polytechnique
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(whose syllabus included the teaching of various engineering techniques requiring a 
good deal of highly abstract theoretical knowledge of physics and even chemistry), 
Comte seemed to have exhibited a lively interest for biological studies almost 
immediately after his expulsion from the school in 18166. Whilst staying in Montpellier 
(before returning to Paris at the end of 1817), Comte is said to have attended various 
lectures at the then very famous Faculte de Medecine, one of the oldest in France and 
the stronghold of Barthezian Vitalism7. A few years later, when he started the set of 
lectures that constituted the basis for his Cours de philosophie positive, he decided to 
supplement his biological knowledge by attending, from 1829 to 1832, the course in 
general and comparative physiology given by his friend and mentor Henry Ducrotay de 
Blainville (1777-1850) at the Parisian Faculte des sciences, which Comte heralded “the 
most perfect type of the most advanced state of current biology” (A. Comte, PP, p. 665) 
and on which he drew extensively in his subsequent writings8. This knowledge
eventually found its place in the several lessons Comte dedicated to biology in the Cours
de philosophie positive (lessons Forty to Forty-five, published in 1838 with the lessons on 
chemistry in the third volume of the Cours), which amply testify to his knowledge of the 
recent developments in the field, and attracted some of its renowned practitioners (such 
as Robin9) and a few physicians (Broussais10, Littre11) towards positivism.
To be sure, Comte’s methodological and biological conceptions had been 
severely challenged by key members of the biological community (his most illustrious 
critic being the physiologist Claude Bernard), but the very fact that they had been 
thought worth criticizing is proof of their heuristic nature. As G. Canguilhem recalled,
“in fact, from 1848 to 1880 in France, there was no biologist or physician who, in 
order to situate her own research in the concourse or the clash o f  ideas, to define 
for herself the meaning and scope o f  her work, did not deal either directly with the 
themes o f the Comtian philosophy o f  biolog}', or indirectly with themes deriving 
from it” (G. Canguilhem, “La philosophie biologique d’Auguste Comte”, p. 71)12.
Everything considered, whilst recognizing Comte’s status as an amateur in biology, one 
must nonetheless take into account that he was a particularly well-informed amateur.
Conversely, little is know about the extent of John Stuart Mill’s actual 
acquaintance with biological knowledge, as the absence of secondary literature on the 
subject illustrates. Alexander Bain once argued that “science was his forte” (A. Bain, John 
Stuart Mill, p. 142)13, meaning that the powers of analysis and abstraction with which he 
was endowed naturally predisposed him for the pursuit of logical and methodological 
enquiries, what Mill called in a letter to his friend John Sterling “the science of science
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itself, the science of investigation — of method” (Mill to J. Sterling, October 20-22, 1831; 
in J. S. Mill, Earlier Letters, p. 79). As his Autobiography recounts, Mill had been exposed 
early on by his father James — besides other subjects such as ancient languages, 
literature, history, psychology, and political economy - to the subtleties of syllogistic 
logic, its clarifying virtues, and its usefulness at identifying fallacies. He mainly taught 
himself mathematics, just as he did for experimental science, which he learnt from 
books (the four volumes of Thomas Thomson’s System of Chemistry14 were among his 
favourites) but seldom practiced. But no specific mention is made of biological studies 
in the Autobiography.
This very peculiar education came to a halt when Mill joined the family of Sir 
Samuel Bentham, Jeremy Bentham’s brother, for a one year-trip to France in 182015. 
When the party reached Montpellier — Comte’s hometown — around mid-October, it 
was decided that the young John Stuart would register for the winter courses at the 
Faculte des Sciences, where he attended lessons on chemistry, zoology, and logic, and 
became friend with the chemist-to-be and discoverer of bromine Antoine-Jerome 
Balard and Comte’s childhood friend Romeo Pouzin16. It was also during his boyhood 
visit to France that Mill discovered botany with George Bentham17. Accordingly, one 
may date his first encounter with some of the life sciences from the beginning of the 
twenties, without being able to specify exactly what a fifteen-year old boy could get out 
of such an exposition.
On his return to England, John Stuart Mill first resumed his solitary train of 
education under the supervision of his father whilst studying law under John Austin, 
and then engaged with a few other promising young men (such as George Grote, John 
Austin’s brother Charles, Eyton Tooke) in a discussion group which attempted to 
review through and through the main treatises available in the fields of political 
economy, logic, and psychology. Accordingly, since the Autobiography remained silent as 
to Mill’s later cultivation of scientific subjects, one has to rely for the assessment of his 
actual acquaintance with those on the meagre evidence offered by his early training: in 
this last regard, Bain’s overall estimate, if harsh, seems appropriate and undoubtedly 
applies to Mill’s biological studies:
“His readings in Physical Science were (...) untutored: unless at Montpellier, he
never had any masters, and his knowledge was at no time mature” (A. Bain, John
Stuart Mill, p. 25).
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Fortunately, the lack of textual evidence for the period spreading from the early 
twenties to the beginning of the correspondence with Comte is not total. For, besides a 
quite anecdotic letter published in the Morning Chronicle (September 1, 1823) which 
defended the contested practice of human dissection18, Mill published (in the issue of 
November, 1834, of The Monthly Kepository) a review of the physician Thomas King’s The 
Substance of a -Lecture, Designed as an Introduction to the Study of Anatomy Considered as the Science 
of Organisation *. To be sure, King’s tract was a rather short (only 32 pages) and quite 
elementary survey of what we could call biology, but the architecture of his presentation 
and the sources on which he drew are worth noticing. Firstly, King argued that any 
proper understanding of living beings (of their “organization”) could only be attained by 
the search for the similarities and contrasts existing between themselves and between 
them and inorganic beings:
“What are Organized Beings?
The answer can be furnished only by comparison. We must seek it in a comparative
enquiry” (T. King, The Substance of a Lecture, p. 8)
He then went on to analyse the differences between organic and inorganic bodies 
with respect to their ultimate chemical components, their combination, the structure 
they gave rise to, their external form, their growth and decay, etc. So doing, as Mill’s 
review noticed, King relied almost exclusively on the works and classifications “which 
characterise the French anatomists and physiologists” (J. S. Mill, “Dr King’s Lecture on 
the Study of Anatomy”, 323)20. And among the French scientists King mentioned 
(Bedard, Bichat, Vauquelin, Chevreul), the one who received most praise and whose 
ideas (especially his zoological classification and his definition of life as a dual 
movement of absorption-exhalation) constituted the backbone of his presentation was 
Comte’s biological mentor, Henry Ducrotay de Blainville, whom King said he “could 
not better than follow” (T. King, The Substance of a Lecture, p. 12) in his exposition21. 
From this short introduction to the Science of Organization, Mill might have retained 
that biology was at root a classificatory science resting on the comparative method, as 
Blainville’s achievements testified. Four years later, his reading of Comte’s Lessons of 
biology in the Cours certainly strengthened such a view.
Eventually, another manner of approaching the difficult question of the extent 
of Mill’s knowledge of biology by the time his correspondence with Comte started 
amounts to considering the first edition of his System of Logic and locating therein 
evidence for it. But here again, the record of Mill’s familiarity with the life sciences is
259
hard to establish. Firsdy, because most of the examples chosen by Mill to illustrate his 
different views on the logic of science were drawn from the inorganic sciences of 
physics and chemistry, which Mill, just as the majority of his contemporaries, considered 
as more perfect embodiments of scientific method than the organic sciences. Secondly, 
because the few references made to the latter were seldom first hand22.
Bain23, who proofread the Logic, provided a telling testimony in that last respect:
“The main defect o f  the work (...)  was in the Experimental Examples. I soon saw, 
and he felt as much as I did, that these were too few and not unfrequently incorrect.
It was on this point that I was able to render the greatest service. Circumstances had 
made me tolerably familiar with the Experimental Physics, Chemistry and 
Physiology o f  that day, and I set to work to gather examples from all available 
sources” (A. Bam, John Stuart Mill, p. 66).
For instance, the reference to Liebig’s work in organic chemistry in the first edition24 
and the physiological examples taken from Brown-Sequard’s researches on cadaveric 
rigidity25 and the nervous system26, which pardy replaced them in the 1865 edition, were 
procured by Bain.
Another major source of Mill’s physiological examples was John Ayrton Paris’ 
Pbarmaco/ogia (first published in 1812)2'. Paris, a lecturer in materia medica both at the 
medical school in Great Windmill Street, London, and at the Royal College of 
Physicians, presented in his book a vast number of proprietary medicines and analyzed 
their effects on the body. The historical aspect of Paris’ work, which usually underlined 
the various shortcomings of earlier chemists and druggists, enabled Mill to take stock of 
a few good instances of the different fallacies he exposed in Book V of the System of 
LogidH.
One may also note throughout Mill’s book cursory mentions of some naturalists 
whose names were evoked just in passing (Bichat29, Magendie30) or whose works were 
used to illustrate Mill’s views on non-biological subjects such as names, definitions, or 
predication (Linnaeus31, Cuvier32). However, Mill’s borrowings from other authors and 
his occasional remarks about biology or biologists offer little evidence of his biological 
culture besides the bland facts that he displayed a well-educated layman’s knowledge of 
the doctrines of the life sciences and a certain interest in the illustrations he could find 
in them for his own methodological views.
Yet, some chapters o f the System of Logic seem to be more promising with regard 
to our present concern. For instance, in Book IV, Chap. IV (“The Principles of a 
Philosophical Language Further Considered”), Mill singled out botany as a perfect
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instance of a precise and reliable language because it rested on an accurate descriptive 
sensationalist terminology. The two following chapters on classification (VII, “O f 
Classification, as Subsidiary to Induction”; VIII, “O f Classification by Series”) drew on 
the previous one by taking up the example of botany for the formation of natural 
groups, but also referred to the different systems of zoological classification for the 
formation of natural arrangements.
As far as botany was concerned, these different passages indicated Mill’s first­
hand knowledge of the matter, even if his treatment of the classificatory issue was not 
intended as an exhaustive presentation of his philosophy of botany but rather as a 
refutation of Whewell’s conceptions of the subject. As Henry Trimen pointed out after 
Mill’s death,
“the views expressed so clearly in these chapters are chiefly founded on the actual 
needs experienced by the systematic botanist, and the argument is largely sustained 
by references to botanical systems and arrangements. Most botanists agree with Mr.
Mill in his objections to Dr Whewell’s views o f a natural classification” (H. Trimen,
“John Stuart Mill’s Botanical Studies”, p. 31).
As for zoology, it clearly appears that Mill’s exposition depended heavily on 
Comte’s own presentation of serial classification in the Forty-Second Lesson (General 
Considerations on Biotaxic Philosophy) of the Cours-. the former’s chapter on the 
“Classification by series” opened with the acknowledgement that this “important 
portion of the theory” of classification had “not yet as far as [he was] aware, been 
systematically treated of by any writer except M. Comte” (J. S. Mill, TL, IV, VIII, 1, p. 
726). But the very details of his exposition also indicated the Comtian influence.
The echo was particularly obvious when Mill came to conceive serial 
classification as taking the form of a single linear ascending series (Sect. 2), organized 
with reference to a type-species (Sect. 3), and constituted of discrete groupings (Sect. 4). 
When compared with its positivist equivalent, the parallel is striking: for Comte, a serial 
classification amounts to
“conceiving all the cases studied as being radically analogous from the perspective 
adopted and to representing their actual differences as simple and determined 
modifications, within a fundamental abstract type, by all the characters proper to 
the corresponding organism or being” (A. Comte, PP, p. 702-3).
And just as Comte33, Mill considered the former’s biological mentor zoological 
classification as the most satisfactory. For Blainville’s classification of animals took man
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as its type-species and ranked hierarchically the other animal forms according to the 
degree to which they approached the ‘sensibility’ (the ability of being stimulated and of 
responding to these stimulations) and the locomotive ability proper to mankind (its 
‘animality’). Both properties were held to be dependent on the nervous system, but the 
difficulties associated with the identification of the latter in the animals situated at the 
bottom of the series prompted Blainville to choose a correlated trait (the envelop of the 
different animals) as the appropriate character for ranking.
Comte followed Blainville both for the choice of “the adult and normal man” as 
the fundamental zoological type (Ibid., p. 703) and the election of what he called 
“external characters” for the establishment of the different groups forming the animal 
series (Ibid., p. 783). And Mill imitated Comte:
“the preference, among zoological classifications, is probably due to that o f  M. de 
Blainville, founded on the differences in the external integuments; differences which 
correspond, much more accurately than might be supposed, to the really important 
varieties, both in the other parts o f the structure, and in the habits and history o f  
the animals” Q. S. Mill, SL., IV, VII, 2, p. 715)34.
Eventually, another possible source for Mill’s information on biology was the 
physician W. B. Carpenter35, whose Principles of General and Comparative Physiology (1839) 
and Principles of Human Physiology (1842) Mill invoked to support his claim that vital 
phenomena were good instances of the composition of causes (J. S. Mill, 3jL, III, VI, 2, 
p. 374). It is likely that Mill read Carpenter’s General Physiology, since he reviewed its 
second edition36 in the Westminster Review (for the issue of January of 1842) and
commended its “clear exposition of the highest generalities yet arrived at in the science
of life” and its “breadth of speculation and reach of philosophy”, which Mill said had 
“not hitherto been often exemplified in this country” (J. S. Mill, “Carpenter’s 
Physiology”, p. 324)37. Carpenter’ treatise, which was primarily aimed at medical 
students but proved itself accessible to a lay audience, was indeed a very rich (almost 
six-hundred pages long, with numerous illustrative plates) and well-informed textbook 
(it included the latest developments in histology due to Schleiden and Schwann, and 
presented minutely recent works on embryology and reproduction). Moreover, his 
approach, which took into consideration the different forms of living beings, conformed 
well with the biological canon adopted by Comte and Mill, even if Carpenter did not 
refer explicidy to Blainville. Firstly, he repeatedly underlined the essentially comparative 
nature of biological studies:
262
“It is now generally acknowledged, that Physiology can only be properly studied by 
a constant reference to the comparative structure and functions o f  many different 
classes o f  Animals” (W. B. Carpenter, 'Principles of General and Comparative Anatomy, p.
XIII).
“the study o f  Physiology' can only be scientifically prosecuted (...)  by embracing 
within its range the examination o f  the phenomena exhibited by all classes o f  living 
beings” {Ibid., par. 5, p. 4)
His contribution to this endeavour, which Mill also highlighted in his review38, 
resided in the establishment of a continuum between vegetal and animal physiology. 
Secondly, Carpenter emphasised that the principles of classification, especially for the 
animal kingdom, should be based on easily observable external characters, even if he 
acknowledged the difficulty of establishing a definitive classification on those39:
“It is the object o f  the Naturalist ( ...)  to discover what peculiarities o f  external 
conformation are constantly associated with differences in internal conformation, 
whether or not he can discern the objects o f  their connection; in order that he may 
not be obliged to examine the latter, in every case in which a classification, already 
formed, is brought into use” {Ibid., par. 105, p. 80)
In that regard, he took the nervous system as the point of reference of any 
classification, for
“it is found that every' one [the natural] groups may be characterised by the form 
and development o f  its nervous system; and as this has an obvious relation with all 
the functions, both animal and nutritive, it is probably the best single character 
which could be adopted” {Ibid., par. 107, p. 83).
Accordingly, Carpenter started his zoological classification with the primitive 
Radiata, ascended through the Mollusca and the Annulosa to the Vertebrates, and naturally 
reached to the organism in which the nervous system was most developed, namely 
Man, thereby reiterating the example of “most of the recent works” in physiology in 
which “an outline of the development and actions of each system in the inferior tribes is 
prefixed to the details relating to its condition in man” (Ibid., p. XIII)40. To be sure, 
Carpenter did include a good deal of the recent discoveries made by experimental 
physiologists (especially with regard to cell-theory and reproduction) that Comte did not 
take into account, but the main tenets of his methodology he shared with the author of 
the Cours and Mill: the comparative nature of biology; a single linear classification 
determined with reference to man; the emphasis on the nervous system as the 
appropriate ranking criterion.
To conclude this foray into Mill’s writings to assess the extent of his biological 
culture, one may argue that it reveals at least two contextual facts relevant to the 
discussion of the biological aspect of the sexual equality issue, and enables one both to
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challenge the charge of “biological ignorance” raised against Comte, and to moderate 
Comte’s suspicions about Mill’s knowledge of the life sciences.
Firstly, whereas Comte was well-informed of biological doctrines, Mill’s 
knowledge of the life sciences was certainly not on a par with that of his French 
correspondent, botany excepted.
Secondly, although Mill did not seem to have engaged into any kind of detailed 
study concerning biology comparable to that Comte set about for himself, for most of 
his knowledge was second-hand, either gleaned from Bain or through his reading of 
Comte’s Cours and Carpenter’s treatises, he nevertheless cannot have failed to notice 
what A. Desmond has described as the “importation” of French comparative anatomy 
in England during the 1830s and 1840s41. Drawing on German Romantic and French 
Materialistic sources, this movement rapidly diffused (especially through the works of 
Carpenter) among the scientific audience, in which it rooted a certain style of biological 
thinking and a few methodological principles. As L. S. Jacyna has argued42, the 
comparative perspective in physiology depended on three main tenets: the belief in the 
existence of a structural plan common to all living beings; the postulation of a 
progressive continuity between the different forms of life; and the acknowledgment of a 
parallelism between the zoological and embryological series. Emphasizing the order and 
regularity present in the organic world, this approach therefore advocated the search for 
the laws governing biological phenomena and called for the application of the same 
rules of reasoning and evidence already in use in the inorganic sciences. Eventually, 
because it was held to be the interface between the physical and the mental, the study of 
the nervous system became an essential element of such an inquiry. Having witnessed 
these developments, Mill was certainly aware of and interested in the methodological 
and philosophical issues they raised. In any case, in the light of the varied textual 
evidence adduced above, the thesis about Mill’s alleged lack of scientific culture needs 
qualification: to be sure, compared, say, with Herschel or Whewell, or even with Comte, 
one may agree with S. F. Cannon that “ Mill knew litde” (S. F. Cannon, Science in Culture, 
p. 23)43 about science and its history; however, it would be a gross exaggeration to claim 
that that he was totally ignorant of what was going on within the scientific world. Mill 
was certainly not a practitioner of the natural sciences; but he did know a good deal 
about them.
What is interesting in such a state of affairs is that it sheds a new light on the 
vexed question of Comte’s influence on Mill. According to Mill’s own testimony in the
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Autobiography, his only debts to Comte’s Cours had to do with the Inverse Deductive 
Method introduced in Book VI of the System (J. S. Mill, Autobiography, p. 219), and a few 
other elements to be found “in the chapter on Hypotheses and in the view taken of the 
logic of algebra” (Ibid1, p. 255). But, as the previous analysis of Book IV has revealed, 
Comte’s stamp on Mill’s conception of classification was real. Furthermore, the fact, 
pointed out by J. M. Robson44, that Mill’s writing of this Book and his reading of 
Comte’s Lessons on biology were coeval strengthens the case for Comte’s influence 
over Mill. Consequendy, one is entided to think that the latter not only benefited from 
the former for his general philosophy of science and his philosophy of social science, 
but also for his understanding of biology and his philosophy of classification45.
Accordingly, as far as Comte is concerned and at the time he was corresponding 
with Mill, the Huxley/Hayek charge can be set aside. However, it seems also to be the 
case that after having written his Lessons on biology, Comte did not reallv keep abreast 
of the latest developments in this field. As Littre pointed out, “his readings were made 
during his youth; after that period, he neither read nor re-read” (E. Littre, Auguste Comte 
et la philosophie positive, p. 257). As for Mill, his relative lack of biological education may 
explain his eagerness to benefit from Comte’s expertise in the field (especially by 
welcoming any reading advice), just as he benefited from his reading of the Cours. Surely, 
this contrast between Comte and Mill does not imply that the former was necessarily 
right and the latter necessarily wrong when it came to adjudicate the biological aspect of 
the sexual equality issue. But it certainly shed some light on Mill’s cautiousness46 with 
regard to the biological premises of the debate and on his outraged reply, when the 
relation was drawing to its close, to Comte’s suspicion about the extent of his familiarity 
with biology:
“I do not believe that I studied biology any less than all the other basic sciences. I 
believe I know the field just about as well. I am well acquainted enough with the 
method and the general principles o f  all sciences, including biolog}7. I may even 
keep more informed o f  the latest achievements in this science than in the others. As 
for my meditations, they are most often devoted to questions o f  biolog}7” (Mill to 
Comte, March 26,1846; in Haac [ed.], p. 365-6).
1 T. H. Huxley, “On the Physical Basis o f Life”, in Lay Sermons, Addresses, and Reviews. Fourth edition. 
London: Macmillan & Co, 1872, pp. 120-46. It was in this article that Huxley devised a qualification o f  
positivism that met with great success: “In so far as my study o f  what specially characterises the Positive 
Philosophy has led me, I find therein little or nothing o f  any scientific value, and a great deal which is as 
thoroughly antagonistic to the very essence o f science as anything in ultramontane Catholicism. In fact, 
M. Comte’s philosophy in practice might be compendiously described as Catholicism minus Christianity” 
(P- HO).
2 T. H. Huxley, “The Scientific Aspects o f  Positivism”, in La)' Sermons, pp. 147-73.
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3 On the other hand, Huxley praised Comte’s advocacy o f the importance o f  biolog}7 for sociological 
studies: “Nothing could be more interesting to a student o f biolog}7 than to see the study o f  the biological 
sciences laid down as an essential part o f  the prolegomena o f  a new view o f social phenomena”(7fo’<7., p. 
148).
4 F. A. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science. Studies on the Abuse of Reason. Second Edition. Indianapolis: 
The Libert}7 Fund, 1979.
5 See A. Comte, PP, p. 852.
6 On Comte’s biological studies, see H. Gouhier, La Jeunesse d Auguste Comte et la formation du positivisme. Vol. 
Ill: Auguste Comte et Saint Simon. Second edition. Paris: Vrin, 1970, pp. 236-8.
' On Montpellier’s Faculte de Medecine, see E. A. Williams, The Physical and the Moral. Anthropology, 
Physiology, and Philosophical Medicine in France, 1750-1850. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 
Chap. I, II (pp. 73-6) and Chap. I ll (pp. 136-151). Pickering suggests that Comte might have followed the 
advice o f  his childhood friend Romeo Pouzin, who withdrew from Polytechnique to enter the course o f  
medical education at Montpellier in 1816 (M. Pickering, Auguste Comte, p. 33, n. 111). However, Gouhier 
(cf n. 6 supra) doubts that Comte got much from his stay in Montpellier. It has to be noted that Mill, 
whilst in Montpellier, befriended Pouzin, to whom -  Mill told Comte in one o f  his letter -  he “stood 
closer than anyone else at Montpellier” (Mill to Comte, January 28, 1842; in Haac [ed.], p. 130), with the 
exception o f the chemist-to-be Balard and the Berard family. In a later letter, Comte forwarded Pouzin’s 
greetings to Mill, with Pouzin’s memory o f his acquaintance with Mill: “Air John Mill was very young at 
the time (...)  but it was already easy to recognize his superior intelligence” (Comte to Mill, August 28, 
1843; Ibid., p. 182).
8 Comte dedicated the Cours to Blainville and the mathematician Fourier. On Blainville, see W. Coleman, 
“Blainville, Henri Alarie Ducrotay de”, in C. C. Gillispie (ed.), Dictionary of Scientific Biography. New York: 
Scribner, 1981, vol. 1, pp. 187-8. On Comte and Blainville, see E. Littre, Auguste Comte et la philosophie 
positive. 2mi edition. Paris: Hachette, 1864, Chap. XI; P. Ducasse, Methode et Intuition che-y Auguste Comte. 
Paris: Alcan, 1939, pp. 127-38; H. Gouhier, “Blainville et Comte”, Revue d ’histoire des sciences, 1979, 32, 1, 
pp. 59-72; D. Guillo, Les figures de I’organisation. Sciences de la vie et sciences sociales au X I X  siecle. Paris: PUF, 
2003, Third Part, chap. 3. Guillo argues that “Comtian positivism — and particularly its sociological part -  
is built in its entirety on a basis o f notions borrowed from nineteenth-century comparative anatomy”{Ibid., 
p. 338) and illustrates how Comte relied on biological analogies to expose such central conceptions o f  the 
Cours as the law o f  the three stages, the static/dynamic distinction in the study o f  intellectual functions, 
the classification o f  the sciences, or the view o f  the history o f  mankind as a development from a 
preformed germ. However, it has to remembered that some o f  these conceptions — especially the law o f  
the three stages and the classification o f the sciences, which appeared in Comte’s Plan des travaux 
scientifiques necessaires a la reorganisation de la societe (first published in 1822) - antedated Comte’s encounter 
with, and reading of, Blainville and cannot be considered to be straightforward translations o f biological 
conceptions. On the other hand, Guillo makes a forceful case for Comte’s biologically inspired rhetoric in 
the Cours.
9 Charles Robin (1821-1885), the first holder o f  the Chair o f  Histology at the Faculte de Medecine de 
Paris, was one o f the founding members o f the Societe de Biologie (1848), an institution which played a key 
role in the establishment o f  biolog}7 as an autonomous discipline in France.
10 Francois Joseph Victor Broussais (1772-1838) actively contributed to the medical revolution o f the early 
nineteenth century by furthering the search for the anatomical localisation o f diseases.
11 Emile Littre (1801-1881), a physician turned lexicographer, co-authored with Charles Robin the 
numerous re-editions o f  the Dictionnaire de Medecine o f  Nysten, one o f  the most authoritative compendium 
in the field in the nineteenth-century.
n  G. Canguilhem, “La philosophie biologique d’Auguste Comte et son influence en France au XIXe 
siecle”, in G. Canguilhem, Etudes d ’histoire et de philosophie des sciences concemant les vivants et la vie. Seventh 
Edition. Paris: Vrin, 1994, pp. 61-74. General appraisals o f Comte’s philosophy o f  biolog}7 can be found 
in L. Levy-Bruhl, The Philosophy of Auguste Comte. Translated by K. de Beaumont-Klein, with an 
introduction by F. Harrison. London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co, 1903, Book II, Chap. IV; J. Grange, La  
philosophie d ’Auguste Comte. Science, Politique, Religion. Paris: PUF, 1996, Deuxieme partie, Chap. II.
13 A. Bain, John Stuart Mill. A  Criticism with Personal Recollections. London: Longmans, Green & Company, 
1882. For a detailed and critical account o f John Stuart Mill’s education, see J. Stillinger, “John Stuart’s 
Mill Education: Fact, Fiction, and Alyth”, in M. Laine (ed.), A  Cultivated Mind. Essays on J. S. Mill Presented 
to John M. Robson. Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1991, pp. 19-43.
14 T. Thomson, A  System of Chemistry. London: Robinson, 1802. In 1818, some Professors o f the Royal 
Military College, Bagshot, who had been greatly impressed by John Stuart’s intellectual achievements, sent 
an invitation for the boy to attend a series o f chemistry lectures.
15 For more details on Mill’s French experience, see A. J. Mill, John M ill’s Boyhood Visit to France. Toronto: 
University o f Toronto Press, 1960.
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following Mill’s visit to France touched upon such scientific subjects as botanies or chemistry and Balard’s 
early professional career as a scientist (one o f  Balard’s letter recounted his recent discovery o f bromine): 
see M. Filipiuk, “Letters to Mill from ‘A Friend o f  My Own Choosing’: Antoine Jerome Balard (1802-76”, 
Mill Newsletter 1987, X X II/2 , pp. 9-27.
17 Botany was Mill’s lifelong hobby, which resulted in the publication o f a considerable number o f notes 
in the specialized magazine The Phytologist. On Mill as a botanist, see H. Trimen, “John Stuart Mill’s 
Botanical Studies”, in H. R. Fox Bourne, John Stuart Mill: Notices of his Life and Works, together with Two 
Papers Written by Him on the Land Question. London: E. Dallow, 1873, pp. 28-31. George Bentham (1800- 
1884), Samuel’s son and Jeremy’s nephew, first practiced botany as a gifted amateur whilst managing his 
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establishment o f  the Royal Botanic Garden, Kew, by donating more than 100,00 specimens o f his 
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species, served as a foundation for modern systems o f vascular plant taxonomy.
18 This letter, signed “A Friend to Science”, was primarily an attack on the “popular”(i.e. religious) 
prejudice existing against human dissection. Perhaps inspired by Jeremy Bentham’s decision to have his 
body used for medical purposes, Mill recommended, “as the only effectual mode o f  destroying the 
prejudice, that such as are superior to it adopt the practice o f leaving their own bodies to the surgeons” (J. 
S. Mill, “Resurrection-Men”; in J. S. Mill, Newspaper Writings. Edited by A. P. Robson and J. M. Robson. 
Introduction by A. P. Robson. Textual introduction by J. M. Robson. Toronto & London: University o f  
Toronto Press and Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986, p. 50).
19 T. King, The Substance of a Lecture, Designed as an Introduction to the Study of Anatomy Considered as the Science of 
Organisation; and Delivered at the Re-Opening of the School, founded by the late Joshua Brookes, Esq. . In Blenheim 
Street, October 1':, 1833. London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, Green, and Longman, 1834. King, a 
member o f the Royal College o f Surgeons and lecturer on anatomy and surgery7, had been trained in 
France (as his credentials indicated, he had been a “House Surgeon to the Hotel Dieu in Paris) and 
seemed to have submitted a thesis at the Faculte de Medecine de Paris (the Bibliotheque Inter- 
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movement, and, as Adrian Desmond has noted, his taking-over o f  Joshua Brookes’ private medical school 
in the mid-thirties enabled him to teach “the best French comparative embryology and serialist zoology7” 
(A. Desmond, The Politics of Evolution. Morphology, Medicine, and Reform Radical London. Chicago & London: 
The University o f Chicago Press, 1989, p. 164).
20 J. S. Mill, “Dr King’s Lecture on the Study o f  Anatomy7”, in J. S. Mill, Miscellaneous Writings. Edited by J. 
M. Robson. Toronto & London: University o f Toronto Press -  Roudedge & Kegan Paul, 1990, p. 323.
21 “Blainville (...)  has given a zoological classification, under which all the parts o f  it [the Science o f  
Organization] might be arranged, so as to make it complete; and he has furnished a vast deal o f  the 
materials for such work. He divides the Science o f  animals, (or what I should term the complete Anatomy 
o f animals) that is Zoology7, or the Science o f  Organization limited t the animal kingdom, into: - 
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of a Lecture, p. 5); Zootomia (anatomy); Zoobiologia (physiology7); Zooethica (natural history); Zooiatria 
(pathology7); and Zoonomia (the management o f animals).
22 With regard to die inorganic sciences, Mill openly acknowledged his debt to William Whewell’s History 
of the Inductive Sciences (1837): “the materials were there, for my own thoughts to work upon: and the author 
had given to those materials the first degree o f  elaboration which so greatly7 abridges and facilitates the 
subsequent labour” (J. S. Mill, Autobiography, pp. 215-7).
23 On Bain, see J. N . Hattiangadi, “Bain, Alexander”, in C. C. Gillispie (ed.), Dictionary of Scientific Biography. 
New York: Scribner, 1981, pp. 403-4; R. Rylance, Victorian Psychology and British Culture. 1850-1880. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, Chap. 5 (“Alexander Bain and the N ew  Psychology7 o f  the Higher 
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24 J. S. Mill, SL, III, IX, 1, Appendix E (III, XIII, 1 to 3, were included until the sixth edition o f  the 
book).
25 Ibid., I ll, IX, 4.
26 Ibid., Ill, XIII, 3.
27 Mill used the fifth edition o f  John Ay7rton Paris’s Pharmacologia; comprehending the A r t of Prescribing upon 
Fixed and Scientific Principles; together with the History of Medicinal Substances. London: Phillips, 1822.
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method to the direct construction o f  the true animal hierarchy”(A. Comte, PP, p. 787) and appended a 
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& London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1984, pp. 47-92.
43 S. F. Cannon, Science in Culture: The Early Victorian Period. N ew  York: Dawson & Science History 
Publications, 1978.
44 J. M. Robson, “Textual Introduction”, in J. S. Mill, SL, p. lxv.
45 Comte’s influence was also noticeable in Book III, Chap. XI, Sect.l o f the first edition o f  the System, 
where he is credited for having underlined the fact that pathological phenomena could serve as substitutes 
for experimentation in physiology (Ibid., p. 456n) and for his presentation o f  comparative anatomy and 
physiology (Ibid., p. 458).
4fi For instance, Mill to Comte, October 30, 1843: “I find it quite natural that you should explain this 
opinion o f  mine [on sexual equality7] as based on an insufficient acquaintance with the physical theory o f  
animal life, and above all o f  cerebral physiology. I am doing and shall continue to do my utmost to make 
such objections vanish” (in Haac [ed.], p. 198).
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Appendix III: Comte’s Anatomical, Physiological, Developmental and 
Comparative Arguments for the Subjection of Women. 
A - Human Anatomy.
The first argument to consider is the anatomical one, which Comte believed 
demonstrated “the radical differences, both physical and moral (...) which, within the 
human race, separate one [sex] from the other, notwithstanding the common 
preponderance of the specific type” (A. Comte, PS, p. 186). More precisely, what was to 
be proven was that the bodily structure of women prevented them from competing with 
men with regard to achievements of the intellect or the will.
Comte’s lack of explicit textual reference for this claim should not come as a 
surprise, when one realizes that it was a commonplace among specialists of the female 
sex. Take for instance the two articles on “Femme (anthropologie et physiologie)” and 
“Femme (morale)” Julien-Joseph Virey wrote for the Dictionnaire des sciences medicates par 
une societe de medecins et de chirurgiens (1812-1822)1 edited by Charles-Louis-Fleury 
Panckoucke. In these articles, Virey, a pharmacist and physician, summarized the 
medical and biological lore about women and emphasised the consequences it had on 
their social condition. He maintained that
“The entire moral constitution o f the feminine sex derives from the innate 
weakness o f  its organs; ever)'thing is subordinated to this principle, by which nature 
wanted to make woman inferior to man; she is not woman Only by the attributes o f  
her sex; she is in everything” (J.-J. Virey, “Femme (morale)”, p. 555)2.
The alleged source of this generalized weakness was ascribed to her “frail and 
slender organization”, which was said to be made out of “thin and greatly irritable 
fibres” (Ibid., p. 557). In that instance, it is very likely that Virey drew on Bordeu’s 
Recherches sur le tissu muqueux (1767), according to which the specific disposition in 
women of the mucous or “cellular” tissue spreading throughout the body was
responsible for their heightened sensibility3. Consequently, women were said to be
subjected to rapid alterations of mood and to be more sensitive to both the flow of 
outer impressions and the play of passions than men. Consequently, they were deemed 
less able to control themselves, to focus at will, and were often described as being 
governed by their emotions. As Virey remarked,
“Such a moral disposition is usually at odds with the strength, thoroughness, 
perseverance, and the firmest qualities o f man (...); the frivolousness o f  her tastes,
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the eternal versatility o f  her ideas and penchants, will forever hold woman beyond 
perfection in the sciences, the letters or the arts” {Ibid., p. 558).
But it was not only the peculiarities of her nervous system that fated woman to be 
the inferior of man, for even her bones contributed to her subjection. Virey argued that 
whereas the general conformation of woman’s skeleton took the shape of a pyramid 
(the pelvis, thighs, buttocks being comparatively broader than the head, shoulders, 
chest), man’s skeleton revealed a prominence of the upper parts of the body, especially 
his skull which was said to “contain three to four ounces of brains more (...) than that 
of woman” (J.-J. Virey, “Femme (anthropologie et physiologie)”, p. 543)4. These 
osteological features, Virey added, mirrored in the specific functions of men and 
women:
“This difference in conformation is analogous to the functions o f  each sex; man is 
destined by nature to work, to use his bodily strength, to think, to use his reason 
and his genius to support the family, o f which he is the chief; woman, to whom  
generation was to be entrusted, needed a large pelvis which lent itself to the dilation 
o f  the matrix during pregnancy, and to the passage o f the foetus during deliver}7”
{Id).
There again, Virey merely echoed themes that were widespread in the 
anatomical writings of the Enlightenment. As Londa Schiebinger recalls, “beginning in 
the 1750s, a body of literature appeared in France and Germany calling for a finer 
delineation of sex differences” (L. Schiebinger, “Skeletons in the Closet: The First 
Illustrations of the Female Skeleton in Eighteen-Century Anatomy”, p. 51)5. For 
instance, the “pyramidal” aspect of woman’s body was easily perceived in the plates due 
to Marie-Genevieve-Charlotte Thiroux d’Arconville and published in 17596, in which 
the skull was depicted “as smaller in proportion to the body than a man’s, the hips as 
much broader than men’s, and the ribs as extremely narrow and confining” (Ibid., p. 59). 
This rendition proved extremely popular, and found its way into influential anatomical 
texts such as John Barclay’s A.natomy of the Bones of the Human Body.
However, the rival female skeleton produced by the German anatomist Samuel 
Thomas von Soemmerring in 1796s challenged d’Arconville’s widely accepted model by 
picturing women’s ribs sensibly less smaller in proportion to the hips than usual. The 
debate about the relative merits of the two contestants soon focused on their respective 
depictions of the female skull. And it was certainly a debate relevant to the sexual 
equality issue, for cranial volume was indeed held to be the index of innate intellectual 
capacities. In this last respect, Virey seemed to have been a bit over-enthusiastic in his
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definitive pronouncement on man’s superior cranial volume, for Soemmerring argued 
that the female skull was larger in proportion to the body than the male skull: he 
maintained that the female skull represented 1 /6  of total body weight, whereas the male 
skull represented from 1/8 to 1/10. If someone believed, just as Soemmerring, that 
“larger skulls hold larger brains, that larger brains are capable of greater intellectual 
activity, and, consequendy, that intellectual ability is innate” {Ibid., p. 78, n. 75), and also 
accepted taking into account not absolute but proportional weights, then the case for 
women’s intellectual superiority could be made. In other words, the grounds for Virey’s 
confidence were quite shaky.
In the absence of evidence for the innate inferiority of women, one could 
nonetheless argue that, even if their skeleton did not prevent women from pursuing 
intellectual activities, some of its features destined them to one definite function, that of 
reproduction: the article “Squelette”(first published in 1765) of the Encyclopedic ou 
Dictionnaire raisonne des sciences, des arts et des metiers, edited by Diderot and d’Alembert, thus 
listed the various osteological details facilitating deliver)’ to conclude that these 
peculiarities “prove that the destination of women is to have children and feed them” 
(“Squelette”, E^ ncyelope die, p. 483)9. Yet, the mere fact that women could bear offspring 
was certainly no reason why they ought to have done so preferably to any other activity.
Comte might well have been aware of the inconclusive nature of the anatomical 
arguments; hence their absence from his letters. But they certainly were part of the 
biological evidence he thought could be adduced to establish women’s intellectual 
inferiority. As for Mill, he did not fail to question them in his replies to Comte, and 
focused on women’s brain size rather than on the features of their tissues. This 
emphasis may receive a twofold explanation. On the one hand, the histology inherited 
from Bordeu had lost much of its appeal by the time of the Comte-Mill correspondence, 
especially when compared with the latest developments in cell-theory. For instance, Mill 
could have found in W. B. Carpenter’s Principles of Human Physiology, to which he referred 
in the System10, a descriptive account of the cells, bones, and tissues of the human body 
that did not have the sexualized overtones of Virey’s or Bordeu’s depictions. On the 
other hand, Mill could also have come across the following claim, which appeared in the 
last paragraph of Carpenter’s book (Par. 774 : “Relative Characters of Sexes”):
“There is no obvious structural difference in the nervous system o f  the two sexes 
(putting aside the local peculiarities o f its distribution to the organs o f  generation); 
save the inferior size o f  the Cerebral Hemispheres in the Female” (W. B. Carpenter,
Principles of Human Anatomy, p. 729)11.
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This anatomical contrast was mirrored at the functional level, for, Carpenter argued, 
“there can be no doubt that — putting aside the exceptional cases which now and then 
occur -  the intellectual powers of Woman are inferior to those of Man” (Id). Woman’s 
perceptive faculties were said to be more acute, her views more “distinguished by 
clearness and decision”, and her emotions and instincts more active than those of man. 
Conversely, she was less capable of sustained mental effort, her thought lacked 
comprehensiveness, and she was not endowed with the same amount of “volitional 
power,f* as man. Carpenter thus concluded:
“In regard to the inferior development o f her Intellectual powers, therefore, and in 
the predominance o f  the Instinctive, woman must be considered as ranking below 
Man; but in the superior purity and elevation o f her Feelings, she is as highly raised 
above him” {Ibid., pp. 729-30).
The support given to Comte’s theses in what Mill considered as one “of the best 
treatises of general and human physiology” in English (Mill to Comte, January 28, 1843; 
in Haac [ed.], p. 129) might have convinced him that it was necessary to challenge the 
conclusion of arguments drawn from the size of women’s brain. His reply came with the 
letter to Comte dated August 30, 1843, within which he made clear he was aware of the 
anatomical arguments:
“I do know that very- eminent physiologists suggest that the feminine brain is 
smaller, consequently weaker, but more active than that o f  men” (Mill to Comte,
August 30,1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 183).
After having drawn the likely psychological consequences deriving from female cerebral 
constitution (a lesser aptitude for continuous and prolonged intellectual work that 
rendered them less fit for science; a greater efficiency and quickness of mind that suited 
them for poetry and practical life) and acknowledged that such a hypothesis was 
compatible with the observed facts, Mill nonetheless qualified the conclusion arrived at:
“We would, however, risk exaggerating the extent o f the diversity a great deal if  we 
did not take into account the difference in education and in social position; for 
whether women are or are not naturally inferior in their capacity for prolonged 
intellectual work, there is no doubt that nothing in their education is organized to 
develop this talent, while for men, the study o f  science and even o f dead languages, 
certainly tends to do just that” {Ibid., p. 184).
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What Mill suggested was to balance the consideration of the biological make-up of 
individuals and its bearing on their mental capacities with a concern for the way the 
environment related to the latter: perhaps was it the case that differences in brain 
conformation made a difference with respect to intellectual achievements, but surely 
were also differences in education and social position. Given that women were usually 
prevented, because confined to household chores, from being exposed to stimulations 
favourable to their intellectual development, it was difficult to assess the respective 
contributions of biological and environmental factors. Mill did not go into the details of 
the perspective that would permit this assessment, but his sketchy evocation pointed 
towards a conception of human nature in which human capacities were dependent on 
the biological make-up of their bearers but the actualization of these capacities 
depended on environmental stimulations. Furthermore, he remained silent as to the 
outcomes of such a survey, even if his letter repeatedly stressed the plasticity of human 
nature.
However, certainly because of Comte’s refusal to consider his comparative 
proposal12, Mill became less accommodating and retracted what he said about women’s 
brain size:
“If, in our discussion o f  the characteristic tendencies o f the two sexes, I have cited 
the view that I knew to be that o f several eminent physiologists — the view that 
women are less suited than men to sustained intellectual work, in science as much as 
in philosophy — it was not presented as my own opinion. I stated it as the only one 
among the theories o f  this type that did not seem to stand in flagrant contradiction 
to the facts” (Mill to Comte, October 30,1843; Ibid., p. 199).
To be sure, Mill thought that a theory of a different type was available, which ascribed 
the lesser “special vocation”(Id) of women for science to their education and social 
education, as outlined in the 1832-1833 unpublished piece “On Marriage”13. But what 
he certainly realized was that neither the psychological nor the physiological theory 
could be assessed independently of each other. Since Comte refused even to consider 
the former, Mill eventually judged the latter irrelevant to the adjudication of the sexual 
equality issue. As things then stood, it was a tie: the anatomical arguments failed to settle 
the case one way or another.
B - Human Physiology.
Whereas the anatomical argument tried to infer women’s inferiority from the 
structure (osteological or histological) of their bodies, the physiological argument
273
attempted to show that the dominant function which characterized them as women 
prevented them from partaking in intellectual activities. As E. A. William notices, many 
physicians in the late eighteenth-century thought that the physiology of reproduction 
could back up their claim that
“women differed inherently from men, and taught that women had but limited 
capacity for any activities other than those for which nature had intended them — 
gestation, birthing, nursing, and the care o f  children” (E. A. Williams, The Physical 
and the Moral, pp. 54-5).
This was exacdy the perspective adopted by Roussel14, the Montpellier physician 
Comte referred Mill to in his letter of November 14, 1843: as Comte put it, Roussel 
based this “principle [the subordination of one sex to the other] simply on the dominant 
idea of the physical functions [proper to man and woman]” (Comte to Mill, November 
14, 1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 208). Women were physiologically destined to be mothers, 
and this biological fate conditioned the scope and nature of their mental abilities.
Even though it antedated by far the clinical and anatomo-pathological 
revolution, Roussel’s Sjsteme physique et moral de la femme (1775)15 continued to be read and 
used by many French physicians late in the nineteenth-century: the famous 
dermatologist Alibert procured a second edition of it in 180516; Virey mentioned 
Roussel in his article for Panckoucke’s Dictionnaire7 as an important reference on the 
subject in 1815; and the book was still available around 187018. Accordingly, one may 
say that Comte merely endorsed a traditional medical teaching that still was authoritative 
in the 1840s.
The two main tenets of Roussel’s thought about woman were his 
“incommensurabilism” and his finalism. Firstly, he maintained that women were not 
imperfect men, and claimed that they should be studied in their own right: even if they 
belonged to the same species, the differences between the two sexes were such that they 
pointed towards two different “natures”.
“There is a radical, innate difference [between men and women], which exists in 
every country and every people. (...) the disposition o f the parts that compose 
woman’s body is determined by nature itself, & (...)  serves as a foundation for the 
physical and moral character that characterizes her”(P. Roussel, Sjsteme, pp. 16-7)19.
Secondly, Roussel radicalized his physiological functionalism into a finalism so 
as to turn the reproductive capacity of woman into her essence: her destination was to 
give birth to children and raise them, to the exclusion of any other activity. There was 
more to woman than a child-bearer, Roussel acknowledged, but one should not be 
misled; the perpetuation of mankind was her main contribution20.
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“All that nature especially did for woman was only to lead her there: when nature 
succeeds, its plan is fulfilled” {Ibid., p. XXXV).
This emphasis on the reproductive role of women was far from original, but 
Roussel added a new ingredient that transformed a purely physiological consideration 
into an all-encompassing perspectives with dramatic social consequences. For Roussel 
argued, in line with the holistic approach he inherited from the vitalist Montpellier 
Faculte de Medecine, that the sexual dimorphism of mankind also conditioned non- 
reproductive functions, including psychological ones such as reasoning and imagination.
“the difference o f  the sexes may very well find its way into the mind & character, 
for different instruments produce different effects” {Ibid., p. 23, note a).
It was not only that men and women were anatomically (women have breasts, no 
external genitalia, etc.) and physiologically different (they have menstruations, get 
pregnant, etc.); these very differences were reflected in all the other parts of their bodies 
and affected all the aspects of their individualities: the essence of sex
“does not limit itself to one single organ, but extends, in more or less sensible 
nuances, to all the parts o f  the body; so that woman is not woman in one place 
only, but from every' perspective through which she can be considered” {Ibid., p. 2).
For instance, Roussel claimed that the necessary constitutional weakness of 
women (which permitted untroubled pregnancies and easy deliveries) supposed softness 
in their tissues and a greater laxity' of their osteological structures. Accordingly, he could 
then draw on the teachings of Bordeu21 and maintain that the greater sensibility of 
women made them capricious, inconstant, and unfit to engage in any demanding 
intellectual task:
“It is not unlikely that this weakness, which we have held to characterize the organs 
o f woman, prevents her from achieving the efforts o f  concentration that are 
necessary for the study o f  the abstract sciences (...); and that her imagination, 
which is too lively and so unable to sustain any enduring attention, renders her unfit 
for the arts that depend on that faculty o f the soul; but it is also this weakness that 
gives birth to the sweet and affectionate sentiments constituting the principal 
character o f  woman” {Ibid., pp. 31-2).
These “sentiments” therefore prompted women to search for a protector who 
would guide them in the path of life and to whom women would repay his dedication 
through care and affection.
To be sure, Roussel did not deny that women could, to a certain extent, launch 
into intellectual pursuits; but, as a guarantor of the “bonne morale” {Ibid., p. XI), the
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physician emphasized the evil consequences of such attempts for their health. Whereas 
moderate exercise and a sensible diet were advocated as good preservatives, a sustained 
application of the female’s mind to abstract or complicated questions was considered a 
threat to the balance of her temperament, which was naturally “sanguine”, and thereby 
would compromise her reproductive abilities. Since any additional energy devoted to 
intellectual pursuits would be spent to the detriment of the rest of the organism, 
women ought to abstain from them for their own sake and in the interest of the species. 
Just as men of letters were often constitutionally sick due to their unhealthy mode of 
life, Roussel argued the unthinking “femmes savantef ’ would lose their reproductive 
powers:
“This affectation familiar to men o f  letters would follow even more naturally and 
more infallibly from a serious study in women who would be foolish enough to 
devote themselves to it. Their delicate organs would suffer even more from the 
inevitable drawbacks it leads to” {Ibid., p. 103).
So Roussel’s medical moral, inspired by his “incommensurabilism” and his 
finalism, was to encourage women to stick to their traditional roles as mothers and 
household carers. In short, reproductive physiology provided the rational for woman’s 
subjection.
This line of reasoning proved extremely appealing and became an essential 
element of nineteenth-century bio-medical knowledge about women. Take for instance 
P.-J.-G. Cabanis’ highly influential Rapports du physique et du moral de I’homme (1802)22: 
whilst paying tribute to Roussel’s Sjsteme and Rousseau’s Emile2*, the Fifth Memoire on 
“the influence of the sexes on the character of ideas and moral affections” also argued 
for the existence of radical constitutional differences between men and women deriving 
from the sexual dimorphism of the human species24, the overriding importance of 
reproductive physiology in the life and functioning of individuals25, and its specific 
consequences with regard to their psychological make-up26.
In this last respect, Cabanis merely developed Roussel’s analysis by emphasizing 
that the specific manner of feeling in woman, itself dependent on her constitutional 
frame and the influence of her reproductive organs, led her to pay attention only to 
what was related to her needs; to engage in minute handwork; to let her imagination 
wander; or to develop moral insight and sagacity in personal relations. Conversely, she 
righdy avoided any intellectual task requiring knowledge, perseverance or reasoning. In 
a tone reminiscent of the Greeks, Cabanis concurred with Roussel that the frail 
constitution of woman was mirrored in her intellectual shortcomings:
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“In a word, both the nature o f things and experience prove that, if  the weakness o f  
woman’s muscles forbids her to enter the gymnasium and the hippodrome, the 
qualities o f her mind and the role she must play in life forbid her perhaps even 
more imperiously to make an exhibition o f herself in the lyceum or in the 
colonnade” (P.-J.-G. Cabanis, Rapports, 243).
This depiction of woman inherited from Roussel and popularized by Cabanis 
spread out and rapidly turned into a commonplace, especially in the medical field. The 
twin theses of the unfitness of women for abstract mental reflection and of the sterility 
that would naturally result from an excessive engagement in intellectual pursuits were 
reiterated ad nauseam in the literature, as the physician and historian of medicine J.-L. 
Moreau de la Sarthe’s Hzstozre naturelle de la femme (1803)27 and Virey’s articles for 
Panckoucke’s Dictionnaire illustrated28.
With regard to the debate on sexual equality, it is interesting to note that this 
physiological approach, which focused on the dramatic consequences of the 
reproductive function on women’s intellectual capacities, was set aside both by Comte 
and Mill. As for Comte, he made clear in the Fiftieth Lesson of the Cours that this 
argument would fail to provide evidence to support his claim for the subjection of 
women:
“I have purposely set aside the vulgar consideration o f the mere material differences 
on which such a fundamental subordination has been irrationally grounded; for it 
has to be essentially connected with the nobler properties o f  our cerebral nature”
(A. Comte, PP, p. 187).
What the physiological perspective maintained was that women had an essential role in 
the reproduction o f the human species, to which the constitution of her body testified. 
But, as we have seen with Roussel, it was not held that this role was incompatible with 
intellectual pursuits. Accordingly, when they were not pregnant and once their children 
were raised, women could surely devote their free time to something else than 
household matters. And what about childless women? Could they not contribute to the 
well-being of mankind through scientific or cultural achievements? So, it was not 
enough for Comte to have the generational role of women recognized; he also needed 
to have a positive proof of their intellectual inferiority, which certainly had, in his eyes, 
more to do with the physiology of their brains than with that of their reproductive 
organs.
Similarly, Mill never evoked in his letters the arguments drawn from the 
physiology of reproduction. In fact, it is very likely that they might have seemed quite 
exotic to him, especially when the holistic approach of women’s constitution developed
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by Roussel or Cabanis is compared with the more neutral approach in Carpenter’s 
Principles of Human A.natomy. In this last book, the various details o f the reproductive 
process were extensively treated in the light of the most recent discoveries in the field, 
but no inferences were made from those as to the intellectual capacities of women. As 
we have seen, Carpenter certainly held that women were intellectually inferior to men, 
but he did not claim that the phenomena associated with generation wrere the causes of 
such a difference. Accordingly, Mill may have felt authorized to skip the consideration 
of arguments drawn from the physiology of reproduction, even the more so given 
Comte’s reluctance to endorse them29.
C - Developmental Analysis.
Another view that Cabanis, Virey or Moreau inherited from Roussel, and on 
which Comte himself drew’ at length, was the assimilation of women to children. For if 
women were closer to children than to men, anatomically and physiologically speaking, 
it wras claimed to follow that their intellectual capacities could not compete with those of 
men, just as everybody agreed that the intellectual capacities of a child were inferior to 
those of an adult. For whereas the child could grow into an adult, an adult woman 
would never become a man. Such was the knock-down argument provided by the intra­
specific comparison of the respective development of man and woman, what Comte 
called its “third mode”.
As he first stated in the Cours and reasserted in the correspondence with Mill, 
Comte held that intra-specific comparison could also setde the case about women’s 
intellectual inferiority. In that respect, the formulation given in Comte’s letter to Mill 
dated July 16, 1843, is the most explicit:
“As imperfect as biology may still be in every respect, it seems to me that it can 
already firmly establish the hierarchy o f  sexes, proving both anatomically and 
physiologically that for almost the entire animal chain, and especially in our species, 
the female sex constitutes a sort o f state o f radical childhood, which makes it 
essentially inferior to the corresponding organic type” (Comte to Mill, 16 July, 1843; 
in Haac [ed.], p. 179-80).
Putting aside for the time being the inter-specific component of this claim, one 
nonetheless realises that the demonstration of women’s inferiority according to this last 
approach involves a developmental component that appeals both to anatomical and 
physiological evidence. The rationale of the argument, which is certainly one of the 
reasons for the permanence of the “childlike woman” myth, seems to be the following:
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let us take a case in which there is no dispute as to the extent of the respective 
intellectual achievements of the individuals considered, namely the case contrasting 
children with adults. Everybody would agree that the intellectual achievements of adults 
outstrip by far those of children. If one could show that women are on a par with 
children for their intellectual achievements, then Comte’s argument for the latter’s 
innate inferiority would follow, provided one also accepts the additional premise that
the intellectual shortcomings of women are due to a constitutional cause (their
biological make up having not developed beyond the stage of infancy) nothing could 
compensate. To be sure, the comparison of women with children was not a novelty, 
but, as Londa Schiebinger points out3", the alleged support it gained from biology in the 
nineteenth-century greatly contributed to strengthen its rhetorical power.
The retention o f juvenile characteristics in mature women (what is called neoteny 
in the context of evolutionary theory) was already pointed out by Roussel in his Sjsteme:
“Woman, whilst approaching puberty, seems to move away less from her primitive
condition than man. Sensitive & gentle, she always retains something o f  the
temperament proper to children” (P. Roussel, Sjsteme, p. 6).
When puberty occurred, Roussel argued, the maturing process produced dramatic 
internal and external changes in woman’s body (complexion, voice, height, movements), 
but her organs and her tissues were still characterized by the softness typical of infancy, 
which made them highly receptive to sensory impressions: hence “the passive state to 
which nature destines her” (Ibid., p. 15), which explained why it had been observed to 
exist between man and woman a “radical, innate difference (...) in every country and 
every people” (Ibid., p. 16). Neither any alteration in the circumstances nor any amount 
of training or education could modify such a state of affairs: women were, at least from 
the intellectual point o f view, less developed than men, as their constitutional proximity 
with children demonstrated.
The success of this argument almost rivalled that of the anatomical and 
physiological ones. If Cabanis’ Rapports tirelessly repeated the importance of the softness 
of woman’s tissues but did not link it explicitly with the constitution of the child, Virey 
did not fail to make the comparison in one of his articles for Panckoucke’s Diciionnaire:
“woman relates to infancy in many respects” (J.-J. Virey, “Femme (anthropologie et 
physiologie)”, p. 544).
His list of commonalities was long, but to name just a few: bones smaller than 
those of man; a spongier and wetter cellular tissue; a smaller and quicker pulse;
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beardlessness; a taste for sweet and sugary food; a sanguine temperament. But, and that 
was the critical point for the proof of their innate intellectual inferiority, child and 
woman shared the same unfitness for sustained mental activity because of their specific 
physiology:
“Like a child, her organs easily give in to impulsions; she exhibits a heightened, and 
consequently excessively variable, sensibility, which is incapable o f persevering in 
the same sensations; or whose constancy lies in a perpetual variety’ o f  sentiments 
about the same object” {Ibid., p. 546).
However, whereas the stiffening of nerves and tissues in the (male) child could allow 
education and discipline to have their effects, namely to facilitate the access to 
autonomy, females’ immutable “softness” severely limited the impact of exercise and 
training on their mental development. The enduring immaturity of women made them 
girlish to the last, and consequently necessitated their subjection to the authority of 
thoughtful and strong-willed men.
What is striking about the comparison of children and women is that it gave a 
new impetus to old discussions. For instance, we have seen previously how the 
d’Arconville/Soemmerring debate reached a stalemate because of the unreliability of the 
data at hand. Yet, the anatomist John Barclay, whose writings had been instrumental in 
introducing the D ’Arconville skeleton in England, found a way to vindicate the view 
that, notwithstanding Soemmerring’s measurements, the skull size of women 
demonstrated their intellectual inferiority. He agreed with the German anatomist that 
their skull was larger than that of men if considered in relation with the size of their 
body. But, and that was the nerve of Barclay’s argument, so was the children’s skull. 
Consequendy, he inverted the usual claim according to which the larger the skull, the 
bigger the brain, the greater the intelligence, by relating women’s large skulls to an 
incomplete anatomical and physiological development. In his 1829 Anatomy of the Bones of 
the Human Body, Barclay vindicated pictorially his interpretation by introducing what is 
likely to be the first anatomical drawing presenting joindy skeletons of man, woman and 
child31. His depiction was in many respects similar to that of Virey: children and women 
had equivalent skull sizes, a frontal fissure, smaller bones than men, comparable rib 
cages, jaw shapes, and feet sizes. However, he also acknowledged that the assimilation 
had a limit: women’s pelvis was specific.
“It is there [in the pelvis] that we cease to trace the analogies between its [the female 
skeleton’s] proportions and those o f  the foetus: or in other words, it is there that, in 
deviating from those characters which at one time were common to both [male and 
female], we regularly find it [the pelvis] deviating farther than that o f  the male -  the
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pelvis o f  the foetus being always proportionally the smallest o f  the three, and that o f  
the female proportionally the largest” (J. Barclay, quoted in L. Schiebinger,
“Skeletons in the Closet”, p. 65).
And in line with Roussel, Cabanis, Virey, or Moreau de la Sarthe, Barclay’s presentation 
associated women’s intellectual inferiority (due to an immature growth) with their 
reproductive role: babies, not thoughts, should be the products of women’s bodies.
As we have seen, Comte took it that the “childlike woman” argument offered 
substantive support for his case for female subjection: both the Cours and his letter to 
Mill dated July 16, 1843 stressed this point. Accordingly, Mill could not fail to challenge 
the conclusion drawn from developmental analysis. In his letter dated August 30, 1843, 
Mill made clear he knew what Comte suggested:
“I think I understand what you mean when you compare the organic constitution o f  
the feminine sex to a state o f prolonged childhood. I am well acquainted with what 
many physiologists have said on this subject, and I know that not only in the 
muscular and cellular system but also in the nervous system and quite probably in 
their brain structure, women are less removed than men from the organic nature o f  
children” (Mill to Comte, August 30,1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 183).
Mill even added four paragraphs later that he was not denying that
“women, like anyone who is more nervous and excitable than the average person, 
will naturally have a character that resembles young persons more than the mature”
{Ibid., p. 184).
Yet, whilst taking note of the teachings of the physiologists, Mill nonetheless tried 
again to bring to the forefront of the discussion the necessity to balance the 
consideration of biological factors with that of environmental ones. Now, the gist of the 
“childlike woman” argument was on the contrary to maintain that the similarities 
between women and children with regard to intellectual achievements were primarily 
ascribable to a similar physiological constitution, women being held not to have 
developed further than the stage of infancy. Ignoring the physiological facts adduced in 
support of this claim32, Mill maintained that the hypothesis of an incomplete 
physiological development did not exhaust the stock of likely explanations for women’s 
lesser intellectual record.
“To make it so, one would have to prove that the inferiority o f  children as 
compared to men depends on the anatomical difference o f their brain[s], while it 
evidendy depends to a large degree, if not entirely, on the lack o f  training” {Ibid., p.
183).
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What Mill apparently wanted to argue was that the child/adult — women/men analogy 
did not hinge decisively on anatomy. For, Mill seemed to suggest, when we claim that 
the intellectual capacities of adults outstrip those of children, what we generally assume 
is not that anatomy makes a difference (since the comparison between children and 
adults naturally makes sense only if premised on the fact that the two groups share the 
same physiological make-up on which intellectual abilities depend33), but rather that 
education and experience do. Furthermore, if we compare two adult men with respect 
to their respective record of intellectual achievements, any difference would be primarily 
accounted for by a difference in education or experience. It is only in case no 
environmental cause can be adduced for the discrepancy that we turn to anatomy. So 
why should we act differently with women? The example Mill appended to his previous 
statement pointed towards such a line of reasoning:
“for a great number o f  men, especially o f the higher classes o f  workers, their daily 
occupations necessitate, or at least permit, sustained intellectual application, while 
for the great majority o f women, the perpetual obsession with the petty concerns of  
domestic life, that distracts the mind without occupying it, admits no intellectual 
effort wdiich requires either physical isolation or uninterrupted attention” (Ibid., p.
184).
To grasp the strength of Mill’s point, one must put it back into its historical 
context. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that in anrien regime societies, 
intellectual and moral capacities were correlated with lineage (virtuous and intelligent 
men necessarily being of noble birth, whereas men of humble birth remained peasants 
and workers because less gifted). Modern societies, and especially post-revolutionary 
ones, refuted this hierarchical prejudice based on the alleged properties of kinship, by 
enabling the higher classes of workers to develop and manifest their mental abilities by 
transforming their social condition, notably by educational means. Let us apply the same 
process to women, and we will see what the outcome would be, Mill implicitly proposed 
by concluding that it is the way we usually conceive the effects of education on boys:
“Among the men themselves, one can certainly discover no great aptitude for 
mental work among those whose childhood was spent far from any study and 
where the requirements o f  later life have not made up here what was lacking during 
their early education” (Id).
Unfortunately, Comte did not seem ready to accept Mill’s rendition of the 
problem:
“While admitting the anatomic differences which place the feminine organism 
further from the mature human type, I believe that you do not assign an important 
enough physiological role to these differences, while perhaps exaggerating the
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possible effect o f  training which, after all, necessarily assumes first o f  all a suitable 
constitution [i.e. a capacity to be trained]” (Comte to Mill, October 5, 1843; Ibid., p.
189).
What Comte failed to see was that he was just dogmatically asserting women’s 
intellectual inferiority. As Mill claimed, the actual condition of women would prevent 
them from exhibiting the true scope of their mental abilities. Either they were naturally 
inferior, and their condition would only renew and reinforce their inferiority. Or they 
were naturally equal (or superior), but the weight of social arrangements would stifle 
their development. In any case, Mill suggested, the only way to decide the question of 
the natural inferiority of women would be to alter their social condition so as to be able 
to compare men’s and women’s achievements.
D - Inter-Specific Comparison.
Eventually, the comparison between all living organisms was held by Comte to 
support his claim for the subjection of woman. The precise sources of this last argument 
are certainly the most difficult to identify, for Comte declared that, although he had 
been inspired by Blainville, he also acknowledged that the French scientist proposed 
“no express thesis of any kind” (Comte to Mill, November 14, 1843; Ibid., p. 202) 
concerning the alleged intellectual inferiority of women34. So, what made Comte think 
that
“it is impossible not to see emerge, from the whole o f  zoological studies, the 
general law o f  the superiority o f  the masculine sex in all the upper ranges o f  the 
hierarchy o f living beings” (Id.)?
If one sticks to the idea of a single linear ascending series, organized with 
reference to a type-species and constituted of discrete groupings, as theorized by 
Blainville and accepted both by Mill and Comte, one of the reasons why the latter may 
have held inter-specific biological classification to support the case for woman’s 
inferiority surfaces: within the anthropocentric frame characteristic of the pre- 
evolutionary context, the type-species was “man, considered in the adult and normal 
state” (A. Comte, PP, p. 700)35. However, Comte later specified that it was not the 
human species as such that served as a type but only the “male sex”(Ibid, p. 705), 
because it truly constituted the higher — most developed — element in the biological 
series. Accordingly, Comte may have thought that inter-specific comparison provided
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evidence for man’s superiority over woman, and primarily with regard to intellectual 
capacities.
Now, this last contention rests on somewhat shaky grounds for several reasons. 
First of all, Comte argued in the Cours that the greater scope of inter-specific 
comparison supported the case for women’s inferiority because it allegedly 
demonstrated that female inferiority was the rule in the (dimorphic) animal kingdom. 
But he also pointed out that this support primarily concerned claims that dealt with 
biological phenomena such as physical strength — which could be observed in many 
different specie of animals -, not claims about intellectual capacities that could be 
identified with precision only in the most developed organisms:
“This is certainly the case for the most eminent intellectual and moral functions, 
which, except for man, disappear almost entirely or become hardly recognizable 
once one goes beyond the first classes o f mammals. One must undoubtedly regard 
this tendency to become less completely applicable as a radical imperfection o f  the 
comparative method, especially when the complication and utmost importance o f  
the phenomena considered would demand a more vigorous assistance from 
fundamental resources” {Ibid., p. 707).
For instance, Comte’s mentor Blainville maintained that his zoological 
classification, which rested on the morphological appraisal of organisms’ structural 
disposition for sensibility and locomotive abilities, eschewed the consideration of the 
cerebral functions on which depended intellectual capacities, because, as D. Guillo 
recalls, Blainville. admitted that “in the case of the cerebral functions, the “faculty” 
cannot be deduced from the anatomical or morphological properties of the organs: in 
such a case, the mechanism does not explain the functioning” (D. Guillo, Les figures de 
rorganisation, p. 201). Accordingly, with regard to women’s intellectual capacities, it 
seems that inter-specific comparative anatomy could not provide the appropriate 
evidence: comparison could only take place within the human species.
However, Comte thought that the consideration of inter-specific comparative 
physiology was evidence enough for his claim:
“Even if  the analysis o f  anatomy had not as yet sufficiently clarified the explicit 
demonstration that our species is organically superior to the rest o f  the animal 
kingdom (...), the study o f  physiology would leave no doubt here, if only because 
man has progressively obtained the ascendancy [over all other species]. Things stand 
about the same way in the matter o f the sexes, though to a much lesser extent”
(Comte to Mill, October 5,1843; in Haac [ed.], p. 191).
Unfortunately for Comte, he could not argue from the domination exerted by 
men over animals to legitimate that over women. For, whereas in the first case the 
domination primarily depended on physical constraint (animals were forced to obey),
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the domination in the second case was said to depend primarily on intellectual 
superiority. Consequently, since the grounds for domination differed, one could not 
take the latter as a mere extension of the former. Inter-specific comparison seemed to 
fare no better than the arguments based on human anatomy, reproductive physiology, 
and developmental analysis.
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Appendix IV : The Phrenological Sources of Comte.
Comte’s enthusiastic treatment of phrenology (or what he preferred to call 
“phrenological physiology”) has received much attention in the secondary literature1. 
Yet, the details of how he became acquainted with the doctrine remain obscure. 
Accordingly, I will trace some of the likely sources of Comte’s phrenological knowledge.
What is sure is that it would have been difficult for Comte to ignore the 
phrenological movement that swept France whilst he was trying to establish a new social 
philosophy based on the proper knowledge of the methods and results of the natural 
sciences2. Gall’s ideas about the physiology of the brain were already discussed in the 
French medical community at the turn of the century, but the settling of the Austrian 
physician in Paris after his highly successful two years European tour in 1807 gave a 
new impetus to his work. Whilst continuing to lecture large audiences with the help of 
an impressive amount of skulls and casts3, Gall also had the opportunity to put in 
writing the sum of his conceptions, which endeavour resulted in the multi-volumes 
massifs of the Anatomic et physiologie du systeme nerveux en general et du cerveau en particulier 
(1810-1819)4 and the Kecherches sur les fonctions du cerveau et sur celles de chacune de ses parties 
(1822-1825)\
However, the opinions as to the value of Gall’s work remained divided. On the 
one hand, upper class circles found his ideas fashionable, even the more so given Gall’s 
readiness to proceed to a phrenological analysis of the head of his hosts or table 
companions; but he also attracted individuals or groups with political agendas, such as 
the Carbonari, because of the materialist dimension (which he always tried to downplay) 
of his teachings; and a few social reformers (such as the prison expert B. Appert) 
seduced by the improvements his theory could bring to social organization, especially in 
judicial and penal matters.
On the other hand, the political authorities and the Catholic Church during the 
Empire and the Restoration considered with suspicion these ideas because of their 
unmistakable whiff of materialism, fatalism, and atheism (despite Gall’s postulation of 
an organ of veneration). But it was certainly the reluctance of the scientific community 
to endorse his conceptions that thwarted most Gall’s ambitions. The kecherches sur le 
systeme nerveux en general et sur celui du cerveau en particulier, which he submitted with 
Spurzheim to the Institut in 1808, had a lukewarm reception. The report of the 
committee (composed of such scientific and medical figures as the zoologist G. Cuvier
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or the alienist P. Pinel) in charge of reviewing Gall’s Memoire recognized his abilities as 
an anatomist and validated most of his views on the structure of the nervous system, 
but refused to consider the different physiological theses he upheld, because they 
declared that such topics were out of their field of expertise and, what was worse, 
because they contradicted the orthodox view, both in the scientific and religious senses 
of the term, of the workings of the brain and its relations to the soul.7 The passing of 
time did not help to reduce this hostility, for when Gall put himself forward as a 
candidate for a seat at the Academie des science in 1821, he only got a positive vote 
from his friend E. Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire. Moreover, some anatomists and physiologists 
relentlessly pointed out the inaccuracy of many functional localization upheld by Gall. 
For instance, in his 1824 Kecherches experimentales sur les proprietes et les fonctions du systeme 
nerveux dans les animaux invertebres8, Pierre Flourens, resorting to experiments on ablation 
and stimulation of pigeons’ cerebral cortex and cerebellum, showed, contrary to what 
Gall maintained, that it was not sexual activity but voluntary motion that the cerebellum 
controlled. Accordingly, when he died in 1828, Gall’s fame in the lay public and among 
a certain fraction o f the intellectual and political elite was considerable, but his scientific 
works were still not widely accepted by his peers.
Surprisingly, the death of its founder and main exponent did not hinder the 
development of phrenology, quite the contrary. As most historians now agree, the 
advent of the July Monarchy after the 1830 revolution coincided with the opening of the 
“Golden age” of phrenology in France, which, according to G. Lanteri-Laura, “came to 
a close only with the election of Louis Napoleon-Bonaparte as president of the short­
lived Second Republic” (G. Lanteri-Laura, Histoire de laphrenologie, p. 146) in 1848.
The signs of the growing success of phrenology were numerous. Firsdy, Gall’s 
theory started making new converts among the medical community, gaining support 
from renown physicians such as F. Broussais or J. Bouillaud (who welcomed the 
localisationist thesis of Gall) and leading psychiatrists such as J.-P. Falret and G. Ferrus 
(whose organic etiology of mental diseases fitted well phrenology’s emphasis on the 
role of brain disorders in psychopathological affections). Secondly, a flow of 
pedagogical, educational, and polemical literature influenced by phrenology flooded the 
reading market. Thirdly, the diffusion of the phrenological doctrine benefited from the 
establishment of several institutions that were deliberately designed to spread its 
teachings or put in practice the social policies it recommended: the creation of the Societe 
Phrenologique de Paris in 1831 (which had around 200 members and started publishing its
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own periodical, the Journal de la Societe Phrenologique de Paris, in 1832), of the Jnstitut 
Orthophrenique (an educational facility run in accordance with phrenological principles by 
the physician F. Voisin) in Issy-les-Moulineaux, and even of a phrenological museum 
located in Paris (1837), gave phrenology a public face. Finally, the involvement of some 
phrenologists in different scientific enterprises (for instance A. Dumoutier’s 
participation in J. Dumont d’Urville’s 1837 expedition in the seas of the southern 
hemisphere) and social projects (Appert’s enduring contribution to prison reform, for 
example) testified to its practical and political usefulness.
Yet, despite these achievements, a strong opposition still prevailed among 
anatomists and physicians. First of all, Gall’s cranioscopy, the weakest part of his system 
indeed, was held by many practitioners as resting on the highly conjectural hypothesis 
according to which the bones of skull bore the imprint of the shape of the brain. 
Secondly, his physiology attracted much criticism from those who maintained a 
Unitarian conception of the brain, functioning as a whole in which no further anatomical 
distinctions could be made besides that of the cortex, the cerebellum, the nuclei of the 
cerebral basis and the cerebral trunk. Pierre Flourens’s Examen de la phrenologie (1842)9 
soon became, for the wealth of anatomical, physiological, and clinical observations it 
contained, the scientific manifesto of this view, and elicited no other responses from the 
phrenologists than a slavish repetition of Gall’s pronouncements. This inability to face 
empirical objections and to keep pace with the advance of nervous anatomy and 
physiology gready contributed to the progressive disappearance of phrenology in the 
late 1840s from the scientific scene, and its extinction as an intellectual and social 
movement in the following years.
Now, if one keeps in mind that the formative years of Comte as a philosopher 
started with his expulsion from the Ecole polytechnique in 1816 and came to an end with 
the writing of the Cours de philosophic positive in the 1830s, one realizes that this period was 
almost contemporary with that of the most active diffusion of phrenology in France 
described above. But what were the exact sources of Comte’s familiarity with 
phrenology? As shown in Appendix II, Comte’s project of an exhaustive account of the 
philosophy and methods of the various sciences, which eventually resulted in the 
publication of the Cours, led him to gain a proper knowledge of the life sciences. And it 
probably was whilst doing this that Comte first got acquainted with phrenological 
doctrines.
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Although nothing indicates that he attended any of Gall’s or Spurzheim public 
or private lectures, an analysis of his private correspondence in the 1820s and of his 
circle of intellectual relations sheds some light on the likely origins of his phrenological 
knowledge. Firsdy, during his period of collaboration with Saint-Simon, who was on 
good terms with Gall himself, Comte came to know — sometime in 1816 or 1817 — 
Etienne-Marin Bailly (also known as Bailly de Blois)10, a catholic physician and close 
associate of Saint Simon and the Saint Simonians, whom he met when the latter “was 
studying medicine and was Gall’s pupil” (A. Comte to G. d’Eichtal, June 6, 1824; in A. 
Comte, Correspondance generate et confessions. Tome I, 1814-1840, p. 97)11. After having lost 
track of him for years, Comte seems to have wished to renew his ties with Bailly when 
this “cunning physician” and “young physiologist of great merit” (A. Comte to E. 
Tabarie, July 17, 1824; Ibid., p. 101) published a provocative brochure entitled 
T  ’Existence de Dieu et la liberte morale, demontrees par des arguments tires de la doctrine du docteur 
Gall (1824)12. Given the hostility of the Church to the materialistic and fatalistic aspects 
of phrenology, such an attempt might have seemed odd. As far as he was concerned, 
Comte thought that Bailly’s book was just a clever “mystification” (A. Comte to G. 
d’Eichtal, August 5, 1824; Ibid., p. 109) intended to defuse the attacks of the religious 
party. Although he praised Bailly for his dexterity when dealing with the question of the 
existence of God (by underlining Gall’s postulation of an organ of veneration), he 
criticized his treatment of moral liberty because Bailly stuck to the outdated and anti- 
scientific distinction between intelligence or organisation and the soul, a stance he 
judged not radical enough. When he realized that Bailly’s religious commitment was 
genuine, Comte’s enthusiasm quickly cooled down and he eventually came to consider 
Bailly a mere impostor. Accordingly, when Bailly presented, in the Saint-Simonian 
volume Opinions litteraires, philosophiques, et industrielles (1825)13, his views on the eminent 
role of the physician in industrial societies, Comte bluntly commented that even a 
“literary hack” would have been ashamed of having written such a bad piece on “the 
relation between physiology and politics” (A. Comte to G. d’Eichtal, December 10, 
1824; in A. Comte, Correspondance generate et confessions. Tome I, 1814-1840, p. 145). 
Notwithstanding this ultimate break, Comte’s relation with Bailly, who was “one of the 
essential agents of the diffusion of phrenology in the circles of utopian socialism”(M. 
Renneville, Te langage des cranes, p. 106) in the late 1810s and the brief revival of it in the 
mid 1820s, illustrates his first-hand acquaintance with leadings figures of the 
phrenological movement.
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As M. Pickering suggests, Blainville might also have stimulated Comte’s interest 
in phrenology14. Despite his conservatism in political and religious matters, Blainville 
seems to have “supported Gall and the phrenological school” (G. Lanteri-Laura, Histoire 
de laphrenologie, p. 162). For instance, phrenology was the subject of his 1824 lectures at 
the Athenee, “a course that Comte probably attended” (M. Pickering, Auguste Comte, p. 
303) and which provided a fair and balanced account of Gall’s work. Similarly, the 
psychiatrist B.-A. Morel recalled that in his teaching at the Sorbonne in 1839, which he 
attended, Blainville introduced quite favourably Gall’s ideas to his audience15. This 
lenient acknowledgment of Gall’s merits was eventually put in print when Blainville’s 
lectures were published a few years later as his Histoire des sciences de I’organisation et de leurs 
progres comme base de la philosophie (1845)16. Assessing Gall’s scientific contributions to 
biology on a par with those of the De Jussieu family, Vicq d’Azyr, Pinel, Bichat, 
Broussais, Lamarck, and Oken, Blainville heralded Gall as the one
“who gave the study o f  the nervous system its only basis, the only direction that 
would guarantee its progresses, hasten them, and lead them to the possible result, 
the physiology of the brain” (H. de Blainville, Histoire des sciences de /'organisation, III, p.
269).
Blainville admitted that the methodological approach adopted by Gall, which postulated 
for each function an organ, logically required that all psychological faculties depended 
on a material substratum. However, he parted from the Viennese physician when it 
came to localize them in the brain, since he held the anatomy of the brain itself — which 
was of a highly homogeneous constitution — prevented such localizations of the higher 
intellectual and moral faculties.
“One must necessarily admit this substratum with Gall; but it cannot be divided 
into organs, as he wanted it. It is composed o f parts that form a whole, and to these 
parts faculties are associated” {Ibid., p. 328).
But what Blainville praised most in Gall was that the latter’s endorsement of the method 
of natural history. First of all, Gall’s distinction between the dispositions shared by 
animals and man and those proper to the latter was, said Blainville, “worthy of a genius” 
(Ibid., p. 331). Moreover, by choosing to determine what were the essential psychological 
dispositions by focusing on behaviour, Gall opened a new path to the knowledge of the 
intellectual and moral faculties. In this last regard, he held Gall to be the “first naturalist 
physiologist” (Id.). Finally, and even if he criticized its cranioscopic element, Blainville 
emphasized that Gall’s theory, which relied on anatomy, physiology, and natural history, 
had the noticeable merit of “having brought back the unity among these sciences we 
have seen subdivided and divergent” (Ibid., p. 334). Given that nothing prevents us from
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assuming that this final appreciation of Gall’s phrenology had been entertained by 
Blainville for many years before it was voiced in his Histoire des sciences de I''organisation, it is 
also very likely that it either initiated or comforted Comte’s early interest for Gall’s 
ideas.
As an additional piece of evidence of Blainville’s influence on Comte’s 
cultivation of phrenology, it is also worth noting that the first extent trace of Comte’s 
articulated reflections on the subject appeared in a letter to his friend Valat, dated 
September 8, 1824, that is the very year of Blainville’s lectures on phrenology at the 
Athenee. This long letter responded to Valat’s disputation of Comte’s claim that 
physiology had recently become a positive science and to the former’s angry and 
indignant objections against Gall’s doctrine. It testified to the detailed knowledge Comte 
had of the main tenets of Gall’s theory (Innateness, cerebral Localization, and 
Modularity of affective, moral, and intellectual dispositions), o f its importance in the 
long term history of the science of man, and some of its shortcomings, all elements that 
would constitute the backbone of Comte’s analysis of phrenology in the following years. 
The remarks concluding this letter stated unambiguously his appreciation of phrenology, 
for Comte prophesised that this theory would “mark an epoch in the history of the 
human mind”:
“it is almost the common opinion, either openly expressed or secretly upheld, o f  all 
the present physiologists worthy o f that name; (...) a doctrine does not develop 
itself during twenty7 years, despite the fact that it has been ridiculed and subjected to 
the most odious prejudices, if  it does not contain something o f  value (...). In brief, 
my opinion is that physiology has become nowadays an entirely positive science, 
not only despite Gall’s doctrine, but partly because o f  that very doctrine” (A. Comte 
to X. Valat, September 8, 1824; in A. Comte, Correspondancegenerate et confessions. Tom  
I, 1814-1840, p. 126-7)17.
This verdict remained that of Comte for the rest of his career and found its most 
developed exposition in the Cours de philosophic positive. But it also appeared in some of 
Comte’s earlier publications, namely his Considerations philosophiques sur les sciences et les 
savants (1825)1K and his review (1828)19 of F.J.V. Broussais’s De Hrritation et de laFolie2".
This last piece suggests another possible source of Comte’s phrenological 
knowledge, namely the physician Broussais21. For, besides developing a localisationist 
approach to diseases (he argued that most pathologies were caused by lesions of the 
digestive system which were themselves the result of an excess of irritation; mental 
disorders, he claimed, depended on a pathological irritation of the brain) known as 
“physiological medicine” and defending the continuity of normal and pathological states 
(what later came to be known, partly due to Comte, as “Broussais’ principle), Broussais
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was also one of the most prominent advocates of phrenology in the 1830s. Because of 
his position in the French intellectual landscape (he was both Professor at the Paris 
Faculte de Medecine and a member of the prestigious Academie des sciences morales et 
polidques), he played a crucial role in pleading the cause of the new cerebral 
physiology22.
Broussais came to phrenology progressively, mitigating more and more his 
criticisms against Gall’s theory with the years. As J.-F. Braunstein recounts23, before De 
nrritation et de la Folie (1828), Broussais agreed with Gall on the dependence on the brain 
of the affective, moral, and intellectual functions, but criticized his neglect of the 
influence of the other viscera on mental phenomena. Then, in De limitation et de la Folie, 
Broussais recognized the value of Gall’s works on the functions of the brain, but was 
wary of the inflation in localisations, which he thought multiplied unnecessarily the 
number of organs to match psychological dispositions whilst leaving unexplained the 
consensus existing between them. Eventually, these reservations faded away and Broussais 
came to endorse a version of phrenology gready indebted to Gall and Spurzheim, as his 
Cours de phrenologie (1836)24 illustrated. In fact, Broussais almost repeated Spurzheim’s 
classification of the different faculties without adducing any new evidence for their 
localisation in the brain. But his intellectual prestige made up for his lack of originality: 
twenty five years or so after the Institut’s refusal of Gall’s conceptions and fifteen years 
or so after his failure at entering the Academie des Sciences, the phrenological 
commitment of a leading medical figure gave this cerebral physiology the appearance of 
a subject worthy of scientific interest, even if Broussais often used phrenology as a 
philosophical weapon to support his materialism and his atheism.
Accordingly, if Broussais’ phrenological propaganda played a role in Comte’s 
intellectual history, it is very likely to have consisted in being an additional stimulus for 
his study of the works of Gall and those who followed him. Even the more so if one 
keeps in mind that Comte was not merely a reader of Broussais’ writings, as J.-F. 
Braunstein points out25, but also a personal acquaintance of the physician, and one of 
his fellow members at the Societe Phrenologique de Paris26.
The impact of Comte’s early and sustained exposure to biology, phrenology 
included, prompted changes in the exposition of his own ideas. For when Comte re­
opened his lessons on positive philosophy in early January 1829, which were first started 
in April 1826 but stopped almost immediately because he had been struck by a violent 
bout of madness, he decided to increase the number of lectures on the organic sciences
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(from 10 to 12) to the detriment of those dealing with the inorganic sciences (Chemistry 
was reduced from 10 to 6 lessons). His special interest for the study of phrenology and 
the physical basis of moral phenomena also appeared in his decision to devote four 
lectures on the “intellectual and affective” part of physiology, “which indicates”, as M. 
Pickering notes, “how important phrenology had become for him”(M. Pickering, 
Auguste Comte, p. 420). This importance eventually crystallised in Comte’s Cours de 
pbilosophie positive, whose Forty-Fifth Lesson was dedicated to “General Considerations 
on the Positive Study of Intellectual and Moral, or Cerebral, Functions”.
1 G. Lanteri-Laura, Histoire de la phrenologie, Chapter Three (“L’expansion de la phrenologie”), pp. 141-44 ; 
J.-F. Braunstein, “Antipsychologisme et philosophic du cerveau chez Auguste Comte”, Revue internationale 
de pbilosophie, 1998, 1, 203, pp. 7-28 (esp. 16-25); and L. Levy-Bruhl, The Philosophy of Auguste Comte, Book 
II, Chapter Five (“Psychology”), pp. 194-205, offer a complete review o f  Comte’s treatment o f  
phrenology in the Cours de pbilosophie positive and the Systeme de politique positive, whereas E. Littre, Auguste 
Comte et la pbilosophie positive, Third Part, Chapter Three (“Du tableau cerebral, ou modification apportee 
par M. Comte au systeme phrenologique de Gall); R. Vernon, “The Political Self: Auguste Comte and 
Phrenology”, History of European Ideas 1986, 7:3, pp. 271-86; J. Grange, La pbilosophie dAuguste Comte, Third 
Part (“Le nouveau discours de la methode”), “Le tableau systematique de Fame”, pp. 378-387 ; and L. 
Clauzade, “Le statut epistemologique du tableau cerebral et la notion de type chez Comte”, in M. 
Bourdeau & F. Chazel, eds., Auguste Comte et I’idee de science de Thomme. Paris : L’Harmatfan, 2002, pp. 111- 
30, mostly analyse the Systeme.
2 See II, n. 10 for secondary literature.
3 Gall lectured at the Athenee just after his arrival in Paris, from December 1807 to February 1808 (where 
he also offered a course on General Physiology from 1812 to 1815, and a set o f  lectures on the 
“Philosophy o f  the intellectual faculties in 1825-1826), made public presentations at the Societe de 
Medecine, and performed dissections at the Museum d’Histoire Naturelle. However, as it was a common 
practice at the time, he came to prefer to lecture in his home for a happy few. Spurzheim was also hired 
twice by the Athenee administrators to lecture on “the nature o f moral and intellectual man applied to 
social institutions”(1818-1819) and “anthroplogy” (1831-1832). On this, see M. S. Staum, “Physiognomy 
and Phrenology at the Paris Athenee”, esp. p; 452, and M. Renneville, Le langage des cranes, Chapter Two 
(“Entre Savoirs et Politiques”).
4 See II, n. 14.
5 See II, n. 15.
6 F.J. Gall & J.G. Spurzheim, Recberches sur le systeme nerveux en general et sur celui du cerveau en particulier, memoire 
presente a llnstitut de France, le 14 mars 1808, suivi d ’observations sur le rapport qui en a ete fait a cette compagnie par 
ses commissaires. Paris, F. Schoell & H. Nicolle, 1809.
7 Rapport sur un memoire de MM. Gall et Spurzheim, relatif a Vanatomie du cerveau, Institut de France, classe des sciences 
mathematiques et physiques, seances du 25 avril et 2 mai 1808, in Bibliotheque medicale, 1808, XXI, pp. 3-42 and 
133-57. On the details o f  the report, see G. Lanteri-Laura, Histoire de la phrenologie, pp. 128-31.
8 P. Flourens, Recherches experimental sur les proprietes et les fonctions du systeme nerveux dans les animaux 
invertebres. Paris : Crevot, 1824.
9 P. Flourens, Examen de la phrenologie. Paris: Paulin, 1842.
10 On Bailly, see M. Renneville, Le langage des cranes, pp. 106-8.
11 A. Comte, Correspondance generate et confessions. Tome I, 1814-1840. Edited, with an introduction, by P. E. de 
Berredo Cameiro and P. Amaud. Paris — La Haye: Mouton, 1973.
12 E.-M. Bailly de Blois, L ’Existence de Dieu et la liberte morale, demontreespar des arguments tires de la doctrine du 
docteur Gall. Paris: Delaunay, 1824. Comte’s copy, signed by Bailly, is still preserved in his library at the 
Maison d’Auguste Comte in Paris.
13 L. Haking, H. de Saint-Simon, O. Rodringues, J.-P. Duvergier et alii, Opinions litteraires, philosophiques, et 
industrielles. Paris: Galerie de Bossange, 1825.
14 M. Pickering, Auguste Comte, p. 303. In one o f his letter to Mill, Comte indeed recalled that Blainville, 
“for the last twenty-five years, has always devoted several lessons o f his yearly courses to the exposition 
and discussion o f  Gall’s work, looking upon his general principles as having been definitely established as 
part o f science” (Comte to Mill, June 19, 1842; in Haac [ed.], p. 80-1).
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15 For Morel’s testimony, see G. Lanteri-Laura, Histoire de la phrenologie, p. 159.
16 H. de Blainville, Histoire des sciences de I’organisation et de leurs propres comme base de la pbilosophie. Redigee 
d’apres ses notes et ses lecons faites a la Sorbonne de 1839 a 1841, avec les developpements necessaires et 
plusieurs additions, par F. L. M. Maupied. Three Volumes. Paris & Lyon : Librairie Classique de Perisse 
Freres, 1845. The chapter on Gall (Section IV) is in the third volume, pp. 268-334. The editing work o f  
Maupied, a Catholic abbe, became the subject o f much controversy when it was realized that he had 
distorted some o f  Blainville’s historical views for apologetic purposes. With respect to Gall, it seems that 
Maupied attempted to downplay the originality o f his physiological approach and the anatomical 
improvements he contributed to the knowledge o f the nervous system. Comte was one o f  the victims o f  
Maupied’s religious zeal: see E. Littre, Auguste Comte et la pbilosophie positive, Third Part, Chap. XI.
17 Comte was aware o f  Flourens’ criticism o f Gall’s phrenology but discarded them for methodological 
reasons: “His famous experiments are regarded as false and made with too much precipitation, ; the 
phenomena he has considered as radical merely happen to be instantaneous abnormalities” (A. Comte to 
G. d’Eichtal, August 5, 1824; in A. Comte, Correspondance generale et confessions. Tome I, 1814-1840, p. 105). 
Comte also blamed Flourens for the lack o f consistency in his plan o f experiments, within which no 
region o f the nervous system dealing with animal life was ascribed to the intellectual and affective 
functions, and which Comte called “an odd neglect” (Id.). In fact, it is likely that Comte drew on Gall’s 
own dismissal o f Flourens’ experiments in the third (pp. 379-415) and sixth volume (pp.213-88) o f  the 
Recberches sur les fonctions du systeme nerveux. Among many other points he raised, Gall insisted that Flourens’ 
invasive procedures o f  ablation and mutilation were not conclusive since a local injury or lesion did 
interfere with the nervous system as a whole. Hence it was not possible to isolate precisely one organ, so 
as to identify its function, because the very process o f doing so produced global disorders in the brain. On 
this, see R. M. Young, Mind, Brain, and Adaptation, pp. 46-53.
18 A. Comte’s Considerations sur les sciences et les savants were first published in 1825, as a series o f  three 
articles in the seventh (November 12th), eight (November 19lh), and tenth (December 3rd) issues o f  Le 
Producteur. Reviewing the recent development o f the branch o f  physiology that dealt with the affective and 
intellectual functions, Comte offered the following account: “All those wTho are truly in tune with their age 
know as a matter o f  fact that physiologists today consider moral phenomena in absolutely the same spirit 
as all other animal phenomena. Very extensive work has been undertaken in this area, and has been 
enthusiastically pursued for more than twenty years;; positive conceptions, more or less fruitful, have 
come into being; schools have formed spontaneously to develop them and propagate them; in short, all 
the signs o f  human activity have been displayed unequivocally with regard to moral physiology. It is 
useless here to take sides for or against any o f the different opinions wiiich today fight for dominance 
about the kind, the number, the extent, and the mutual influence o f  the organs assignable to the different 
functions, whether intellectual or affective. N o doubt science has not yet found its definitive foundations 
in this regard; and the only things solidly established here are a few generalities that are insufficient, 
though very valuable. But the very fact o f this diversity o f  theories, which indicates an inevitable certainty' 
in any emerging science, clearly establishes that the great scientific revolution has taken place in this 
branch o f our knowledge, as in all the others, at least in the minds which in this respect form the avant- 
garde o f the human race, and which sooner or later are followed by the mass” (quoted from A. Comte, 
Early Political Writings. Edited and translated by H. S. Jones. Cambridge: Cambridge University7 Press, pp. 
157-8). Even if  Gall was not mentioned, Comte implicitly assumed that his phrenology7 defined the 
methodological limits within which the different theories o f  the workings o f  the brain could be 
developed.
19 In his review o f Broussais’ treatise, Comte repeatedly underlined the contribution o f  Gall to the advent 
of a positive (i.e. physiological) study o f  intellectual and affective functions: “The works o f M. Gall and 
his school have singularly strengthened it, and above all imparted to this new and latest portion o f  
physiology a noble quality7 o f accuracy, by providing a determinate basis for discussion and investigation” 
(Ibid., p. 229). In this article, Gall was praised by Comte, on various accounts, no less than six times, that 
is almost once ever)7 couple o f pages.
20 F.J.V. Broussais, De llrritation et de la Folie, ouvrage dans lequel les rapports du physique et du morale de I’homme 
sont etablis sur les bases de la medecineplysiologique. Paris: Delaunay ,1828.
21 In a letter to Mill, Comte also mentioned ,in relation with the diffusion o f  phrenology7 in France, the 
name o f Broussais, even if  he judged that the physician “had embarked on this at too advanced an age” 
and got “lost in useless and absurd researches concerning the initial localization [of functions o f  the 
brain]” (Comte to Mill, June 19,1842; in Haac [ed.], p. 81).
22 On Broussais and phrenology7, see J.-F. Braunstein, Broussais et le materialisme. Medecine et pbilosophie au 
XDC siecle. Paris: Meridiens Klincksieck, 1986, Part II, Chapter III (“Une phrenologie philosophique”); M. 
Renneville, Ee langage des cranes, pp. 108-16.
23 See J.-F. Braunstein, Broussais et le materialisme, pp. 155-60.
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24 F.J.V. Broussais, Cours de phrenologie. Paris: J.-B. Bailliere, 1836. The Cours is the transcription o f  
Broussais’ lectures on phrenology given at the Paris Faculte de Medecine the same year.
25 See J.-F. Braunstein, Broussais et le materialisme, Part III, Chapter II (“Broussaisisme et Positivisme”). 
Among the different books o f  Broussais Comte had in his library, one finds the Cours de phrenologie.
26 On Comte’s brief engagement with the Societe Phrenologique de Paris, see M. Pickering, Auguste Comte, 
p. 420; M. Renneville, De langage des cranes, p. 135. Broussais and Comte may have met through Saint- 
Simon, whose personal physician was the former. In January 1829, Broussais, who had been genuinely 
impressed by Comte’s review o f  De I’lrritation et de la Folie, attended the re-opening o f  Comte’s lectures on 
positive philosophy.
297
Appendix V — A Historical Account of Mill’s Acquaintance with Phrenology.
Whereas Comte’s familiarity with, and estimate of, phrenology is easy to locate 
in his writings and has received much attention from commentators, the extent of Mill’s 
knowledge of the new cerebral physiology is as difficult to assess as his acquaintance 
with biology1. Except for his letters to Comte, one finds very few references to 
phrenology or phrenological authors in his correspondence. In the submissive tone 
characteristic of Mill in the beginnings of the exchange, he welcomed Comte’s advice 
with respect to any appropriate reading in “physiological phrenology” (Mill to Comte, 
December 18,1841; in Haac [ed.], p.42), for what he had read so far had been of no use.
“In our country, phrenology has hardly been practiced except by men with less than 
mediocre minds, to judge by what I have read o f their writings, ;md I must admit 
that I long regarded this field, at least in its present state, as unworthy o f  occupying 
the mind o f  a true thinker. I have abandoned this notion only when I learned from 
your third volume that you believe in phrenology, at least in its basic 
principles”(Mill to Comte, February 25, 1842; Ibid., pp. 53-4)
The little that can be guessed from this statement is that, although his intellectual 
interests did not draw him to the subject, it is very likely that Mill had been exposed to 
phrenological agitation before he started corresponding with Comte. In fact, it would be 
surprising that he had not, for the first third of the nineteenth-century witnessed a 
frantic diffusion of phrenological doctrines in the British Isles2.
As early as 1803, the Scottish philosopher Thomas Brown rhetorically asked in 
his review of Charles Villers’ account of phrenology for the Edinburgh Review, “O f Dr 
Gall, and his skulls, who has not heard?’” , thereby evidencing the penetration of 
phrenological ideas in the cultural, scientific, and medical elite of the British Isles, and 
especially in Scodand. However, even if several accounts of the state of the Continental 
debate over Gall’s conceptions were published in the following years (in particular, a 
review of Gall and Spurzheim’s 1808 Memoire presented to the Institut de France), it was 
only after 1815 that phrenology became a highly popular subject of interest, following 
Spurzheim’s lectures tour throughout Britain and the publication of his first book in 
English, the Physiognomical System o/Drs. Gall and Spurzheim (1815)4.
Just as in France, phrenology evoked much controversy because of its supposed 
materialistic and atheistic leanings. The opposition mostly originated from the upper- 
classes of society and the established Church, but was also supported by naturalists and 
physicians who questioned Gall’s anatomical findings and his physiological conclusions5. 
The consequence of such public exposure was that the general public quickly became 
acquainted with the basic tenets of phrenology and that it attracted many individuals
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belonging to the rising middle-class to the “new science of human nature”. As a result, 
a considerable number of local phrenological societies were established all over the 
country during the 1820s and 1830s (The Edinburgh Phrenological Society in 1820, the 
London Phrenological Society in 1823, the Wakefield Phrenological Society in 1825, the 
Manchester Phrenological Society in 1830, the Aberdeen Phrenological Society in 1838, 
the Birmingham Phrenological Society in 1838, etc.), as well as a national body (the 
British Phrenological Association, in 1838) which was supposed to compensate for the 
refusal of the British Society of the Advancement of Science to accept phrenology 
among one of its sections. Periodicals were also created to spread phrenological 
doctrines (the Transactions of the Edinburgh Phrenological Society in 1821, and the Phrenological 
Journal in 1823).
The public success of phrenology was primarily due to its ability to serve as a 
support for many different, and sometimes contradictory, social or personal interests. 
Some commentators have insisted on its appeal for more or less radical reformers who 
wanted to replace the existing social order grounded on inherited privileges, ancient 
customs, and theological conceptions, with a new organization of society in accordance 
with individuals’ natural capacities and merits, so as to fulfil the aspirations of the 
commercial middle-class and those of the higher strata of the working-class6, most 
notably artisans and shop-keepers. This social endeavour came to the forefront of the 
social debate with the publication of George Combe’s Constitution of Man (1828), a 
phrenology-based manifesto of Victorian naturalism which encountered even more 
editorial success than Roberts Chambers’ Vestiges of Creation (1844) or Charles Darwin’s 
Origin of Species (1859). And, just as in France, education, penal reform, or the treatment 
of the insane figured prominently on the agenda of the phrenologists. But whereas 
Combe’s discourse, which mixed an evocation of natural laws and self-help thought, 
advocated a secularized conception of society7, other phrenologists found in Gall’s ideas 
support for more orthodox views, including additional evidence for the existence of a 
Creator, as testified by Gall’s organ of veneration. Hence the development of Christian 
phrenological societies. Finally, as J. Van Whye has recently argued7, it was also the case 
that many individuals involved in the business of diffusing and promoting phrenology 
contributed to the movement with the hope that the scientific and moral authority 
conferred on them by this new science of human nature would enhance their personal 
status. In any case, whatever the motivations of those engaged in phrenology during the 
1820s and 1830s, their success in publicizing and popularizing their achievements or
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proposals was undeniable: by 1836, as A. McLaren recalls, “thirty Phrenological 
Societies had been created, 64,000 copies of phrenological works sold, and over 15,000 
plaster heads or bust casts”(A. McLaren, “Phrenology: Medium and Message”, p. 94)8. 
On the face of it, it would hardly be imaginable that Mill had not heard of “Dr Gall, 
and his skulls”, to use Brown’s address, during these most intense years of phrenological 
agitation. Yet, when it come to assess the extent of Mill’s awareness of, or involvement 
in, phrenological debates, the paucity of textual evidence warrants only a highly 
conjectural account.
Mill’s first encounter with phrenology, at least in an institutional setting, seems 
to trace back to his boyhood visit to France in 1820-19, while he was attending the logic 
lectures of Joseph-Diez Gergonne10, a professional mathematician and holder of the 
Chair in astronomy at the University of Montpellier since 1816, in Comte’s hometown. 
In his notes for these lectures, Mill recorded Gergonne’s favourable comments on Gall’s 
hypothesis, which “ deduces all the habits, all the propensities of an individual, from the 
organization of his brain”:
“Up to a certain point, I do share his opinion, since the brain is the seat o f  the soul, 
why would not the development o f a particular organ o f the brain produce a similar 
development in a particular faculty o f  the mind?” (J. S. Mill , Journal and Debating 
Speeches, pp. 196-7)11.
On the other hand, Gergonne, “a very accomplished representative of the eighteenth 
century metaphysics” (J.S Mill, Autobiography, p. 59) as Mill recalled, was more guarded 
on the alleged possibility of character reading usually associated with phrenology.
What the young Mill made of this, we do not know. But it is certainly interesting 
to note that this first public exposure to phrenology, received through the altogether 
favourable appraisal of a reputed academic figure, may have prompted the young man 
to think that some elements of the phrenological doctrine were worth considering. 
However, such an accommodating stance may have been difficult to reconcile with his 
father’s sensationalist approach to mental phenomena, even the more so if it is recalled 
that it was at the root of his own son’s upbringing. For instance, in his article on 
“Education” for the fifth supplement of the Entyclopaedia Britannica, James Mill grounded 
his pedagogic reflections on the omnipotence of the laws of association of ideas as 
introduced by Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Condillac, and Hartley, and he sided with 
Helvctius in the debate over the existence of natural intellectual inequalities: all cognitive 
differences between individuals, claimed James Mill, were the result o f differences in 
education, and not due to differences in cerebral constitution.
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“This much, therefore, may be affirmed on the side o f  Helvctius, that a prodigious 
difference is produced by education; while, on the other hand, it is rather assumed 
than proved, that any difference exists, but that which difference o f  education 
creates” (J. Mill, “Education”, p. 20)12.
The empiricist psychology of his father and its emphasis on the formative influence of 
the circumstances over human character sat ill, to say the least, with Gall and 
Spurzheim’s innatist theory of the mind13.
Yet, even within the Utilitarian circle in which the Mills evolved, the reception 
of phrenological doctrines was not entirely hostile14. The leading figure of the 
movement, Jeremy Bentham, had much to praise in Gall’s slnatomie etphysiologie du systeme 
nerveux en general, as he told his Russian friend Pavel Chichagov in 1821:
“Have you read Doctor Gall’s new doctrine? It contains the truest philosophic all 
experimental, practical, and applicable to life. It affords true knowledge o f  your 
organisation, faculties and aptitude to all sorts o f things and transactions. (...) I 
have read it from one end to the other with the greatest pleasure I consider it as one 
o f the most philosophical works o f our times. Every thing is experience, 
observation and practicable in it. It may be put in the compleatest harmony with 
Legislation as you have traced it. All that has been published upon Gall’s system 
before this, is either false or wrong or imperfect, but since the publication o f  his 
own work he maked [sic] converts even' day and would have done great many 
more had his work not been so voluminous and so dear” (J. Bentham to P.
Chichagov, March 12, 1821; in J. Bentham, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham. The 
Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham. Vol. 10, pp. 313-4)15.
On the other hand, the remunerated palpations and dramatized skulls and casts 
presentations of the phrenologists and their utterly dogmatic advocacy of the 
truthfulness of the doctrine could not fail to attract Bentham’s legendary irony. For 
instance, in his Rationale offudicial Evidence, when he wanted to ridicule the various means 
used by English lawyers to restore one’s individual competency with regard to evidence 
(to qualify as a witness in a trial for example), Bentham ridiculed their whole strategy by 
pretending that it could be based on a phrenological analysis of the organs of 
“trustworthiness” and “untrustworthiness”:
“The theory o f trustworthiness, untrustworthiness, and restoration o f  
trustworthiness -  o f  health, disease, and mode o f cure, so far as concerns the 
branch o f  the pathologico-psychological system here in question, has revealed itself 
here and there, in unconnected rudiments and fragments, to the sagacity o f  English 
lawyers. But, with shame be it spoken, never yet was it formed into a complete and 
consistent whole; never was this interesting branch o f  the science o f  evidence 
placed upon its proper basis, till the genius o f  Dr. Gall arose, and dazzled with its 
effulgence the eyes o f  astonished Europe. By the discoveries o f  that great man, we 
are at length enabled to understand what English lawyers have been at” (Jeremy 
Bentham, The Rationale of Judicial Evidence, p. 433).16
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This scathing instance of Bentham’s murderous rhetorical skills launched at the 
expenses of phrenology (and English law) might well have struck the attention of the 
first editor of the Rationale, namely ... the young John Stuart Mill17.
The second textual trace of Mill’s familiarity with phrenology consists in an 
allusion to a quotation drawn from Combe that was supposed to illustrate a speech on
perfectibility given by Mill at the London Debating Society in May, 1828: it allegedly
illustrated the power of public opinion and its role in the taming of human passions18. 
One of Combe’s books was later mentioned in a letter to John Pringle Nichol (Mill to 
John Pringle Nichol, 7 Oct., 1835), but no precision was given as to what book of his it 
was19. Moreover, Mill merely stated his project of reading the book and not the fact that 
he had read it:
“I shall read Combe’s book with a pleasure increased by receiving it from you.
Phrenology, no doubt, may be to a certain extent reconciled with analytical 
psycholog}7, that is, if  it can be discovered that certain nervous peculiarities, 
affecting the kind or the intensity o f  our sensations, have to do with peculiar
conformations o f  the brain. (...) It is, I believe, ascertained that the nerves o f
external sense terminate mostly, if  not wholly, in the cerebrum, those o f  internal in 
the cerebeUum and spinal marrow” (Mill to ]ohn Pringle Nichol, 7 Oct., 1835; in J.
S. Mill, Earlier Letters, p. 275).
Besides a bland acceptance of a dependence of mental phenomena on cerebral 
ones, one could hardly infer something about Mill’s views on phrenology from such a 
scanty piece of information. To be sure, Mill also added in the same letter that 
phrenologists had some evidence in favour of their theories, but it in no way suggested a 
complete agreement: “Thus, for instance, what they say about their “organ of 
amativeness” has some foundation, because we know that nymphomania can be traced 
to inflammation of the cerebellum” (Id).  However, from what Mill said, it is difficult to 
grasp which phrenological claim he thought was corroborated by that clinical 
observation: did it confirm the phrenologists’ general theory of cerebral organs or just 
that relating to the “organ of amativeness”? Did the fact that one was dealing with 
pathological evidence alter the nature of phrenological conclusions with regard to the 
normal functioning of the brain? Mill himself was indecisive: “What or how much can 
be inferred from this I do not know” (Id ) .  However, there was one feature of 
phrenological theory about which he had no doubt, namely its utter lack of proper 
evidential support:
“But the difficulty I feel in limine about phrenology is the insufficiency o f the 
induction” (Id).
Mill was here referring to Gall’s method of picking out public and historical figures 
known for one o f their marked psychological traits and his attempt to find on their skull
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the anatomical confirmation of the presence or absence of the organ responsible for 
that trait. Firstly, Mill objected, Gall and his followers’ exclusive reliance on overt 
behaviour — the public face of one’s personality — ignored the fact that the individual 
might have displayed other more prominent traits in private: it was possible that, say, a 
political leader had been cruel in his handling of public matters but excessively 
benevolent to his friends or relatives. Secondly, Mill questioned the reliability of the 
anatomical sample on which phrenologists based their conclusions, that is the skulls of 
public or historical figures:
“many o f  the skulls they argue from are not sufficiently authenticated as belonging
to the persons to whom they ascribe them” (Id).
A perfect illustration of such a shortcoming, Mill claimed, had been offered by the 
infamous controversy over Raphael’s skull2". In his Fonctiom du cerveau, Gall recalled how, 
presented with the cast of an unknown skull by his colleague Dr Scheel, he identified on 
it very pronounced traces of the organs of Constructiveness and Imitation. The 
craniological analysis was indeed a success, for Scheele declared that it was a cast made 
from the skull of Raphael preserved by the fine arts academy of Saint Luke21. Thereafter, 
many phrenologists, including Combe, used this story as an illustration o f the power of 
phrenological analysis. Unfortunately, when Pope Gregory the Sixteenth ordered the 
opening of Raphael’s grave so as to put a halt to the phrenologists’ impious treatment of 
one of the most distinguished artists associated with the Vatican, the skeleton was found 
to be complete. Consequendy, the skull of the Saint Luke’s Academy could not be that 
of Raphael22.
The letter to Pringle, even if it is far from providing us with elements from which 
to infer the principled position -  if any — Mill might have adopted concerning 
phrenology, tells us at least one thing: by Mill’s own admission, his “opinion on the 
subject” in the mid-1830s was “not that of a competent judge” (Id.). But short of being 
a “competent judge” of phrenology, it may still be interesting to know whether Mill was 
at least an “informed witness”. In this regard, one may have hoped that the consultation 
of the list of Mill’s library at Somerville College, Oxford, might bring some interesting 
results. Unfortunately, it has proved to be of no avail, since it contains no books by 
Gall, Spurzheim, Combe, or any other minor figure of the phrenological movement. But 
this does not prove much, since 1) Helen Taylor, Mill’s step-daughter, presented in 1905 
to Somerville College’s library only those of Mill’s books that were in England at the 
time of his death, and given that 2) the Somerville books were used for the next sixty
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years as a working library for students and were consequendy exposed to the common 
fate of library books (some have disappeared, some have been deteriorated and 
consequendy thrown away), that 3) books considered inappropriate for a college library 
(which may well have included books on phrenology) were disposed of, without any 
record being kept of which, and that 4) Mill’s books in Avignon (where he died in 1873) 
were auctioned in several lots and dispersed thereafter23. Moreover, the mere fact that 
one does not find phrenological books in Mill’s library does not prejudge his lack of 
acquaintance with the doctrine, since its primary means of diffusion had been through 
public lectures and periodical literature, and most notably The Phrenological Journal 
founded by George Combe in 1823. Accordingly, Mil may well have attended 
phrenological events or read phrenological papers, without having left traces of it.
Eventually, more indirect textual evidence can be invoked in our search for an 
appraisal of Mill’s familiarity with phrenology. To that end, we have to resort to the 
same sources we have used in our attempt to assess the extent of Mill’s biological 
culture. A first case in point is W.B. Carpenter’s Principles of Human Physiology (1842), 
which Mill apparently read whilst completing the System of Logic, that is a few months 
before he started corresponding with Comte24. What could Mill have learnt about 
cerebral physiology from Carpenter?
The topic was treated extensively in the seventeenth chapter on the “General 
Functions of the Encephalon” of the Principles. According to Carpenter, all 
investigations led to the conclusion that the cerebrum was the organ through which all 
impressions, deriving either from the external or the internal sensory organs, were 
received, in which voluntary actions were elaborated, and from which the volitional 
processes leading to muscular contractions originated. With regard to localizations, 
Carpenter did not think one could go further than the general ascription of sensory, 
cognitive, and motor functions to the brain, as his review of phrenology made clear. In 
the two paragraphs he devoted to the question, he acknowledged the interest o f the 
hypothesis according to which “different portions of the cerebrum [had] different 
functions in the complex operations of thought” (W.B. Carpenter, Principles of Human 
Physiology, p. 236)25, and he also agreed that
“a large amount o f  evidence has been adduced by [phrenologists] in support o f
Gall’s views, which is regarded by many physiologists o f  much intelligence as quite
decisive” (Id).
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Yet, Carpenter was not convinced. Firstly, he objected that, even if it was common 
usage to rely on the outward appearance of individuals to estimate their intellectual 
capacity or some of their character traits, such a procedure could not warrant the 
inference of the existence of distinct organs from the mere observation of the outward 
anatomical specificities of one’s skull.
“It may be thought to be, in regard to the form o f the head, very much as in respect 
to the character o f  the mind, - that we may draw from it a general idea as to the 
character o f  the mind, and may not unfrequently be able to predicate correctly some 
minute details; and yet that an attempt to localize the organs more minutely, may be 
as destitute o f  truth as were the details o f the system o f  Lavater” {Ibid., p. 237).
In short, phrenology fared no better than physiognomony.
Secondly, Carpenter refused to deduce from the size of the different parts of the 
brain the measure of their relative functional power (as the Proportionality Thesis of 
phrenology would have it), because nobody had yet established the thickness of the 
cortical substance in the different parts of the brain, that is the proportion of grey 
matter, which was supposed to be the source of the functional power of the organ, 
compared with that of white matter, which was considered as a mere conductor:
“Certainly there is a considerable variation in this respect among different 
individuals; and it is yet to be proved, that the relation is constant in different parts 
o f  the same individual Brain. Until this is substantiated, all inferences drawn from 
correspondence between the prominence o f  certain part o f  the brain and the 
intensity o f  a particular function are invalid” {Id).
Thirdly, the observations on which the phrenologists based their claims did not 
convince him, as the controversy over the function of the cerebellum illustrated. As we 
have seen, Gall located the “instinct of propagation” in the cerebellum, and much of the 
appeal of phrenology, as the case of Comte testified26, rested on the strength of the 
evidence adduced for that association between a physiological function and a definite 
organ. To prove his case, Gall drew on all sorts of resources. He resorted to 
comparative anatomy to show that when animals endowed with a cerebellum were in 
the process of reproducing, this organ swelled and heated up. He also underlined the 
correlation of large necks with active sexual propensities in animals such as rams, bulls, 
and pigeons, a feature that was also present in human individuals with stronger sexual 
urges and absent in those deprived of them as well as in women. In general, Gall 
concluded, the larger development of the cerebellum in animals and the larger 
development of the anterior parts of the brain in man accounted for the pronounced 
activity of the sexual functions in the former and their moderate amount in the latter.
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From clinical observations, Gall drew the conclusion that lesions of the genitals 
produced lesions of the cerebellum, and vice versa. Finally, Gall, insisting on how easy it 
was to gauge the size of the cerebellum just by palpating the part of the skull above the 
hollow of the neck, argued that anybody could check for oneself the accuracy of his 
claim.
To this, Carpenter replied that 1) the cranioscopic diagnostic of the phrenologists 
fell short of substantiating their cerebral claims, for they were made “upon the cranium, 
rather than upon the brain” (Jd); 2) some of the consequences Gall deduced from his 
association of the cerebellum with sexual functions were contrary to the facts, and 
therefore undermined the general conjecture. For instance, as Carpenter recalled, Gall 
(followed by many phrenologists including Joseph Vimont, which was referred to in a 
footnote) maintained that castration affected the development of the cerebellum, and 
invoked the difference in size allegedly existing between the cerebellum of entire horses 
and geldings27. Unfortunately for phrenologists, Carpenter insisted, “the facts 
ascertained regarding the comparative weight of the Cerebellum in castrated and entire 
horses” (Id) went counter the phrenological assertion, since the French anatomist 
Francois Leuret demonstrated by using quantitative data that, contrary to Gall’s 
hypothesis, geldings had a bigger cerebellum (if compared to the cerebrum) than mares, 
and that even mares had a bigger cerebellum than entire horses28. This proved both that 
the phrenological association between the cerebellum and sexual functions was not 
vindicated by the facts, and that Gall’s empiricist stance came closer to mere rhetoric 
than actual method.
Fourthly, the support from comparative anatomy invoked by Gall for his theses 
was not, in Carpenter’s eye, properly established:
“the difference in the antero-posterior diameter, between the brain o f  Man and that 
o f the lower Mammalia, principally arises from the shortness o f  the posterior lobes in 
the latter, these being seldom long enough to cover the Cerebellum; yet it is in these 
posterior lobes, that the animal propensities are regarded by phrenologists as having 
their seat. On the other hand, the anterior lobes, in which the intellectual faculties 
are considered as residing, bear, in many animals, a much larger proportion to the 
whole bulk o f  the brain, than they do in Man” (Ibid., p. 238).
But all these data, concluded Carpenter, demonstrated that it was not the case, as the 
phrenologists maintained, that the purely instinctive propensities common to man and 
animals were not located in the cerebrum.
Fifthly, Carpenter objected that the evidence drawn from psychopathological 
observation was far from corroborating unambiguously the localisationist thesis. To be
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sure, a considerable number of physicians interested in the aetiology of mental diseases 
welcomed the phrenological correlation of the different types of monomania and their 
associated symptoms with lesions of specific parts of the brain as a progressive 
approach in the study of these affections. However, Carpenter underlined that instances 
of such correlation were not numerous, and that it was seldom possible to find a unique 
anatomical localization for each functional deficit. He contended that, in the case of 
disorders affecting the memory of words, the lesions of the organ of language 
phrenologists predicted were neither constant nor always present. Furthermore, their 
emphasis on the fact that the effects of each local cerebral injury would provoke a loss 
of memory of a particular subject led, according to Carpenter, to an uncontrollable 
inflation in the number of organs:
“this principle, if  carried to its full extent, would require us to regard each organ as 
split up into a large number o f  subdivisions, - the organ o f language, for example, 
having one store-house for Latin, another for Greek, &c.; either o f which may be 
destroyed, without the other being affected” {Ibid., p. 238).
Such a multiplication seemed neither sensible nor reasonable to Carpenter29.
Finally, it was the very method of justification used by the phrenologists that 
Carpenter questioned. For, if they were always keen on boasting of the numerous 
confirmations of their theses, they were comparably more reluctant to mention 
refutations. As Carpenter pointed out, his “own experience of their determinations” led 
him to think that “failure [was] as frequent as success” (Id). And when they did take 
into account these failures, phrenologists generally tried to explain away the 
discrepancies between their conjectures and the empirical data. In other words, rather 
then facing objections, they merely attempted to defuse them. But if they could not be 
proven wrong, certainly they could not be proven right either. Accordingly, Carpenter 
soberly concluded that, as matters stood, phrenological claims had not yet been 
definitively substantiated, and recommended the phrenologists that they made
“themselves first acquainted with what can be established as the general functions 
o f  the Brain, before descending to particulars” (Ibid., p. 239).
Granted he read the book, what Mill could have got out of Carpenter’s Principles of 
Human physiology} The main lesson to be learnt from it was that, even if cerebral 
physiology had established the general dependence of sensory, intellectual, and 
volitional functions on the brain, no finer localizations had been vindicated either for 
the traditional psychological faculties such as memory, judgement, or imagination, or for
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the phrenological dispositions. The phrenological hypothesis of a modular cerebral 
constitution was not in itself implausible, but the evidential support adduced by 
phrenologists was generally inconclusive, if not totally far-fetched (as the quack practice 
of cranioscopy illustrated). In short, the truth of phrenology remained to be 
demonstrated30.
Nearer to the time of his correspondence with Comte, one may finally evoke the 
encounter with Alexander Bain as a possible source for Mill’s knowledge of phrenology. 
For just as Bain had provided him with useful examples drawn from physiology, it may 
have been the case that he contributed to make Mill more familiar with Gall’s doctrine31: 
as Bain recounted in his Autobiography, the Mechanics’ Mutual Instruction Class he 
joined in Aberdeen in May 1835 was not spared the phrenological frenzy, “which was 
now in full force in Edinburgh, through the Combes, and had a small number of 
votaries in Aberdeen” (A. Bain, Autobiography, p. 27)32. Phrenology was indeed a subject 
that Bain’s fellows and himself tackled, especially with respect to the theory’s “great 
rock of offence” (Id.), i.e. its alleged materialism. Bain also pointed out that “Combe’s 
Constitution of Man had great influence at that time” and that, as far as he could 
remember, they “went cordially along with it” {Ibid., p. 28), certainly meaning that they 
endorsed his emphasis on the importance of natural laws for the understanding of a 
wide range of phenomena. Yet, he also took pain to specify that their agreement with 
Combe went along with them “only partially admitting his phrenological tenets” (Id.). 
Perhaps, one may venture that these doubts about phrenology entertained by Bain were 
aired in conversations with Mill, thereby enabling the latter to benefit from the first­
hand expertise of the former. However, for want of textual evidence, this still remains a 
conjecture, even if a somewhat plausible one.
In any case, this foray into the likely sources of Mill’s phrenological knowledge 
enables one to conclude at least two things: Mill was far from being totally ignorant of 
the main tenets of phrenology when he started corresponding with Comte and his 
reluctance to accept phrenological conclusions was certainly influenced by his reading of 
Carpenter, as a minute analysis of his writings indicates33.
1 See Appendix II on Mill’s general knowledge o f  biology. As for phrenology, there is no trace o f Millian 
scholarship on the subject: both Professor Stefan Collini (Oxford) and Dr John Van Whye (Cambridge) 
have confirmed to me in writing that they had no knowledge o f  any existing secondary literature. 
Unfortunately, my own research has corroborated the fact.
2 See II, n. 10 for secondary literature.
3 T. Brown, “Villers, sur une nouvelle theorie du cerveau”, Edinburgh Review 1803, 2, p. 147.
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4 J.G. Spurzheim, The Physiognomical System ofDrs. Gall and Spurzheim;founded on an Anatomical and Physiological 
Examination of the Nervous System in general, and of the Brain in Particular; and indicating the Dispositions and 
Manifestations of the Mind. London: Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1815.
3 Two widely influential anti-phrenological tracts were “The Physiognomical System o f Doctors Gall and 
Spurzheim”, Quarterly Revieiv 1815, pp. 159-78 (perhaps due to the clergyman William Rowe Lyall), and 
John Gordon’s anonymous “The Doctrines o f  Gall and Spurzheim”, Edinburgh Review 1815, 25, pp. 227- 
68. On what is known as the Edinburgh phrenological controversies, see S. Shapin, “Phrenological 
Knowledge and the Social Structure o f Early Nineteenth-Century Edinburgh”, Annals of Science, 1975, 32, 
pp. 219-43; “The Politics o f  Observation: Cerebral Anatomy and Social Interests in the Edinburgh 
Phrenology Disputes”, in R. Wallis, ed., On the Margins of Science: the Social Construction of Rejected Knowledge, 
Sociological Review Monograph, 27. Keele: University o f  Keele, 1979, pp. 139-78; “Homo Phrenologicus: 
Anthropological Perspectives on an Historical Problem”, in B.S. Barnes and S. Shapin, eds., Natural Order: 
Historical Studies of Scientific Culture. Beverly Hills & London: Sage Publications, 1979, pp. 41-71.
6 See R. Cooter, The Cultural Meaning ofpopular science.
7 J. Van Whye, “Was Phrenology a Reform Science? Towards a N ew  Generalization for Phrenology”, 
History of Science 2004, XIII, pp. 313-31.
8 A. McLaren, “Phrenology: Medium and Message”, The Journal of Modern History 1974, 46 ,1 , pp. 86-97.
9 See Appendix II.
10 On Gergonne, see D.J. Struik, “Gergonne, Joseph Diez”, in C. C. Gillispie (ed.), Dictionary of Scientific 
Biography. New York: Scribner, 1981, vol. 5, pp. 367-8.
11 J. S. Mill, Journal and Debating Speeches. Edited by John M. Robson. London & Toronto: University o f  
Toronto Press and Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1988.
12 J. Mill, “Education”, in J. Mill, Essays, London: J. Innes, 1828, pp. 1-46. Alexander Bain, the biographer 
o f the Mills, pointed out this belief in the natural equality o f men as a legacy o f  the father to the son. In 
his biography o f  James Mill, Bain claims that the latter was “the victim o f a theory that grossly 
misrepresents the facts. The power o f education is great, but it does not account for all the differences o f  
character o f men and o f  races” (A. Bain, James Mill. A  Biography. London: Longmans, Green, & Co, 1882, 
p. 249). In his critical account o f  the younger Mill’s life and works, Bain regarded his belief in natural 
equality and his disregard for the physical conditions o f  mental life as his two “greatest theoretical errors 
as a scientific thinker” (A. Bain, John Stuart Mill, p. 146). As to the first, he maintained that John Stuart 
Mill “inherited the mistake from his father, and could neither leam nor unlearn, in regard to it” (Id.). As to 
the second, Bain ventured that he “might have educated himself out o f his error, but he never did” (Ibid., 
p. 147). It was not that Mill “made no allowances for the physical element o f our being”, Bain continued, 
but rather that “he did not allow what every competent physiologist would now affirm to be the facts” 
(Id.). Certainly, Bain thought that a clear appraisal o f the material conditions o f  mental life would have led 
Mill to reject the thesis o f natural equality.
13 ]. S. Nlill describes as follows the central tenets o f his father’s psycholog}’ in the Autobiography, “his 
fundamental doctrine was the formation o f all human character by circumstances, through the universal 
Principle o f  Association, and the consequent unlimited possibility o f  improving the moral and intellectual 
condition o f  mankind by education O f all his doctrines none was more important than this, or needs 
more to be insisted on: unfortunately there is none which is more contradictory to the prevailing 
tendencies o f  speculation, both in his time and since” (J. S. Mill, Autobiography, pp. 109-11).
14 Some prominent Benthamites such as the lawyer Edwin Chadwick and the Unitarian physiologist 
Thomas Southwood Smith (Bentham’s own physician) shared many ideas with George Combe, the main 
popularizer o f phrenology in the British isles, especially with respect to the importance o f  the knowledge 
o f natural laws for the improvement o f social arrangements. See J. Van Whye, Phrenology and the Origins of 
Victorian Scientific Naturalism, p. 188.
15 J. Bentham, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham. The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham. Edited by S. 
Conway. Vol. 10: July 1820 to December 1821. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.
1(1 J. Bentham, The Rational of Judicial Evidence, in J. Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham. Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring. Part X IV , Containing the Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Books IX  <& 
X, with a General Index to the two vols. A nd notes, chiefly illustrative of alterations in the law which have taken place since 
the publication of the first edition. Edinburgh: William Tait, 1840. Both R. Cooter (The Cultural Meaning of 
Popular Science, p. 23) and A. McLaren (“Phrenology: Medium and Message”, p. 89) single out from this 
passage a phrase (“a sick man’s dream”, p. 433) which they both hold to refer to phrenology. However, 
on closer inspection, it rather seems to point toward the irrational legal arrangements o f  English law.
17 Mill’s editing work o f  Bentham’s papers resulted in the first edition o f the latter’s Rationale of Judicial 
Evidence, specially applied to English practice. From the manuscripts. Edited, translated, and with contributions by 
J. S. Mill. Five volumes. London: Hunt & Clarke, 1827. Mill recounts this episode in J. S. Mill, 
Autobiography, pp. 117-9.
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18 See J. S. Mil\, journal and Debating Speeches, p. 433. J. M. Robson surmises that it had to do with Combe’s 
developments about the “Love o f  Approbation” taken from his System of Phrenology. Second edition. 
Edinburgh: John Anderson, 1825, pp. 165-73
19 However, Mill’s mention in the same letter o f the controversy over Raphael’s skull may suggests that he 
was referring to Combe’s Essays on Phrenology (Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, 1819), later published as A  
System of Phrenology. See n. 17supra.
20 J.M. Robson indicates that Mill might have known about the controversy through the account o f it 
given by the Athenaeum, 1833,16, p. 780.
21 See F.J. Gall, Recherches sur lesfonctions du cerveau, V, pp. 177-178.
22 Combe recounted the story as follows: “Dr Scheel o f  Copenhagen had attended a course o f  D r Gall's 
lectures at Vienna, from which city he went to Rome. One day he entered abruptly, when Dr Gall was 
surrounded by his pupils, and, presenting to him the cast o f  a skull, asked his opinion o f  it. Dr Gall 
instandy said, that he ‘had never seen the organ o f Constructiveness so largely developed as in the head in 
question.’ Scheel continued his interrogatories. Dr Gall then pointed out also a large development o f  the 
organs o f Amativeness and Imitation. ‘How do you fmd the organ o f Colouring.' I had not previously 
adverted to it,’ said Gall, ‘for it is only moderately developed.’ Scheel replied, with much satisfaction, ‘that 
it was a cast o f  the skull o f Raphael’ ”. Yet Combe had to acknowledge that the cast had not been made 
on Raphael’s skull. But he thought that such a finding did not diminish Gall’s merit: “The skull from 
which the cast was taken was preserved in the Academy o f  St Luke at Rome, and was universally 
mentioned as being that o f  Raphael; so that Dr Scheel acted in perfect good faith on this occasion. It has 
been since discovered that the skull was not that o f Raphael. Dr Gall merely stated the development 
which he observed in it ; and it remains as striking an example o f  that development as ever. As, however, 
the mental qualities o f  the individual are unknown, it affords no evidence for or against Phrenology, and I 
therefore omit farther mention o f  it in this edition. It is now said to have been the skull o f  Adjutorio, a 
celebrated amateur in the fine arts, who founded St Luke's Academy” (G. Combe, A  System of Phrenolog'. 
Fifth edition. Edinburgh: Maclachlan & Stewart, 1853, Vol. I, p. 330). On this episode, see M. Renneville, 
Ee langage des cranes, p. 145.
23 Miss Pauline Adams, librarian and archivist at Somerville College, very kindly provided me with all 
these details and a typescript o f  the list o f Mill’s book at Somerville College. Some o f  Mill’s books that 
were auctioned in Avignon found their way to the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris, but I have not been able 
to locate those, because French archivists did not seem to have created a Mill collection when the books 
were acquired, and just incorporated them in the main collection. By accident, I stumbled on some o f  
Mill’s books at the Bibliotheque de la Sorbonne in Paris, but there too, no record had been kept o f  what had 
been acquired.
2A See IIIB.
25 W.B. Carpenter, Principles of Human Physiology. I quote from the second edition (1844), which includes no 
change in the passages dealt with here.
26 See Appendix IV.
27 See F.J. Gall, Recherches sur les fonctions du cerveau, III, p. 286. Joseph Vimont held that, even if  there was a 
central portion o f  the cerebellum that was in charge o f  agility and surefootedness, its lateral parts were 
nonetheless the siege o f  sexual instinct. See his Traite dephrenologie humaine et comparee. 2 volumes. Paris : J.- 
B. Bailliere, 1831-1835, vol. II, p. 230-245.
28 For Leuret’s figures, see F. Leuret & P. Gratiolet, Anatomie comparee du systeme nerveux considere dans ses 
rapports avec / ’intelligence. Vol. I, Paris: J.-B. Bailliere & fils, 1839, pp.425-30.
29 In retrospective, Carpenter’s mention o f the organ o f  language might seem ironical, for it has been 
argued that Broca’s localization o f  the seat o f  articulated language in the third frontal convolution o f  the 
left hemisphere was indeed the only genuine anatomical confirmation phrenology ever received. 
However, a more detailed analysis o f  Broca’s claim reveals that it depended on a functional conception o f  
language at odds with that o f  the phrenologists (he argued for the existence o f one articulatory and one 
cognitive element to language), and that the localization he proposed — a unique seat in the left 
hemisphere — went again the phrenological claim o f the necessary symmetry o f all brain organs. On this 
see, G. Lanteri-Laura, Histoire de la phrenologie, Chap. IV; and A. Harrington, Medicine, Mind, and the Double 
Brain. A  Study in Nineteenth-Century Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987, Chap. 2.
30 In 1846, Carpenter would publish an article entitled “Mr Noble on the Brain and its Physiology” in the 
British and Foreign Medical Review (October, 1846, pp. 488-544), which reviewed sharply the phrenology- 
influenced book o f  the physician D . Noble, The Brain and its Physiology; a Critical Disquisition on the Methods of 
Determining the Relations subsisting between the Structure and Functions of the Encephalon (London: J. Churchill, 
1846). Developing greatly what he had said in the Principles of Human Physiology, Bain castigated Noble and 
the phrenologists in general for their ignorance o f  comparative anatomy, their shortcomings about 
nervous physiology, and their reluctance to live by the probative standards common to other scientific 
investigations. Mill wrote to express his agreement: “I should have been truly vexed not to have heard
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immediately o f  such a valuable contribution to science as your paper. I have read it once with great care, 
but I must read it a second time before I can have completely incorporated it with my system o f thought. 
I have long thought that you were the person who would set to rights the pretensions o f present and the 
possibility o f  future phrenology; but I did not venture to hope that I should see, so soon, anything 
approaching in completeness and conclusiveness” quoted in W.B. Carpenter, Nature and Man. Essays 
Scientific and Philosophical. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co, 1888, p. 55).
31 On Bain and phrenology, see R.M. Young, Mind, Brain, and Adaptation, pp. 121-33; and R. Rylance, 
Victorian Psychology and British Culture, 1850-1880, pp. 169-71.
32 A. Bain, Autobiography. Edited by W.L. Davidson. London: Longmans, Green, & Co, 1904. The 
physician Andrew Combe joined his brother George in his phrenological crusade.
33 See IIIC.
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Appendix V I : Mill and the Legacy of Associationism.
What was the kind of psychology Mill endorsed? Let us consider the way he 
introduced the psychological laws he held to enter into the explanation of “moral 
phenomena”. He singled out what he took to be the most general laws of psychology 
established so far: the law that every mental impression has its idea (Hume’s so-called 
“correspondence principle”)1; and three “Laws of Association” which explained the 
bond of union among ideas by three qualities (similarity, frequency, intensity). He 
concluded by referring the reader keen to learn more to
“works professedly psychological, in particular to Mr Mill’s Analysis of the Phenomena 
of the Human Mind, where the laws o f  association, both in themselves and in many o f  
their applications, are copiously exemplified, and with a masterly hand” (J. S. Mill,
SL, VI, IV, 3, pp. 852-3)2.
Now, this final reference was more than a filial tribute. It was also a pledge of 
allegiance to a specific intellectual tradition in the studv of the mind, to which James 
Mill certainly belonged1 but that did not originate with him: namely, association 
psychology4, “the theory which resolves all the phenomena of the mind into ideas of 
sensation connected together by the law of association” (J. S. Mill, “Blakey’s History of 
Moral Science, p. 23)5.
The progress of scholarship in the history of psychology has certainly not 
rendered obsolete Theodule Ribot’s judgement, made in 1870, that John Stuart Mill was 
the direct heir of “an uninterrupted tradition which, through Brown, is united with the 
Scottish School, and by James Mill, is linked to Hartley and Hume” (T. Ribot, Ha 
psychologie anglaise contemporaine, p. 44)6. For some, like E.G. Boring, even if it is the case 
that “Mill never wrote a psychology like that of his English predecessors”, it nonetheless 
remains true that the “nineteenth-century saw the culmination of associationism in 
James Mill and (...) John Stuart Mill” (E.G. Boring, A  History of Experimental Psychology, 
p. 219)7. In this regard, the principal landmarks of J. S. Mill’s contribution to 
psychological theorizing were written during the 1860s8. However, Mill’s architectonic 
concerns with the relations of psychology with the other sciences as to the explanation 
of “moral” phenomena appeared much earlier, and most notably in the System and the 
correspondence with Comte9. Let us summarize briefly what was the nature of Mill’s 
allegiance to associationism.
As he told Comte, Mill believed “in the possibility of a positive psychology” 
conceived as an “analysis of our intellectual and affective faculties” (Mill to Comte, 
December 18, 1841; in Haac [ed.], p. 42). This belief certainly had various sources, but
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it certainly derived primarily from the very peculiar education James Mill dispensed to 
his son John Stuart. As the Autobiography of the latter amply testifies, John Stuart Mill’s 
childhood was conceived by his father as a sort of educational experiment undertaken 
according to associationist principles. The entire education of the young boy rested on 
the empiricist assumption that the human mind gains knowledge only through 
experience and that the character of the child is moulded by the environment and 
therefore determines the future behaviour of the adult.
As John Stuart Mill’s puts it in his description of the central tenets of his father’s 
thought, in psychology, “his fundamental doctrine was the formation of all human 
character by circumstances, through the universal Principle of Association, and the 
consequent unlimited possibility of improving the moral and intellectual condition of 
mankind by education. O f all his doctrines none was more important than this” (J. S. 
Mill, Autobiography, p. 109-110). Accordingly, James Mill managed to subject his son to a 
highly intensive, and somewhat frightening, training, which mostly focused on the 
extensive reading of the classics but was soon extended to the study of mathematics, 
logic, and political economy.
Despite its broad scope, this scheme remained the strict application of 
associationist methods. Consider for instance how John Stuart Mill started learning 
Greek at the age of three: because “in those days Greek and English Lexicons were 
not”, and because the boy “could make no more use of a Greek and Latin Lexicon than 
could be made without having yet begun to learn Latin”, his father forced him to 
memorize “Vocables, being lists of common Greek words, with their signification in 
English, which he wrote out for me on cards” (Ibid., p. 9). Here, one does not have an 
object and a name that are associated — as it is usually the case when children learn to 
speak -, but two words whose meanings are taken to be equivalent by way of repeated 
association: it is nevertheless the proper application of an associationist rule o f learning.
Furthermore, one important assumption of the educational scheme devised for 
his son by James Mill bore directly on the point at issue between John Stuart Mill and 
Auguste Comte, that of the origins of individual differences in character, ability, and 
intelligence. For, on the associationist explanation, “all the marked distinctions of 
human character”, far from being “innate, and in the main indelible” (Ibid., p. 270) could 
be explained by the varieties of circumstances the individuals were subjected to in the 
course of their existence. As D.B. Klein remarks (D.B. Klein, A  History of Scientific 
Psychology, pp. 740-3), that was exacdy the message his father conveyed to John Stuart
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Mill on the eve of his trip to France. Surely, predicted James Mill, the young boy would 
be highly praised for his various intellectual achievements. But he also warned him that 
his somewhat exceptional attainments were not due to any constitutive superiority of 
mind. What differentiated him from others children and the majority of adults was that 
he had the chance of being educated properly:
“whatever I knew more than others, could not be ascribed to any merit in me, but 
to the very unusual advantage which had fallen to my lot, o f  having a father who 
was able to teach me, and willing to give the necessary trouble and time; that it was 
no matter o f  praise to me, if I knew more than those who had not had a similar 
advantage, but the deepest disgrace to me if I did not. I have a distinct 
remembrance, that the suggestion thus for the first time made to me, that I knew 
more than other youths who were considered well educated, was to me a piece o f  
information, to which, as to all other things which my father told me, I gave implicit 
credence, but which did not at all impress me as a personal matter (...); but, now  
when my attention was called to the subject, I felt that what my father had said 
respecting my peculiar advantages was exactly the truth and common sense o f the 
matter, and it fixed my opinion and feeling from that time forward” (J. S. Mill,
.Autobiography, p. 37).
As we have seen, it was indeed Mill’s focus on the role of circumstances and the 
importance of education that distinguished his position in the debate with Comte.
However, Mill not only received a training inspired by associationist principles, 
for he also turned directiy to the very theoretical sources of James Mill’s programme as 
soon as he entered his “last stage of education”111. While discovering Bentham’s thought 
in Dumont’s Traites de legislation civile et penale, the young Mill started reading the main 
works of the associationist tradition in psychology, including Condillac’s Traite des 
sensations, Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding, Helvetius’ De IE  sprit, and 
Hartley’s Observations on Man, a book his father “deemed the really master-production in 
the philosophy of mind” {Ibid., p. 71)n. “The other principal English writers on mental 
philosophy”, Mill added, “I read as I felt inclined, particularly Berkeley, Hume’s Essays, 
Reid, Dugald-Stewart, and Brown on cause and effect” (J.d
In the light of such an account, one better understands how tight may have been 
the hold of the associationist tradition, and, more broadly, of a psychologically oriented 
philosophy, on the mind of John Stuart Mill. O f course, his thought, especially regarding 
psychological issues, was not a mere duplicate of what had been said by his notorious 
forerunners (the distinction between “chemical” and “mechanical” phenomena is a 
good case in point), but Mill nevertheless belonged to that tradition and shared some of 
its most basic assumptions, most notably its empiricism and its theory of ideas. His 
commitment never wavered in the course of his intellectual life: From his 1833 review 
of Blakey’s History of Moral Science, in which he enthusiastically endorsed the “association-
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philosophy as taught by Hartley” (J. S. Mill, “Blakey’s History of Moral Science”, p. 23) 
and by his father’s Analysis, to his psychological writings of the 1860s, he stuck to the 
associationist account of the nature and laws of the human mind as the best theory 
available for the explanation of “moral” phenomena, and most notably of the individual 
differences in mental abilities.
1 See D. Hume, A  Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by D.F. Norton and M.J. Norton. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000, Book 1, Part 1, Sect. 1, p. 8.
2 Another short introduction to the basics o f association psychology can be found in J. S. Mill, SL, III, 
XIII, 6, p. 480-1, where Mill regarded as an illustration o f  “the explanation o f  laws o f  nature”(i.e. the 
reduction o f  uniformities o f successions to laws o f  greater generality and simplicity) the deduction from 
the law that “ideas o f  a pleasurable or painful character form associations more easily and strongly than 
other ideas” o f  “many o f  the more special laws which experience shows to exist among particular mental 
phenomena”{Ibid., p. 481).
4 On association psychology, see R.M. Young, “Association o f  Ideas”, in Philip P. Wiener, ed., Dictionary of 
the History of Ideas. N ew  York: Scribner's, 1968, vol. 1, pp. 111-18; D.B. Klein, A  History of Scientific 
Psychology. Its Origins and Philosophical Background. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970, Chap. 18.
5 J. S. Mill, “Blakey’s History o f  Moral Science”, in J. S. Mill, Esscys on Ethics, Religion, and Society, pp. 19-29.
6 T. Ribot, Eapsychologie anglaise contemporaine. Third edition. Paris: Felix Alcan, 1914.
7 E.G. Boring, A  His toy of Experimental Psychology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950.
8 The most relevant pieces o f  that genre are Mill’s 1859 article on “Bain’s Psychology” (in J. S. Mill, Esscys 
on Philosophy and the Classics, Edited, with a textual introduction by J.M. Robson. Introduction by F.E. 
Sparshott. Toronto & London: University o f Toronto Press & Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, pp. 339- 
73), the Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy published in 1865 (Edited, with a textual 
introduction by J.M. Robson. Introduction by A. Ryan, Toronto & London: University o f Toronto Press 
& Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), and the second edition o f his father’s Analysis in 1869 (London: 
Longmans, Green, and Dyer, 1869).
9 On the different aspects o f Mill’s contribution to psychology, see D.B. Klein, A  Histoy of Scientific 
Psychology, Chap. 20: “The Millean Background”, especially, pp. 721-57.
t0 This is the title John Stuart Mill gave to the third chapter o f  the Autobiography.
11 The latter seems to have made a lasting impression on John Stuart Mill’s intellectual development: 
“Hartley’s explanation, incomplete as in many points it is, o f the more complex mental phenomena by the 
law o f association, commended itself to me at once as a real analysis, and made me feel by contrast the 
insufficiency o f  the merely verbal generalizations o f  Condillac, and even o f the instructing gropings and 
feelings about for psychological explanations, o f Locke” (J. S. Mill, Autobiography, p. 71). This interest was 
furthered by the creation o f  the so-called Utilitarian Society, within which Mill and his associates 
“launched into analytic psychology, and having chosen Hartley for [their] text-book, [they] raised 
Priestley’s edition [Joseph Priestley published an abridgment o f  Hartley’s Observations under the title 
Hartley’s Theoy of the Human Mind in 1775] to an extravagant price by searching through London to furnish 
each o f  [them] with a copy” {Ibid., p. 215-7).
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